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This dissertation considers the relation between literary documents and public identities, and how U. S. culture is reflected and transfigured by poetry in the United States after 1960. Concerned with epideictic communication in public contexts, this study looks at how private interventions in public spaces can shape attitudes toward cultural phenomena. A secondary concern elucidates the ways literary texts are valued in English departments, bearing critical reflection on rhetorical, literary, and creative pedagogy. Insofar as the epideictic mode prepares individuals for a decision-making process in current democratic situations, this dissertation considers recent examples of strategic public engagements, and provides rhetorical readings of key situations in American social and cultural life since 1960 to illustrate how such methods can bring rhetoric and literature together in contemporary public contexts. The first of these studies inspects the correspondence and poetry of Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov during the Vietnam War over the uses of poetry as a public document. Public identity and U. S. social practices are explored in the following chapter with the 1970s and ’80s poetry of Lorenzo Thomas and Edward Dorn, whose poems participate in the articulation of tensions between private and public life. Chapter 4 argues that Charles Olson’s poems and letters appearing in the editorial pages of The Gloucester-Daily Times in the 1960s effectively helped bring civic attention to the transformation of public space in Gloucester, Mass. While he interpreted the changes he perceived in Gloucester through literary and historical theories, he framed them within rhetorically motivated communication strategies to deliver new perceptions of what constituted civic value. Chapter 5 concludes by examining more recent attempts by poets to influence public reflection on crucial events that led to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan through digital media, public performance, and civic encounters mediated by fugitive texts. The opening and final chapters introduce my methodology and present the problem of poetry in public contexts, and advocates for reflection within English departments on the rhetorical value of literary texts. / text

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:27:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:48:06Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 jorge_bwga_me_mar.pdf: 806060 bytes, checksum: c3dbcac513f11151071767ea461e5ad7 (MD5) / A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da “transformação militar” que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um “novo” modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de “guerra ao terror”, as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas. / The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the “military transformation” that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a “new” american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of “global war on terror”, went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions.

Orientador: Reginaldo Mattar Nasser / Banca: Oliveiros S. Ferreira / Banca: Shiguenoli Miyamoto / O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas" / Resumo: A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da "transformação militar" que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um "novo" modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de "guerra ao terror", as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas. / Abstract: The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the "military transformation" that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a "new" american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of "global war on terror", went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions. / Mestre

Cette thèse est destinée à appréhender le phénomène Taliban d'un autre point de vue, c'est-à-dire en tantqu'État, durant la période 1996-2001. À cet égard, nous avons utilisé la théorie d'Alain Touraine relative auxmouvements sociaux, distinguant trois grands principes caractérisant un mouvement social : l'identité, l'oppositionet la totalité, ces trois éléments étant interdépendants. Le premier chapitre de cette thèse est destiné à analysercomment les Talibans, en tant que sujet historique, ont été créés dans un contexte de guerre et d'opposition. Sontainsi successivement abordés la guerre avec l'Union soviétique, les Moudjahidins, les guerres civiles, les oppositionsrégionales et le clivage essentiel entre sunnites et chiites. Ensuite, il a été tenté de clarifier la façon dont le caractèretotalitaire de l'identité de l'Etat Taliban est renforcé par ses deux dimensions organisationnelles : l'islamisme et lepachtounisme, ce qui a conduit à confronter le régime des Talibans à la définition du modèle classique de régimetotalitaire concernant les institutions et la domination. La dernière partie aborde la question de la chute de l'EtatTaliban. La contradiction entre l'universalisme idéologique et l'existence des Talibans en tant qu'Etat a conduit àl'isolement sur la scène internationale. Les Talibans échouent par ailleurs à établir une domination intégrale enAfghanistan et se trouvent confrontés à une crise de légitimité interne ouvrant la voie à leur chute. En conclusion, ilest souligné la façon dont les Talibans ont mis en place une centralisation politique, en dépit de la profondeur desclivages tribaux et idéologiques. Pour atteindre leurs buts, ils se sont concentrés principalement sur trois éléments :l'islam fondamentaliste, la conscience nationale et tribale et l'honneur du guerrier. Finalement par le moyen de lathéorie de George Bataille, l'auteur de la présente thèse tente de préciser que les Talibans ont échoué à établir leuremprise totalitaire dans le climat hétérogène de la société afghane, malgré leurs efforts pour imposer les troiséléments d'homogénéisation susmentionnés. / In the present thesis, it is intended to survey Taliban phenomenon, as a State, during 1996-2001 from another pointof view. In this regard, it is benefitted from Alain Touraine’s theory on the function of social movements. Hedescribes the function of each movement based on three major principles: Identity, Opposition and Totality, andconsiders the three of them as being interrelated. The first chapter of the present thesis is intended to indicate howTaliban, as a historical subject, is created in the context of war and opposition. For instance, the conflict between theSoviet Union and Mujahidin, civil wars, regional oppositions, as the important cleavage of Sunni-Shiite. Afterwards,it is tried to clarify how the totalitarian aspect of Taliban’s identity is reinforced by its two significant organizingdimensions: Islamism and Pashtunism. Subsequently, we proceed to Taliban’s endeavor to establish an Islamictotalitarian state and also it is tried to reveal the assimilation between the Taliban regime and a classical model oftotalitarian regime regarding institution and domination. Dealing with the fall of Taliban state is done within the lastchapter. It is analyzed how the Taliban’s ideology of universalism confronts the national interests such as any othertotalitarian Stat. The confrontation of ideological universalism and the national interests leads to isolation and fall ofTaliban, in the international stage. Taliban even fails to establish an integral domination within Afghanistan.Therefore, Taliban is dragged into the crisis of internal legitimacy which paved the way to its fall. As a conclusion,it is dealt with how Taliban tried to create political centralization, despite the existence of effective tribal andideological cleavage. To fulfill their aim, they concentrated mainly on three elements of fundamentalist Islam, thenational and tribal consciousness and the honor of the warrior. Eventually, by the means of George Bataille’s theory,the writer of the present thesis tries to clarify that Taliban failed to establish its expected totalitarism in theheterogeneous climate of Afghan society, despite its efforts in imposing the three aforementioned homogenizingelements.

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! Victorian period is the golden age in British history. During the 1870s Great Britain was still the leading world power and Benjamin Disraeli had a credit for that. This dissertation deals with his attitude to Empire, his ideas about British foreign policy and his objections to Liberal foreign policy, specifically against his rival William E. Gladstone. It also presents important events during Disraeli's second ministry and evaluates his influence on British foreign policy.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bernardo Wahl Goncalves de Araujo Jorge.pdf: 1473998 bytes, checksum: 8cefb96903764170d80df6eb0969cfa8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-03-23 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the military transformation that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a new american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of global war on terror , went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions / A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da transformação militar que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um novo modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de guerra ao terror , as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) represent one of the longest wartime deployments in the history of the American military. To date, 1.6 million American military members have deployed. Of these, an estimated 300,000 have returned with a mental health condition, such as depression or PTSD. The Department of Defense has established a robust screening program to identify and track deployment-related physical and psychiatric illnesses. The Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) is a primary tool to identify physical and psychiatric risk following a deployment. The PDHRA is a web-based survey, which is administered between 90-180 days after a deployment. This study seeks to evaluate the psychometric properties and clinical utility of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) for accurately identifying truama and depression among Airmen following a deployment. Descriptive statistics, confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling were used to address separate research aims. Study aims assessed the impact of deployment on military members and the clinical utility and psychometric properties of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment. Findings suggest that the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment is a useful triage tool to identify trauma and depression among Airmen following deployment. The study makes recommendations for improving the clinical utility and psychometric properties of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA). / text