Nos Estados republicanos modernos, o sistema de freios e contrapesos é um dos modelos institucionais responsável por assegurar o equilíbrio entre os Poderes e prevenir abusos por parte dos governantes. Dois questionamentos podem ser encontrados na literatura brasileira sobre o tema e fundamentam esta Dissertação: um geral sobre o suposto poder excessivo que o nosso sistema político confere ao Poder Executivo e outro, específico, de que nesse contexto, o veto teria um papel central na supremacia do presidente da república sobre o Congresso Nacional no âmbito do processo legislativo. Partindo dessas premissas, a pesquisa avalia se essas características estão condizentes com as expectativas e o desenho institucional proposto para o Estado brasileiro pela Assembleia Nacional Constituinte ANC de 1987. Com base nos anais da ANC e em referências históricas, conclui-se que, ao menos no tocante ao instituto do veto presidencial, o modelo de preponderância do Poder Executivo observado no processo legislativo decorreu de uma opção deliberada e reafirmada pela elite política em 1988, quando da promulgação da Constituição. / In modern republican states, the system of checks and balances is one of the institutional models responsible for ensuring the balance between powers and preventing abuses by rulers. Two issues can be found in the Brazilian academic literature on the matter that underlie this Dissertation: one concerning the alleged excessive power that our political system grant to the executive branch, and another one more specific that, in this context, the veto would have a main role in the supremacy of the President of the Republic over Congress in the legislative process. Beginning with these assumptions, this research evaluates whether these characteristics are consistent with the expectations and the institutional design proposed for the Brazilian State by the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) of 1987. Based on the ANC records and historical references, it concluded that, at least in regard to the presidential veto institute, the preponderance of the executive branch model observed in the legislative process derived from a deliberate and reaffirmed choice made by the political elite in 1988, at the promulgation of the Constitution.

Nos Estados republicanos modernos, o sistema de freios e contrapesos é um dos modelos institucionais responsável por assegurar o equilíbrio entre os Poderes e prevenir abusos por parte dos governantes. Dois questionamentos podem ser encontrados na literatura brasileira sobre o tema e fundamentam esta Dissertação: um geral sobre o suposto poder excessivo que o nosso sistema político confere ao Poder Executivo e outro, específico, de que nesse contexto, o veto teria um papel central na supremacia do presidente da república sobre o Congresso Nacional no âmbito do processo legislativo. Partindo dessas premissas, a pesquisa avalia se essas características estão condizentes com as expectativas e o desenho institucional proposto para o Estado brasileiro pela Assembleia Nacional Constituinte ANC de 1987. Com base nos anais da ANC e em referências históricas, conclui-se que, ao menos no tocante ao instituto do veto presidencial, o modelo de preponderância do Poder Executivo observado no processo legislativo decorreu de uma opção deliberada e reafirmada pela elite política em 1988, quando da promulgação da Constituição. / In modern republican states, the system of checks and balances is one of the institutional models responsible for ensuring the balance between powers and preventing abuses by rulers. Two issues can be found in the Brazilian academic literature on the matter that underlie this Dissertation: one concerning the alleged excessive power that our political system grant to the executive branch, and another one more specific that, in this context, the veto would have a main role in the supremacy of the President of the Republic over Congress in the legislative process. Beginning with these assumptions, this research evaluates whether these characteristics are consistent with the expectations and the institutional design proposed for the Brazilian State by the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) of 1987. Based on the ANC records and historical references, it concluded that, at least in regard to the presidential veto institute, the preponderance of the executive branch model observed in the legislative process derived from a deliberate and reaffirmed choice made by the political elite in 1988, at the promulgation of the Constitution.

Why do some member states infringe EU law more than others? Based on the quantitative and qualitative analysis reported here, is not because of administrative capacity limitations, but because of political context, policy changes and deliberate opposition by member governments in order to maintain their independence. States in turn, are motivated by domestic politics to seek to avoid implementing EU law. Additionally, I find that richer countries violate the law more often than poorer countries. Further, member states infringe more than others because of a high number of institutional and coalitional veto players. These results suggest that member states are in the EU because the EU serves their national interest over collective ones. Finally, these results suggest new hypothesis. Member states that have a high level of public discontent with the EU are unlikely to tolerate the political costs of implementing EU legislation.

This thesis considers how the international response to egregious crimes can be made more consistent and effective. It focuses in particular on the Security Council as the authorising mechanism for intervention and comprehensively evaluates the proposals for its reform. It shows that contrary to several existing proposals, reform to the Security Council would not improve its authorisation of international action to address atrocity crimes. Similarly, the thesis considers proposals that seek to circumvent the authority of the Security Council but rejects their capacity to bring about a more consistent humanitarian regime. Finally, it robustly considers and argues for the use of regional organisations as alternative authorising mechanisms during mass atrocities.

Taiwan area has administered local autonomy for over fifty years. At first its authority was mainly based on an administrative order called the Guidelines for Local Autonomy and then the Local System Law at present. Among the powers vested by the law, veto is an important weapon for the local administration to balance legislative power. However, the veto power has yet to be further elaborated for it was used in just a little more than 500 cases all over Taiwan area in the past sixty years. This essay tries to probe both the theoretical and practical facets of the veto system. The local system of this country adopted an administration and legislature separation system. In case a conflict should occur between the two powers, its time for veto to help solve the dilemma. As a matter of fact, government is responsible for proposing important bills, the officials can defend its policies while attending the legislature for interpellation or proposal deliberation. In addition, budgets are only proposed by local administrations. Local legislatures are restrained from increasing the sizes of the proposed budgets by law. So while deliberating on draft resolutions, the legislature would consider officials¡¦ opinions and not to make less feasible resolutions. Despite an unfeasible resolution should be made, the administration would rather seek other ways out than veto it in order to maintain the harmony between the two powers. More over, the content of the Local System Law has put more weight on administration power so as to make the legislature conservative in enforcing its power lest its resolutions should be vetoed. In recent years, democracy has enrooted into the daily lives of the society; Local political environment change drastically and divided government is now a commonplace; Local cliques have either reformed or vanished; Gangsters and money politics enter local legislatures and struggle for personal interests. The administrations are facing an overwhelmingly new eco system in local legislatures. Comparing the factors that induce a veto, it is found that the conflict for personal interest is the most common cause. The veto system is a mechanism of instrument equilibrium. Administration and legislation should stand on an equal position to discuss veto dispute to reach the purposes of the separation of powers between the executive and legislature. This essay suggests the central government that the time limit, quorum, scope and method in deliberating a veto should be explicitly defined in law so as to make sure a healthier veto system.

Sverige har sedan år 2009 det nationella målet att producera 30 TWh vindkraftsenergi, varav 20 TWh ska komma från landbaserad vindkraft. Detta är ett viktigt delmål för att bli ett mindre fossilberoende samhälle och för att minska koldioxidutsläpp och luftföroreningar. För att nå det nationella målet om 30 TWh utgör vindkraft en viktig förnybar energikälla. Åre kommun och Bergs kommun i Jämtlands län har båda upprättat ett vindkraftstillägg till sina översiktsplaner där de har pekat ut områden möjliga för storskalig vindkraftsetablering, detta för att underlätta för exploatörer att veta på vilka platser kommunen stödjer en utredning för vindkraftsetablering. En vindkraftspark kan sedan augusti år 2009 endast få tillstånd om kommunfullmäktige i kommunen där parken planeras att etableras i tillstyrker parken. Kommunen kan alltså med ett veto stoppa ett vindkraftsprojekt, utan motivering. Således har kommunpolitiker stor inverkan på ett vindkraftsprojekts utfall. För att veta vad som har lett till tre olika vindkraftsparkers utfall har kommunens vindkraftstillägg till översiktsplanen, kommunikationen mellan exploatören och allmänheten, medias inverkan samt den kommunala vetorätten undersökts. Två av de tre studerade vindparksplanerna har fått avslag från kommunfullmäktige. Den tredje fick tillstånd 2011. Representanter från kommunernas kommunfullmäktige har intervjuats, samt representanter från varje vindbolag. Resultaten från denna studie visar att kommunens vindkraftstillägg spelar mindre roll i både val av etableringsplats och i kommunfullmäktiges val att använda det kommunala vetot. Kommunikationen mellan exploatören och allmänheten är viktig för att få lokalt stöd och genom detta få kommunal tillstyrkan. Det är svårt att dra en slutsats om hur stor inverkan media haft på vindkraftsetableringarna. Den kommunala vetorätten har haft stor inverkan på vindkraftsetableringarna och har använts för att få ut någon slags vinst av etableringarna, antingen politisk eller ekonomisk. Framtida forskning behövs kring allmänhetens och närboendes syn på vindkraftsetableringar. / Since 2009, Sweden has the national objective to produce 30 TWh wind energy, where 20 TWh should originate from land based wind turbines. This is an important sub target to become fossil fuel independent community and to reduce the carbon dioxide emmissions and air pollution. To reach the national objective of 30 TWh, wind power is an important renewable energy alternative. The municipalities of Åre and Berg in Jämtland county, Sweden, have both established a wind power supplement to their municipality layout plan, where they point out locations suitable for large scale windfarm establishments, to facilitate for the exploiter where the municipality support wind power establishments. Since august 2009, the representative assembly of the municipality must grant the establishment permission for the wind park. Hence, the municipality can stop an establishment with a veto without motivation. Thus, the representative assembly of the municipality has a large impact on the outcome of a windfarm establishment.  To understand the outcome of three wind farm establishments, the municipality layout plan, the communication between the exploiter and the general public, the impact of media and the municipality veto were studied. Two of three studied wind farm projects were dismissed by the representative municipality assembly. The third project was granted in 2011. Representatives from the assembly of municipality and from the wind farm exploiter firms were intervjued. The results from this study shows that the municipality layout plan has little impact both on the exploiters choise of location for the wind farm and on the assemblies choise to use the veto. The communication between the exploiter and the general public is important for local support and through this, a grant from the assembly. It is difficult to draw any conclution from the impact of the media from the limited data in this study. The municipality veto has a large impact on the outcome of the windfarms establishments and has been used to profit from the establishments, either political or economical. Future studies should be directed towards a survey amongst the general and local public.

Este trabalho analisa o instituto do veto presidencial no Brasil, comparando os períodos de 1946-1964 e 1990-2000. Cria um modelo de jogo do veto para o Brasil, empregando a Teoria da Escolha Racional e a Teoria dos Jogos. Basicamente, o desafio é superar o paradoxo apresentado pela literatura de que o veto não é previsto mas acontece. Examina os efeitos da alteração, entre um período e outro, do quorum de derrubada do veto sobre o confronto Executivo - Legislativo e suas implicações para o presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro. Os resultados alcançados foram os seguintes: 1) nosso modelo do jogo do veto supera o paradoxo ao admitir a existência dos jogos ocultos que acompanham o veto e o processo legislativo: polarização política, conexão eleitoral, disputa entre poderes; 2) além disso, demonstramos que a prática do apoio mútuo no Legislativo permite a ocorrência do veto e de sua manutenção; 3) o quorum de derrubada do veto, e sua alteração, é importante na formação das coalizões de governo, mais especificamente, das maiorias; 4) variável igualmente importante é a disciplina partidária, que garante a eficácia das maiorias formadas. / This work analyzes the presidential veto in Brazil, comparing the periods of 1946- 1964 and 1990-2000. It creates a model of veto game for Brazil, using the Rational-Choice Theory and the Game Theory. Basically the challenge is to overcome the paradox presented by the literature, that the veto is not foreseen but it happens. We examine the effects of the alteration, between a period and other, of the override veto quorum on the Executive- Legistative confrontation and its implications for the Brazilian coalition presidentialism. The reached results were the following ones: 1) our model of the veto game overcomes the paradox when admits the existence of the nested games that accompany the veto and the legislative process: political polarization, electoral connection, dispute among powers; 2) besides, we demonstrated that the practice of the mutual support in the Legislative allows the veto to occurs and its maintenance; 3) the override veto quorum, and its alteration, is important to the formation of government's coalitions, more specifically, of the majority; 4) variable equally important is the party discipline, that guarantees the effectiveness of the majority.

Este trabalho analisa o instituto do veto presidencial no Brasil, comparando os períodos de 1946-1964 e 1990-2000. Cria um modelo de jogo do veto para o Brasil, empregando a Teoria da Escolha Racional e a Teoria dos Jogos. Basicamente, o desafio é superar o paradoxo apresentado pela literatura de que o veto não é previsto mas acontece. Examina os efeitos da alteração, entre um período e outro, do quorum de derrubada do veto sobre o confronto Executivo - Legislativo e suas implicações para o presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro. Os resultados alcançados foram os seguintes: 1) nosso modelo do jogo do veto supera o paradoxo ao admitir a existência dos jogos ocultos que acompanham o veto e o processo legislativo: polarização política, conexão eleitoral, disputa entre poderes; 2) além disso, demonstramos que a prática do apoio mútuo no Legislativo permite a ocorrência do veto e de sua manutenção; 3) o quorum de derrubada do veto, e sua alteração, é importante na formação das coalizões de governo, mais especificamente, das maiorias; 4) variável igualmente importante é a disciplina partidária, que garante a eficácia das maiorias formadas. / This work analyzes the presidential veto in Brazil, comparing the periods of 1946- 1964 and 1990-2000. It creates a model of veto game for Brazil, using the Rational-Choice Theory and the Game Theory. Basically the challenge is to overcome the paradox presented by the literature, that the veto is not foreseen but it happens. We examine the effects of the alteration, between a period and other, of the override veto quorum on the Executive- Legistative confrontation and its implications for the Brazilian coalition presidentialism. The reached results were the following ones: 1) our model of the veto game overcomes the paradox when admits the existence of the nested games that accompany the veto and the legislative process: political polarization, electoral connection, dispute among powers; 2) besides, we demonstrated that the practice of the mutual support in the Legislative allows the veto to occurs and its maintenance; 3) the override veto quorum, and its alteration, is important to the formation of government's coalitions, more specifically, of the majority; 4) variable equally important is the party discipline, that guarantees the effectiveness of the majority.

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Resumo: O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar as decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal ante o prisma do processo legislativo estadual e conferir se o mesmo é ou não um ator com poder de veto no conceito de George Tsebelis, para então, verificar algumas hipóteses colacionadas a respeito da influencia do governador frente as decisões da Assembleia Legislativa. Desta forma, as respostas buscadas são para responderem se o STF veta igualmente ou diferentemente as decisões federais e estaduais, se os legitimados para propositura de ações de controle concentrado podem ser absorvidos, restringidos, e, se o número de legitimados na introdução da judicialização aumenta a estabilidade decisória e reduz o poder de agenda (do governador/coalizão) e a capacidade decisória de coalizões majoritárias (maioria governista) no processo decisório estadual. Para tanto, o método utilizado é tanto o qualitativo, como o quantitativo, e revelaram que o STF tem sido um ator presente nas decisões estaduais, alterando-as e tem sido buscado, especialmente pelo governador, face a assembleia legislativa quando alguma lei estadual lhe desfavorece ou não é competência constitucional da assembleia em legislá-la. O que se pecebe é uma restrição ao processo legislativo estadual, desde as competências previstas, até a legislação que propõe, sendo o STF um importante ator nestas decisões. Os resultados ainda indicam que os legitimados não são restringidos, não há como ter este controle, ainda que com uma coalizão forte estadual, aumentando, portanto, a estabilidade decisória.