In this research, a heat localizing solar thermal membrane distillation system has been developed for producing potable water from untreated surface water, wastewater, and seawater, using solely solar thermal energy. Unlike most other membrane technologies, this system requires no electrical power or equipment for its operation. The high production rate was achieved through the effective evaporation of water molecules within the pores of the membrane without dissipating much heat to the bulk feed water. It can remove suspending particles, microorganisms, inorganic salts, as well as organic contaminants from the feed water. The system can produce potable water for 32, 18, and 10 days on average under simulated sunlight when distilling seawater, canal water, and municipal wastewater, respectively, without cleaning the membrane. Low cost, high energy efficiency (i.e., 55%), and good water quality make the new system feasible for undeveloped areas where basic water treatment is lacking. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.S.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2019. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Orientador: Shiguenoli Miyamoto / Tese doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T19:47:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 SantosJunior_RaimundoBatistados_D.pdf: 1938466 bytes, checksum: 1be6afe2148952f80e822847ddcc03dc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Resumo: O presente trabalho analisa os princípios teórico-estratégicos que orientam as políticas de financiamento e ação do Banco Mundial, em particular, aqueles voltados para o setor social. Para empreender tal análise, foi premente examinar o fomento das políticas sociais e de alívio da pobreza que fazem parte da agenda do Banco, desde início da década de 1960. O objetivo principal dessa pesquisa é dar a conhecer que as políticas sociais são parte integrante do projeto de desenvolvimento econômico desenhado pelo BIRD para os países em desenvolvimento, o que significa dizer que elas não são residuais ou dependentes da política econômica, mas integrantes de uma conjunção de medidas voltadas ao desenvolvimento econômico dos países "atrasados". Desse modo, é possível concluir que esse tipo de política legitimava os programas de desenvolvimento dos governos nacionais. Ao longo das últimas seis décadas, o Banco Mundial se transformou em um dos principais organismos de financiamento do desenvolvimento e no principal provedor de recursos para o combate à pobreza. Assim, importantes decisões tomadas pelos governos nacionais foram custeadas ou monitoradas por essa instituição de fomento, o que torna urgente o estudo de sua atuação diante do desenvolvimento dos países pobres. / Abstract: This study analyzes the underlying theoretical and strategic principles applied by the World Bank to determine policies for financing and implementing interventions, especially in the social sector. In order to carry out the analysis, it was necessary to examine the Bank's fomentation of social policies and poverty alleviation that has been part of its agenda since the beginning of the 1960's. As such, the main objective of this research is to provide evidence that social policies are an integral component of the economic development program designed by this institution for developing countries. This means that such policies are neither residuals nor dependent upon economic policymaking practices; they constitute an integrated part of the steps adopted by this Bank for the economic development of "underdeveloped countries". Accordingly, it is understandable to conclude that it is this practice in designing policies that has given legitimacy to development programs drawn up by national governments. During the last six decades, the World Bank has transformed itself into one of the principal agencies for financing development. It has, at the same time, become the main source for the resources in the fight against poverty. In this way, important decisions taken by national governments have been paid for or monitored by this institution set up for fomenting economic development. This is what makes it relevant to study the World Bank's performance with regards to the development of poor countries / Doutorado / Doutor em Ciência Política

Orientador: Marcos Antonio Macedo Cintra / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-12T03:54:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Freitas_JeanToledode_M.pdf: 1461969 bytes, checksum: 03b77f234297768c063f5c04cab4b1b2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: O objetivo deste trabalho e avaliar os impactos potenciais sobre os paises em desenvolvimento derivados da implementação do Acordo de Basiléia 2 nos membros do G-10. Para tanto, apresenta a seguinte estrutura. O primeiro capitulo discute os elementos que conduzem a emergência de períodos de instabilidade financeira e como os bancos participam neste processo, partindo de um referencial heterodoxo. O segundo capitulo avalia os principais instrumentos que compõem a estrutura de Basiléia 2. O terceiro capitulo analisa os principais condicionantes impostos pelo Acordo aos paises em desenvolvimento, tendo em vista suas especificidades. Apesar de Basiléia 2 possibilitar uma disseminação dos instrumentos de gerenciamento de riscos pelos bancos do ponto de vista individual; pode intensificar o potencial de geração de crises financeiras como resultado da tendência prociclica dos fluxos de credito, exacerbando a alternância entre períodos de euforia e pânico. Dada a maior volatilidade macroeconômica dos paises em desenvolvimento, estes efeitos tendem a ser intensificados nestas regiões. Basiléia 2 penaliza os tomadores de credito por perfis de riscos mais elevados. E esperado que maiores exigências de capital regulatorio se revertam em aumento dos spreads sobre empréstimos ou redução de sua oferta por parte dos bancos. Para os paises em desenvolvimento, que concentram maior proporção de devedores com piores avaliações de credito ou com insuficiência de informações quantitativas, estes impactos podem ser potencializados. Adicionalmente, ha desafios para os órgãos supervisores destes paises com relação a sua habilidade em suportar pressões dos bancos internacionais em adotar os critérios estabelecidos por suas matrizes, em sua capacidade de assimilação dos modelos de riscos mais avançados ou em impedir que as exigências de capital não se revertam em diferenciais competitivos para os bancos estrangeiros. Com isto, e vislumbrada a necessidade de medidas complementares ou mitigadoras a Basiléia 2 e de reforma dos órgãos internacionais de regulação financeira, em especial o BCBS, que apresenta uma estrutura de representação concentrada e excludente. / Abstract: This document aims to investigate the potential impacts on the financial stability of the developing countries related to the implementation of the Basel II Capital Accord in G10 members. For this purpose, the following discussions are introduced. The first chapter comments the elements which lead to the emergency of financial instability and how banks participate in this process, based on a heterodox approach. The second chapter evaluates the main instruments in the Basel II structure. The third chapter discusses the main conditioners imposed by the Accord to the development countries, having their specificities as a reference. In spite of the contribution of Basel II to the dissemination of the risk management instruments for the banks in the individual point of view; it may intensify the financial instability processes, as a consequence of the its procyclical trend, and exacerbate the alternation between periods of euphoria and panic. Given the largest macroeconomic volatility of the developing countries, this effect tends to be intensified in these regions. Basel II penalizes the less creditworthy borrowers. It is expected that larger requirements of regulatory capital result in an increase of bank loans spreads or in a reduction of credit offer on the part of the banks. For the developing countries, which concentrate a bigger proportion of debtors with worst credit evaluations or insufficiency of quantitative information, these impacts can be amplified. Additionally, Basel II presents challenges for the supervisors from these countries, concerning their ability to support pressures from foreign banks concerning the local implementation of the Accord, their capacity in assimilating the most advanced bank risk models, or in preventing that the different capital requirements patterns among banks revert in competitive advantages for the foreign banks. In this way, it is recognized the necessity of complementary or mitigation procedures to Basel II and of reform of the international organisms of financial regulation, especially BCBS, that presents a concentrated and exclusionary representation structure. / Mestrado / Mestre em Ciências Econômicas

Abstract I analysed Finnish parties’ policies for developing sources of livelihood in Northern and Eastern Finland in 1951–1970. I used the minutes of the main organs of four parties – the Agrarian League/Centre Party, the Coalition Party, SKDL and SDP – as source material. Parliamentary documents were another important source. After World War II, Finnish society had to adapt to peacetime demands. To quickly provide productive work for people and to achieve self-sufficiency in food production as soon as possible, industrial policy embraced expansion of agriculture. As the 1950s arrived it was noticed that the new small farms were unable to support the growing rural population. Thus, an attempt was made to diversify rural sources of livelihood. At the same time, the parties competed earnestly for rural votes, turning this into a very political question. With the exception of the Agrarian League, the parties put forth new programmes in preparing for the 1958 election, which formed a turning point. After the election, a coalition cabinet – Fagerholm’s Cabinet III – was formed; it then had to resign due to foreign political pressure. After the so-called yöpakkaset crisis, the most important criterion of cabinet eligibility in Finnish government politics was that the party had to have the approval of the Soviet Union. Thereafter the parties were no longer able to cooperate in developing rural areas. The parties were in agreement that rural sources of livelihood had to be developed in order to employ Finland’s growing population. They were unable to agree on how this should happen in practice. The Agrarian League sought to develop rural areas through agriculture, small industry and the wood processing industry. SDP raised industrialisation as the main employment alternative. Un-fortunately, because of questions concerning persons, the party split into two competing camps. SKDL supported increasing state-run industry and foreign trade with the Soviet Union. The Coalition Party was for entrepreneurship and trade connections with the West. Regional development policy measures started up in the 1960s were already long overdue. Despite various regional policy measures, Finland was not able to employ the rural population, and Finns moved to Sweden to find work. This can be considered an indication that the implemented policy was not successful. / Tiivistelmä Tässä tutkimuksessa käsittelen suomalaisten puolueiden Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomen elinkeinojen kehittämispolitiikkaa vuosina 1951–1970. Lähteinä ovat olleet neljän suurimman puolueen eli Maalaisliitto-Keskustapuolueen, Kansallisen Kokoomuksen, Suomen Kansan Demokraattisen Liiton (SKDL) ja Suomen Sosialidemokraattisen Puolueen (SDP) keskeisten toimielinten pöytäkirjat. Toisena keskeisenä lähdeaineistona ovat olleet valtiopäiväasiakirjat. Suomalainen yhteiskunta oli toisen maailmansodan jälkeen sopeutettava rauhanajan vaatimuksiin. Elinkeinopolitiikassa valittiin ratkaisuksi maatalouden laajentaminen, jotta kansa saataisiin nopeasti tuottavaan työhön ja saavutettaisiin elintarvikeomavaraisuus mahdollisimman nopeasti. 1950-luvulle tultaessa huomattiin, etteivät uudet pienviljelmät pystyneet elättämään maaseudun kasvavaa väestöä. Näin ollen maaseudun elinkeinojen kehittämistarve oli mitä ilmeisin Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomessa. Samalla puolueet kävivät kovaa kilpailua maaseudun äänestäjistä, joten kysymys politisoitui voimakkaasti. Käännekohdaksi muodostuivat vuoden 1958 vaalit, joihin puolueet valmistautuivat, maalaisliittoa lukuun ottamatta, uusilla ohjelmilla. Vaalien jälkeen muodostettiin laajapohjainen Fagerholmin III hallitus, joka joutui eroamaan ulko-poliittisen painostuksen jälkeen. Niin sanotun yöpakkaskriisin jälkeen suomalaisessa hallituspolitiikassa tärkeimmäksi hallituskelpoisuuden kriteeriksi muodostui se, että puolueella täytyi olla Neuvostoliiton hyväksyntä. Tämän jälkeen puolueet eivät enää pystyneet yhteistyöhön maaseudun kehittämistyössä. Puolueiden välillä vallitsi yksimielisyys siitä, että maaseudun elinkeinoja oli kehitettävä, jotta Suomen kasvava väestö saataisiin työllistettyä. Siitä ei päästy yksimielisyyteen, miten työllistäminen käytännössä tapahtuisi. Maalaisliitto pyrki maaseudun kehittämiseen maatalouden, pienteollisuuden ja puunjalostusteollisuuden avulla. SDP nosti teollistamispolitiikan keskeiseksi työllistämisvaihtoehdoksi. Valitettavasti puolue hajosi henkilökysymysten takia kahteen kilpailevaan leiriin. SKDL kannatti valtiojohtoisen teollisuuden lisäämistä ja ulkomaankauppaa Neuvostoliiton kanssa. Kokoomus oli yksityisyrittäjyyden ja läntisten kauppayhteyksien kannalla. 1960-luvulla aloitetut kehitysaluepoliittiset toimet olivat jo pahasti myöhässä. Erilaisista aluepoliittisista toimista huolimatta maaseudun väestöä ei pystytty työllistämään Suomessa, vaan suomalaiset muuttivat töiden perässä Ruotsiin. Tätä voidaan pitää osoituksena harjoitetun politiikan epäonnistumisesta.