In recent years the normativity of thought and meaning has been the subject of an extensive debate. What is at issue is whether intentionality has normative features, and if so, whether that constitutes a problem for naturalistic attempts to account for intentional phenomena. The origin of the debate is Saul Kripke’s interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke claimed, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that dispositional accounts of linguistic meaning - accounts, i.e., which attempt to reduce semantic phenomena to facts about how speakers are disposed to employ words - fail to ground the factuality of semantic statements. From this, and other arguments, the far reaching conclusion was drawn by Kripke’s Wittgenstein that there are no semantic facts, that every application of a word is “a leap in the dark”. This position has become known as meaning scepticism. In the present essay, it will be argued that meaning scepticism is incoherent, but that the normativity argument is interesting in its own right. The development of the debate will be traced, primarily through detailed consideration of the writings of Paul Boghossian, who has shifted the focus from the normativity of linguistic meaning to that of belief. It will be contended that even though Boghossian’s attempt to locate a normativity of belief fails, there is a related form of normativity that has to do with the intrinsic badness of false beliefs. Also, suggestions made by Kripke regarding the normativity of intentions will be investigated, and related to contemporary arguments in the philosophy of rationality. The tentative conclusion is that there are some interesting kinds of normativity associated with the intentional, but of a somewhat different variety than those usually discussed.

Le but de ce mémoire est d’effectuer une analyse détaillée de ce chapitre de la Critique de la raison pure de Kant à partir de l’idée qu’il présente les « résultats » de la démarche critique menée jusque-là concernant les limites de la connaissance. Le mémoire sera divisé en deux parties. Dans la première partie, nous montrerons que ce chapitre dresse un bilan provisoire et que pour cette raison il soulève deux enjeux : 1 – montrer que les concepts purs de l'entendement – en dépit de leur caractère a priori et de leur origine dans l'entendement pur – ne sont susceptibles d'un usage objectif qu'appliqués aux données de la sensibilité (A 246/B 303 : « L'Analytique transcendantale a donc cet important résultat... ») ; 2 – montrer que, à son tour, la sensibilité est elle-même limitée par l'entendement et qu'elle ne renferme pas la totalité des objets possibles (A 251 : « Tel a été le résultat de toute l'Esthétique transcendantale... »). Dans la seconde partie, nous analyserons les différences entre les deux éditions de la Critique de la raison pure concernant ce chapitre en insistant tout particulièrement sur la distinction faite dans la deuxième édition entre noumène au sens positif et noumène au sens négatif. / The purpose of this master thesis is to perform a detailed analysis of this chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason from the idea that it summaries the “results” of the critical approach did so far concerning the limits of the knowledge. The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part, we show that this chapter provides preliminary assessment and that is why raises two issues: 1. Show that the pure concepts of the understanding – despite of their a priori character and their origin in the pure understanding – are likely to use objective data only applied to the sensitivity (A 246/B 303: “The transcendental analytic has this important result…”) 2. Show that the sensitivity itself is limited by the understanding and it does not contain all possible objects (A 251: “This was the result of all the Transcendental Aesthetic…”). In the second part, we will analyze the differences between the two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason regarding this chapter with particular emphasis on the distinction made in the second edition between noumenon in the positive and negative sense.

This is the first book-length philosophical study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Freud’s theory of the unconscious. The book investigates the possibility for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to clarify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with a focus on the theory of repression as its centre. Repression is the unconscious activity of pushing something away from consciousness, while making sure that it remains active as something foreign within us. How this is possible is the main problem addressed in the work. Unlike previous literature (including Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) this book makes full use of the resources of genetic phenomenology and passivity in the attempt to clarify the Freudian unconscious. The central argument developed is that the structure of the lebendige Gegenwart as the core of Husserl’s theory of passivity consists of preliminary forms of bodily kinaesthesia, feelings and drives in a constantly ongoing process where repression occurs as a necessary part of all constitution. The clarification of Freudian repression thus takes place by showing how it presupposes a broad conception of consciousness such as that presented by Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. By arguing that “repression” is central to any philosophical account of subjectivity, this book takes on the most distinct challenge to philosophy posed by Freud.

<p>Denna uppsats undersöker den kvantitativa och den kvalitativa forskningsmetoden ur ett kunskapsteoretiskt och ett vetenskapsteoretiskt perspektiv. I fråga om kvalitativ forskning har metoderna hermeneutik och fenomenologi studerats särskilt grundligt. Uppsatsen argumenterar för att kunskapsteoretiska och vetenskapsteoretiska antaganden måste vara gemensamma för de båda typerna av metod, om man anser att båda typerna ska betraktas som vetenskapliga. Vidare hävdas att de kvalitativa metoderna är sammankopplade med en rad problem beträffande objektivitet, generaliserbarhet, rättfärdigande av kunskap och teoriers empiriska stöd. I många fall utger sig dessa metoder för att leva upp till de krav man ställer på vetenskaplig forskning i dessa avseenden i lika hög grad som kvantitativ metod, men en av uppsatsens teser är att de misslyckas med detta. I uppsatsen hävdas att vetenskapens mål är att generera generaliserbar kunskap. På grund av de kunskapsteoretiska problem kvalitativ forskning stöter på, kan sådan forskning inte ensam nå detta mål och således inte ha någon självständig plats i vetenskapen, utan kan endast tjäna ett förvetenskapligt syfte, genom att, i vissa fall, formulera frågor och hypoteser som sedan besvaras respektive testas av kvantitativ forskning.</p> / <p>This paper examines the quantitative and the qualitative research methods with respect to both epistemology and the philosophy of science. With regards to qualitative research, the paper takes a closer look at the hermeneutic and the phenomenological methods in particular. The paper argues that the different types of method must have the same epistemological assumptions, if it is held that both types ought to be considered scientific. It is further claimed that the qualitative methods are connected to several problems concerning objectivity, generalizability, the justification of knowledge and the empirical support of theories. In many cases, these methods purport to live up to the requirements that are made on scientific research in these respects to the same degree as the quantitative method, but one of the theses of this paper is that they fail to do this. In the paper, it is maintained that the goal of science is to generate generalizable knowledge. Due to the epistemological problems qualitative research are faced with, such research cannot reach that goal alone and thus cannot hold an independent position in science, but can only serve a prescientific purpose, by, in some cases, drawing up questions and hypotheses which are then answered and tested respectively, by quantitative research.</p>

The extensions of vague predicates like ‘is bald’, ‘is tall’, and ‘is a heap’ apparently lack sharp boundaries, and this makes such predicates susceptible to soritical reasoning, i.e. reasoning that leads to some version of the notorious sorites paradox. This essay is concerned with a certain kind of theory of vagueness, according to which the symptoms and puzzles of vagueness should be accounted for in terms of a particular species of context sensitivity exhibited by vague expressions. The basic idea is that the extensions of vague predicates vary with certain contextual factors, and that this fact can explain why they appear to lack sharp boundaries. This kind of view is referred to as contextualism about vagueness. A detailed characterisation of contextualism about vagueness is given in chapter two and three. In chapter two, a generic version of contextualism about vagueness is developed, and some alternative forms of context sensitivity are introduced. In chapter three, the specific contextual factors appealed to by different contextualists are discussed. In chapter four, different contextualist diagnoses of the sorites paradox are considered, and found to be problematic in various ways. It is argued that contrary to what some of its proponents have claimed, contextualism about vagueness is not superior to other comparable theories of vagueness when it comes to explaining the appeal of soritical reasoning. In chapter five, a certain version of the sorites paradox, known as the forced march sorites, is discussed. It is argued that “data” about how speakers would behave in the forced march cannot lend any firm support to contextualism about vagueness. In chapter six, some problems concerning the instability of the contextual factors are considered. One problem is that contextualist diagnoses of the sorites which locate a fallacy of equivocation in the reasoning seem to render non-soritical reasoning fallacious as well. A model for treating this problem is suggested, but on closer consideration, it turns out to be problematic. Moreover, this model is of no help in solving the more general problem that even if classical logic remains valid for vague language on some contextualist views, the instability of the extensions of vague predicates makes it difficult to know when a certain piece of reasoning instantiates a valid argument form. Other difficulties arise with respect to speech reports and belief contents. Chapter seven concludes with a summary and some methodological remarks.

Though generally recognized as a formative force in his philosophy, Thomas Reid’s Newtonianism and his philosophy of science has not received due attention among scholars. My aim is to inaugurate a detailed survey. In ch. 1 it is shown that Reid demarcates physics as against metaphysics and theology, making his brand of Newtonianism different from first generation moral and religious Newtonianism. In ch. 2 it is argued that "Newtonian" is not an apt label on Reid’s call for a Science of the human mind. Neither his practice within the field, nor his methodological views, make lawlike connections the central kind of truth to be discovered. Ch. 3 is devoted to Reid’s account of the 1st and 2nd of Newton’s Regulae Philosophandi, and an ensuing notion of explanation which approaches the deductive-nomological model. It is shown that Reid’s account is very much his own, though presented as an explication of Newton’s intentions. Reid’s dismissive view towards simplicity as a guide in scientific reasoning leans on Bacon’s theory of idols and Reid’s theory of first principles of common sense. Ch 4 concerns hypotheses in connection with Newton’s phrase Hypotheses non fingo. It is argued that Reid does not mind speculation about unobservable or theoretical entities, and that his objections to particular ether theories are scientific rather than principled. Nonetheless, since Reid does not explain the difference between powerful conjecture and established truth, his notion of scientific reasoning remains elusive. Ch 5 concerns Reid’s views on the concept and ontology of forces of attraction. It is argued that Reid takes forces to be physical entities open for empirical enquiry, and that forces are neither active, nor efficient. Finally, Reid’s view of metaphysics is considered, and further differences with early Newtonians emphasised.

Denna uppsats undersöker den kvantitativa och den kvalitativa forskningsmetoden ur ett kunskapsteoretiskt och ett vetenskapsteoretiskt perspektiv. I fråga om kvalitativ forskning har metoderna hermeneutik och fenomenologi studerats särskilt grundligt. Uppsatsen argumenterar för att kunskapsteoretiska och vetenskapsteoretiska antaganden måste vara gemensamma för de båda typerna av metod, om man anser att båda typerna ska betraktas som vetenskapliga. Vidare hävdas att de kvalitativa metoderna är sammankopplade med en rad problem beträffande objektivitet, generaliserbarhet, rättfärdigande av kunskap och teoriers empiriska stöd. I många fall utger sig dessa metoder för att leva upp till de krav man ställer på vetenskaplig forskning i dessa avseenden i lika hög grad som kvantitativ metod, men en av uppsatsens teser är att de misslyckas med detta. I uppsatsen hävdas att vetenskapens mål är att generera generaliserbar kunskap. På grund av de kunskapsteoretiska problem kvalitativ forskning stöter på, kan sådan forskning inte ensam nå detta mål och således inte ha någon självständig plats i vetenskapen, utan kan endast tjäna ett förvetenskapligt syfte, genom att, i vissa fall, formulera frågor och hypoteser som sedan besvaras respektive testas av kvantitativ forskning. / This paper examines the quantitative and the qualitative research methods with respect to both epistemology and the philosophy of science. With regards to qualitative research, the paper takes a closer look at the hermeneutic and the phenomenological methods in particular. The paper argues that the different types of method must have the same epistemological assumptions, if it is held that both types ought to be considered scientific. It is further claimed that the qualitative methods are connected to several problems concerning objectivity, generalizability, the justification of knowledge and the empirical support of theories. In many cases, these methods purport to live up to the requirements that are made on scientific research in these respects to the same degree as the quantitative method, but one of the theses of this paper is that they fail to do this. In the paper, it is maintained that the goal of science is to generate generalizable knowledge. Due to the epistemological problems qualitative research are faced with, such research cannot reach that goal alone and thus cannot hold an independent position in science, but can only serve a prescientific purpose, by, in some cases, drawing up questions and hypotheses which are then answered and tested respectively, by quantitative research.

The topic of this study is to what extent standards of rational inquiry can be rationally criticized and revised. It is argued that it is rational to treat all such standards as open to criticism and revision. Arguments to the effect that we are fallible with regard to all standards of rational inquiry are presented. Standards cannot be ultimately justified and with certainty established either as adequate or as inescapable presuppositions. Apel's attempt to give ultimate justifications of certain moral and logical rules is examined and criticized. Special attention is given to our fallibility with regard to logical inference rules. The idea that certain logical rules cannot be put into question because any critical argument presupposes them is criticized. It has been claimed that there must be some basic standards which are such that they cannot be rationally evaluated and hence are rationally unrevisable. This is called "the unrevisability thesis". Related to this thesis is the normative policy according to which rationality requires that some standards be treated as unrevisable, the unrevisability policy. Two arguments that have been used to defend the unrevisability thesis and policy are examined and criticized. The conclusion is that we are not forced to accept either the thesis or the policy. The negation of the unrevisability policy is the revisability policy, according to which it is rational to treat all standards as open to rational criticism and revision. Objections that have been directed against the revisability policy are discussed and criticized. According to the objections, the revisability policy leads to rationality relativism. These objections are refuted, and it is argued that it is, on the contrary, rational to adopt the revisability policy and treat all standards of rational inquiry as criticizable and revisable. It is proposed that the rational change of standards should be viewed as a bootstrap process. General features of a bootstrap view of rational change of standards are presented, and it is argued that it is impossible to formulate a real theory of bootstrapping. Two models of standard change are presented and discussed: Laudan's reticulated model of scientific rationality and Briskman's bootstrap theory. It is claimed that in spite of defects and limitations, these models contribute to a richer understanding of bootstrapping. The fallibility and revisability of standards of rational inquiry have consequences for how the normativity of rationality should be understood. The book ends with an account of how the rationality of cognitive actions is related to the idea of the adequacy of standards. A distinction between absolute and standard-relative rationality is made, and it is argued that what an inquiring agent rationally ought to do coincides with what it is standard-relatively rational for him to do. It is shown that this view of rationality of inquiry is nevertheless inconsistent with rationality relativism, and that it is compatible with an objectivistic view of rationality. / digitalisering@umu

This is the first book-length philosophical study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Freud’s theory of the unconscious. The book investigates the possibility for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to clarify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with a focus on the theory of repression as its centre. Repression is the unconscious activity of pushing something away from consciousness, while making sure that it remains active as something foreign within us. How this is possible is the main problem addressed in the work. Unlike previous literature (including Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) this book makes full use of the resources of genetic phenomenology and passivity in the attempt to clarify the Freudian unconscious. The central argument developed is that the structure of the lebendige Gegenwart as the core of Husserl’s theory of passivity consists of preliminary forms of bodily kinaesthesia, feelings and drives in a constantly ongoing process where repression occurs as a necessary part of all constitution. The clarification of Freudian repression thus takes place by showing how it presupposes a broad conception of consciousness such as that presented by Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. By arguing that “repression” is central to any philosophical account of subjectivity, this book takes on the most distinct challenge to philosophy posed by Freud.

Some form of absolutism has generally been the majority view within philosophy and in other traditions, and it is common to take absolutism for granted without providing rational arguments or empirical evidence in support of it. However, such attitudes are not viable if we want to avoid dogmatism. In this paper, I question absolutism and the closely associated correspondence theory of truth through the writings of Goodman and Nāgārjuna. I first describe Goodman‟s philosophy with a focus on his works dealing with „worldmaking‟ and multiple true versions. Subsequently follows an outline of Nāgārjuna‟s philosophy, in which he intended to show that the notion of an essence, an inherently existent entity or relation, is incoherent and that essences would be incompatible with experience. I then reflect on the relation between absolutism and relativism, and propose that the philosophies of Goodman and Nāgārjuna make it possible to transcend both. The paper ends with a discussion on the notion of knowledge in the absence of absolute entities and essences. From the works of Goodman, Nāgārjuna, and Bohm, I put forward the idea that an aspiration for a greater good and fitting is more general than a desire for knowledge of entities, and that it is therefore important to be aware of the larger context in which any given entity appears so that it can be seen to what extent further inquiry and use of it can lead to a greater good and fitting.