Thesis (MA)-- Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The Brazilian welfare state has developed over time in relation to national and global trends. This study analyses the creation of Latin Americas largest Conditional Cash Transfer program in relation to these trends. The thesis provides an historical overview of the creation of Conditional Cash Transfers in the country that lastly ended with Bolsa Familia. Alongside events that led to Bolsa Familia, the nation witnessed the development of social welfare initiatives as well as alternative poverty reducing programs. The study analyses this in the context of the creation of the Brazilian welfare. The question guiding the study is: Has the Bolsa Famila programme helped to reduce poverty in Brazil? It is argued that Brazil has been successful in reducing its poverty rate as a result of the programme. The study looks deeper into the structure of Bolsa Familia in order to view its results and effects both advantages and disadvantages of the programme are assessed. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Brasiliaanse welvaart staat het in verhouding tot nasionale en internasionale tendense ontwikkel. Hierdie studie analiseer hoe Latyns-Amerika se grootste voorwaardelike kontant oordrag program in die lig van hierdie tendense ontwikkel het. Die tesis verskaf ‘n historiese oorsig tot die inwerkingstelling van voorwaardelike kontant oordrag programme en die wyse waarop dit meer spesifiek uitgeloop het op die Bolsa Familia program. Die studie is gelei deur die vraag: Het die Bolsa Familia program daartoe bygedra dat armoede in Brasilïe verminder het? Benewens die feit dat hierdie vraag positief beantwoord word, bekyk die studie in groter detail die struktuur van die program asook die program se voordele en nadele.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Despite their lack of merits and demands, Occupy Wall Street (OWS) did become a defining feature in the short aftermath of the Financial Crisis and a part of the global occupy-movements during the protest year of 2011. As the founders and organisers behind the first encampments in Zuccotti Park called out for a "Tahrir moment" in the United States of America (US), few scholars or pundits had seen the leaderless movement coming. OWS spread across the US in the matter of months, hitting the media headlines gradually and more rapidly than any previous protest movement. Scholarly responses to OWS have been plentiful, and their categorisations of the OWS’ structure, demands and impact have been going in many different directions. This study attempts to debate and analyse the main research question; is OWS a new kind of a social movement? Even though there are several ways in which one may approach this question, the following will focus on the organisational structures, the political opportunity structures and the global linkages of OWS. The organisational structures has been debated by most, as the movement has a leaderless structure, it is ruled by consensus and supported by protesters from all social spheres, who came, protested and left as they pleased. The political and economic deficits, which gives way to the political opportunity structures of the movement, has not been this dramatic since the Great Depression. The Financial Crisis of 2008 has not only been defined as an economic crisis, but also a crisis of representative democracy. Furthermore, the global protest movements of 2011 have been similar in several ways. Even as all of them, be it Tahrir, 15M, in Greece or OWS, has been unique in matters of context, time and space, they share similarities in tactics, methods and fundamental demands - democracy and prosperity. The concluding statement to the research question is not clear-cut. Rather, it revokes former debates, which distinguished between old and new social movements, and implements a globalising civil society. A new kind of a social movement has come and gone, with elements of the earlier movements. It has added new modes of tactics, structures and demands, all formed by the present context. OWS is not an exception. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Ten spyte van hul gebrek aan eise en tasbare sukses, het “Occupy Wall Street (OWS) wel ’n definiërende kenmerk geword tydens kort naloop van die Finansiële Krisies, asook ’n deel van die globale beset-bewegings tydens die 2011 protesjaar. Daar was min akademici en kenners wat, ten tye van die eerste kamperings in Zuccotti Park en die eis deur die stigters en organiseerders van OWS vir ’n “Tahrir oomblik”, die opkoms van hierdie leierlose beweging voorsien het. Binne ’n kwessie van maande het OWS dwarsoor die VSA versprei, eers stadig en daarna vinniger die hoofopskrifte van die media gehaal as enige ander protes-beweging wat dit voorafgegaan het. Daar is heelwat akademiese bydraes (uit verskillende dissiplines) wat daarop gemik is om OWS te verstaan in terme van hoe om dit te kategoriseer, die struktuur daarvan, die eise wat gestel is en die impak daarvan. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die hoofnavorsingsvraag te bespreek en analiseer, naamlik; is OWS ’n nuwe soort sosiale beweging? Die benadering wat gevolg word is om te fokus om organisatoriese strukture, politieke geleentheidstrukture and die globale verbintenisse van OWS. Die organisatoriese strukture het die meeste aandag gekry in die literatuur tot dusver, aangesien die organisasie ’n leierlose struktuur het. Besluite word deur middel van konsensus geneem en ondersteuning word gewerf van protesteerders uit ’n verskeidenheid van sosiale sfere. Hierdie protesteerders het opgedaag, protes aangeteken, en weer vertrek na willekeur. Die politieke en ekonomiese terkortkominge van die kapitalistiese stelsel in die VSA, waarin die politieke geleentheidstrukture van die beweging geanker is, was, sedert die Groot Depressie, nie so skynbaar dramaties nie. Die Finansiële Krisies wat in 2008 sy hoogtepunt bereik het, word gedefinieer nie alleen as ’n ekonomiese krisies nie,maar ook as ’n krisies van verteenwoordigende demokrasie. Daarby is daar bevind dat die globale protesbewegings wat in 2011 gedy het, soortgelyke kenmerke gehad het. Nieteenstaande die feit dat Tahrir in Egipte, 15M, die Griekse protes-aksies en OWS wel as uniek gesien kan word in terme van konteks, tyd en ruimte, is daar ooreenkomste in taktiek, metodes en fundamentele eise: deelnemende demokrasie en welvaart vir almal. Die slotsom waartoe die tesis kom is nie definitief nie. Eerder, is die gevolgtrekking dat daar teruggegaan moet word na vorige debatte wat onderskeid getref het tussen ou en nuwe sosiale bewegings, en ook na die literatuur oor die moontlikheid van ’n globale burgerlike samelewing. Wat wel vasstaan is dat ’n nuwe soort sosiale beweging verskyn het en weer gekwyn het, wat aspekte van vorige bewegings omvat maar ook in duidelike terme van hulle verskil. In die opsig is OWS nie ’n uitsondering nie, met nuwe taktiek, strukture en eise wat almal gevorm is binne die huidige konteks.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study seeks to understand the causes and nature of xenophobia in South Africa. It investigates this through the case of De Doorns, where in November 2009 3000 Zimbabweans were chased out of their homes, which were subsequently looted and destroyed. This case was chosen because it is an example of a xenophobic incident that went beyond xenophobic attitudes to manifest in violent behaviour towards African migrants. The study was guided though three questions. (1) How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained? (2) Do the explanations for xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes and nature of xenophobia in De Doorns? (3) Are the causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns? To answer the first and third questions key informant interviews with relevant organisations were conducted with Agri Wes-Cape, the Hex River Valley Table Grape Association and People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP). In addition, published work (reports and an article) has been analysed. To answer the second question, literature on the topic of xenophobia was reviewed and the findings compared to the answers found for the first question. The key findings in this study were, firstly, that the causes for xenophobia were twofold: there was a context and there were underlying causes; in addition there were specific triggers for the xenophobia. This twofold explanation is evident in Horowitz’s ethnic violence theory, where he takes into consideration both external contextual causes and immediate locality-bound causes. The context was the farming community of De Doorns, characterised by casual work, job insecurity and (often) poor living conditions. The underlying causes were found to be locals’ frustration with and perceptions of Zimbabweans; this led to the development of xenophobic attitudes. In addition, labour brokers were found to have worsened the situation by encouraging causal work and by skimming off workers’ payments. Government insufficiencies were also an underlying condition: there was lack in an early warning system and there were service delivery failures. These underlying conditions gave a breeding ground for the triggers of the violence to operate. These triggers were found to be of a local political character, and these highlighted the explanatory value of Misago’s micropolitics theory. A local councillor stirred up the xenophobia to gain popularity for re-election before the upcoming local government elections. From this it is found that with similar or worse underlying condition xenophobia could flourish, given the ‘right’ triggers. This is an important finding in light of the up coming local government elections in 2016. In terms of the nature of the xenophobia in South Africa, it is argued that this often goes beyond the expression of xenophobic attitudes, and takes the form of violent xenophobic behaviour which is usually targeted at black African migrants. Explanations for this violence have historical roots in the armed struggle and it illicits a response from government. Why black Africans? Their proximity and their vulnerability are put forward as explanations, though it is also recognized that current explanations are insufficient. / AFRIKKANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie se oogmerk is om die oorsake en aard van xenofobie in Suid-Afrika te verstaan. Dit word ondersoek deur die geval van De Doorns, waartydens November 2009 3000 Zimbabwiërs uit hul huise gejaag is wat geplunder en vernietig is. Hierdie geval is gekies omdat dit ‘n voorbeeld van ‘n xenofobiese geval is wat verder as die xenofobiese houdings gegaan het om in gewelddadige gedrag teenoor immigrante uit Afrika te manifesteer. Die studie is deur drie vrae gelei: (1) Hoe kan die gewelddadige xenofobiese aanvalle in De Doorns verduidelik word? (2) Bied die verduidelikings vir xenofobie genoegsame verduideliking vir die oorsake en aard van xenofobie in De Doorns? (3) Is die oorsake van xenofobie steeds sigbaar in De Doorns? Om die eerste en derde vrae te beantwoord is sleutel informante onderhoude met relevante organisasies gevoer naamlik Agri Wes-Kaap, Die Hexriviervallei Tafeldruif Vereniging en People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP). Daarby is gepubliseerde werk (verslae en ‘n artikel) ook ontleed. Om die tweede vraag te beantwoord is literatuur oor die onderwerp van xenofobie hersien en die bevindinge vergelyk met die antwoorde op die eerste vraag. Die sleutel bevindings in hierdie studie was eerstens dat die oorsake vir xenofobie tweeledig was: daar was ‘n konteks en onderliggende oorsake; daar was ook bykomende snellers vir die xenofobie. Hierdie tweeledige verduideliking is duidelik in Horowitz se etniese geweldsteorie, waar hy beide eksterne kontekstuele oorsake en onmiddelike ligging-gebonde oorsake. Die konteks was die plaasgemeenskap van De Doorns wat gekenmerk is deur informele werk, werksonsekerheid, en (dikwels) swak lewensomstandighede. Hierdie onderliggende oorsake is bevind om die plaaslike inwoners se frustrasie met en siening van Zimbabwiërs te wees; dit het aanleiding gegee tot xenofobiese houdings. Daar is verder gevind dat arbeidsmakelaars die situasie vererger het deur die aanmoediging van informele werk en die afskeer van werkers se betalings. Regeringstekortkominge was ook ‘n onderliggende oorsaak: daar was ‘n gebrek aan ‘n vroeë waarskuwingstelsel terwyl diensverskaffing ook misluk het. Hierdie onderliggende toestande het ‘n broeiplek aan die snellers van die geweld gegee om te funksioneer. Daar is bevind dat die snellers ‘n plaaslike politieke karakter gehad het en beklemtoon die verklarende waarde van Misago se mikro-politieke teorie. ‘n Plaaslike raadslid het die xenofobie aangewakker om gewildheid te verwerf vir herverkiesing voor die toekomstige plaaslike verkiesings. Vanuit hierdie is daar bevind dat xenofobie met soortgelyke of erger onderliggende toestande kan floreer, met die ‘regte’ snellers. Dit is ‘n belangrike bevinding in die lig van die toekomstige plaaslike regeringsverkiesings in 2016. In terme van die aard van xenofobie in Suid-Afrika word daar gearguenteer dat dit dikwels verder gaan as die uitdrukking van xenofobiese houdings en die vorm neem van gewelddadige xenofobiese gedrag wat dikwels op swart immigrante van Afrika gemik is. Verklarings vir hierdie geweld het geskiedkundige oorsake in die gewapende stryd en ontlok ‘n reaksie van die regering. Hoekom swart Afrikane? Hulle nabyheid en kwesbaarheid word aangebied as verklarings terwyl dit egter ook herken word dat huidige verklarings onvoldoende is.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study aims to understand the processes and factors that explain the framing of HIV and AIDS policy in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. Africa remains the global epicentre of the HIV and AIDS epidemic with Southern Africa remaining the most affected region in the world. The investigation centres on the HIV and AIDS policymaking discourses and dynamics leading to the securitisation of the epidemic in the three countries. The central focus of the study covers the timeframe of the leadership of President Mogae in Botswana, President Mbeki in South Africa and King Mswati III in Swaziland. This period is important as it characterises the HIV and AIDS epidemic being elevated onto the political agenda of the respective countries. This dissertation relies on two strands of theoretical literature namely, public policy theory and securitisation theory to help explain the framing of policy decision-making that leads to the process of securitisation of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the three countries. This study is a multiple case study within the qualitative research paradigm. This research is based on three case studies: Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland. As far as data collection is concerned, this study drew on primary sources of data, which consisted of documents obtained during the fieldwork from various stakeholders such as such as official government documents, as well as official documents from international and domestic HIV and AIDS organisations. Twenty semi-structured interviews were also conducted between 2007 and 2008 with various stakeholders including government officials, representatives of domestic and international HIV and AIDS organisations operating in the respective countries, researchers from think tanks and academics. In addition, eleven exploratory interviews were also conducted as part of the fieldwork process. Furthermore this study also relied on various secondary sources of data such as scholarly articles and books, official documents and legislation and newspaper articles. The preliminary results collected and analysed in this study suggest that Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland have all demonstrated a degree of formal commitment to adopting international guidelines to combat the epidemic. The thesis shows that while all three countries may share the burden of the epidemic, each presents a different political, social and cultural identity with different institutional architects (both foreign and domestic) that determined the nature of the response policy to the epidemic. The study shows that each of the three case studies presents an example of differing degrees of securitisation attempts: i) Botswana - successful securitisation; ii) South Africa - unsuccessful securitisation; and iii) Swaziland - partial securitisation because different actors and audiences are positioned at varying points along a spectrum of securitisation. This degree of securitisation can be linked to the acceptance of international ideas and the prevailing global discourse regarding the HIV and AIDS epidemic and the openness to forming collaborative agreements between state and non-state actors in each of the three countries. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie poog om ’n begrip te ontwikkel van die prosesse en faktore wat verklaar hoe beleid rondom MIV en VIGS in Botswana, Suid-Afrika en Swaziland geraam word. Die Afrikavasteland is nog steeds die wêreld se MIV en VIGS-episentrum en die Suider-Afrika-streek loop die mees gebuk onder die epidemie. Die ontleding sentreer op die MIV en VIGS beleidsdiskoerse en die dinamieke wat aanleiding gee tot die beveiliging van die epidemie in die drie lande. Die kollig val op die tyd toe President Mogae van Botswana, President Mbeki van Suid-Afrika en Koning Mswati III van Swaziland aan bewind was. Hierdie periode is van belang omdat dit die tyd was toe MIV en VIGS op die drie lande se politieke agendas geplaas is. Die proefskrif gebruik literatuur uit twee teoretiese velde, naamlik openbare beleidsteorie en sekuriteitsteorie, om te verklaar hoe daar op bepaalde beleide besluit word, hoe dit geraam word, en die proses waarvolgens MIV en VIGS gevolglik in die drie lande beveilig word. Die studie is ’n meervuldige gevallestudie binne die kwalitatiewe navorsingsparadigma. Die navorsing is op drie gevallestudies gebaseer, te wete Botswana, Suid-Afrika en Swaziland. Ten opsigte van data-insameling, het die studie van primêre databronne gebruik gemaak bestaande uit bewysstukke wat van verskeie belangegroepe verkry is. Hierdie stukke beslaan amptelike regeringsdokumente en amptelike dokumentasie van internasionale sowel as nasionale MIV en VIGS-organisasies. Daar is ook met verskeie belangegroepe onderhoude gevoer. Die belangegroepe het bestaan uit regeringsamptenare, die verteenwoordigers van nasionale en internasionale MIV en VIGS-organisasies betrokke in die drie lande, akademici, en kundiges by navorsingsinstansies. Twintig semi-gestruktureerde onderhoude is in 2007 en 2008 gevoer. Boonop is daar as deel van die empiriese navorsing 11 verkenningsonderhoude gevoer. Die studie het ook van verskeie sekondêre databronne soos vakwetenskaplike artikels en boeke, amptelike dokumentasie, wetaktes en koerantartikels gebruik gemaak. Die voorlopige bevindinge dui dat Botswana, Suid-Afrika en Swaziland elkeen hulself tot ’n mate formeel tot internasionale riglyne verbind het om die epidemie te beveg. Die proefskrif bewys dat ofskoon al drie lande swaar aan die las van die epidemie dra, daar by elkeen verskillende politieke, maatskaplike en kulturele identiteite, asook institusionele argitekte (plaaslik sowel as buitelands) bestaan wat die aard van die beleidsrespons bepaal het. Die studie dui verskillende grade van beveiliging by elkeen van die gevallestudies: i) Botswana – suksesvolle beveiliging; ii) Suid-Afrika – onsuksesvolle beveiliging; en iii) Swaziland – gedeeltelike beveiliging. Hierdie grade van beveiliging kan verklaar word aan die hand van die mate waartoe daar by elkeen van die lande aanvaarding was van internasionale denke en diskoers oor die MIV en VIGS-epidemie en of samewerking tussen staats- en nie-staatsakteurs bewerkstellig is.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In a world where emerging markets are increasingly driving the world’s economic growth, and an increasing part of the world’s energy supply comes from politically unstable or undemocratic countries with less developed institutions and inadequate rule of law, the field of political risk has acquired especially great significance. In order to keep up with international and domestic demand, as well as maintain profit levels, there has been and will continue to be a search for new sources of petroleum reserves. This has pushed the extractive industries to invest in new territories, some of which pose potential risks for new investments. These trends are changing where and how oil and gas companies conduct their business, as many of the political risks that face the extractive industries stem from the political, institutional and structural framework of the host country. The core of this study has been the investigation of the assumption that high levels of democracy constitute low levels of political risk. The assumption that high levels of democracy constitute low levels of political risk implies, conversely, that low levels of democracy constitute high levels of political risk. The debate around this assumption is an essential part of this research study; its validity was tested through conducting an industry-specific political risk analysis, using the case of Statoil’s operations in Angola. Angola poses an interesting case for analyzing political risk in the oil and gas sector, as it exhibits many of the qualities that are found amongst these “new” actors in the oil industry. Furthermore, additional and new research on the risk of investing in these emerging markets is more relevant than ever before. The stipulation of the relevance of this research study is based on the following two main points: firstly, the general decline in the level of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa; secondly, the fact that many of the current oil and gas resources are located in these very areas, i.e. in undemocratic and unstable countries. Moreover, there is little research on the effects the level of democracy has on the industry-specific risk, in this case the oil and gas industry. Hence further research on this area is both relevant and necessary. The political risk analysis shows that the political risks that face Statoil in the undemocratic nation of Angola are in fact not high. The analysis concludes with a result that indicates that investment in Angola poses a medium level of political risk. This challenges the abovementioned assumption, as the political risks are not necessarily higher in an undemocratic country. This study finds that the political risk associated with Angola is in the short- to mid-term seen as stable and medium; however, there are simmering tendencies and trends that currently point to a different long-term political risk picture. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In ‘n wêreld waar opkomende markte die ekonomiese groei van die wêreld toenemend voortdryf en ‘n toenemende deel van die wêreld se energie voorraad van politiese onstabiele of ondemokratiese lande met minder ontwikkelde instellings en onvoldoende regering kom, het die veld van politieke risiko groot waarde gekry. Om by te hou by die internasionale en plaaslike vraag, sowel as om winsvlakke te handhaaf, is en sal daar altyd ‘n soektog na nuwe bronne van petroleum reserwes wees. Dit het die ekstraksie industrieë gedruk om in nuwe gebiede te belê waarvan sommiges potensiële risiko’s het vir nuwe beleggings. Hierdie neigings verander waar en hoe olie- en petrolmaatskappye hul besigheid doen omdat baie van die politieke risiko’s wat die ekstraksie industrieë moet hanteer voortvloei uit die politieke, institusionele en strukturele raamwerk van die gasheerland. Die kern van hierdie studie was die ondersoek van die aanname dat hoë vlakke van demokrasie aanleiding gee tot lae vlakke van politieke risiko. Die aanname dat hoë vlakke van demokrasie aanleiding gee tot hae vlakke van politieke risiko impliseer dat lae vlakke van demokrasie aanleiding gee tot hoë vlakke van politieke risiko. Die debat rondom hierdie aanname is ‘n noodsaaklike deel van hierdie navorsingstudie; die geldigheid daarvan is getoets deur die uitvoering van ‘n industrie-spesifieke politieke risiko analise, deur gebruik te maak van die geval van Statoil se operering in Angola. Angola is ‘n interessante geval vir die ontleding van politieke risiko in die olie en petrolsektor, omdat dit baie van die kwaliteite toon wat onder die “nuwe” rolspelers in die olie-industrie gevind word. Verder is bykomende en nuwe navorsing op die risiko van belegging in hierdie opkomende markte meer relevant. Die stipulasie van hierdie relevansie van hierdie navorsingstudie is gebaseer op die volgende twee punte: eerstens, die algemene afname in die vlak van demokrasie in Sub-Sahara Afrika; tweedens, die feit dat baie van die huidige olie en petrolbronne in hierdie areas geleë is, d.i in ondemokratiese en onstabiele lande. Daar is ook min navorsing oor die uitwerking wat demokrasie het op die industrie-spesifieke risiko, in hierdie geval die olie en petroleum industrie. Daarom is verdere navorsing in hierdie area beide relevant en noodsaaklik. Die politieke risiko ontleding wys dat die politieke risikos wat Statoil in die gesig staar in die ondemokrastiese nasie van Angola nie hoog is nie. Die ontleding sluit af met ‘n gevolgtrekking wat toon dat belegging in Angola ‘n medium vlak van politieke risiko toon. Dit daag die bogenoemde aanname uit, omdat die politieke risiko’s nie noodwendig hoog is in ‘n ondemokratiese land nie. Hierdie studie vind dat die politieke risiko wat met Angola geassosieer word in die kort tot middel termyn is en as stabiel en medium beskou word; daar is egter neigings wat dui op ‘n ander langtermyn politieke risiko prent.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The core question this study aims to address is whether a state-sponsored ethnic middle class in a dominant party political system premised on ethnic politics, will punish the ruling party by not according them their electoral vote. The latter core question stems from the conventional notion of a large middle class producing stronger democratic tendencies within a society. However, South Africa and Malaysia are dominant political party systems where politics is aligned along ethnic lines fundamentally because of the colonial and apartheid histories. Furthermore, the ethnic middle classes’ (Malays and Blacks) grew as a result of affirmative action policies implemented by the same political parties that dominated the political scene in the respective countries. An analytical framework of one-party dominance, ethnic politics and the composition of the state bureaucracy, is applied to analysing the Black and Malay middle classes’ behaviour in South Africa and Malaysia. This study looks at how the Black and Malay middle classes’ grew via state affirmative action policies implemented in public service employment, business and education; which are fundamental spheres for social upward mobility. This was done by looking at the implementation of the NEP in Malaysia between 1971 to 1990, and the implementation of BEE and employment equity in South Africa post-1994. South Africa and Malaysia’s colonial and apartheid histories created economic imbalances amongst majority and minority ethnicities primarily. Therefore, after independence and the inauguration of democracy the assumption of political power of ethnic majorities resulted in a need for the past’s economic imbalances to be addressed. Hence, affirmative action policies were implemented that would benefit the ethnic majority groupings (Malays and Blacks) where the electorate is highly polarised. Therefore, the outcome of this study suggests that because politics are aligned along ethnic lines under a climate where the ANC and the UMNO have political hegemony, the Malay and Black middle classes’ are unlikely to bite the hand that feeds it. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die kernvraag in hierdie studie wentel om die moontlikheid al dan nié dat ‘n staat-ondersteunde etniese middelklas in ‘n dominante-party politieke opset wat op etniese grondslag gebaseer is, die regerende party sal straf deur hul verkiesingstem te weerhou. Dit spreek die konvensionele siening aan dat ‘n groot middelklas demokratiese tendense in ‘n gemeenskap sal versterk. Nietemin, bestaan dominante-party stelsels in Suid-Afrika en Maleisië ooreenkomstig basies etniese riglyne as gevolg van hul onderskeie apartheid en koloniale geskiedenisse. Meer nog: die etniese middelklasse het hul bestaan te danke aan die regstellende aksie beleide wat ingestel is deur dieselfde politieke partye wat die politiek in die onderskeie lande domineer. Swart en Maleier middelklas-gedrag in Suid-Afrika en Maleisië is ge-analiseer volgens ‘n raamwerk van een-party oorheersing en die samestelling van die staatburokrasie. Hierdie studie fokus op die wyse waarop die Swart en Maleisiese middelklas deur middel van regstellende aksie in openbare dienste, besigheid en opvoeding – die fundamentele sektore vir die ontwikkeling van opwaartse mobiliteit in die samelewing – bevoordeel is. Dit is gedoen deur te kyk na die beleidstoepassing van die NEP in Maleisië tussen 1971 en 1990 en die toepassing van Swart Ekonomiese Bemagtiging (BEE) en gelyke werkgeleenthede in Suid-Afrika sedert 1994. Die grootste ekonomiese wanbalans tussen meerderheid- en minderheidsgroepe is hoofsaaklik die gevolg van Maleisië en Suid-Afrika se onderskeidelike geskiedenisse van koloniale en apartheidsregering. Onafhanklikheid en die instelling van ‘n demokratiese stelsel het dus aandag aan die ekonomiese wanbalans genoodsaak. Vanselfsprekend sou die regstellende aksie ter voordeel van die meerderheids- en etniese groepe (Maleiers en Swart mense), waar die elektoraat uiters gepolariseer is, werk. Die uitkoms van hierdie studie dui daarop dat weens die klimaat geskep deur die politieke hegemonie van die ANC en die UMNO, waar die politiek volgens etniese riglyne bedryf word, dit onwaarskylik is dat die Maleisiese en Swart middelklasse bevoordeling van die hand sal wys.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Botswana and Mauritius have been operating as stable, multi-party democracies since their independence, in 1966 and 1968 respectively. It is unclear, however, which country is the most consolidated democracy. Therefore, this study compares Botswana and Mauritius, using specific criteria as developed by writers such as Huntington (1991), Linz and Stepan (1996), Przeworski (1996) and Schedler (1998 and 2001) to determine which country is the most consolidated democracy. The criteria used to determine the most consolidated democracy, can broadly be subdivided as follows. Firstly, institutions impacting on democratic consolidation, and the presence of these institutions in Botswana and Mauritius will be studied, such as the rule of law; whether the respective countries are characterised by a system of Presidentialism or Parliamentarianism; the electoral system used; whether elections are competitive, free and fair, and whether these elections resulted in a peaceful change in political power; the presence of a usable state bureaucracy; and lastly, the rankings by Freedom House will be used to determine to what extent citizen political and civil rights are protected and guaranteed. Secondly, the socio-economic factors impacting on the erosion or deepening of democratic consolidation will be studied, with the focus on trends since independence. These factors include the existence of an economic society; per capita income; economic growth and inflation; as well as inequality reduction within the respective countries. Lastly, the social conditions influencing democratic consolidation will also be studied, such as ethnic homogeneity or heterogeneity; the prevalence and size of the middle class as influenced by urbanization and adult literacy; and lastly, the prevalence and role of civil society. Botswana and Mauritius were compared using the above criteria. This study comes to the conclusion that Mauritius is the most consolidated democracy. The following findings support the conclusion that Mauritius is the most consolidated democracy. Mauritius is a rechtsstaat, whilst Botswana is not. In Mauritius, there is a distinction between the position of Head of State and Head of Government, in contrast to the extensive power given to the President in Botswana. There is no single dominant party in Mauritius, whilst the political sphere in Botswana is characterised by the dominance of the BDP since independence. The FPTP electoral system in Mauritius is supplemented by the BLS, in an effort to ensure sufficient representation to minority groups in the National Assembly, whilst Botswana only uses the FPTP electoral system. Elections in Mauritius are considered to be competitive, free and fair, whilst the fairness of Botswana’s elections, given the electoral system, have been questioned. Mauritius also passes Huntington’s Two Turnover test, as there have been three changes in political power, whilst the BDP in Botswana have won every election since independence. Mauritius’ position on the HDI is much better than the position of Botswana, and the consociational compromises agreed upon in Mauritius resulted in a social environment which assists democratic consolidation. Lastly, Mauritius is also characterised by a lively civil society, whilst civil society in Botswana is considered to be a-political and weak.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--Stellenbosch University, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In the context of the present conflict in Darfur, and in the years preceding it, the distinction between so-called African and Arab tribes has come to the forefront, and the tribal identity of individuals has increased in significance. These distinctions were never as clear cut and definite as they are today. The ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ distinction that was always more of a passive characteristic in the past has now become the reason for standing on different sides of the political divide. What then are the main factors which contributed to this new violent distinction between Arab and African? How is it possible for people and communities who have a positive history of cooperation and tolerance to suddenly plunge into a situation of such cruelty and hate towards one another. The thesis uses the New War framework to look at the current situation in Darfur. The most definitive version of this new framework is presented by scholars such as Mary Kaldor (2006), Martin van Creveld (1991) and Helfried Münkler (2005). The thesis then shows how the war in Darfur, exactly in line with the new war argument, has political goals with the political mobilization occurring on the basis of identity. Kaldor (2006) argues that the political goals in the new wars are about the claim to power based on seemingly traditional identities, such as Arab or African. Defining identity politics as “movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power” (Kaldor, 2006: 80), it becomes apparent that Darfur has become subject to this these kind of new war politics. The study therefore questions the popular argument that ethnic conflict arises out of an “ancient hatred” or “tribal warfare”. Chapters three and four illustrates how this new distinction between Arab and African should rather be seen as the cumulative effects of marginalization, competing economic interests and, more recently, from the political polarization which has engulfed the region. Most of the factors leading to the current Arab/African antagonism were traced to contemporary phenomena. The study also looks at factors such as loss of physical coercion on behalf of the state, loss of popular legitimacy and effective leadership, underdevelopment, poverty, inequality, and privatization of force. The study then concludes that politics of identity should more often be seen as a result of individuals, groups or politician reacting to the effects of these conditions then as the result of ethnic hatred. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die konteks van die huidige konflik in Darfur, en die jare wat dit voorafgaan, het die verskille tussen sogenaamde ‘Afrikaan’ en ‘Arabier’ stamme na vore gekom. So ook het die stamverband van individue kenmerkend toegeneem. Hierdie onderskeid was nooit so noukeurig afgebaken en bepalend soos wat dit vandag is nie. Die ‘Afrikaan’ en ‘Arabier’ onderskeid wat in die verlede meer van ’n passiewe kenmerk was, het ontaard in die rede waarom beide kante hulself vandag in ’n politieke skeiding bevind. Wat dan is die hoof faktore wat bydra tot hierdie nuwe gewelddadige onderskeid tussen ‘Afrikane’ en ‘Arabiere’? Hoe is dit moontlik vir mense en gemeenskappe met ’n positiewe geskiedenis van samewerking en verdraagsaamheid om skielik ’n toestand van soveel onmenslikheid en haat teenoor mekaar te ervaar? Die tesis maak gebruik van die Nuwe oorlog denkrigting in ’n poging om die huidige oorlog in Darfur te beskryf. Die mees bepalende weergawe van hierdie denkrigting word voorsien deur akademici soos Mary Kaldor (2006), Martin Creveld (1991) en Helfried Münkler (2005). Die tesis fokus op hoe die oorlog in Darfur (in lyn met die Nuwe Oorlog denkrigting) politieke doelwitte aan die dag lê, met die gepaardgaande politieke mobilisering wat geskied op grond van identiteit. Kaldor (2006) argumenteer dat die politieke doelwitte in die nuwe oorloë berus op die aanspraak tot mag op grond van skynbare tradisionele identiteite of stamwese, soos ‘Afrikaan’ en ‘Arabier’. As ’n mens identiteitspolitiek definieër as ’n beweging wat mobiliseer rondom etnisiteit, ras of geloof, met die doel om aanspraak te maak op staatsmag, dan blyk dit of die konflik in Darfur wel onderhewig is aan hierdie nuwe vorm van Nuwe Oorlog politiek. Die studie bevraagteken dus ook die gewilde aanname dat etniese oorloë ontstaan uit ‘stamoorloë’ of ‘antieke vyandskap’. Hoofstuk drie en vier verduidelik hoekom hierdie nuwe onderskeiding tussen ‘Afrikaan’ en ‘Arabier’ eerder beskou moet word as die kumulatiewe effek van marginalisasie, kompeterende ekonomiese belange en die politieke polarisasie wat die streek in twee skeur. Meeste van die faktore wat gelei het tot die etniese polarisasie van die streek word hier beskou as kontemporêre verskynsels. Die studie kyk ook na faktore soos: die verlies van populêre legitimiteit en effektiewe leierskap, onderontwikkeling, armoede, ongelykheid en die privatisering van mag. Die studie sluit af met die gedagte dat identiteitspolitiek in Darfur beskou moet word as die uitkoms van individue, groepe of politieke leiers wat reageer op die bogenoemde omstandighede, eerder as die resultaat van ‘antieke vyandskap’ of aggresiewe ‘stamoorloë’.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / After 1994, South African foreign policymakers faced the challenge of reintegrating a country, isolated for many years as a result of the previous government’s apartheid policies, into the international system. In the process of transforming South Africa's foreign identity from a pariah state to a respected international player, some commentators contend that presidents Mandela and Mbeki were informed by two contrasting theories of International Relations (IR), namely, idealism and realism, respectively. In light of the above-stated popular assumptions and interpretations of the foreign policies of Presidents Mandela and Mbeki, this study is motivated by the primary aim to investigate the classification of their foreign policy within the broader framework of IR theory. This is done by sketching a brief overview of the IR theories of idealism, realism and constructivism, followed by an analysis of the foreign policies of these two statesmen in order to identify some of the principles that underpin them. Two case studies – Mandela's response to the ‘two Chinas’ question and Mbeki's policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe – are employed to highlight apparent irregularities with the two leaders’ perceived general foreign policy thrusts. It takes the form of a comparative study, and is conducted within the qualitative paradigm, with research based on secondary sources. The findings show that, although the overarching foreign policy principles of these two former presidents can largely be understood on the basis of particular theoretical approaches, they neither acted consistently according to the assumptions of idealism or realism that are ascribed to them. The conclusion drawn is thus that categorising the foreign policies of presidents Mandela and Mbeki as idealist and realist, respectively, results in a simplistic understanding of the perspectives that inform these two statesmen, as well as the complexity of factors involved in foreign policymaking. More significantly, it is unhelpful in developing a better understanding of South Africa's foreign policy in the post-1994 period.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / South Africa has played an essential role as one of the founding members of both the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN), the latter of which came into existence in 1945. However, when the South African government introduced and pursued its policy of Apartheid, the country became a pariah within the international community. In 1994, after twenty years of international isolation, a new democratic government was sworn in and was immediately embraced by the international community. In their quest to further strengthen South Africa’s ongoing transformation from an isolated international pariah to an emerging leader of the developing world, the Mandela and Mbeki administrations adopted foreign policy adaptation strategies. These strategies were designed to adapt South African’s foreign policy to the new realities of the post-apartheid era: restructuring the foreign policy establishment; selfpromotion as the leader of the ‘African Renaissance’; adherence to the foreign policy principle of ‘universality’ and assuming a leadership role in international organizations. The United Nations has became one of the most important forums through which the international community’s rapprochement towards South Africa has manifested itself and has continued to play an important role in post-Apartheid South Africa’s international relations. South Africa’s global status has increased significantly through its participation in numerous UN bodies, agencies and General Assembly sessions. It has thus been argued that South Africa’s participation at the United Nations is driven by its intention to reform the organisation as well as showcase itself as a representative of the developing world and especially Africa, in an attempt to increase its global stature as a moral and African power. In addition to this it ostensibly seeks to profile itself as a multilateral leader. This thesis attempts to explore the nature of South Africa’s involvement and participation within the United Nations in the Post-Apartheid era and what the major consequences have been. It assesses the content and consequences of South African foreign policy rhetoric and institutional participation at the United Nations since the end of apartheid. This is done, first, through an attempt to understand the role of international organisations within the international arena and how they are utilised in furthering foreign policy objectives of states through cooperation (which constitutes the theoretical backdrop to the thesis), and second, through a systematic review of South African behaviour and policy objectives at the United Nations. Amongst others, one of the more important themes emerging from this analysis is that South Africa is combining many of its more recent UN initiatives with its participation in other multilateral partnerships.