The 17th Indiana Volunteer Regiment was part of “Wilder’s Lightning Brigade”, a mounted infantry brigade under Col. John T. Wilder. Through his efforts he mounted his infantry on horseback and equipped them with Spencer Repeating Rifles. This paper argues that these changes were deliberate on the part of John T. Wilder rather than emulating others, led to a conscious and noticeable change in tactics, that these changes were effective, and examines the Brigade’s influences on future military tactics. Through the use a various Primary and Secondary sources, with heavy emphasis placed on diaries, letters, unit histories, and drill manuals, I show that the changes made were deliberate, noticed by the men and their adversaries, highly effective, and an early example of future forces like mechanized infantry.

Economic integration between major powers has long been viewed as a force for international stability. The intuitive logic is appealing: states that are trading with and investing in each other stand to lose if that commerce is jeopardized by conflict. Yet there are sound reasons for supposing that such deepening economic integration can also shift the balance of power between major states, by causing follower economies – states that are not among the most developed in the international system – to grow faster than leading economies, and economic size and development are what underpin national material capabilities. Moreover, a rich body of theory and history suggests that such shifts in the balance of power make interstate war more likely. This dissertation argues, therefore, that economic integration can actually be a potent cause of security competition and war. A theoretical framework that unites economic theory on the differential growth impact of trade, financial flows, and technology diffusion with realist arguments on the conflict implications of polarity shifts and dynamic power differentials is constructed. It is then explored using evidence from three key historical cases: the rise of the Dutch Republic during the 1581-1648 period, the relative decline of the United Kingdom and the relative rise of other great powers between 1870 and 1914, and the differential growth rates and corresponding tensions of 1945-89. Certain scope conditions and qualifications notwithstanding, the empirical evidence supports the theoretical framework. As such, the argument that deepening economic integration raises the mutual cost of fighting and thereby makes conflict less likely is not directly refuted, but an important countervailing mechanism is found to be at work. Such a finding has implications for debates over the security implications of economic globalization, the foundations of realist theory, and the causes and potential consequences of the rise of new powers today.

The struggle between the President and the Congress over the power to control the use of military force is an enduring dimension of U.S. foreign policy. In the 20th century Arthur Schlesinger labeled the growth of Presidential war power the “Imperial Presidency.” While some scholars have attempted to explain the expansion of Presidential power based on the Cold War or nuclear weapons, there has been little work studying the link between America’s ascending role in international legal frameworks and this domestic legal transformation. In this dissertation, I argue that America’s participation in international legal frameworks, such as the United Nations and NATO, has been a central factor in enabling the growth of Presidential war power. These international frameworks allow the President to circumvent Congress and to assert that the use of military force was something other than a ‘war’ that would need Congressional authorization. In case studies of pre-WWII aid to Great Britain, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, I demonstrate how the rise of executive war power relied on America’s growing participation in international legal frameworks. The dissertation contributes to the nexus of International Relations and Constitutional scholarship. It offers a unique interpretation of Presidential war power while also offering new insights on the nature of the United States’ relationship with international legal frameworks. I argue that participation in international legal frameworks has been ‘democracy-undermining’ as the President utilizes those frameworks to circumvent the Constitution’s restrictions on Presidential war power.

This thesis is a history of humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Britain, between 1942 and 1985. Specifically, it is focused upon the group of leading agencies linked to the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), an umbrella body for joint emergency fundraising established in the 1960s. The thesis explores the role of these NGOs in building up an expansive and technocratic disaster relief industry in Britain, in which they were embedded as instruments for the delivery of humanitarian aid. This was problematic, as many principal aid agencies also wished to move away from short-term disaster relief, to focus upon political advocacy connected to international development instead. It is argued that, despite this increasing political focus, humanitarian NGOs were consistently brought back to emergency relief by the power of television, the lack of public support for development, and the interventions of the British government. Aid agencies also actively contributed to this process, as they used apolitical disaster relief to generate public support and drive institutional growth in a crowded marketplace. This analysis complicates linear narratives of a transition from emergency relief to development aid in post-war British humanitarianism, instead presenting the period as characterised by competing and contradictory trajectories. This challenges conceptions of NGOs as bottom-up agents of civil society, by highlighting their competitive tendencies and complex interconnections with the mass media and the state. The rise of NGO humanitarianism also sheds light on broader trends in contemporary British history, such as changing patterns of political engagement, the character of modern activism, and the legacies of empire in the post-imperial period.

The thesis investigates the role of the Greek junta in the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 and analyses the invisible and complex components, including the foreign factors, which determined its outcome. Initially it examines the backstage of the intra-Greek collision between Brigadier-General Ioannides in Athens and Archbishop Makarios in Nicosia, as well as the subversive planning, including the possibility of US implication, and the military operations of the Greek coup that dethroned the Cypriot president on 15 July. It analyses the critical preinvasion days (15-19 July), which offered a clear operational forewarning over Turkish strategic intentions, and the Athenian strategic miscalculations, for the timely mobilization of the Greek-Cypriot forces, against the imminent invasion on 20 July. Then it focuses on the analysis of the offensive and defensive operations during the two phases of the Turkish invasion, and examines the difficulties encountered by the Turkish forces as well as the causes that pre-determined the Greek-Cypriot defensive failure. The thesis concludes with the implicating responsibility of foreign powers, which silently acquiesced to the deterioration of a crisis that ended with the military partition of the island Republic: the surprising Soviet silence, the fluctuating behaviour of Whitehall, and the ambiguous role of Washington which, under the dominance of Kissinger, played a critical role in encouraging, rather than deterring, Turkish strategic objectives.

This thesis spotlights eleven formative moments or ‘events' in the history of twentieth-century art music in Greece. They date from 1908 to 1979 and are ordered by two master narratives, the ‘Great Idea' and the ‘European Idea', concepts with multifarious implications for the making of contemporary Greece. The nature of the musical works presented during these events, the particular kind of reception they received, the debates they generated, and the role their composers hoped they would play in the construction of a contemporary Greek musical identity are some of the indicative issues that will be discussed, and always in relation to the prevailing political and social context. More specifically, I will try to show by way of these events how politics and culture were inextricably tied together. In some cases the events directly mirrored the political divisions and social tensions of their time, while in others they formed an easy (‘innocent') prey to political agendas – indigenous and foreign – that were at some remove from matters aesthetic. The discussion of these historical moments in the concert life of Greece is partly based on secondary sources, but it is also supported by extensive archival research. It is hoped that both the general approach and the new findings will enrich and update the existing literature in English, and that they may even serve to stimulate further research in the music history of other countries located in the so-called margins of Europe.

The thesis is concerned with the British perception of Soviet foreign policy between 1951 and 1956. In particular it examines the understanding that British diplomats, politicians and civil servants had of the process of change which the death of Stalin stimulated in the Kremlin's relations with the outside world. The core of the study centres around 1955, as this was the pivotal point for the British. With the ascendancy of Khruschev there was perceived not only a new emphasis in Moscow on the necessity of avoiding global war between East and West, but also a new interest in economic competition. By 1956 Whitehall had concluded that there were a number of factors informing the Soviet re-evaluation of foreign policy. Among which were: the stabilisation of the Western alliance culminating with West German rearmament in 1955; the cost of defence expenditure both in armaments and in supporting the satellite regimes and China; the development of American and Soviet thermonuclear potentials. The latter was thought by the British to be the most profound in its implications on the Soviet approach to the future of international relations. The Soviet leadership certainly appeared eager to be friendly and particularly to communicate an awareness of the grotesque futility of a war employing the latest weaponry. To this end they agreed to the Geneva Summit of 1955. Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan were convinced by this meeting that, in Macmillan's words, "there ain't gonna be no war". For a few brief, golden months, it seemed in London as if the Cold War might even be negotiated into history. However, by the end of 1955 it was apparent to the British that Geneva did not mean the Kremlin had given up aspirations to global supremacy, rather that the means to this end were now to be different.

Thesis (M.A.)--Indiana University, 2010. / Title from screen (viewed on July 29, 2010). Department of History, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). Advisor(s): John R. Kaufman-McKivigan, Robert G. Barrows, Kevin C. Robbins. Includes vitae. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 145-151).

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study is to determine how the role and identity of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) changed during and after the Cold War. The demise of the Movement in the post-Cold War era, predicted by some scholars, is discussed. This study examines whether the Movement merely offered an alternative grouping during the Cold War. The issue that becomes evident with respect to the Cold War is to show the terror it brought about and how the Third World became the battleground of the Superpowers. The question as to what extent the role played by the Movement defused the Cold War is investigated. It is shown that the Movement sent emissaries to Washington and Moscow to resolve the German Crisis in 1961 and to reduce the arms race. A historical overview of the Movement is offered, which determines the role of Afro- Asianism in the birth of the Nonaligned Movement. It is explained that the 1955 Bandung conference gathered leaders from independent African and Asian states - with different foreign policies - which created energies that in the following years greatly affected Third World politics and the shaping of nonalignment. This study traces also the role of different gatherings of the Movement up to the Durban Summit of 1998. At issue are also participating countries in the 1961 Belgrade Summit, which are described, as well as the growth of the Movement's membership. Different goals of the Movement are examined. Some, like nuclear disarmament, the right to self-determination, peaceful coexistence, and the right for the Palestinians to a homeland, were adopted during the Cold War and still remain valid. Others, like protection of the environment, and the struggle for human rights, were implemented during the post-Cold War era. The détente allowed the Movement to launch a New International Economic Order. An attempt is made to show the failure and success of the Movement in this respect. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie studie is om te bepaal hoe die rol en identiteit van die Onverbonde Beweging (NAM) tydens en na die Koue Oorlog verander het. Die ondergang van die Beweging in die na-Koue Oorlogse era soos deur sommige kenners voorspel is, word ook ondersoek. Die studie het probeer vasstelof die Beweging 'n alternatiewe groepering tydens die Koue Oorlog teweeg gebring het. Die kwessie met betrekking tot respect tot die Koue Oorlog bewys dat terreur meegebring word en hoe die Derde Wêreld die slagveld van die Supermoondhede gemaak het. Daar word ook gepoog om vas te stel tot watter mate die Beweging 'n rol gespeel het in die ontlonting van die Koue Oorlog. In die verband word onder andere verwys na die Beweging se pogings om die Duitse Krisis (1961) te ontlont en die wapenwedloop te beëindig deur die stuur van afgevaardigdes na Washington en Moskou. In 'n historiese oorsig van die Beweging word die rol wat 'n Afro-Asiatiese gevoel/gees in die stigting van die Onverbonde Beweging gespeel het, ondersoek. Die studie toon aan hoe die Bandung Konferensie van 1955 leiers van onafhanklike state van Afrika en Asië, wat uiteenlopende buitelandse beleidsrigtings gehad het, bymekaar gebring het. Hierdie uiteenlopendheid het 'n dinamika geskep wat Derde Wêreldse politiek en die aard van onverbondenheid wesenlik beinvloed het in die jare na die Konferensie. Verskeie byeenkomste van die Onverbonde Beweging tot en met die Durbanse spitsberaad (1998) word ontleed. Die samestelling en verloop van die spitsberaad in Belgrado in 1961 en die groei in die lidmaatskap van die Beweging kom onder andere onder die loep. Verskeie van die Beweging se doelwitte wat tydens die Koue Oorlog beslag gekry het en steeds geldig is, word onder die soeklig geplaas. Kernkrag ontwapening, die reg op selfbeskikking, vreedsame naasbestaan en die Palestyne se reg op 'n eie staat/tuisland is voorbeelde in die verband. Ander doelwitte van die beweging wat veral in die na-Koue Oorlogse era geimplementeer is, soos die bewaring en beskerming van die omgewing en die stryd om menseregte, word ook ondersoek. Die loodsing van 'n Nuwe Internasionale Ekonomiese Orde deur die Beweging wat deur die détente van die na-Koue Oorlogse era moontlik gemaak is, word ook bespreek en die sukses en mislukking daarvan geëvalueer.

The Donovan Report (1965-1968) is often seen as one of the great failures in the overall attempt to deal with the thorny problem of the contentious nature of industrial relations in post-war Britain. This thesis re-examines that report and subsequent governmental responses, using numerous sources, many of which have barely been used by previous authors, in order to establish where it all went wrong. Such an examination is important to inform future governments on some of the problems of trying to legislate on industrial relations matters. This thesis addresses the central question addressed by the Report – the validity of employing legislation to deal with the problems within industrial relations, asking what contribution had legislation made to the ordering of industrial relations in the past, and what lessons future governments could take from that? Why did both the Labour Governments under Harold Wilson and the Conservative Government under Edward Heath choose to go beyond Donovan in their attempts to alter the role of the state in industrial relations Finally, could the Industrial Relations Act 1971, had it survived, have been to the benefit of trade unions in time? This thesis suggests that legislation had an important role to play in the ordering of industrial relations, and that collective bargaining alone, although effective in many areas, was unable to address issues which had wider implications, such as those relating to health and safety or the reconciliation of differences due to the laws’ interference with trade unions’ rights to defend their members and their own collective rights. Both the Labour and Conservative Governments chose to go beyond the measures proposed by Donovan because economic and political necessity demanded a greater measure of control over strike action. However, the inquiry had undoubtedly focused the debate on whether or not legislation could ever be the most appropriate tool for controlling industrial relations, and therefore acted as a catalyst for the reforms that followed. The Industrial Relations Act 1971 failed to bring about the hoped-for industrial peace. Its repeal in 1974, however, did nothing to prevent further rises in strikes after 1974. Piecemeal legislation in the 1980s and 1990s did bring about a greater level of industrial peace, but this suggests that it was not legislation per se that was the wrong strategy for controlling industrial relations, but rather the method and pace of implementation. Other means of maintaining industrial peace were experimented with and could have been successful if the political will had been there and the unions and employers had engaged more fully,but the seeds had been sown for legislative control and it was impossible to hold back the tide of restrictive legislation which followed these early forays into the concept of law as a means of controlling industrial relations. The Donovan Report did indeed represent the thin end of the legal wedge and opened the floodgates to the many enactments designed to control and emasculate the trade union movement which the Conservative governments of the 1980s and early 1990s were able to introduce. The collective failures of the Donovan Report, In Place of Strife and the Industrial Relations Act to bring about industrial peace were, however, only indicative that legislation was not the most appropriate means of achieving this goal at this particular point in time. Alternative attempts to reduce strikes and engage trade unions in closer working relationships with employers and their associations, and with the government, did meet with some success in the 1970s and may be usefully attempted again in the future. This will, however, depend on whether government is able to keep an open mind on the utility, or perhaps futility, of legislative controls such as those attempted in the years between 1965 and 1975.