The amphibious operation, one of the most complex operations one can undertake, compriseall services and is regarded as the precursor of today’s joint operations. Though questioned, leading theoretics on the subject are convinced that the amphibious operation´s unique ability to exploit mobility and provide access will remain relevant in the foreseeable future. This thesis examine dominant theories on amphibious assaults and extracts the fundamental principles upon which they rely. These are then tested on two cases, Operation Shingle and Operation Chromite. Robert Leonhard´s Maneuver theory is presented as an alternative theory. The thesis concludes that maneuver theory can explain success where amphibious theory fails. Moreover, Surprise and exploitation thereof seem to be the most valuable principlesfrom the amphibious theoretics. Those two relate closely to maneuver theory´s preemption, dislocation and disruption

An amphibious assault can open new fronts and totally change the operational and strategic situation. Amphibious assault often depends on the principles of surprise and tempo.   The principles of war, surprise and tempo are the main focus in this thesis. The context consists of the operational type, amphibious assault. The main problem that the study will try to answer is the paradox that theorists highlight these principles as essential conditions for amphibious operations, but they have not developed specifically why and how. In this context it is interesting because there are a number of paradoxes between the type of operation and the principles.   To be able to examine the principles a higher degree of concreteness has to be applied. This is done by examining what other modern theorists has developed on the principles. The most prominent factors then become the thesis operationalized indicators that provides the analysis tool for the thesis. The theory will then be tested by analysing two case studies, Operation Shingle in Anzio and Operation Chromite in Inchon.   The result shows that the indicators of surprise consists of unexpected acting, diversion and operations security. The results of the case study regarding this comes to the conclusions that unexpected acting and operation security are key factors. The indicators of tempo are rapid decision-making and quick physical movement. The case study result indicates that both are criterias for success and are based on a mutual relationship between the indicators.

This thesis deals with the life and career and intimate life of Francis Carroll Grevemberg, an antiaircraft World War II officer from New Orleans, Louisiana. Grevemberg joined the Louisiana National Guard in 1932 and began his military career in the midst of the Great Depression. In the reorganization of the U.S. Army before World War II, the War Department transformed Grevemberg's cavalry regiment into a coastal artillery battalion with antiaircraft capability. During World War II, Grevemberg saw continuous action in the North Africa, Italy and Southern France. He regularly wrote letters from battlefields to his wife Dorothy. These letters provide a important window into a young officer's feelings, thoughts and affection in the unfolding of World War II. They are documents of a soldier's emotional release during times of crises. Lt. Col. Grevemberg is a rare, World War II antiaircraft artillery officer who took part and survived five amphibious landings in the Mediterranean.

This is an analysis of the U.S. Army's personnel decisions in the Second World War. Specifically, it considers the U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall's appointment of generals to combat command, and his reasons for relieving some generals while leaving others in place after underperformance. Many historians and contemporaries of Marshall, including General Omar N. Bradley, have commented on Marshall's ability to select brilliant, capable general officers for combat command in the war. However, in addition to solid performers like J. Lawton Collins, Lucian Truscott, and George S. Patton, Marshall, together with Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lesley J. McNair, often selected sub-par commanders who significantly underperformed on the battlefield. These generals' tactical and operational decisions frequently led to unnecessary casualties, and ultimately prolonged the war. The work considers six case studies: Lloyd Fredendall at Kasserine Pass, Mark Clark during the Italian campaign, John Lucas at Anzio, Omar Bradley at the Falaise Gap, Courtney Hodges at the Hürtgen Forest, and Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. at Okinawa. Personal connections and patronage played strong roles in these generals' command appointments, and often trumped practical considerations like command experience. While their superiors ultimately relieved corps commanders Fredendall and Lucas, field army and army group commanders Clark, Hodges, and Bradley retained command of their units, (Buckner died from combat wounds on Okinawa). Personal connections also strongly influenced the decision to retain the field army and army group commanders in their commands.