This is a qualitative essay that deals with students' experience of primary school sex andrelationship education. The purpose was to gain new knowledge into how students in theirfirst year of high school experienced primary school sex education about sexuality, consentand relationships in terms of both its form and content, with a hope to contribute knowledgethat may be relevant to the school's actors who from 2022 will implement new curriculumchanges. The subjects we have chosen are students who are in their first year of uppersecondary school and have a relatively recent and clear picture of the teaching they receivedfrom primary school. To collect our data, we used a qualitative method of focus groupinterviews that were recorded and transcribed. The data has been analyzed with the help ofPeter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s socialization theory and Judith Butler's queertheory, as well as five articles with previous research. The results of our study reveal, asdescribed in background and previous research, a failure to provide an education that isadapted to today's societies problems and youth culture. Specifically there is a lack ofconversation and up-to-date knoledge about LGBTQ identities, the course literature'spresentation of heteronormativity and the teacher's need for competence development andinterpretation of the curriculum's content in this subject. There was also a lack of deeperdiscussions regarding relationships, feelings, consent and desire, and a greater participationand engagement in the teaching was desired.

La presente tesis doctoral aborda los usos de se, su tratamiento en los diccionarios románicos actuales y su representación en un diccionario de aprendizaje de español como lengua extranjera. Su objetivo principal es proponer un modelo de representación para verbos que muestren estos usos. Para ello, se atenderán los siguientes aspectos:  El estado de la cuestión tanto en los estudios de gramática (capítulo 2) como en los lexicográficos (capítulo 3).  La representación de los usos pronominales en los diccionarios románicos actuales, en concreto los de aprendizaje de segunda lengua (capítulo 4).  El análisis sistemático de los usos de se en el corpus, enfocado desde la perspectiva de la Theory of Norms and Exploitations y el Corpus Pattern Analysis de Hanks (2004) (capítulos 5 y 6).  La elaboración de un modelo de entrada lexicográfica verbal que contenga usos con se para un diccionario de ELE (capítulo 7). Los resultados de la tesis son principalmente la elaboración de una base de datos sobre verbos con usos pronominales (capítulo 6, SCPA) y de un prototipo de 20 entradas lexicográficas de los mismos verbos analizados con CPA (capítulo 7). / The present Ph.D. thesis studied the uses of the Spanish particle se, its treatment by current romance dictionaries and its representation in a dictionary for learners of Spanish as a foreign language. The main objective is to propose a model for the representation of the verbs that present the use of se. For this, the following aspects will be analysed:  The review of related work in grammar studies (chapter 2) as well as lexicography (chapter 3).  The representation of pronominal uses in the current romance dictionaries, particularly in those for learners of Spanish as a second language (chapter 4).  The systematic analysis of se in corpora from the perspective of Hanks’ (2004) theory of Norms and Exploitations and Corpus Patterns Analysis (chapter 5 and 6).  The elaboration of a model of a verbal lexical entry for a dictionary of Spanish as a second language containing uses of se (chapter 7). The results of the thesis are mainly the elaboration of a database on Spanish pronominal verbs (chapter 6, Spanish CPA) and of a prototype of 20 lexical entries with the same verbs analysed with CPA (chapter 7).

.:1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Fairness norms can explain the emergence of specific cooperation norms in the Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1 Solving the cooperation problem in repeated interactions . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2 Solving the “coordinate to cooperate” problem in repeated interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2 .1 The coordination problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2 .2 Feasible norms in the Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma . . . . . . 12 2.3 Hypothesis on the emergence of cooperation norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.4 Fairness norms as a predictor for the emergence of different cooperation norms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.5 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.5 .1 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.5 .2 Phase 1: Social dilemma game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.5 .3 Phase 2: Social value orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.6 .1 Patterns of cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.6 .2 Which cooperation norms emerge in the PD and in the BOPD? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.6 .3 Which cooperation norms emerge under the shadow of the future? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.6 .4 Which cooperation norms emerge under asymmetric pay-offs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.6 .5 Fairness norms can explain the emerging cooperation norms 27 2.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3 A sociological perspective on measuring social norms by means of strategy method experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.1 Towards methodological integration of economics and sociology . . 34 3.2 Measuring conditionality, intensity and consensus of social norms 35 3.3 An introduction to the strategy method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.4 .1 Operationalization of conditionality, intensity, and consensus with the ultimatum game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.4 .2 Design of the strategy game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.4 .3 Design of the response game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.4 .4 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.4 .5 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.5 Empirical demonstration of measuring conditionality, intensity and consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.6 The differences between measuring normative principles and their intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.6 .1 Derivation of hypotheses about differences between strategy and response game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.6 .2 Analysis of offers in strategy and response game . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3.6 .3 Analysis of acceptance decisions in strategy and response game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4 How norms can generate conflict: An experiment on the failure of cooperative micro-motives on the macro-level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.1 A perspective of normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 4.2 Bargaining norms as an exemplification of normative conflict . . . . . 58 4.2 .1 Conditional and unconditional bargaining norms . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.2 .2 Normative conflict over commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.2 .3 Normative conflict over contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 4.3 Derivation of hypotheses on normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.3 .1 A general model of normative behavior and its application to the ultimatum game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.3 .2 Application of the model to study normative conflict . . . . . . . 65 4.3 .3 Hypotheses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4.4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.4 .1 The ultimatum game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.4 .2 The real effort task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.4 .3 The strategy vector method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 4.4 .4 Discussion of the strategy vector method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 4.4 .5 Procedure and participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.5 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 4.6 .1 Macro-level conditions for normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 4.6 .2 The micro-level roots of normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 4.6 .3 Aggregation of norm adherence on the micro-level to normative conflict on the macro-level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 5 The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions . . . . . . 86 5.1 A conflict theory of norm emergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 5.2 Application on distributive justice and definition of fairness norms 91 5.3 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 5.3 .1 Procedure and participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 5.3 .2 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 5.3 .3 The real effort task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 5.3 .4 The bargaining game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 5.3 .5 Treatments and measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5.4 .1 The bargaining process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5.4 .2 Consequences of normative conflict: Costly delays . . . . . . . . . . 98 5.4 .3 Macro emergence of norms (mixture model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 5.5 Discussion and open questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 A Proofs and instructions for chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 1.1 Proof of lemma 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 1.2 Proof of lemma 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 1.3 Instructions chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 B Complete strategy profiles and instructions for chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 2.1 Instructions chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 2.1 .1 Instructions for the strategy method game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 2.1 .2 Instructions for the response method game, proposer . . . . . . . 125 2.1 .3 Instructions for the response method game, responder . . . . . . 126 C Classification algorithm for fairness types in chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 3.1 Proof of proposition 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 3.2 Proof of proposition 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 3.3 Classification algorithm for fairness types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 D Instructions chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

La « norme facultative » n’est pas reconnue en droit. Pourtant, elle renvoie à un phénomène singulierauquel les juristes se trouvent de plus en plus confrontés. Celui-ci est porteur de normes non obligatoires, enmarge des instruments juridiques traditionnels. Ces normes ont en commun une mise en œuvre tributaired’un consentement préalable de leurs destinataires, ce qui signifie qu’elles sont laissées à leur libredisposition et qu’ils peuvent les utiliser entièrement ou seulement en partie, selon leur convenance.Facultatives, elles supposent la reconnaissance d’une normativité distincte de l’obligatoriété et del’impérativité. Elles tirent leur caractère normatif du fait qu’elles constituent à la fois des actes de langageayant force illocutoire et des modèles pour agir.En raison de leur originalité, leur intégration en droit est susceptible d’entraîner des bouleversementsdans la théorie des normes. En effet, la reconnaissance de la norme facultative conduit à s’interroger sur laplace du facultatif au sein des catégories de contenus normatifs. À côté des contenus normatifs classiquesconçus à partir de l’obligation, à savoir le prescriptif, le prohibitif et le permissif, le « facultatif » désigne unautre contenu normatif correspondant aux normes de faculté tournées vers le « normativement souhaitable ».Ces normes sont porteuses d’une faculté de choisir, autrement dit, une opportunité normative ouverte audestinataire et demandant à être saisie. Une fois qu’elles ont fait l’objet d’une adhésion, elles s’introduisentdans un « lien normatif». / The « voluntary norm » is not recognized in law. Yet, it refers to a peculiar phenomenon that juristshave increasingly to deal with. It is associated with noncompulsory norms, outside the traditional legal tools.These norms share a tributary implementation of a prior agreement from their recipients, which means theycan freely dispose of them and use them fully or partly, at their convenience.Being voluntary, the norms involve the recognition of a normativity distinct from the bindingnessand imperativity. They draw their standards-relative feature from the fact that they establish bothillocutionary speech acts and patterns to operate.As a result of their originality, their incorporation into law is likely to cause some changes in thetheory of norms. Indeed, the recognition of the voluntary norm leads to question the position of the voluntaryfeature within the categories of standards-relative contents. Besides the classical standards-relative contentsbuilt upon what is compulsory, that is the prescriptiveness, prohibitiveness and permissiveness, the“voluntaryness” refers to another standards-relative content which corresponds to the voluntary normsfocused on what is normatively desirable. These standards include the capacity of choice, in other words, astandards-relative opportunity opened to the recipient and asking to be seized. And once they obtain anadhesion, they get into a “standards-relative bond”.