Thrasymaque de Chalcédoine, un sophiste de renom dans l'Athènes du Ve siècle av. J.C. est présenté comme l'interlocuteur principal de Socrate dans le livre I de la République. Il y est surtout question de la justice et des implications qui en découlent, Socrate et Thrasymaque ne s'entendant évidemment pas sur la nature de la justice. Thrasymaque, poussé par le questionnement constant de Socrate, en vient à formuler différentes thèses sur la justice, notamment : «Je soutiens, moi, que le juste n'est rien d'autre que l'intérêt du plus fort» (Rép. 338c) et «la justice et le juste constituent en réalité le bien d'un autre.» (Rép. 343c) Parallèlement, il oppose au philosophe une vision de la justice difficile à accepter, mais aussi difficile à réfuter : celui qui commet l'injustice est plus heureux que celui qui agit en fonction de la justice. Ainsi, pour Thrasymaque, l'injuste est meilleur que le juste et est plus heureux, car l'injustice est plus profitable pour soi-même. Selon cette vision, qu'est-ce donc que la justice, et en quoi n'est-elle pas profitable pour soi-même? L'objectif de ce mémoire sera de faire ressortir positivement la conception de la justice de Thrasymaque, car c'est avec elle qu'entre en conflit la recherche du bonheur. En effet, si la justice est la représentation des intérêts du dirigeant, comme l'avance le sophiste, alors être juste n'est rien d'autre qu'agir en fonction des intérêts d'autrui et non de soi-même. Cependant, dans une Cité où les individus sont sous la gouverne de la loi, il n'est pas si simple d'agir toujours selon ses propres intérêts lorsque ceux-ci sont contraires à la justice. C'est pourquoi il sera également pertinent de s'attarder aux caractéristiques et aux vertus qu'un individu doit posséder, selon Thrasymaque, pour être heureux. Nous essaierons donc de dégager de la pensée de Thrasymaque un modèle de vie à suivre : le κρείττων. En dernière analyse, nous mettrons en relief la position de Thrasymaque avec la critique platonicienne. Pour Socrate, la position voulant que l'injustice soit profitable est difficile, car il lui faudra montrer que c'est en fait la justice qui apporte le bonheur, en tant qu'elle est une vertu de l'âme. / Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, a renowned sophist in the Athens of the fifth century BC, is presented as the main interlocutor of Socrates in Book I of the Republic. As it is mainly a debate on the question of justice and its implications, Socrates and Thrasymachus are obviously not agreeing on the nature of justice. Thrasymachus, driven by the constant questioning of Socrates, comes to formulate different theories about justice, including: "I support that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger" (Rép. 338c) and "justice and just are actually another's good." (Rép. 343c) Meanwhile, he opposes the philosopher a vision of justice difficult to accept, but also hard to refute: one who commits injustice is happier than he who acts according to justice Thus, for Thrasymachus, injustice is better than justice and is happier because injustice is more profitable for yourself. According to this view, what is justice, and why is it not profitable for ourselves? The objective of this thesis is to highlight the positive conception of Thrasymachus about justice, because it is in conflict with the pursuit of happiness. Indeed, if justice represent the interests of the ruler, as argued by the sophist, then being just is nothing else that acting according to the interests of others and not yourself. However, in a city where people are under the guidance of the law, it is not always so easy to act according to its own interests when they are contrary to justice. That is why it is also relevant to dwell on the characteristics and qualities an individual must possess, according to Thrasymachus, to be happy. We will try to identify in Thrasymachus' ideas about justice a life model to follow: the κρείττων. Ultimately, we will highlight the position of Thrasymachus with Plato's critique. For Socrates, the position that injustice is profitable is difficult because he will have to show that this is actually justice that brings happiness, as it is a virtue of the soul.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 JorgeSL.pdf: 715455 bytes, checksum: 8220d6a1b6aaa7bdb5b114e363436337 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-29 / The allegory of the divided line presents one structure that divides itself into four levels of reality. Two of them move in the world of appearances or opinion, and the others into the world of being or intelligibility: eikasia and pistis, and dianoia and noesis. The difficulty is the following: if there are four levels of reality each with their respective objects that are apprehended according to a type of knowledge involved, is there an interpretation of the justice according to each level? Accordingly, our intention, after presenting the types of knowledge in the allegory of the divided line, is to demonstrate how the justice is comprehended at each level of reality. We understand that Plato uses the characters to represent levels involving different types of knowledge. The characters are Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon, Adimantus and Socrates, and the comprehension about what is the justice at each level follows what these characters understand justice to be / A alegoria da linha dividida apresenta uma estrutura que se divide em quatro n?veis de realidade. Dois deles se movem no mundo das apar?ncias ou da opini?o e os outros no mundo do ser ou intelig?vel: eikasia e pistis, e di?noia e noesis. A inquieta??o ? a seguinte: Se h? quatro n?veis de realidade com seus respectivos objetos que s?o apreendidos segundo um tipo de conhecimento, existe uma interpreta??o da justi?a segundo cada um desses n?veis? Objetiva-se, portanto, ap?s a apresenta??o dos tipos de conhecimento segundo a estrutura da alegoria da linha dividida, demonstrar como a justi?a ? compreendida em cada um dos n?veis de realidade. Entende-se que Plat?o utiliza certos personagens de acordo com n?veis de realidade que envolve tipos espec?ficos de conhecimento. Os personagens s?o: C?falo, Polemarco, Tras?maco, Gl?ucon, Adimanto e S?crates, e, portanto, a compreens?o sobre o que ? a justi?a em cada um dos n?veis segue o que esses personagens entendem por justi?a

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 JorgeSL_TESE.pdf: 1029067 bytes, checksum: ae8e1e06cf2d03b47d093d83cb9179fc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-11-05 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / This thesis endorses the interpretation that in Plato`s Republic the argument made by Thrasymachus in which justice is the convenience of the most powerful one is implicitly accepted by Socrates. Although Thrasymachus? discussion does not show any similarity with the argument of Socrates, it proposes a sarcastic and ironic comment on political life. Socrates accepts this comment to develop a more refined notion of the category of the most powerful ones. While Thrasymachus assumes that the convenience of the most powerful ones includes the power to subordinate all and everything to their individual pleasures, Socrates admits that the most powerful ones are defined only by their characteristic of being able to hold power in perpetuity. In this context, the main theme of The Republic is that the harmony between the functional classes of the city is convenient for perpetual power. For preservation of harmony, the functional class of the most powerful considers the convenience of forsaking a possible monopoly on pleasure towards a redistribution that promotes harmony, which also makes it convenient for the other classes. Thus, we can explicitly say that the most powerful ones believe in a sense of justice as convenience for everyone, but implicitly believe only in the argument that justice is what is convenient for themselves. Since convenience is what promotes harmony between functional classes, it becomes convenient to Socrates to believe that the understanding justice that the most powerful ones have is not publicly disclosed. The notion that all the speculation of the dialogue between the characters cannot be true, but, at best, only plausible and convenient is also part of the central argument in The Republic. Socrates needs to modify the nature of the functional classes through a targeted program of sexual reproduction and a program of ideological indoctrination so that the proposal to promote harmony through the elements of the city, declaring that justice is in favor of the weakest becomes a more plausible and convenient speech. To make the new system more plausible, Socrates develops a metaphysics based on the mathematical notion of harmony, such metaphysics serving the official rhetoric of the political regime presented by Socrates / Essa tese de doutorado defende a interpreta??o de que n A Rep?blica de Plat?o o argumento elaborado por Tras?maco, no qual justi?a ? a conveni?ncia do mais forte, est? implicitamente aceito por S?crates. Apesar da defesa enfatizada por Tras?maco n?o demonstrar nenhuma afinidade com o argumento de S?crates, ela prop?e um coment?rio ir?nico e sarc?stico sobre vida pol?tica. S?crates aceita esse coment?rio para derivar dele uma no??o mais refinada da categoria dos mais poderosos. Enquanto Tras?maco assume que a conveni?ncia dos mais poderosos inclui o poder de submeter todos e tudo a seus prazeres individuais, S?crates admite que os mais poderosos estejam definidos apenas pela sua caracter?stica de ser capaz de manter o poder em perpetuidade. Nesse contexto, o tema principal d A Rep?blica ? que a harmonia entre as classes funcionais da cidade ? conveniente para poder perp?tuo. Para conserva??o dessa harmonia, a classe funcional dos mais poderosos v? como conveniente renunciar um poss?vel monop?lio sobre prazer em prol de uma redistribui??o que promova a harmonia, o que tamb?m se torna conveniente para as demais classes. Assim, pode-se dizer que os mais poderosos divulgam o sentido de justi?a como sendo a conveni?ncia de todos, mas que implicitamente acreditam somente no argumento de que a justi?a ? o que lhes ? conveniente. Uma vez que a conveni?ncia ? o que promove a harmonia entre as classes funcionais, torna-se conveniente para S?crates a cren?a de que a compreens?o de justi?a dos mais poderosos n?o seja divulgada publicamente. Tamb?m faz parte do argumento central d A Rep?blica a no??o de que toda a especula??o presente no di?logo entre seus personagens n?o pode ser verdadeira, mas, na melhor das hip?teses, apenas plaus?vel e conveniente. S?crates precisa modificar a natureza das classes funcionais atrav?s de um programa direcionado de reprodu??o sexual e um programa de doutrina??o ideol?gica para que a proposta de promover a harmonia atrav?s dos elementos da cidade, sob a alega??o de que a justi?a est? a favor do mais fraco, torne-se o discurso mais plaus?vel e conveniente. Para fazer o novo regime mais plaus?vel, S?crates desenvolve uma metaf?sica fundamentada na no??o matem?tica de harmonia, tal metaf?sica a servi?o da ret?rica oficial do regime pol?tico apresentado por S?crates

Cette étude porte sur la réfutation (elenchos) dans la République de Platon, et montre que la présence de cette méthode au livre I ne saurait être un signe de la rédaction antérieure de ce livre, ni de la volonté de Platon de critiquer cette forme de la dialectique. Les deux premiers chapitres traitent de l'aspect épistémologique de la question : le premier montre que l'exposition de la dialectique au livre VII inclut l'elenchos, et le second que la défaillance des arguments du livre I doit être interprétée par des motifs pédagogiques, et non par une intention satirique de l'auteur. Les deux derniers chapitres se penchent sur la dimension morale de l'elenchos. Ainsi, le troisième chapitre affirme que Platon nous présente, au livre I, l'elenchos comme un outil efficace d'éducation morale, tandis que le quatrième chapitre cherche à expliquer la critique morale de l'elenchos du livre VII par la différence entre l'éducation dans une cité parfaite et celle dans une société corrompue. La conclusion de l'ouvrage explique le délaissement de la méthode élenctique dans les neuf derniers livres de la République par des raisons autres que par la perte de confiance de Platon en les capacités de cette méthode. / This study is about refutation (elenchus) in Plato's Republic. I claim that Socrates' use of this method in Book I cannot be considered evidence that the text belongs to an earlier draft of this book, nor of an implicit critique of the elenctic method by Plato. My first chapter shows that the dialectic described in Book VII actually includes the elenchus. The second chapter studies the arguments of Book I and shows that their many flaws should be interpreted in term of Plato's pedagogical motives, and do not suggest that he intended to write a satire. Chapter three shows that, far from criticizing Socrates' method on moral grounds, Book I actually presents the elenchus as a successful tool for moral education. Chapter four explains the moral criticism of the elenchus in Book VII by contrasting education in a perfect city with Socrates' education of already-corrupted men. I conclude by explaining why the Republic's main books do not make use of refutation.

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