<p>The purpose of this thesis has been to analyse seven major factors that tend to influence the rate of early retirement in Sweden. The scope of data was gathered for every municipality in Sweden. Economic theories of labour supply, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and the Insurance Model were used to analyse the empirical results. In the analysis, earlier studies of the rate of sickness absence were important and used as a framework in choosing the explanatory variables for the econometric model. The analysed variables were; average income, average sickness days, educational level, foreign born, public sector employment, unemployment and the share of women in the population. As a consequence of the rift that occurred in 2003, when the average sickness days decreased and disbursed early retirements simultaneously increased, the relationship between these two variables was given special attention. The empirical findings confirmed our conjectures and were consistent with earlier research. Average income and the level of education were negatively related to the rate of early retirement. Moreover foreign born, average sickness days and unemployment showed a positive relation to early retirement. The relationship between average sickness days and early retirement had statistically changed and decreased between the years. A possibility is that other factors, such as changed social norms and increased stress in society (which are difficult to measure in a statistical and economical sense) might have become more relevant in explaining the rate of early retirement.</p> / <p>Syftet med denna uppsats har varit att analysera sju viktiga faktorer som tenderar att påverka graden av förtidspensionering i Sverige. Data omfånget insamlades för alla kommuner i Sverige. Ekonomiska teorier om arbetsutbud, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection och Insurance Model användes för att analysera de empiriska resultaten. I analysen var tidigare studier utav graden av sjukfrånvaro viktig och användes som ramverk i valet av de förklarande variablerna till den ekonometriska modellen. De analyserade variablerna var; medelinkomst, genom-snittliga sjukdagar, utbildningsnivå, utlandsfödda, offentligt anställda, arbetslöshet och andelen kvinnor i befolkningen. Som en konsekvens utav den klyfta som uppstod 2003, när de genomsnittliga sjukdagarna minskade och utbetalda förtidspensioner samtidigt ökade, gavs sambandet mellan dessa två variabler speciell uppmärksamhet. De empiriska iakttagelserna bekräftade våra förväntningar och stämde överens med tidigare forskning. Medelinkomst och utbildningsnivå var negativt relaterade till graden av förtidspensionering. Dessutom var utlandsfödd, genomsnittliga sjukdagar och arbetslöshet positivt relaterade till förtidspensionering. Relationen mellan de genomsnittliga sjukdagarna och graden av förtidspensionering hade statistiskt sätt ändrats genom att ha minskat mellan åren. En tänkbar förklaring till detta skulle kunna vara att andra faktorer, såsom skiftande sociala normer och en ökande stress i samhället (vilka är svåra att mäta statistiskt och ekonomiskt) kan ha blivit mer relevanta i att förklara graden av förtidspensionering.</p>

För försäkringsbolag är beslutsfattande en viktig process där privatpersoners situationer ska bedömas. Vilka bedömningsfaktorer som försäkringsbolag tar hänsyn till vid premiesättning har därför diskuterats. Likaså vilka svårigheter försäkringsbolag upplever inför och under beslutsfattandeprocessen av en försäkringspremie. Tidigare studier visar att beslutsfattandeprocessen innehåller element från ett bolags riskhantering till en försäkringstagares beteende och livssituation. I vår studie har vi valt att fokusera på motorförsäkring, sjuk- och olycksfallsförsäkring samt livförsäkring där premien kan variera utifrån försäkringstagarens beteende. Tidigare studier belyser också principal-agentteorin utifrån moral hazard och adverse selection som försäkringsbolags främsta dilemman. Vidare har vi i vår studie valt att undersöka genom intervju hur de nämnda dilemman påverkar försäkringsbolags beslutsfattande. Intervjuerna genomfördes med en kvalitativ metod. I vår slutsats konstateras att osäkerhet präglar försäkringsbolags beslutsfattande vilket påverkas av både moral hazard och adverse selection. Försäkringsbolag vill minska denna osäkerhet och använder sig därför av en tydlig riskhanteringspolicy. Likaledes läggs förhoppningar på att digitaliseringen ska underlätta visst beslutsfattande. / For insurance companies decision making is an important process where the situation for private persons are assessed. Which assessment criterias that are used for premium setting by insurance companies have therefore been discussed. Also what difficulties insurance companies experience before and during the decision making process of an insurance premium. Previous research shows that the decision making process contains elements from a company's risk management to a policyholder's behaviour and life situation. In our research we have chosen to focus on motor insurance, health insurance and life insurance where the premium can vary due to a policyholder’s behaviour. Previous research also estimate that principal-agent problem whit moral hazard and adverse selection constitutes insurance companies’ main dilemma. Furthermore, in our research we have chosen to look into, with interview, how the mentioned difficulties affect the decision making in insurance companies. The interviews were conducted with a qualitative method. In our conclusion is it noted that insecurity is characterized by insurance companies’ decision making which is affected by both moral hazard and adverse selection. Insurance companies want to decrease this insecurity and therefore uses a clear enterprise risk management. Likewise, hopes are being made that the digitization will facilitate certain decision making.

It is frequently argued that the high costs of clinical trials prior to the admission of new pharmaceuticals are stifling innovation. At the same time, regulation of the access to markets is often justified on the basis of consumers` inability to detect the true quality of a product. We examine these arguments from an information economic perspective by setting a framework where the incentives to invest in R&D are influenced by the information structure prevailing when the product is launched in the market at a later stage. In this setting, by changing the information structure, regulation (or the lack of) can thus indirectly affect R&D efforts. More formally, we construct a moral hazard - cum - adverse selection model in which a pharmaceutical firm exerts an unobservable effort towards developing an innovative (high quality) drug (moral hazard) and then announces the (unobservable) quality outcome to an uninformed regulator and/or consumers (adverse selection). We compare the outcomes in regard to innovation effort and expected welfare under two regimes: (i) regulation, where products undergo a clinical trial designed to ascertain product quality at the point of market access; and (ii) laissez-faire with free entry, where the revelation of quality is left to the market process. Results show that whether or not innovation is greater in the presence of entry regulation crucially depends on the efficacy of the trial in identifying (poor) quality, on the probability that unknown qualities are revealed in the market process, and on the preference and cost structure. The welfare ranking of the two regimes depends on the differential effort incentive and on the net welfare gain from implementing full information instantaneously. For example, in settings of vertical monopoly, vertical differentiation and horizontal differentiation with no variable cost of quality, entry regulation tends to be the preferred regime if the effort incentive under pooling is relatively low and profits do not count too much towards welfare. A complementary numerical Analysis shows how the outcomes vary with the market and cost structure. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Having the author been involved in banking and finance for almost 25 years, this thesis intends to reflect on the role of banks with emphasis on cross border lending and credit rating, their effectiveness and the impacts of cultural differences. Perhaps this would not differ substantially from a researcher or a scholar, yet the exploratory approach taken in this research will be somewhat different as it deliberately seeks to answer a number of questions relevant to practitioners in today’s banking. In trying to achieve this goal, this thesis hopefully may find its way to international bankers wondering about the perspectives of their business in general and their profession in specific. It even may perhaps improve the understanding of their clients. The Basel committee which published the new Basel II framework on bank regulation and supervision was the result of long and careful discussions, wide consultations and comprehensive impact studies. Whereas Basel II covers the entire risk profile and supervision of financial institutions, this research is limited to the cross border lending by banks to companies and provides the views from both practicing international bankers and their customers on their 3 expectations regarding Basel II, credit rating and the relevance of context and culture differences. Bankers all over the world are being trained on how to read balance sheets, yet less attention is being paid as to by whom they are being created and how precisely these balance sheets came into existence, other than the accountancy standards applied. Bankers furthermore seem to agree on the fact that credit risks in large part are related to the management competencies, effective corporate governance and integrity of management and organization. The argument could be made that the assessment of management capabilities, governance and integrity may be hindered in those cases where the culture is little understood. In a three days conferences titled; “The Future of Relationship Banking”, 80 senior executives from international banks and large companies were gathered in Punta del Este, Uruguay and were asked to speak about these aspects. A transcript of the conference is provided as annex to this thesis (Annex 1) and serves to triangulate the findings of the research. Main findings of three management papers were presented by the researcher during the conference. A survey was performed during the conference and in addition, through an online survey, in total over 100 practitioners in the field participated in the survey. Results show a variation of conclusions, but very especially seem to confirm the view, contrary to the approach taken in Basel II, that cultural differences and context are felt to be highly relevant in cross border lending.

The thesis examines factors that influence sustainability and success of microfinance institutions in Ghana. The topic is important, particularly in poverty stricken Africa, where microfinance institutions play a significant role in supporting governments' initiatives to reduce/alleviate poverty. The developed model is tested using data collected from 14 face-to-face interviews and 114 questionnaires. The data is analysed using different techniques- descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations and regression analysis. The research design and scale of the study are appropriate to both the problem addressed and doctoral level research. A number of factors in the model developed were found to be influencing the sustainability and success of microfinance institutions. A model was proposed that seeks to offer an explanation of sustainability and success of Microfinance Institutions in Ghana. The proposed model identified five categories being: institutional characteristics, agency costs, business strategy, environment/governance and success. Single factor analysis established positive relationships between sustainability and all the five factors but placed more emphasis on three out of the five factors namely; success, business strategy and environment/ governance. Multiple factor analysis established no significant differences in the sustainability with respect to the type of MFI, ownership and source of funding. Multiple Regression which allows for the testing of theories or models established a significant relationship between the Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS) and the predictors, especially the drop-out rate of clients and average loans. The Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) was calculated for the various types of MFIs and the result was a high dependency ratio especially among the FNGOs. Though the dependency is on the decline, it is very slow indicating that most MFIs will depend on subsidies for a very long time to come. Finally it was observed that the relatively high interest rates charged by most of the MFIs tended to defeat the purpose for which the microfinance movement came about. Not only did the study confirm the research model, but it also revealed that most owners did not exhibit a deep sense of involvement and used general knowledge to practice in Ghana. The study concluded that success factors, business strategy, and environment/governance were the most critical of the sustainability factors in Ghana. It is therefore important that managers develop institutional capacities especially in managing the agency problem effectively if they have to be sustainable and successful.

L’assurance chômage (AC) est un dispositif central des politiques du marché du travail. Une revue de littérature détaille ce que l’on sait de la pertinence et de l’optimalité de ces régimes dans le contexte du marché du travail contemporain. Elle illustre que si la stabilisation de la consommation des chômeurs est le motif générateur de l’AC, peu de travaux ont évalué cet aspect ou les autres effets positifs de l’AC, se focalisant sur les effets pervers du dispositif, notamment l’alea moral des chômeurs, et sur l’optimisation des règles pour les contenir. Dans la dernière décennie, la prise en compte des firmes et de la dynamique économique a rendu la littérature plus fertile pour optimiser les dépensescomme les ressources de l’AC.Les régimes d’AC profitent-ils de ces enseignements ? L’évolution des règles du régime français depuis 50 ans, ainsi que l’extrême diversité de celles en vigueur dans 5 pays incline à douter que ces régimes sont optimaux, surtout si on se limite à l’AC plutôt que de tenir compte de l’ensemble des transferts aux chômeurs pour analyser leurs comportements.La situation du régime français montre que ses fréquentes évolutions n’ont pas résolu ses problèmes. Il a subi, mais aussi stimulé, la récurrence au chômage, au prix d’une pression fiscale accrue et d’une efficacité dégradée pour la majorité des salariés et des firmes. En France comme dans de nombreux autres pays, les ressources de l’AC sont un domaine de réformes délaissé, alors qu’à tous points de vue (équité, incitations, équilibre financier, etc.) les gains potentiels d’une révision de leurs modalités sont plus élevés que ceux à attendre d’un nouvel ajustement marginal des droits. / Unemployment Insurance (UI) is a key labour market policy.A comprehensive survey of UI literature assesses what we know about UI optimality and its relevance regarding present labour market conditions. Despite of being its founding rationale, jobseekers’ consumption smoothing is rarely assessed, as well as other UI gains. In contrast research has long focused on UI adverse effects, namely recipients’ moral hazard, and on benefits optimization to control it. Recent literature better integrates firm and economic dynamics, thus being richer regarding the way UI benefits and financing rules could be more optimal.Do UI regimes build on this knowledge? An historical approach of French UI rules, and up to date descriptions of 5 other UI regimes, show an extreme diversity of UI arrangements, raising doubts about their optimality. Comprehensive analysis of social transfers to unemployed should be preferred to analysis restricted to UI benefits, because less misleading about unemployed real situation and behaviour.An in depth analysis of French UI rules illustrates that numerous reforms didn’t solve structural problems. The regime suffered increasing spending due to labour market changes, but it also stimulated adverse expensive behaviours among specific groups and short term contracts, both leading to heavier taxes and reduced efficiency for the bulk of workers and firms. In France as elsewhere, UI systems’ funding is a forsaken part of reforms. Yet regarding justice, incentives, financial stability, etc. reviewing rules governing resources could be more rewarding than implementing usual UI benefits reforms.

[pt] Esta dissertação investiga a presença de informação assimétrica no mercado de planos de saúde do Brasil e os principais efeitos gerados por essa assimetria de informação, conhecidos como seleção adversa e risco moral (moral hazard). A partir de dados do Suplemento Saúde da PNAD 98, são feitas análises descritivas e realizadas inferências estatísticas para avaliação tanto do risco moral quanto da seleção adversa. Na busca por um melhor entendimento do problema de seleção adversa estima-se também um modelo logístico para investigação da relação entre a condição de uma pessoa ter plano de saúde e variáveis explicativas tais como, renda, idade e auto- avaliação do estado de saúde, dentre outras. Em uma etapa subseqüente, são realizadas inferências sobre o risco moral por intermédio de dois procedimentos distintos: no primeiro, a partir da construção de um indicador de risco moral, denominado IRM, analisa-se a diferença entre o número de consultas médicas ambulatoriais realizadas por indivíduos com e sem plano de saúde levando-se em consideração o plano amostral da PNAD 98; o segundo, consiste num procedimento que tem por objetivo verificar a relação entre o fato de uma pessoa ter plano de saúde e o número de consultas médicas realizadas, por intermédio da estimação de um modelo binomial negativo com barreira (hurdle negative binomial model). / [en] The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the presence of asymmetric information in the Brazilian health insurance market and the effects that arises due to this asymmetric information: adverse selection and moral hazard. Using the data set of the Health Supplement of the Brazilian Household Sample Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios - PNAD) for the year 1998, descriptive analysis are produced and statistical inferences are realized to evaluate the moral hazard and adverse selection. In order to have a better perception of the adverse selection problem it is estimated a logistic model to evaluate the relation among the condition of having a health plan and independent variables such as income, age, and health self- perception. In a next step inferences related to moral hazard are realized by two different procedures: the first one, based on the construction of a moral hazard indicator, named MHI, analyses the differences between the number of physician visits for individuals who have and who have not a health plan, considering the sample design of the Health Supplement of the Brazilian Household Sample Survey. The second procedure aims to verify the relation between having a health plan and the number of physician visits by estimating a hurdle negative binomial model, which allows the elimination of some bias in the average number of physician visits.

O objetivo desta dissertação foi analisar o mercado de saúde suplementar no Brasil e avaliar as regulamentações da Agência Nacional de Saúde Suplementar – ANS, órgão regulador do setor, no contexto da teoria da informação assimétrica. Para tanto, utilizou-se a teoria da informação assimétrica através dos problemas de seleção adversa e risco moral a fim de analisar os problemas regulatórios. Também foram levantados dados e referenciais teóricos do mercado de planos de saúde no Brasil, principalmente no que se refere a sua regulação e suas implicações. A revisão bibliográfica deste trabalho indica que diversos estudos já evidenciaram a presença de assimetria de informação no mercado de saúde suplementar. A avaliação econômica de quatro resoluções normativas da ANS também corrobora para com essa evidência e explicam a presença de seleção adversa e risco moral evidenciados da literatura. Este trabalho conclui que a regulação desse mercado falhou, no que tange a redução das falhas de mercado, mais precisamente com relação com relação à assimetria de informação, onde sua presença tornou-se mais acentuadas com suas constantes intervenções, comprometendo a sustentabilidade do mercado e reduzindo o nível de bem-estar econômico. / The objective of this dissertation was to analyze the health insurance market in Brazil and evaluate the regulations of the National Health Agency - ANS, regulatory agency, in the context of the theory of asymmetric information. Therefore, we used the theory of asymmetric information through the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in order to analyze the regulatory problems. Also data and theoretical of the health insurance market benchmarks in Brazil, especially in relation to regulation and its implications were raised. The literature review of this work indicates that several studies have demonstrated the presence of asymmetric information in the supplementary health market. The economic evaluation of four legislative resolutions ANS also corroborates with this evidence and explain the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard evidenced literature. This paper concludes that the regulation of the market has failed, as regards the reduction of market failures, specifically with respect with respect to information asymmetry, where their presence has become more pronounced with their constant interventions, compromising the sustainability of the market and reducing the level of economic welfare.

O setor de saúde suplementar brasileiro operou desde os anos de 1940 sem regulação. Em 1998, o governo estabeleceu a regulação deste setor. Na regulamentação das atividades foram estabelecidas a ilimitação do número de consultas médicas, proibição de seleção de risco, entre outras medidas. O objetivo deste trabalho é investigar se a regulação resultou em aumento do número de consultas médicas por parte dos subscritores de planos de saúde, ou seja se ocorreu aumento do risco moral ex-post. Além disto, analisar alterações nos determinantes da demanda por posse de plano de saúde antes e após a regulação visando encontrar indícios de seleção adversa. Para isto, foram utilizados quatro métodos econométricos: regressão de Poisson, regressão binomial negativa e regressão quantílica de dados de contagem e um modelo Probit. O estimador de diferenças-em-diferenças foi utilizado para estimar o impacto da regulação sobre o número de consultas médicas. O modelo de regressão Probit foi utilizado para analisar os determinantes da demanda por posse de plano de saúde. Os dados utilizados provêm da Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra de Domicílios de 1998 (antes da regulação) e 2003 (depois da regulamentação). Os dados foram divididos por sexo e também pelo perfil epidemiológico, sendo selecionados os dados daqueles indivíduos que declararam ser portadores de doença renal crônica. Os resultados dos modelos mostraram que após a regulamentação ocorreu um aumento geral do número de consultas. Contudo, o sinal da principal variável de interesse, a dummy associada ao efeito da regulamentação sobre o número de consultas médicas dos subscritores de planos de saúde foi negativo e estatisticamente significativo - tanto no caso dos homens como no das mulheres - , nos três modelos e nas duas amostras. Isto indica que após a regulamentação ocorreu uma redução do número de consultas médicas dos possuidores de planos de saúde em relação àqueles que não possuíam plano de saúde. O uso da regressão quantílica possibilitou mostrar que o número de doenças crônicas e a posse de um plano de saúde são os fatores que mais afetam o número de consultas. Permitiu também mostrar que os efeitos dos regressores são diferentes entre os sexos e que não são uniformes ao longo dos quantis. Os resultados dos modelos para dados de contagem mostraram que, mesmo quando se controlam as características epidemiológicas, existe risco moral, antes e após a regulamentação. Os resultados do modelo Probit sugerem a existência de seleção adversa após a regulamentação, pois mostram que os indivíduos com maior número de morbidades têm maior probabilidade de adquirir um plano de saúde. Em suma, os resultados mostraram que após a regulamentação ocorreram dois importantes problemas no mercado de saúde suplementar: seleção adversa e risco moral. A conjunção destes dois problemas pode comprometer a sustentabilidade do setor de saúde suplementar brasileiro. / The Brazilian private health insurance sector operated since 1940’s without regulation. In 1998, the government established the regulation of this sector. The reform improved the health insurance coverage level, stating no limit to physician visits and forbiddance of the cream skimming, among others measures. The objective of this thesis is to investigate if the regulation resulted in an increase of physician visits from consumers of health insurance, that is to say, if there has been an increase of moral risk ex-post. Besides, to investigate alterations in the determinants of demand for the health insurance - before and after the regulation - seeking to find evidence or clues of adverse selection. Four econometric methods have been used for this: Poisson Regression, Negative Binominal Regression and Quantile Regression for counts and Probit Regression. The estimator of difference-in-difference was used to estimate the impact of regulation on the amount of physician visits. The Probit model regression was used to analyze the determinants of the demand for health insurance. The data used come from the 1998 Brazilian Household Survey (Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra de Domicílios-PNAD) (before the regulation) and 2003 (after the regulation). The data was divided by gender and also by the epidemiologic characteristics, selecting the data of those individuals who declared being bearers of chronic renal disease. The results of the models showed that, after the regulation, there was a general increase in the amount of consultations. However, the sign of the main variable of interest (year*regulation), the dummy associated to the effect of the regulation on physician visits of the consumers of health insurance, was negative and statistically significant – both in men and in women – in the three models and in both samples. These results suggest that after the regulation there was a reduction in the amount of physician visits of the consumers of health insurance in relation to those who did not hold a health insurance plan. The results of Probit Regression showed that after regulation there is adverse selection, since the number of chronic diseases variable after regulation was positive and statistically significant. The use of quantile regression for counts made possible showing that the number of chronic diseases and the possession of a health insurance plan are the factors which mostly affect the amount of consultations. It also allowed showing that the effects of regressors are different between the genders and also that are different in different parts of the outcome distribution. The results for the models for count data showed that, even when controlling the epidemiologic characteristics, there is a moral hazard, before and after the regulation, since individuals covered by insurance had more physician visits. The results of the Probit Model suggest the existence of adverse selection after a regulation, since it shows that individuals with a higher number of morbidities, are more likely to buy a health insurance plan. In sum, the main findings suggest that after the regulation there are two important problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. The conjunction of these two problems may generate inefficient outcomes and might compromise the sustainability of the Brazilian private health insurance market.

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