The aim of the thesis is to analyze the evolution of hedge funds and their regulation, especially in the context of the global financial crisis. The first part focuses on defining the term "hedge fund", then it is compared with another institutional investor, mutual fund. The history and description of basic investment strategies of hedge funds are also analyzed. The second part overhauls the market of hedge funds, including its quantity, assets under management and performance. The last part is mainly devoted to the theoretical aspects of regulation and supervision of hedge funds, it analyzes the legal status of regulation and supervision of these funds in selected countries before the global financial crisis, the AIFM Directive requirements are discussed and their possible implications are analyzed; the AIFM Directive is compared with the Dodd Frank Act's requirements at the end.

The aim of the thesis is to analyse the non-bank regulatory framework with particular attention devoted to hedge funds and private equity funds. The thesis describes functioning of the funds, discusses their performance during the global financial crisis of 2007-present and, predominantly, describes and analyses the EU and U.S. regulatory reforms with respect to these institutions which have arisen as a response to the crisis. Based on the analysis of the measures incorporated in these reforms, the thesis outlines its own proposal of an alternative investment fund regulatory framework which, if applied, would lead to a more efficient functioning of the alternative investment industry than what is likely to be the outcome of the already adopted reforms. The nature of the thesis is institutional; its methodology is characterized by a broad literature survey. Hedge funds and private equity funds are considered both in pre-crisis context as well as in circumstances that have been brought about by the crisis. Several hypotheses concerning systemic risk and the approach of the regulatory reforms to it are assessed. Mostly qualitative analysis is employed to evaluate the hypotheses.

Modes of the legal regulation of hedge funds This thesis focuses on hedge funds, their history, main strategies, role on the financial market and regulation. It compares approach to regulation of those entities in the US, European Union (and its certain member states) and in significant offshore jurisdictions. Its major focus is on the financial crisis from the year 2008 and its impacts on hedge funds. Its goal is to find whether the regulation of hedge funds can be beneficiary and what approach should the regulator take. It discusses the effects of the Dodd-Frank act, UCITS IV and AIFMD and compares those legislative documents. It consists of four chapters. In first chapter it tries to define the term hedge fund. Second chapter briefly explains history of hedge funds and historical approach to their regulation in the US. Third chapter discusses various strategies used by hedge funds and their outcomes. Legislative approach in various countries is being investigated in part four of this thesis. It compares regulation on hedge funds in the US, European Union, Great Britain, Ireland, Germany, Czech Republic and Singapore. It tries to predict what is going to happen with the hedge fund market after implementation of the EU Directive AIFM in the years 2013 to 2018 and it also tries to find the possible...

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The thesis is focused on economic capital management of top-ranked world banks. A basic theoretical framework is summarised at the beginning. The theoretical framework is then utilised in the main - empirical part. Since economic capital is not a figure commonly reported in any available database, we have created our own database based on annual reports of top fifty world banks of the year 2008. Based on this database we provide an extensive empirical study focused on years 2007-2010. Even though one third of the banks disclose economic capital only, thanks to our approach combining both quantitative and qualitative analysis we were able to study the topic in detail. Within quantitative part the development of economic capital and its allocation is studied, the differences between regulatory and economic capital in time is measured, a relationship between quality of economic capital disclosure and rating is searched for and relationship between the value of economic capital and changes in profits during financial crisis is studied. The qualitative part consists of case studies of fourteen banks. It is focused on special and unique features of economic capital management of individual financial institutions.

Plusieurs trillions de dollars d’actifs sous gestion : tel est le poids de l’industrie des hedge funds dans le système financier. Acteurs indispensables des marchés, les hedge funds sont pourtant des créatures méconnues. Réservés aux investisseurs professionnels ou qualifiés, ils ont longtemps tiré partie d’exemptions et échappé à une trop forte contrainte réglementaire. La crise financière de 2008 a bouleversé ce schéma et fait apparaître, en Europe et aux États-Unis, une même volonté d’encadrer davantage ces structures, par le biais de leurs gestionnaires. Aussi cette étude propose-t-elle une analyse comparée des dispositions introduites en la matière par la directive AIFM et par le Dodd Frank Act. Après un nécessaire éclairage sur cette industrie de l’ombre, elle examine les apports des deux textes, les confronte avant d’en dégager forces et faiblesses. Le traumatisme de la crise a fait émerger un double impératif : mieux protéger les investisseurs et prévenir le risque systémique. C’est à la lumière de ces deux objectifs que la seconde partie s’attarde sur le bien-fondé des réformes, leur portée réelle ainsi que leurs limites. Cette vue d’ensemble de la régulation applicable aux gestionnaires de hedge funds est également prétexte à une réflexion plus large sur la régulation financière, ses finalités, ses contours et ses défis. Nous concluons sur une feuille de route pour un acte II de la directive AIFM et formulons plusieurs propositions, en particulier l’interdiction totale de commercialisation auprès d’investisseurs de détail et la création d’une base de données mondiale du risque systémique. / The hedge fund industry manages several trillion dollars in assets. Though they are key players of the financial system, hedge funds remain mysterious creatures. Available only to professional or qualified investors, they managed, for a long time, to take advantage of exemptions and to avoid a heavy regulatory burden. The 2008 financial crisis profoundly changed perspectives and led the European Union and the United States to introduce new regulations targeting hedge funds, through their managers and advisers. This study is a comparative analysis of such regulations, brought about by the AIFM Directive and the Dodd Frank Act. After a brief overview of the industry, both texts are examined and compared so as to identify their respective strengths and weaknesses. Two imperatives emerged out of the crisis: increasing investor protection and preventing systemic risk. In light of these two objectives, part II discusses the validity of the reforms, their scope and their limits. This extensive analysis of hedge fund regulation also leads to broader remarks on financial regulation, its aims, contours and challenges. Finally, a roadmap for a revised version of the AIFM Directive is proposed and concrete measures are suggested, such as the total prohibition of marketing to retail investors and the creation of a global database of systemic risk.

Les hedge funds sont devenus des acteurs incontournables des marchés financiers et, pourtant, ils demeurent toujours inconnus ou «mal connus» à la fois par le grand public, les régulateurs et les juristes. À l’heure du bilan de la directive AIFM qui avait pour ambition de proposer une réglementation ambitieuse de l’industrie des hedge funds au sein de l’Union européenne, il convient de revenir sur ces entités dont l’histoire, les stratégies, le statut juridique, les caractéristiques et le régime juridique demeurent, encore, flous. La thèse vise à proposer une définition et un portrait-robot précis des hedge funds via leur identification par leurs caractéristiques, qu’elles soient propres ou empruntées à d’autres entités. Un hedge fund n’est pas un fonds de gestion collective ni une forme juridique à part entière. Un hedge fund peut revêtir tout type de forme sociale et sera communément considéré comme tel dès lors que l’entité s’emploiera à adopter certaines stratégies d’investissement et disposera d’une structure de rémunération et organisationnelle particulière. Ces dernières sont des indices permettant la caractérisation d’un hedge fund dont la nature juridique est quasi-exclusivement celle d’un fonds.Le hedge fund en tant que fonds est, selon le droit français, dépourvu, à tort, de la personnalité juridique alors même qu’il dispose de tous les attributs juridiques nécessaires à une telle reconnaissance. La présente étude démontre que le législateur français a ôté la personnalité juridique à la forme sociale originelle du hedge fund en droit français alors que les arguments en faveur de cette reconnaissance étaient plus convaincants. Un hedge fund en tant que fonds s’apparente davantage à une société hybride qu’à un numéro de compte. Cette théorie s’appuie principalement sur l’argument selon lequel il existe une personnalité morale embryonnaire où la personnalité juridique serait graduelle selon l’entité concernée. / Hedge funds have become key players in financial markets and are still unknown or « poorly known » by the general public, regulators and lawyers. At the time of the review of the AIFM directive which aimed to propose an ambitious regulation of the hedge fund industry within the European Union, it is necessary to return to these entities whose history, strategies, legal status, characteristics and legal regime remain, still, unclear. The thesis aims to propose a definition and an accurate robot portrait of hedge funds through their identification by their characteristics. These characteristics are both specific to hedge funds and borrowed from other entities. A hedge fund is not a collective fund or a legal form in its own right. A hedge fund can take any legal form and will be commonly considered as such when the entity strives to adopt certain investment strategies and will have a particular compensation and organizational structure. These characters are clues allowing the characterization of a hedge fund whose legal nature is almost exclusively that of a fund. However, the hedge fund as a fund is, under French law, wrongly deprived of legal personality even though it has all the legal attributes necessary for such recognition. The present study demonstrates that the French legislature removed the legal personality from the original social form of the hedge fund in French law while the arguments in favor of this recognition were more convincing. A hedge fund as a fund is more like a hybrid company than an account number. This theory is based mainly on the argument that there is a cohabiting legal personality where the legal personality is gradual depending on the entity concerned.