Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 425431.pdf: 377029 bytes, checksum: 80b2d42e99d441364398965ef99a3e95 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-03 / Esta disserta??o tem como objetivo investigar a supera??o do idealismo transcendental kantiano realizada pelo idealismo absoluto hegeliano. Os argumentos hegelianos em prol da supera??o do dualismo entre coisa-em-si e fen?meno ser?o detalhados e postos ? prova. Enquanto Kant salienta que a metaf?sica como ci?ncia ? imposs?vel, ou seja, os objetos que as Id?ias transcendentais denotam est?o al?m do espa?o e do tempo, n?o existindo nenhum objeto no mundo sens?vel correspondentes a ela e, portanto, n?o podem ser conhecidas, pois n?o afetam a sensibilidade, Hegel apresenta a realidade como sujeito e nega qualquer forma de cis?o entre o ser e o pensar.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 437406.pdf: 726488 bytes, checksum: b05b0e2f3f2f3fe7e5bcf26c74468349 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-03-05 / This paper deals with the concept of "self" in the "critical" period of Immanuel Kant's theoretical philosophy. The analysis focuses on the Critique of Pure Reason text. Drawing a distinction between empirical, rational and transcendental psychology (to which the paradigm of analysis of Kant belongs), it begins with an attempt to determine cognitive subject's place and character in the genesis of the transcendental epistemology. Pointing out the essentiality of the psychological aspects to a correct textual interpretation, even when they refer to transcendental psychology, it supports the idea that a purely semantic analysis of the Critique of Pure Reason text cannot lead to a legitimate interpretation. Subsequently, a description of the transcendental idealism doctrine is presented, in which the differences between the transcendental and realistic (or transcendent) perspectives are discussed, followed by the rise of two different ways to understand objects: as phenomenon and as noumenon. Following that, an analysis on the limits of knowledge is developed, also centering on ways of thinking the theory's subject itself in relation to those limits. Three distinct perspectives of the "self" approach arise: phenomenal self, transcendental self and noumenal self, each one's analysis being presented separately. Firstly, the phenomenal self and the relation between the intuition of space and time as an essential factor to think the unity of time in a continuous timeline, on which one can identify the chronological sequence of events and that allows us to reflect on the empirical permanency of the "self" in inner sense; secondly, the analysis of the transcendental self, which begins with a basic introduction to the faculty of understanding, its spontaneity and the synthesis ability and its importance to theme comprehension and finally brings up the concept of transcendental apperception and the distinction between conscience's unity and conscience's identity, from which our transcendental concept of "self" can be determined. The analysis also deals with four critics' (Strawson, Henrich, Pippin and Patricia Kitcher) view on transcendental apperception and conscience's identity; lastly, the noumenal self and the psychological understanding of "soul", according to its two kinds of use: constitutive and regulative. / Neste trabalho abordamos a concep??o de eu na filosofia te?rica do per?odo chamado cr?tico da filosofia de Immanuel Kant. Para tanto, focamos nossa an?lise no texto da Cr?tica da Raz?o Pura. Iniciamos pela tentativa de determinar o lugar e o car?ter do sujeito cognitivo no ponto de partida da constru??o epist?mica transcendental, distinguindo entre psicologia emp?rica, psicologia racional e psicologia transcendental, pertencendo a esta ?ltima o paradigma de an?lise de Kant. Apontamos para a impossibilidade de interpretar corretamente o texto sem que se leve em considera??o os aspectos psicologistas, ainda que esta psicologia seja a de car?ter transcendental. Assim, negamos que a possibilidade de uma an?lise puramente sem?ntica do texto da Cr?tica da Raz?o Pura seja uma alternativa vi?vel para uma interpreta??o leg?tima. Partimos posteriormente para a descri??o da doutrina do idealismo transcendental, onde se trata da diferen?a da perspectiva transcendental da perspectiva realista ou transcendente, por onde aparecer?o duas perspectivas distintas para o conhecimento de objetos: como fen?meno e como n?meno. Seguindo, trataremos sobre os limites do conhecimento e como podemos pensar o sujeito da teoria diante destes limites propostos. Ent?o surge uma tripla distin??o das diferentes perspectivas da abordagem do eu : eu fenom?nico, eu transcendental e eu num?nico. Disto trabalharemos cada uma destas tr?s perspectivas, tratando primeiramente do eu fenom?nico e da rela??o entre a intui??o do espa?o e do tempo como condi??o para pensar a unidade do tempo em uma linha cont?nua temporal, de onde se distingue a sucess?o dos eventos temporais e que pode servir para pensar a perman?ncia emp?rica do eu no sentido interno. Depois tratamos do eu transcendental, iniciando com alguns esclarecimentos b?sicos sobre a faculdade do entendimento, seu car?ter espont?neo, a capacidade de s?ntese e a sua import?ncia para compreender o tema, para finalmente tratarmos do conceito de apercep??o transcendental e da distin??o entre a unidade e a identidade da consci?ncia, a partir da qual podemos definir o nosso conceito transcendental de eu. Ainda nesta an?lise, abordamos a leitura de quatro comentadores (Strawson, Henrich, Pippin e Patricia Kitcher) sobre a apercep??o transcendental e a identidade da consci?ncia. Por t?rmino, tratamos do eu num?nico e da ideia psicol?gica de alma, de acordo com os dois usos poss?veis: o constitutivo e o regulativo.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Basilio Teodoro Rodrigues Caruso.pdf: 1320862 bytes, checksum: 9b610cf7f7183762878c98adbd90eebb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-02 / We intent to demonstrate the function of the fundamental norm on the constitution of the object of legal science, in the context of a Pure Theory of Law, function that give an evidence of it´s nature: the fundamental norm´s nature is similar to transcendental category of Kant´s transcendental idealism. The fundamental norm, as it has been conceived on the second edition of Pure Theory of Law, determines itself as a logic-transcendental condition of an particular conception of law: a juridical conception that, if it´s not a necessary conception, is the only that perform a purity. The fundamental norm, as a transcendental condition of cognoscibility, acts in order to constitute the object Law, what means that the object of legal science is conceived as a juridically pure object, if the fundamental norm is considered as a condition to instauration of the fundamental fact of juridical creation. We pretend to conclude that an analogical relation with the transcendental categories, such it has been conceived by Kant´s idealism, can characterize the fundamental norm as an epistemological condition of this particular conception of law, because fundamental norm is transcendental. However, this relation of analogy grows week because this juridically pure conception is not a necessary, but just a possible conception of law / Esta dissertação apresentará a função desempenhada pela norma fundamental na constituição do objeto da ciência do Direito no contexto de uma Teoria Pura, função que indica ou denota sua natureza, a saber, de categoria transcendental à imagem (ou à lembrança) do idealismo kantiano. A norma fundamental, segundo sua formulação na segunda edição da Teoria Pura do Direito de Kelsen, caracteriza-se como pressuposto lógico-transcendental de uma dada interpretação do material jurídico proposto, a saber, uma interpretação jurídica que, se não é interpretação necessária, é a única que atende à pureza. A norma fundamental como condição transcendental de cognoscibilidade aplica-se constitutivamente ao objeto Direito significa que o material proposto ao conhecimento pela ciência do Direito é interpretado como objeto puramente jurídico se, e somente se, a norma fundamental é pressuposta como instauração do fato fundamental da criação jurídica. Conclui-se que a norma fundamental, como condição de tal concepção (epistemológica), tem natureza análoga à dos conceitos puros do entendimento da teoria do conhecimento de Kant na medida em que é transcendental, mas esta analogia se enfraquece porque a transcendentalidade é condicionada, uma vez que a intepretação normativo-positiva é uma interpretação meramente possível (isto é, não necessária)

Submitted by Hellen Luz (hellencrisluz@gmail.com) on 2018-03-06T16:54:49Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_RepresentacoesInconscientesEu.pdf: 895930 bytes, checksum: f951a70f44f799f6a0bcf989bcafe24b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Edisangela Bastos (edisangela@ufpa.br) on 2018-03-08T17:09:05Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_RepresentacoesInconscientesEu.pdf: 895930 bytes, checksum: f951a70f44f799f6a0bcf989bcafe24b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-08T17:09:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_RepresentacoesInconscientesEu.pdf: 895930 bytes, checksum: f951a70f44f799f6a0bcf989bcafe24b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-01-10 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Esta pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar o conceito de representações inconscientes em Kant e sua relação com o conceito de apercepção transcendental, ou o Eu penso. A existência de um gênero próprio de representações, as inconscientes, são apontadas em várias obras de Kant, dentre as quais se podem citar a Antropologia de um ponto de vista pragmático e a Crítica da razão pura. São representações das quais se pode destacar na filosofia de Kant dois aspectos principais, sendo o primeiro a amplitude, pois elas abarcam o campo teórico, prático e estético, e o segundo a positividade, no sentido de desempenharem um papel positivo tanto na produção do conhecimento, quanto nos demais processos mentais – no estético e no moral. Entretanto, quando considerado o conceito de inconsciente frente ao princípio da apercepção transcendental, surge uma problemática: como afinal, compreender a existências de tais representações na filosofia de Kant, se o Eu penso implica em uma referência necessária de toda representação à consciência? Kant é mesmo enfático ao afirmar que, se as representações não se referem a este princípio, elas não são nada para um sujeito (Crítica da razão pura, B131). Com efeito, com vistas a tentar fornecer uma solução a tal problemática, partiremos de três hipóteses relevantes sobre a questão. A primeira delas é a tese de Locke, segundo a qual as representações inconscientes não são admitidas pelo fato de indicarem uma contradição à consciência de si mesmo, afinal, frente a um eu que nem sempre possui consciência de seus atos, pode-se dizer que há certa indeterminação quanto à identidade deste eu. A segunda é a tese de Heidemann (2012), de acordo com a qual a representação inconsciente encontra-se dividida em duas espécies, onde somente uma delas, as representações unconscious by degrees, referemse à apercepção transcendental. Por fim, a terceira tese é a de La Rocca (2007), com a qual concordamos em grande parte, pela qual se compreende o princípio da apercepção transcendental sempre como uma possibilidade estrutural, não a título de uma efetividade em termos psicológicos – ser consciente ou inconsciente –, mas de uma estrutura lógica que diz respeito à forma pela qual a representação precisa se referir. / This research aims to analyze the concept of unconscious representations in Kant and its relation with the concept of transcendental apperception, or the I think. The existence of a gender itself for representations, the unconscious ones, are pointed in several of Kant’s works. Among them can be mentioned in Anthropology in a pragmatic point of view and Criticism on pure reason. They are representations that can be bolded in Kant’s philosophy in two main aspects. The fist one the amplitude, for it holds the theoretical field, that is practical and aesthetic. The second one the positivity, in the sense of performing a positive role both in knowledge production, and in the other mental processes – aesthetic and moral. However, when considering the unconscious concept as opposite of the transcendental apperception principle, a problematical appears: how to understand the existence of those mentioned representations in Kant’s philosophy, if the I think implies in a necessary reference of all representation to the conscience? Kant is very emphatic affirming that, if the representations don’t refer to this principle, they are but nothing to the subject (Criticism of pure reason, B131). As an effect, proposing to give a solution to the problematical, three relevant hypotheses will be raised about this matter. The first one is Locke’s thesis, in which the unconscious representations are not admitted, for the fact that they indicate a contradiction in its own conscience. After all, when the matter is an “I” that not always has conscience of its actions, it is possible to say that there is a certain indetermination concerning the identity of this “I”. The second one is Heidemann’s thesis (2012), according to it, the unconscious representation is divided in two species, in which just one of them, the unconscious by degrees representations, refer to the transcendental apperception. At last, the third thesis is La Rocca’s (2007), in which we agree in almost its whole. Through it, it is possible to understand the transcendental apperception principle, always with a structural possibility, and not as an affectivity in psychological terms – to be conscious or unconscious -, but as a logic structure that concerns to the form by which the representation needs to refer itself.

Submitted by Cássio da Cruz Nogueira (cassionogueirakk@gmail.com) on 2017-01-04T11:53:18Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_ArteIntuicaoIntelectual.pdf: 1028120 bytes, checksum: 2ee337d219d0e8a80299e5b02e8807c4 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Edisangela Bastos (edisangela@ufpa.br) on 2017-01-09T12:32:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_ArteIntuicaoIntelectual.pdf: 1028120 bytes, checksum: 2ee337d219d0e8a80299e5b02e8807c4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-09T12:32:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_ArteIntuicaoIntelectual.pdf: 1028120 bytes, checksum: 2ee337d219d0e8a80299e5b02e8807c4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-11-03 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo desta dissertação é investigar a relação entre arte e intuição intelectual em Schelling a partir da perspectiva das preleções da Filosofia da arte e do Sistema do idealismo transcendental. Dentro do conceito de filosofia da arte como construção do absoluto na forma da arte, pretendemos analisar a importância da absolutez da exposição simbólica para a objetividade das Ideias da filosofia. Assim, pelo lado desse modo absoluto de exposição, a arte pode realmente exibir os arquétipos da filosofia em um objeto concreto. Pelo lado da intuição, como nos mostra a sexta parte do Sistema do idealismo transcendental, isso significa que a produção da intuição estética é a única forma de objetivação da intuição intelectual, a qual permanece dubitável nas esferas teórica e prática por não haver objetos na experiência que correspondam ao objeto inteligível dessa intuição nesses dois âmbitos. / The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between art and intellectual intuition in Schelling from the perspective of his lectures on Philosophy of art and of the System of transcendental idealism. By the conception of philosophy of art as a construction of the absolute in the form of art, we intend to analyze the importance of the absoluteness of the symbolic exposition for the objectivity of the Ideias of Philosophy. Thus, on the side of this absolute way of exposing, art can really exhibit the archetypes of Philosophy through a concrete objet. On the side of intuition, as the sixth part of the System of transcendental idealism shows, this means that the production of the aesthetic intuition is the only form of objectification for the intellectual intuition, which remains doubtful in the theoretical and practical fields. For, there are no empirical objects that correspond to the intelligible objet of this intuition in these two fields.

As social problems, such as environmental pollution persist, the need to implement corporate social responsibility (CSR) to enhance societal well-being becomes important. However, little is known about how corporate leaders implement CSR. The purpose of this qualitative transcendental phenomenological study was to identify and report the lived experiences of corporate managers relevant to CSR implementation. This study was guided by ecological systems theory, the Porter hypothesis, the Maslow hierarchy of needs theory, and the Harrod-Domar growth model, which justify the importance of societal well-being to business profitability and growth. The research question regarding the lived experiences of corporate managers of CSR implementation aligns with the research problem. A transcendental phenomenological approach was used to identify and report lived experiences of corporate leaders to illuminate understanding of CSR implementation worthy of emulation. Open-ended questions were used in semi structured interviews of purposefully selected managers, based on their lived experiences relevant to CSR implementation, of manufacturing corporations in Charlotte, North Carolina. Van Kaam's phenomenological analysis as explained by Moustakas was used to analyze data. Findings revealed that corporate leaders implemented CSR by donating and volunteering to support health care, nature preservation, education, and poverty reduction. Participants also responded that they supported recycling and use of alternative sources of energy to improve the health and safety of employees and society. The understanding gained from participants' responses can positively affect social change, as participants assessed that CSR implementation resulted in societal well-being.

In recent years, combinatorial properties of finite and infinite words have become increasingly important in fields of physics, biology, mathematics, and computer science. In particular, the fascinating family of Sturmian words has become an extremely active subject of research. These infinite binary sequences have numerous applications in various fields of mathematics, such as symbolic dynamics, the study of continued fraction expansion, and also in some domains of physics ( quasicrystal modelling ) and computer science ( pattern recognition, digital straightness ). There has also been a recent surge of interest in a natural generalization of Sturmian words to more than two letters - the so - called episturmian words, which include the well - known Arnoux - Rauzy sequences. This thesis represents a significant contribution to the study of Sturmian and episturmian words, and related objects such as generalized Thue - Morse words and substitutions on a finite alphabet. Specifically, we prove some new properties of certain palindromic factors of the infinite Fibonacci word; establish generalized ' singular ' decompositions of suffixes of certain morphic Sturmian words; completely describe where palindromes occur in characteristic Sturmian words; explicitly determine all integer powers occurring in a certain class of k-strict episturmian words ( including the k-bonacci word ) ; and prove that certain episturmian and generalized Thue - Morse continued fractions are transcendental. Lastly, we begin working towards a proof of a characterization of invertible substitutions on a finite alphabet, which generalizes the fact that invertible substitutions on two letters are exactly the Sturmian morphisms. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--School of Mathematical Sciences, 2006.

<p>In this dissertation I study substantially the effects of disembodied technical change on the total factor productivity and inputs demand in U.S. Apparel industry during 1958-1996. A time series input-output data set over the sector employs to estimate an error corrected model of a four-factor transcendental logarithmic cost function. The empirical results indicate technical impact on the total factor productivity at the rate of 9% on average. Technical progress has in addition a biased effect on factor augmenting in the sector.</p>

The notion of the organism has a somewhat ambiguous status in Kant’s philosophy. On the one hand it belongs to natural science, on the other hand it is based on an analogy with the structure of reason. Biology therefore has a peculiar place among the sciences according to Kant: it is a natural science constituted by the use of a regulative maxim. The present study places Kant’s views on biological teleology in the larger context of transcendental idealism. It consists of five essays. The first one treats the notions of things in themselves and appearances, arguing for an interpretation in terms of two aspects or perspectives rather than two worlds. The importance of the discursivity of our cognitive capacity is stressed, as well as the need to separate Kant’s various reflective perspectives. In the second essay this interpretation is applied to the third section of the Groundwork, arguing that this text does not belong to theoretical metaphysics, but rather to the articulation of a specifically practical perspective. The third essay discusses similarities and differences between Kant’s a priori conditions for cognition and conceptions of innate ideas in the rationalist tradition. Kant’s comparison of the system of categories with the biological theory of epigenesis is considered in connection to eighteenth century theories of generation. The comparison is viewed as an analogy rather than as a naturalistic theory of the a priori. In the fourth essay Kant’s account of functional attribution in biology is explicated in the context of the present day debate of the issue. It is claimed that Kant’s neo-Aristotelian approach avoids some of the difficulties in the dominant naturalistic accounts of today. Kant’s view differs from the Aristotelian in that it involves a distinction of levels, making it possible to take functional attributions on the one hand as objective from the standpoint of biology but on the other hand as having a merely regulative status from a philosophical point of view. In the fifth essay an interpretation of the antinomy of teleological judgment in the Critique of Judgment is offered. The antinomy is taken to consist in the dialectical tendency to treat the regulative maxims of teleology and mechanism as constitutive principles. The difference between the discursivity of the human understanding and the idea of a non-discursive understanding, an important theme in Kant’s solution of the antinomy, puts the question of biological teleology in relation to central tenets of transcendental idealism.

In this dissertation I study substantially the effects of disembodied technical change on the total factor productivity and inputs demand in U.S. Apparel industry during 1958-1996. A time series input-output data set over the sector employs to estimate an error corrected model of a four-factor transcendental logarithmic cost function. The empirical results indicate technical impact on the total factor productivity at the rate of 9% on average. Technical progress has in addition a biased effect on factor augmenting in the sector.