Thesis advisor: David M. DiPasquale / This paper is an exploration of al-Ghazali's attack on philosophy by way of an examination of his autobiographical epistle, "The Rescuer from Error." In this text written late in his life, al-Ghazali advises a young student about the best way to pursue knowledge. The thesis argued below is that his project is to re-form Islam around the Sufi mystics, and that he attacks philosophy as a threat to Islam; meanwhile, he covertly attempts to preserve philosophy as a study which can aid the mystics by refining their mystic knowing and providing an antidote to the poisonous error of the multitude. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

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There are many negative preconceptions about Islam and especially how Islam affects men and women. Women are often described to be subjugated by Islam. Sufism is Islamic mysticism and has been described as one way to give women the same opportunities as men. This thesis examines and compares how men and women are portrayed in texts written by two prominent Sufi mystics, Muhuiddin Ibn ’Arabi and Abu-Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali. To achieve this, I have analyzed one text of each author with a qualitative content analysis. Then I have compared the results to see if there are any differences or similarities in their way of describing men and women. The theory that has been used is Yvonne Hirdman’s gender theory. The aim of the thesis is to come to a greater understanding of whether Ibn ‘Arabi and al-Ghazali increase or decrease differences between men and women in their writings. Hirdmans gender theory says that by increasing differences between men and women it negatively affects gender equality. The aim is also to examine if they support the subjugation of women. The analysis shows that al-Ghazalis writings contribute to increase differences between men and women and he also supports the subjugation of women in his text. The majority of Ibn ‘Arabis writings does not describe men and women in a way that increases differences between men and women or subjugates women.

In this thesis, I compare the intellectual trajectories of René Descartes (c. 1596 – 1650) and Abū-Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (c. 1058 – 1111). In Part I, I begin by considering their initial skeptical phases, where the two thinkers are at their most similar, philosophically, methodologically and narratively. I argue that while they begin their projects almost identically, especially in their methods and course of argument, they nonetheless differ in crucial respects. I locate the principal difference to be in their particular uses of the dream. While al-Ghazālī uses the dream to doubt reason itself, Descartes uses it merely to doubt sense-perception and particulars. I analyze this difference by drawing distinctions between dream consciousness and waking consciousness, local and global states of illusion, and which position in time each thinker argues from. I conclude Part I by showing how, despite arriving at the same formal, global skeptical conclusion, our two philosophers nonetheless arrive at it in characteristically different ways. In Part II, I consider how the two thinkers attempt to defeat skepticism. I pay particular attention to their epistemological, phenomenological and metaphysical claims, and their negotiations between reason, experience and the supra-rational. In virtue of comparing their parallel journeys out of skepticism’s void, I am able to argue that the substantive content of their skeptical phases is integral to their positive conclusions. I show that their positive conclusions are direct inversions of those early skeptical structures. More generally, I argue that skepticism –– to its own demise –– is never empty of content.

This dissertation explores the moral and spiritual role of the self-assessing emotions of shame and pride in the works of Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī (c. 1058-1111) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). In my analysis of their ethical and religious views on these topics, I demonstrate their great debt to Aristotle’s treatment and his ethics and moral psychology more broadly. Nevertheless, I also point to ways in which they adapted Aristotle’s views on shame and pride to their religious commitments. Aristotle understood shame as an emotion that, while praiseworthy, cannot be considered a virtue in the full sense since it presupposes wrongdoing. The virtuous do nothing wrong and, therefore, have nothing of which to feel ashamed. Pride or, more precisely great-souledness, is for Aristotle “the crown of the virtues,” since to be great-souled is to be great in every virtue and to think oneself worthy of great honor. By contrast, both al-Ghazālī and Aquinas describe shame not only as a praiseworthy emotion but also as a religious virtue. That is, as an emotion felt before God, shame is a good disposition of the soul that results in good actions. Furthermore, they described pride as a sinful emotion and trait of the vicious.   I argue that the dissimilarities between al-Ghazālī and Aquinas’s views and those of Aristotle on these self-assessing emotions result from their different metaphysical frameworks. More specifically, I argue that the three main metaphysical frameworks sustaining their respective views of shame as a virtue and pride as a vice are 1) a Big God Theory; 2) a deflationary account of the self; and 3) acknowledgement of Theistic causal moral luck. By showing the link between metaphysical/religious frameworks and the valence of self-assessing emotions such as shame and pride, this dissertation contributes to contemporary discussions on the influence of religion on moral commitments in general and on views on moral emotions, more specifically. It also points to ways of understanding shame as a virtue within a Western secular society. Properly defined, the virtue of shame speaks to a widely held intuition that accurate moral self-assessment, in both positive and negative senses, contributes significantly to a life of moral integrity. / 2024-11-07T00:00:00Z

Tradition is characterised by the dynamics of simultaneous innovation and continuity. The Islamic tradition is a case-in-point where its internal elements are reconstructed through transmission, reception and interpretation. A vast body of texts, rituals and institutions, I contend has been subject to scrutiny and modification by Muslim scholars. Muhammad al-Ghazali’s works are examined, alongside those of his predecessors and peers, in this study for the purpose of establishing the facets of continuity and innovation in his thought. Twentieth century Muslim reformers such as al-Ghazali were heirs of the turath (Arabo-Islamic heritage) constructed over a period of 14 centuries. The tendency of tajdid (renewal) is implicated in a web of authoritative texts, juristic methods and moral norms. Calls to revive the practice of ijtihad (independent judgement) to interpret Islamic law, enveloping ethics and politics, were motivated by the search for the authentic spirit of Islam in the past. This search was also accompanied by the recovery of the ideal norms contained in the texts of the Shari’ah (the way). Reformist thinking since the eve of the twentieth century has privileged the maqasid al-Shari’ah (objectives of the Shari’ah) to varying degrees. In this study, I consider a range of Muslim scholars from the classical period until the present who espoused the ethos of tajdid. Moreover, I seek to propose an alternative reading of tradition contrary to the account of a dynamic modernity and a static tradition. The application of tradition as a concept of interpretation in this study seeks to situate al-Ghazali’s thought in the broader current of tajdid part of a vibrant past. I aim to provide a thick description of the works of al-Ghazali as an important example of a reformist venture maintaining the continuity of tradition. Additionally, the examination of a diversity of Muslim scholars aims to illustrate the patchwork composition of tradition in the past and the present.

The Female Voices of Islam is arguing for feminism to be regarded as a theory instead of an ideology so that the voices of contemporary female Muslims can be heard. This paper reviews the arguments of four such women: Amina Wadud, Fatima Mernissi, Asra Q. Nomani, and finally Zainab al-Ghazali. Collectively their discourses support equality for men and women within the Islamic tradition, while their individual ways of approaching the subject differ dramatically. Wadud and Nomani support the theory that an egalitarian ethic can be found in the roots of the Islamic tradition, in both text and ritual. Mernissi investigates how economic evolution of Islamic society stimulates a shift in spatial boundaries for Muslim women. Al-Ghazali does not address female inequality within the tradition, but advocates an egalitarian ethic through the example she sets in Egyptian society. She is concerned with a world wide observance of “true” Islam.

Scholars, philosophers, and theologians have debated the compatibility of Hellenic Philosophy with Islam since the eighth century CE. In his book Averroes et l’Averroisme (1852), Ernst Renan identified Tahāfut al-Falsifa by al-Ghazali and Tahāfut al-Tahāfut by ibn Rushd as the two key texts resolving the issue: the Islamic world accepted al-Ghazali and fell into decline, while Europe accepted ibn Rushd (Averroës) and experienced the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Renan’s argument has endured among Arab liberal intellectuals over the past one-hundred sixty years, but using ibn Rushd as the mascot for Arab Rationalism has failed to inspire anything resembling asecond Nahda. Two contemporary Arab intellectuals, Mohammad ʿAbed al-Jabari and George Tarabichi, have engaged in their own dialogue about the works of al-Ghazali’s and ibn Rushd’s and whether or not Averroism can effect real change in the modern Arab world. This paper examines the works of al-Ghazali, ibn Rushd, Renan, al-Jabari, and Tarabichi in their historical, cultural, and geographical contexts to conclude that the solution to the problems of the modern Arab world, if one exists, does not lie solely within the works of ibn Rushd. / text

La question de la philosophie et de la religion que nous allons traiter ici n’a cessé, depuis le troisième siècle de l’hégire jusqu’à nos jours, de préoccuper les chercheurs de tous bords et de toutes origines. Il ne fait aucun doute que celui qui entreprend une recherche dans ce domaine va devoir faire face à de vraies difficultés. En effet, faire la différence entre les philosophes, les religieux et les théologiens n’est pas chose aisée. La religion et la philosophie sont considérées comme des activités de réflexion qui tentent chacune, avec ardeur et selon sa méthode propre, d’atteindre la vérité. Elles aident l’individu à comprendre les énigmes de la vie, sa complexité, certains secrets qu’elle comporte, et à vivre une vie naturelle.La religion vise à aider ses adeptes à bénéficier de la vie, à composer avec la réalité et ses différents niveaux de complexité, à travers une incitation et de façon consciente. Elle les pousse aussi à considérer cette vie d’ici-bas comme une station avant une autre vie. Quant à la philosophie, elle cherche à aider ses partisans à jouir de la vie en les exhortant à faire face à leurs difficultés croissantes, à développer leurs capacités rationnelles et à pratiquer la contemplation consciente, de même que la réflexion scientifique. Elle ne considère pas que l’homme doive abandonner cette vie pour une vie future promise par la religion. Ainsi, la philosophie peut saisir la vie de manière générale et expliquer ses subtilités, mais elle ne peut pas inventer une société différente des autres, harmonieuse et régie par les mêmes valeurs. La religion se distingue en revanche par sa capacité à créer des sociétés cohérentes qui partagent les mêmes dogmes, les mêmes valeurs et les mêmes traditions qui garantissent l’unité. Ainsi, si la religion vise à établir des sociétés vertueuses, la philosophie n’a pas vocation à bâtir des sociétés se fondant ou non sur des valeurs. Cependant, ni la religion ni la philosophie ou toute autre idéologie sociale ou politique ne peuvent ne pas subir la logique de l’histoire et son évolution permanente. Nous avons étudié cette question chez deux philosophes du cinquième et du sixième siècle de l’hégire, à savoir al-Ghazâlî et Ibn Rushd, du fait que cette époque a été une période charnière dans l’histoire de la philosophie islamique al-Ghazâlî un jurisconsulte, un spécialiste des fondements du droit, un philosophe et un des plus célèbres penseurs de l’islam. Il a vécu dans la deuxième moitié du cinquième siècle de l’hégire c'est-à-dire, durant la période que les historiens qualifient de la troisième époque abbasside. Ibn Rushd, lui aussi, philosophe, médecin jurisconsulte et juge est né en 1126. En effet, il a passé son enfance et une partie de sa jeunesse sous le pouvoir des almoravides, et le reste de sa vie sous la dynastie des almohades. al-Ghazâlî et Ibn Rushd sont deux grandes écoles de pensée qui représentent l’Orient et le Maghreb. Ils ont beaucoup écrit, et grandement contribué à l’évolution de la philosophie islamique, et à la progression du dialogue entre la rationalité et la spiritualité. al-Ghazâlî a critiqué les philosophes sur leurs positions qui étaient en contradiction avec les fondements du dogme islamique, et cela sur des points précis qu’il a exposé dans son ouvrage Tahâfut al-falâsifa. Ces critiques portent, comme il l’indique lui-même, sur les fausses conclusions fondées sur des hypothèses justes et inversement sur des conclusions exactes à partir d’hypothèses fausses. Dans la pensée islamique, certains savants anciens avaient l’habitude de mettre des barrières entre la spiritualité d’al-Ghazâlî et la rationnalité d’Ibn Rushd.Toutefois, nous pensons que cette opposition n’a pas de raison d’être, d’autant plus qu’il est avéré que la rationalité d’Ibn Rushd et la spiritualité d’al-Ghazâlî sont nécessaires et fondamentales pour la recherche de la vérité d’ici bas et celle de l’au-delà. / The question of philosophy and religion we are treating here has continuously been preoccupying researchers from all sides and from all backgrounds, since the third century AH until now. There is no doubt that those who undertake research in this area will have to face real difficulties. Indeed, making the difference between the philosophers, the theologians and the religious people is not an easy task. Religion and philosophy are considered reflective activities that attempt both, in their own way, to reach the truth with enthusiasm. They help the individual to understand the riddles of life, its complexity, some secrets it has, and to live a natural life. Religion aims to help its followers to enjoy life, to deal with reality and its different levels of complexity, consciously and through an incentive. It also urges them to consider this earthly life as a station before another life. As for philosophy, it seeks to help its supporters to enjoy life, urging them to cope with their increasing difficulties, to develop their rational capacities and to practise conscious contemplation, as well as scientific thinking. It does not consider that man must give up this life for a future life promised by religion. Thus, philosophy can capture life in general and explain its subtleties, but it cannot invent a society different from others, harmonious and governed by the same values. Religion stands in contrast with its ability to create cohesive societies sharing the same dogma, the same values and the same traditions that ensure unity. Thus, if the religion aims to establish virtuous societies, philosophy is not intended to build societies based on values or not. However, neither religion nor philosophy or any other social or political ideology can avoid undergoing the logic of history and its constant evolution. We studied this question in two philosophers of the fifth and sixth century of the Hegira, namely Al-Ghazâlî and Ibn Rushd, considering the fact that that era was a pivotal period in the history of Islamic philosophy.Al-Ghazâlî, a legal adviser, a specialist of the foundations of law, a philosopher and one of the most famous thinkers of Islam. He lived in the second half of the fifth century AH that i.e. during the period historians call the third Abbasid era. Ibn Rushd, a philosopher too, a physician and legal adviser was born in 1126. In fact, he spent his childhood and part of his youth in the power of the Almoravids and the rest of his life under the Almohad dynasty. Al-Ghazâlî and Ibn Rushd are two major schools of thought that represent the East and the Maghreb. They wrote, and contributed a lot to the development of Islamic philosophy and the progression of the dialogue between rationality and spirituality. Al-Ghazâlî, on specific points outlined in his book al-Tahafutfalâsifa, criticized philosophers in their positions that were in contradiction with the fundamentals of Islamic dogma. As for Ibn Rushd, in his criticism addressed to Al-Ghazâlî, he limited himself to what the latter wrote in his book, and only on some issues related to his methodological approach. Ibn Rushd considers the title of Al-Ghazâlî al-Tahafutfalâsifa's work portative, in the sense that fo rAl-Ghazâlî, everything is not inconsistent in philosophers. In Islamic thought, some ancient scholars used to put barriers between Al-Ghazâlî's spirituality and Ibn Rushd's rationality. Some have argued that Al-Ghazâlî completed the Islamic philosophical reason, and others are defending the need to promote Ibn Rushd's rationality. However, we believe that the opposition has no reason to be, especially as it’s proven true that Ibn Rushd's spirituality and Al-Ghazâlî's rationality are necessary and fundamental to the pursuit of truth in this world and the hereafter.

Orientador: Carlos Arthur Ribeiro do Nascimento / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-04T01:47:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Verza_TadeuMazzola_D.pdf: 16646602 bytes, checksum: de4b43a0ee813196f1bd05a8d62d1712 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004 / Resumo: Esta tese é uma análise da primeira discussão do Tahãfut al-tahãfut de Averróis (1126-1198), que trata da pré-eternidade do mundo. O Tahãfut consiste num comentário refutatório ao Tahãfut al-falãsifa de al-Ghazali (1058-1111), obra que, na primeira discussão, visa refutar a posição dos filósofos em favor da pré-etemidade do mundo. Esta tese, portanto, não apenas analisa a defesa de Averróis da pré-etemidade do mundo, mas também sua posição frente aos argumentos de Ghazali, que defendem a criação do mundo a partir do nada e refutam sua pré-etemidade. Pretende-se, também, mostrar que o modo pelo qual Averróis visa defender os argumentos dos filósofos é o fio condutor da primeira discussão / Abstract: This thesis is an examination of the first discussion of Averroes' Tahãfut altahãfut about the pre-eternity of the world. The Tahãfut is a commentary that refutes AI-Ghazali's Tahãfut al-falãsifa, which intends in the first discussion to refute the philosophers' defense of the pre-etemity of the world. Therefore, this thesis analyses not only Averroes' defence of the pre-etemity of the world, but also his position on Ghazali's arguments defending the creation of the world out of nothing and refuting its pre-eternity. It is also intended to show that the way Averroes defends the argument of the philosophers is the conductive thread of the first discussion / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia