Doppelt defends the key elements of Kuhn's thesis that scientific revolutions occur when one paradigm is replaced by another and that crucial aspects of competing paradigms are incommensurable. He concedes the merits in the views of those positivist critics of Kuhn who contend that for paradigms to be comparable their proponents must be able to communicate with one another, to agree on a common core of meaning for basic concepts and to deal with shared data and problems. However, he maintains that in identifying the problems which are held to be of fundamental importance and in adopting the standards by which explanatory adequacy is to be evaluated, rival paradigms do not overlap sufficiently for them to have genuine commensurability. This leads Doppelt to accept Kuhn's version of epistemological relativism which maintains that the rationality of the acceptance of new paradigms by the scientific community, at least in the short-run, has an irreducible normative dimension that is strongly conditioned by subjective factors. Doppelt also accepts Kuhn's views with respect to the loss of data, and the question of cumulative progress. The absence of paradigm-neutral external standards allegedly allows each paradigm to assign priority to its own internal standards, thus providing persuasive grounds for the incommensurability of competing paradigms and for epistemological relativism. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that the validity of these arguments over the long term is a contingent issue which can only be resolved by a careful examination of the historical evidence. A chemical revolution took place in the latter part of the eighteenth century when the oxygen theory replaced that based on hypothetical phlogiston. This transition is frequently cited as a typical example of a paradigm - one that illustrates Kuhn's claims for a shift in standards and a loss of data as central features of scientific revolutions. The phlogiston theory held that phlogiston was a normal constituent of air. It explained smelting as the transfer of phlogiston from the air (or from phlogiston-rich charcoal) to the earthy components of the ore, and held that the similar properties of the metallic products could be attributed to their phlogiston content. Combustion, including the calcination of metals and the respiration of living organisms, was viewed as a process involving the release of phlogiston to the atmosphere. The development of improved techniques for collecting gases and for measuring their volume and weight lead to emphasis on precise quantitative methods for evaluating chemical data as distinct from those based on simple quantitative descriptive observations. These developments soon posed difficulties for the phlogiston theory (eg.,the anomalous weight loss during combustion). Eventually, clarification of the composition of water and the use of the 'nitrous air1 test for the ability of a gas to support combustion and respiration (its 'goodness') led to the discovery of oxygen as a component of air and the demonstration that combustion involved combination with an exact quantity of this gas. Within a relatively short period of time, the oxygen theory gained general acceptance and the phlogiston theory was abandoned by most chemists. A critical examination of the events which culminated in the chemical revolution fails to bear out the claim that it was accompanied by a significant loss of empirical data or that it did not represent genuine cumulative progress in scientific knowledge. Instead the history of this revolution indicates that paradigm-neutral external standards for evaluating explanatory adequacy (conservatism, modesty, simplicity, generality, internal and external coherence, refutability, precision, successful predictions) were available and played a crucial role in bringing about this transition. Accumulating evidential warrant played the decisive role in the triumph of the oxygen theory. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

A signed LAC Non-Exclusive License form from this author is pending. / In this thesis I attempt to develop an alternative to the logical positivist's image of science, which attempts to exclude beliefs from scientific investigations. First I set the problem up by describing what the positivists mean by belief and how they attempt to exclude belief through the use of the scientific method. I begin to develop an alternative by examining the views of three philosophers of science: Thomas S. Kuhn, Michael Polanyi, and Gerard Radnitzky. Each of them provides an alternative to the positivistic conception of science by suggesting that scientific research is surrounded by a framework of tacit beliefs. I present each view in the following way. First I describe the background and context for the framework hypothesis; then I explain the framework itself, including discussions on the nature of the framework, how it is acquired, its role in visible scientific activity, and how switches from one framework to another occur; finally I assess each person's insights, including each's relevance for my thesis. The examination of these views sets the stage for my last chapter. Here I briefly compare the three thinkers, noting similarities and differences. Then I highlight each thinker's unique insights. Finally, I present a brief description of what I believe is a viable alternative to the positivistic image of science, based on the work of the three philosophers.

En la historia de la filosofía, se pueden reconocer épocas indeleblemente marcadas por la necesidad de comprender un complejo proceso de cambios, con alcances sociales y políticos. Allí están las disquisiciones filosóficas del siglo II D.C., tratando de hacer comprensibles las relaciones entre la filosofía y el cristianismo naciente. También encajan en dicha descripción los escritos filosóficos del siglo XII que procuraban hacer viable una relación entre el aristotelismo, recién llegado de oriente, y la filosofía cristiana asentada en occidente. En mi opinión, son casos emblemáticos de tal historiografía: el conjunto de escritos filosóficos del siglo XVI encaminados a comprender la modernidad y la ciencia, así como los escritos del siglo XVIII esclareciendo el siglo de las luces. / Tesis

Orientador: Adolfo Ramos Lamar. / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Regional de Blumenau, Centro de Ciências da Educação, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação.

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No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_ReestruturacaoKuhnianaTese.pdf: 944144 bytes, checksum: bd5f0829c382218bb96668731a5a2f69 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-31 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a tese da incomensurabilidade entre tradições paradigmáticas separadas por uma revolução, tal como é apresentada por Kuhn em sua principal obra A Estrutura das Revoluções científicas, como também as mudanças que a mesma sofreu nos escritos posteriores do filósofo. O problema que norteará nossa investigação tem como foco principal esclarecer quais às razões que levarão Kuhn a reestruturar sua concepção acerca da incomensurabilidade em seus estudos pós-Estrutura. No nosso entender as razões que levaram Kuhn a mudança de posicionamento em sua abordagem da referida tese, são decorrentes das críticas que ele sofreu em 1965, por ocasião do Colóquio Internacional de Filosofia da Ciência. Dentre as críticas que são analisadas neste trabalho, destacam-se as feitas por Popper, que vê na tese da incomensurabilidade a defesa de um relativismo, como também, as críticas de Lakatos, que acusa Kuhn de ser o defensor do irracionalismo no âmbito da ciência. Sustentamos que o filósofo reestrutura a tese da incomensurabilidade, em seus escritos pós-Estrutura, a fim de esclarecer os pontos problemáticos destacados por seus críticos. Consideramos que sua nova posição, na qual defende a incomensurabilidade local, é mais consistente e coerente que a anterior, pois assegura a comunicabilidade e a possibilidade de escolha entre paradigmas rivais, superando assim as acusações de relativismo e irracionalismo. No intuito de apresentar uma possível solução ao problema delineado, o trabalho se desenvolverá em três capítulos. No primeiro apresentaremos uma análise completa de como Kuhn concebe a tese da incomensurabilidade em sua obra A Estrutura das Revoluções cientificas. No segundo capítulo, destacaremos os aspectos problemáticos da tese que levaram o filósofo a ser acusado de defender o irracionalismo e o relativismo nas ciências. Por fim, no terceiro capítulo, procuraremos desenvolver como Kuhn, em seus pós-escritos, irá procurar superar os problemas inerentes a sua tese da incomensurabilidade recorrendo à filosofia da linguagem. / This study aims to examine the thesis of incommensurability between paradigmatic traditions separated by a revolution, as presented by Kuhn in his major work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, as well as the changes that it has undergone in the later writings of the philosopher. The problem that will guide our research has mainly focused clarify the reasons that lead Kuhn to restructure its conception of incommensurability in their PostStructure studies. In our view the reasons Kuhn change of position in his thesis of that approach, derive from the criticism he suffered in 1965, at the International Conference on Philosophy of Science. Among the criticisms that are analyzed in this paper, we highlight those made by Popper, who sees the thesis of incommensurability the defense of relativism, but also criticism of Lakatos, accusing Kuhn to be the defender of irrationalism in science. We hold that the philosopher restructures the thesis of incommensurability, in its PostStructure written in order to clarify the problem areas highlighted by its critics. We believe that his new position, which advocates local incommensurability, is more consistent and coherent than before, because it ensures the communicability and the choice between competing paradigms, thus overcoming the accusations of relativism and irrationalism. In order to present a possible solution to the outlined problem, the work will be developed in three chapters. In the first we present a complete analysis of how Kuhn sees the thesis of incommensurability in his work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the second chapter, we will highlight the problematic aspects of the thesis that led the philosopher to be accused of defending the irrationalism and relativism in science. Finally, in the third chapter, we will seek to develop as Kuhn, in his postscripts, will seek to overcome the problems inherent in his thesis of incommensurability resorting to philosophy of language.

Thomas Kuhn's essay The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has had an overwhelming impact upon academics from various fields, creating a virtual paradigm industry. Authors have frequently had recourse to Kuhn's book, applying insights into the structure and development of the sciences to nonscientific fields. This essay presents a critical review of Kuhn citation in the music-theoretic literature, first reviewing similar citation analyses in the humanities and the social sciences for comparison. While much of the Kuhn citation is problematic, music scholars are found to sin less broadly than those in other fields. After reviewing some of the salient distinctions between scientific and nonscientific endeavors, some of Kuhn's insights into science are found to clarify an issue in the history of music theory, namely the nature of the succession from figured-bass theory to the formulations of J. P. Rameau.

Orientador: Hermas Gonçalves Arana / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-22T00:33:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gemente_AntonioCelso_D.pdf: 37242025 bytes, checksum: 6cb602ac1086c5ea5689882f1c293158 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1996 / Resumo: O objetivo da tese foi o de analisar criticamente o pensamento de Thomas S. Kuhn conforme este se encontra exposto na obra "A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas" e em outras publicações do mesmo autor, ligadas especificamente aos assuntos ali expostos. Isto foi realizado partindo-se da hipótese geral de que o trabalho de Kuhn pode ser encarado como pretendendo ser um representante significativo de uma nova filosofia da . ciência, em contraposição à chamada tradição herdada nesta área, que foi identificada, no caso, primeiramente comas propostas do empirismo lógico de Rudolf Carnap, e posteriormente também com as formulações do racionalismo crítico popperiano. Esta hipótese geral - que define a importância e a representatividade destas correntes de pensamento na filosofia da ciência, que se contemplou, como bem ajustadas às respectivas categorias - foi depois estendida com o fim de se estabelecerem vínculos entre elas que não as colocassem trivialmente dentro de mera ordem cronológica seqüencial, senão que mostrassem o quanto a obra de Kuhn, neste particular, foi tributária da tradição herdada, constituindo-se então como mais um esforço no sentido de compreender-se melhor o conhecimento científico. Tal esforço, no entanto, de acordo com a interpretação desta tese, não superou os limites da tradição, devido a que o próprio Kuhn, ao tentar um detalhamento de suas formulações, não logrou nem ultrapassar a tradição, nem tampouco manter-se fiel aos seus objetivos originais de criar uma nova concepção acabada a respeito da atividade científica, ainda que tenha dirigido críticas relevantes a alguns conceitos tradicionais. Para defender a hipótese da incompletude do pensamento de Kuhn em conftonto com a tradição, a tese descreve preliminarmente as características básicas das três correntes filosóficas contempladas para daí proceder à análise propriamente dita, que se inicia abordando a polêmica entre Popper e Kuhn - o que toca também nos principais pontos levantados pelo empirismo lógico - para terminar com uma análise da síntese kuhniana, ou seja, o resultado das reformulações levadas a cabo por Kuhn, em vista das implicações do seu trabalho. A conclusão da tese é por aceitar tanto a hipótese geral como a sua parte estendida, vale dizer, concluiu-se que as categorias tradição herdada e nova filosofia da ciência foram úteis à compreensão de como a obra de Kuhn parece incompleta, quando conftontada com a tradição. Desse modo, esta obra poderia ser entendida não como uma proposta acabada, mas sim como uma crítica, e portanto não se constituindo em uma visão hegemônica a respeito, em função das muitas lacunas ainda existentes no pensamento de Kuhn, que ele não conseguiu explicar sem envolver-se na ambigüidade de conceitos ou sem recorrer à mesma tradição que anteriormente criticara / Abstract: The purpose of this thesis was to analyse critically the thinking of Thomas S. Kuhn according to his work "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions", and other publications by the sarne author concerning specifically to what it was presented in that work. This analysis was carried out based on the general hypothesis that Kuhn's work , can be seen under the intention of being a new philosophy of science significant representative as opposed to the so called generalized tradition in this field, which was formerly identified, in this case, with the logical empiricism proposed by Rudolf Carnap, and subsequendy related to the Popper critical rationalism. This general hypothesis - which defines the importance and representativeness these lines of thought for the philosophy of science, here considered as properly adjusted to their inherent categories - was later extended in order to establish links arnong those lines ofthougth, thus avoiding to place them as mere chronological sequence, but to show how much Kuhn' s work, in this particular sense, carne &om the generalized tradition, so, becoming an extra effort to better understand the scientific knowledge. This effort however, in this thesis interpretation, did not overcome the tradition limits, neither because Kuhn himself, by elaborating his own formulations, could surpass tradition nor remained faithful to his original objectives of creating a new complete concepction related to the scientific activity, although he has made relevant criticisms on some traditional concepts. In order to defend the hypothesis of Kuhn's incompleteness as opposed to tradition, this thesis preliminarly describes the basic characteristics of the three philosophical lines envisaged, and then analyses them, beginning with the Popper and Kuhn polemics - which also deals with the main points put forward by the logical empirism - and finishes with an analysis ofKuhn's synthesis, that is, the result ofrephrasings carried out by Kuhn, considering the implications ofhis work. As a conclusion of the thesis, the idea is to accept the general hypothesis as its extending part, that is, the generalized tradition and the new philosophy of science categories were use fuI to understand how Kuhn's works seems incomplete when conttonted with tradition. This way, his work could be understood not as a finished proposition, but rather as a criticism, therefore not being an hegemonic vision on the subject, because of many lacks still existing in Kuhn's thinking, which he could not explain without being involved in the concept arnbiguity, or without refering to the tradition which he formerly criticized. / Doutorado / Historia e Filosofia da Educação / Doutor em Educação

Orientador: Zeljko Loparic / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-29T03:07:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Minhot_LeticiaOlga_D.pdf: 5326724 bytes, checksum: 23bd64313736244f40d4b70bd2ffba9a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001 / Resumo: Esta tese consiste era mostrar a possibilidade de uma reconstrução da psicanálise freudiana usando categorias da matriz disciplinar tal como foi apresentada por Thomas Kuhn no Postscript a The structure of scientific revolutions. Tal reconstrução traz à luz as bases de um consenso para uma comunidade científica contidas na obra de Freud. A matriz disciplinar distingue, por um lado, entre uma suprateoria que atua como uma visão de mundo e que determina uma série de compromissos metafísicos, científicos e metodológicos. Por outro lado, incorpora o conhecimento que provém de certos exemplos de solução de problemas concretos. Eles servem de base para a solução de outros problemas concretos e envolvem a aplicação de um esquema de lei a diferentes tipos de situação. O espectro de compromissos determina o a priori a partir do qual intuiremos o objeto psicológico. A análise da rede epistêmica na qual se situa tal objeto nos mostrará a adesão de Freud aos compromissos epistêrnicos do paradigma biológico, tal como foi postulado no século XIX. Neste o objeto é resultado de uma ontogênese cuja dinâmica fundamental é a do conflito. O estudo das metáforas do aparato mental revela esses compromissos, assim como a concepção de uma realidade psíquica distinta da realidade empírica. No entanto, é o outro elemento da matriz disciplinar que nos permite se em uma comunidade há consenso ou não. Se as discussões centram-se em questões da suprateoria, isso é uma prova da ausência de um paradigma nesta comunidade. Qualquer tentativa de mostrar um consenso metateórico na psicanálise é justamente uma prova da falta de consenso no sentido que requer uma ciência madura. Esta rede epistêmica tem que funcionar como a priori, é a obviedade do objeto. O consenso forte de uma comunidade se dá quando, dada essa obviedade, a atividade se centra na solução de problemas, adotando como modelo de solução os apresentados pelo autor de uma teoria. Eles são os exemplos paradigmáticos ou exemplares. Desse modo revela-se o papel central que desempenham os casos que o próprio Freud apresentou. Deles emergirá qualquer possibilidade de consenso futuro na prática da psicanálise freudiana, pois a visão é treinada a partir desses conjuntos paradigmáticos através de relações de semelhança. A partir deles é que se aprende a ver, entendendo este ver no sentido kuhniano / Abstract: This thesis aims at showing that, using the categories of the disciplinary matrix presented by T. Kuhn in his Postcript to The Structure of scientific revolutions, the reconstruction of Freud's psychoanalysis is possible. Reconstructing we wiJ] learn that Freud's work has the key for a consensus among the members of a scientific comunity. One important sort of component of the disciplinary matrix is on one hand a supratheory that is acting like a vision of world and determining metaphisycal, scientific and methodological commitments. On the other hand, incorporates the knowledge based on certain examples of concrete puzzle-solutions. This concrete puzzle-solutions, employed as models or examples aplpy lay-schema in a variety of situations. The spectrum of commitments determins the a priori that permits to intuit psichological object. The analysis of the epistemic net, where such an object lies, shows that Freud shares the biological paradigm postulated during the 19th century. There the object was the consequence of an ontogenesis which had the conflict as its fundamental dynamic. These commitments and the conception of a psyquical reality appeared in the study of the pictures of the mental aparatus. However, the key component of the disciplinary matrix to decide when in a community exists consensus or not is the other. If the discussions are focused in matters of supratheory, this will be the proof that this comunity lacks paradigm. Every attempt to show metatheorical consensus in psychoanalysis is a proof of lack of consensus in the sense that requires a mature science. This epistemic net has to work as a apriori. It is the obviousness of the object. The strong consensus in a comunity emerge when this obviousness exists and the activity is focused in the puzzle-solution, adopting the solution presented by the author of the theory as a model. They are the paradigmatic examples or exemplars. Therefore, the cases presented by Freud reveal their central rol. Consequently, this exemplars permit the future consensus in the praxis of Freudian psychoanalysis, because the vision is trainned by paradigmatic groups while learning the similarity relationship. From this phase on one is able to see, taking it from a Kuhnian poin of view / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: José Carlos Pinto de Oliveira / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T22:43:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_AmeliadeJesus_D.pdf: 1526573 bytes, checksum: 35175fb8e24d12c518f965da0659e2db (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: Pierre Duhem e Thomas Kuhn aparecem como personagens privilegiados nas discussões historiográficas acerca de como a ciência se desenvolve e são classificados, respectivamente, como continuísta e descontinuísta. Este trabalho resulta de uma análise comparativa entre as visões desses dois filósofos e historiadores da ciência. Nosso propósito inicial foi compreender como eles poderiam ter visões tão díspares acerca do desenvolvimento científico, já que ambos são vistos também como participantes do mesmo grupo de filósofos para quem a estreiteza entre a história e a filosofia da ciência é admitida de maneira consensual. A pesquisa inicialmente orientada pela questão ?Como a ciência se desenvolve?' em suas obras nos levou a questionar a própria classificação da qual partimos. Na ausência de elementos corroboradores da difundida oposição entre as duas visões históricas, exploramos em suas obras dois eventos tidos comumente como revolucionários na história da ciência - os que levam o nome de Copérnico e Newton. Esse exame possibilitou a descoberta de uma insuspeitada semelhança entre a visão de Duhem e Kuhn acerca do desenvolvimento científico que neutraliza o antagonismo entre continuísmo e descontinuísmo em suas obras. Sustentamos que esse antagonismo resulta de uma abordagem bastante parcial de seus trabalhos em filosofia e história da ciência, uma abordagem que não leva em consideração os contextos diferentes de suas obras. O que observamos é que, em momentos distintos da história da ciência, Duhem e Kuhn acreditaram no rompimento com uma tradição histórica responsável por uma imagem enganadora do modo da ciência se desenvolver e que, portanto, precisava ser ultrapassada. Na tradição criticada por Duhem, os historiadores relatavam o surgimento repentino de grandes teorias, sem nenhum vínculo com a tradição; só viam revoluções. Na tradição criticada por Kuhn, os historiadores, ao reescreverem a história da ciência a partir da visão e do aparato conceitual de seu momento presente, acabaram tornando ocultas as revoluções. O resultado do trabalho reflete, sim, a tentativa inicial de compreender como se dá o desenvolvimento da ciência em Duhem e Kuhn, mas essa tentativa nos conduziu à necessidade de abandonar as usuais classificações conferidas às suas visões / Abstract: Pierre Duhem and Thomas Kuhn appear as privileged characters in the historiographical discussions about how science develops and are classified, respectively, as continuist and discontinuist. This thesis is the result of a comparative analysis between the views of these philosophers and historians of science. Our initial purpose was to understand how they could have such different views about the scientific development, since both are seen also as participants of the same group of philosophers that admit the necessary intimate connection between the history and the philosophy of science. The research, initially conducted by the question ?how does science develop?' in their works, led us to question the proper classification from which we started. In the absence of elements which corroborate the widespread opposition between the two historical views, we explore in their works two events usually regarded as revolutionary in the history of science - those that bear the names of Copernicus and Newton. This examination made possible the discovery of an unsuspected similarity between Duhem's and Kuhn's views about the scientific development that neutralizes the antagonism between continuism and discontinuism in their works. We maintain that this antagonism results from a very much partial approach of their works in philosophy and history of science, an approach that does not consider the different contexts of their works. What we observe is that Duhem and Kuhn in different times of history of science had believed in the rupture with a historical tradition which was responsible for a misleading image of scientific development, and therefore had to be overcome. In the tradition that is criticized by Duhem, historians related the sudden emergence of great theories, without any connections with the tradition; they just saw revolutions. In the tradition that is criticized by Kuhn, historians, by rewriting the history of science from a perspective of their contemporary moment, ended up turning the revolutions hidden. The result of this work does reflect the initial attempt of understanding how the scientific development occurs in Duhem and Kuhn, but this attempt has led us to the need of abandoning the usual classifications that are attributed to their views / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

This dissertation examines the way the Pythagorean conception of the incommensurable structures the assertions of subjective agency in Blaise Pascal’s Pensées (1670), Søren Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), and Alain Badiou’s Being and Event (1988). The Pythagoreans coined the term “incommensurable,” alogos, to describe magnitudes that cannot emerge within a specific system of signification. Across three chapters, I extend the Pythagorean understanding of the incommensurable into the areas of philosophy, religious studies, and mathematics in order to posit the fundamental instability at the core of subjective agency. Moving from Thomas S. Kuhn’s failure to define the incommensurable logically in his Structures of Scientific Revolutions, I argue that such a conception of the incommensurable must be understood as fundamentally faith-based. Given the fact that the incommensurable cannot emerge into signification, its existence must be posited on faith. Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Badiou each move from a faith-based assertion of the incommensurable to offer a conception of subjective agency within a specific system of signification. Thus, against the work of Bonaventura Cavalieri and Evangelista Torricelli, Pascal refigures the incommensurably infinite to establish a heterodox subjective agency within Augustinian faith-by-grace; Kierkegaard manages to navigate the incommensurability of direct communication and personal faith by effacing his pseudonym Johannes Climacus; and Alain Badiou relies on the incommensurable “event” to imagine the possibility the subject’s calling into being of the new. In each of these three texts, the incommensurable functions to guarantee the possibility of subject agency within a specific system of signification.