Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Heidelberg, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.

La politique et le droit de la concurrence ont pour objet de contrôler le comportement des opérateurs dans le marché. Du fait des effets pervers des ententes illégales à l’économie et à la société, la majorité des autorités de la concurrence autour du monde surveillent sérieusement ce genre de comportement. Néanmoins la Thaïlande est à la traîne. Cette recherche cherche la réponse à la question « pourquoi la politique et le droit de la concurrence ne sont pas efficaces en particulier dans les économies en transition ? ». La politique et le droit de la concurrence aux niveaux local (Thaïlande), régional (ASEAN) et international (OMC, OCDE, CNUCED et RIC) ont été traités, car ils reflètent les finalités du gouvernement à l’égard du marché économique. A fortiori, la démocratie , la corruption, la culture des affaires, l’influence abusive de l’administration des entreprises et des hommes politiques, le système judiciaire et législatif, la capacité des autorités concernées, le soutien financier, l’engagement du gouvernement, la responsabilité civique, l’arrangement institutionnel, le respect du droit de la concurrence des entreprises, la coopération des autorités aux niveaux local, régional et international sont autant de facteurs majeurs influençant le régime de la concurrence. En conclusion, il faut d’abord avoir la politique de la concurrence et ensuite le droit de la concurrence, la compétence d’autorité de la concurrence, l’efficacité d’implémentation des lois et les mécanismes exécutoires et non exécutoires / The competition policy and law are introduced to control the companies’ behaviors that restraint competition. The majority of the authorities from all around the world monitor this kind of behavior very closely and carefully because of the perverse effects of illegal agreements (Cartel) that hinder the economy and society. Given that Thailand is lagging behind. This research seeks for the answer to the question "why competition policy and law are not effective particularly in transition economy?". The competition policy and law at the local level (Thailand), regional level (ASEAN) and international level (WTO, OECD, UNCTAD and ICN) were analysed to reflect the aims of the government in the economic market. A fortiori, the political system (Democracy), the business culture and the bribery, the compliance of competition law by enterprises, the misuse of power by administrative agency and politicians, the judicial and legislative system, the capacity of the authorities, the financial support, the commitment of the government, civil responsibility, the institutional arrangement, the cooperation of the authorities at the local, regional and international level are all the major factors influencing the effective competition regime. In conclusion, first of all, the competition policy and law were required before the competition authority is established, followed by the effectiveness of implementation of laws and the binding and non-binding mechanisms

The overall purpose of this study was to evaluate the current status of the Sherman Act's application to the professions, with emphasis on the accounting profession. This was further stated as two purposes. 1. The primary purpose was to interpret the historical development and current status of the most important defenses used in the courts by the professions and professionals against alleged violations of the Sherman Act. 2. The second purpose was to evaluate the relative importance of variables, including the defenses used, that have affected the outcomes of court cases involving alleged violations of the Sherman Act.

No description available.

published_or_final_version / Law / Master / Master of Philosophy

<p>Denna uppsatts ämnar ge bättre förståelse för företagsstrategier som kan, och har blivit be-visade, strida mot konkurrenslagarna i USA samt Europa. Konkurrenslagarna har skapats för att upprätthålla perfekt konkurrens på marknaden. Konsumentnytta står ofta i fokus när vi ska definiera den perfekta marknadsplatsen. Vi kommer att se hur perfekt konkur-rens är skapad och sedan krossat med fusioner, kombinationsförsäljning och försök att bygga monopolistiskt övertag. För att vinna marknadsandelar och differentiera från kon-kurrenter på marknaden använder sig företag av olika strategier. Här kommer vi att se kvantitetsättade strategier samt produktbindande strategier.</p><p>Denna studie fokuserar på Microsoft fallet där vi får följa företaget genom rättsprocesserna i USA och Europadomstolen, där företaget har använt sig av tekniska inställningar för att tvinga konsumenter fortsätta använda deras produkter. Microsoft har större delen av marknaden för persondatorer och har bevisligen utnyttjat sin monopolistiska position på marknaden för att exkludera konkurrenter från marknaden. Många ekonomer har påstått att Shermanakten är tillräckligt utförlig för att döma alla konkurrensfall, medan andra påstår att man inte kan applicera konkurrenslagarna vid Microsoft fallet då nätverkseffekter skapar en odefinierbar marknad.</p><p>Utmaningen visar sig vara att jämföra värdet och standardiseringsfördelarna med skadan mot marknadskonkurrenter. De nuvarande konkurrenslagarna förutsätter, i de flesta avse-enden, att det är fler än en aktör som tillsammans agerar för att bestämma prissättningen på marknaden. Det har därför varit svårt att se hur Microsoft skulle kunna bryta mot dessa la-gar som en ensam aktör. Konkurrenslagarna är skapade för kunders nytta, och det finns inga bevis att Microsoft hämmar detta, tvärtom har Microsoft bara främjat konsumentnyt-tan.</p>

How did EU and US legislation go from initially appearing to be the same, if not mirroring each other, to differing significantly in their execution of competition legislation goals? Why did the US take a more authoritative tone in enforcing interstate competition legislation? And if the EU is so inclined to mimic US policies 50 years ago, why didn’t their competition enforcement take the same form today? I hypothesize that the US and EU’s legislative history with regulating governmental supremacy is part of the clue to answering for these differences.

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

The main goal in this paper is to make an in-depth analysis of the regulatory situations that can arise during mergers when political involvement takes place. The research is based on four controversial merger cases of undertakings within the same country (E.On-Ruhrgas), European Union countries (E.On-Endesa, Unicredit-Hypoverein) and between companies from the USA (Boeing-McDonnell Douglas) that have effect on the European market. We analyze the four mergers using Michele Ruta and Massimo Motta models from the paper "A Political Economy of Merger Policy in International Markets" (2008). By the end of the research we reached the conclusion that due to some lapses in the European Commission Merger regulation at the time of the mergers, as well as due to government involvement in the mergers, they are not always cleared in the benefit of the market competition or consumer welfare, but due to nationalistic interests of governments to have big players on the market or to keep governmental power in certain industries, even with the risk of harming competition. Along with this, from the mergers analyzed here, it becomes clear that local or union authorities scrutinize the foreign acquirers more.

The purpose of my thesis is to analyse the state of private enforcement of competition law in the European Union and the Czech Republic by taking into consideration the proposals set forth in the Green and White Paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules issued by the European Commission which were inspired by the U.S. system of private enforcement of antitrust law. Further on, the possible impact of the implementation of such proposals into Czech law will be assessed and experience of Member states will be considered. The dynamic development of this area of law and the never ending political and legal debate on the possibilities of private enforcement in Europe was the reason for why I have chosen to write my thesis on this topic. The thesis is composed of eight chapters, each of them dealing with different aspects of private enforcement of competition law. Chapter One is introductory and is divided into three parts. Part one tackles the difference between public and private enforcement. Part two deals with the evolution of the concept of damages claims and introduces the most relevant decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The third part identifies the problems occurring with damages claims. Chapter Two examines the question of applicable law. Chapter Three...