一般創投業者對於公司的評估，因為公司內部人與外部投資人存在「資訊不對稱」(asymmetric information)的問題，投資人必須承擔資訊不對稱的風險，尤其是新創事業或未上市公司，由於未有適當的機制規範，資訊不對稱的情形更為嚴重。因此，對於從事新創事業投資的創投業者而言，其所面臨的風險除了非系統性風險外，也增加了資訊不對稱的風險。由於新創事業的投資風險相當的高，創投與創業家的合作是建立在互信的基礎上，若創業家為了吸引資金的投入而刻意隱藏或扭曲內部真實狀況，造成創投在投資後發現投資案不符預期，將對創投與創業家互信的基礎產生不利的影響。因此，創投或外部投資人在評估投資案時，如何降低資訊不對稱的風險是非常重要的事情。 本研究主要是站在資訊不對稱的立場，探討創投業在投資時面臨的問題，並嘗試發展出「資訊不對稱評估機制」，藉由提出一套新的篩選評估方法作為企業投資評估之輔助工具，解決因為資訊不對稱的問題導致投資者與被投資企業可能發生的衝突。期盼創投或一般投資人在投資的過程中，透過適當的機制來處理資訊不對稱的問題，希望能藉此機制來降低資訊不對稱的風險，增加投資人投資判斷的正確性，進而作出更有利的投資決策；對投資人而言，也可藉提供額外有關風險之資訊，成為考量投資對象之參考依據。

Bakgrund och problem: Underprissättning har länge studerats, och fenomenet har konstaterats förekomma i en absolut majoritet av de studerade länderna. Trots detta råder ingen konsensus kring vilka teorier som förklarar underprissättning. Teorier för underprissättning är i huvudsak indelade i teorier baserade på symmetrisk eller asymmetrisk information, och de empiriska resultat som presenterats målar en spretig bild med resultat som går både emot och ger stöd för flera teorier. Mot bakgrund av den motstridighet som föreligger för teoretiska förklaringar till underprissättning har vi valt att studera ämnet noggrannare. Syfte: Studiens syfte är att, med utgångspunkt i motsägande empiriska resultat, utreda vilka olika teoretiska incitament som kan förklara underprissättning för att skapa en bättre förståelse för den komplexitet som föreligger inom teoribildningen för underprissättning. Metod: Vi applicerar i studien en kvantitativ forskningsmetodik där vi, i linje med internationella referensstudier, väljer att använda en multipel regressionsanalys med minstakvadrat-metoden för att kunna testa vilka teorier som är applicerbara för att förklara underprissättning. Vi approximerar teorierna via variabler med tillhörande hypoteser för att mäta dess individuella och ackumulerade effekt på underprissättning. Via hypotesprövning möjliggör vi en koppling mellan det statistiska resultatet och respektive teori. Slutsats: Studiens resultat stödjer såväl teorier baserade på symmetrisk som asymmetrisk information vilket illustrerar komplexiteten i fenomenet underprissättning. Med utgångspunkt i resultaten av den statistiska modellen förs en analys där teorier frikopplats från symmetri respektive asymmetri, och istället analyserats simultant. Denna analys presenterar en alternativ syn på teori kring underprissättning, där teorier tillhörande symmetrisk respektive asymmetrisk information inte är ömsesidigt uteslutande, vilket introducerar ett nytt sätt att se på teoretiska förklaringar för underprissättning. / Background and problem: Underpricing has been subject to studies for many years, and the phenomena have been observed on a vast majority of studied countries. Despite the fact that studies have been conducted, there is no consensus as to which theories might best explain underpricing. Theories explaining underpricing are mainly divided into either symmetric or asymmetric information, and the empirical results presented testifies to the theoretical discrepancy, with support for and against several theories. The theoretical discrepancy is the main reason as to why we choose to closer examine the phenomena. Purpose: The purpose of this study is, based upon contradictory empirical results, to investigate as to which different theoretical incentives can explain IPO underpricing in order to create a better understanding of the complexity regarding theory for IPO underpricing. Methodology: In the study we apply a quantitative research method in which we, similar to international reference studies, use a multiple regression analysis with an ordinary least squares approach in order to test which theories are applicable in order to explain underpricing. We approximate the theories using variables with belonging hypotheses to quantify the variables individual and accumulated effect on underpricing. Using hypothesis testing we enable a connection between the statistical results and theories explaining underpricing. Conclusions: The study’s result support both theories based upon symmetric and asymmetric information which illustrates the complexity of the phenomenon of underpricing. Based on the statistical results the authors conduct an analysis in which theories are discarded from the context of symmetric and asymmetric information and are instead analyzed simultaneously. This analysis presents an alternative view of underpricing theories, in which theories belonging to symmetric as well as asymmetric information no longer are mutually excluding, which introduces a new approach to theoretical explanations for IPO underpricing.

This thesis presents two chapters on credence goods and one on ongoing partnerships in an infinitely repeated game. The chapters on credence goods focus on the welfare and efficiency of equilibria in overcharging models of credence goods, something which has not been explicitly addressed before. The chapter on partnerships presents a theory explaining ongoing partnerships as solving a commitment problem for clients. There is a small literature on partnerships, and this chapter represents a novel but complimentary approach to that literature. At core, chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis ask the following questions respectively: Do competition and information increase welfare in credence goods markets? How do customers in credence goods markets discipline experts from committing fraud? Can these strategies be welfare ranked? Why do ongoing partnerships exist? What problem do they solve?

L’objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer, d’un point de vue théorique, à la compréhension des raisons du succès très médiatisé du microcrédit dans les pays du Sud afin d’analyser les conditions de son efficacité pour les pays du Nord. Dans le premier chapitre, nous cherchons à identifier les facteurs clés du succès constaté des prêts de groupe, pratique dominante dans les pays du Sud, pour démontrer que ces conditions spécifiques sont difficilement réunies dans les pays du Sud eux-mêmes, et sans doute encore moins dans les pays du Nord. Pour y arriver, nous procédons à une présentation descriptive des principales modalités de prêts de groupe, suivie d’une analyse théorique de leurs mécanismes incitatifs en mobilisant notamment les travaux de Ghatak (1999), Ghatak et Guinnane (1999) et Guttman (2008). Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous nous intéressons à la pratique alternative de microcrédit de type « entrepreneurial », plus adaptée à l’environnement socio-économique assez complexe des pays industrialisés et utilisée dans une perspective de promotion du travail indépendant. Il s’agit d’une pratique qui consiste à coupler le microcrédit avec un encadrement des clients financés. Après avoir précisé les enjeux et les spécificités de cette pratique, nous proposons un modèle analytique qui rend compte de divers effets induits par l’encadrement inclus dans l’offre de microcrédit. Nous montrons finalement que fournir un encadrement aux clients financés pour soutenir l’offre de microcrédit, ce n’est pas la panacée. L’efficacité de cet encadrement est liée en particulier à celle des mécanismes de contrôle des institutions de microfinance (IMFs) pour la sélection des projets financés, sinon l’encadrement peut être porteur d’un biais négatif (ou effets pervers). L’intervention des autorités publiques se justifie alors, via notamment trois mesures de subventions que nous spécifions, afin d’agir sur les incitations des acteurs et améliorer l’efficacité globale du dispositif. / The objective of this thesis is to contribute, from a theoretical viewpoint, in the understanding of the reasons of the highly publicized success of microcredit in developing countries in order to analyze its efficiency conditions in developed countries. In the first chapter, we seek to identify the key factors of the observed success of group loans, a prevailing practice in developing countries, to demonstrate that they themselves hardly meet these specific conditions and that developed countries satisfy such conditions with even more difficulties. For that, we conduct a descriptive presentation of the main terms in group lending, followed by a theoretical analysis of the incitative mechanisms based on the work of Ghatak (1999), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Guttman (2008). In the second chapter, we focus on an alternative microcredit practice, which is entrepreneurial-like, more appropriate to the rather complex socioeconomic climate of industrialized countries and used in the intent of promoting self-employment. It is a practice that involves matching a microcredit with mentoring funded clients. After pinpointing the stakes and the specificities of this practice, we suggest an analytical model that takes into account the various effects induced by the mentoring included in microcredit supply. Finally, we show that providing mentoring to funded clients in order to sustain microcredit supply is no panacea. The efficiency of this mentoring is specifically linked with the efficiency of the control mechanisms of the microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the selection of the funded projects; otherwise, mentoring may generate a negative bias (or perverse effects). Government intervention is then justified, mainly via three subsidy measures that we put forth, so as to act on the incentives of the participants and to improve the overall efficiency of the mechanism.

[pt] Tendo em vista a importância das fontes de financiamento das empresas brasileiras inserida num contexto de particularidades e características do mercado brasileiro, e num contexto de juros baixos internacionais, esse trabalho visa a analisar os determinantes da estrutura de capital das empresas de capital aberto listadas na Bovespa (Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo) no Brasil no período de 2004 a 2006. Há de se levar em consideração que o período estudado foi atípico uma vez que o mercado de emissão de ações no Brasil renasceu em 2004 e permaneceu aquecido nos últimos três anos, contrariando a Pecking Order Theory, de que a última alternativa cogitada para o levantamento de fontes seria a emissão de ações. Segundo a teoria, tenta-se evitar ao máximo a entrada de novos acionistas na atividade da empresa. Entretanto, entre 2004 e 2006, 81 empresas recorreram à bolsa e boa parte delas não tinham um alto endividamento e hoje estão com uma dívida líquida baixa. Esse estudo visa também a investigar se existe uma diferença entre esses fatores determinantes quando se discrimina as empresas de maior das de menor porte. O referencial teórico baseia-se nas teorias dos custos de agência, hierarquia de preferência por fontes de financiamento (pecking order theory), na teoria fiscal, teoria da sinalização e na trade-off theory. Dos diversos fatores determinantes propostos na literatura, elegemos alguns fatores quantitativos para analisar empiricamente suas importâncias e validades. Os fatores eleitos foram a influência das variáveis de controle, tamanho da empresa, lucratividade, tranqüilidade dos ativos e oportunidades de crescimento sobre a estrutura de capital das empresas brasileiras. / [en] In view of the importance of the sources of financing of the Brazilian companies, and taking into account the context of particularities and characteristics of the Brazilian market and the context of low international interest rates, this work aims to analyse the determinants of capital structure of Brazilian companies listed in Bovespa (Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo) in the period between 2004 and 2006. One should bear in mind that the period under study was not typical, once the IPOs in Brazil were reborn in 2004 and remained heated in the last three years, contrasting with the Pecking Order Theory, which defends that the last financing alternative would be the issue of shares. According to this theory, the entrance of new shareholders is avoided to the last extent. However, between 2004 and 2006, 81 companies used the stock market for funding and most of them did not have high levels of debt and remain nowadays with low net debt. This study also aims to investigate if there is a difference between the determinants of capital structure, in case larger and smaller companies are discriminated. The theories studied encompass the cost of agency theory, the pecking order theory, the fiscal theory, the signaling theory and the trade-off theory. Out of the many factors determinants of the capital structure proposed, we selected a few of them, mainly quantitative, to analyse empirically its relevance and validity. The factors in question were: the influence of control, company size, profitability, assets tangibility and growth opportunities concerning the Brazilian companies.

Desde os trabalhos de Modigliani e Miller (1958, 1963), os estudos sobre a estrutura de financiamento das empresas ganharam impulso sem, contudo, desenvolver-se num horizonte único. Pelo contrário, novas linhas de pesquisa foram desenvolvidas, com previsões teóricas sendo comumente testadas empiricamente. Neste sentido, este trabalho busca avançar neste campo de estudo, a fim de promover alguma contribuição acerca do entendimento da estrutura de capital das empresas. Em especial, este trabalho adota a abordagem relacionada com a assimetria de informação entre provedores de recursos (credores e acionistas) e os gestores dessas empresas. Adota-se a governança corporativa (G.C.) como um meio de minorar os efeitos dessa assimetria informacional pois, uma das premissas pelas boas práticas de G.C. é a redução de assimetria de informação entre os financiadores e os tomadores de recursos na empresa. Pela aplicação de um método de verificação empírico em uma amostra de empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, encontraram-se evidências de que a G.C. atua como um meio de acesso a outras fontes de financiamento, pois as empresas com melhores práticas de G.C. apresentaram menor endividamento. Entretanto, os resultados apresentam sensibilidade à técnica estatística utilizada, sendo assim necessário maior aprofundamento em futuras pesquisas sobre a forma como verificar as previsões teóricas. / Since the Modigliani and Millers works (1958, 1963), the studies about the capital structure got a impulse, without development in a single way. In contrast, new lines of research had developed, with theoretical forecasts commonly tested empirically. In this way, this work aim contribute in this field of study and give some advance on the understand in the choice of capital structure by the enterprises. Specially, this work adopt the asymmetric information line of research between who finance (creditors and shareholders) and that uses the capital. It is adopted the corporate governance (C.G.) as a mechanism the minimize the effects of this asymmetric information between who give and get the capital. By the application of a method of empiric verification in a sample constituted by enterprises with shares negotiated in the market, was found evidence that C.G. facilitates the access of other financing form than debt. Then, enterprises with better practices of C.G. would have less debt. But, the results are sensible to the statistic method used, then, it is necessary a deep in future research that could verify the theoretical previsions.

Cette thèse étudie de manière théorique les déterminants et les conséquences économiques de la transmission d'information entre agents rationnels.Un agent possède une information privée sur un état du monde, émet un message qui est observé par un agent a priori non informé, et ce dernier décide d'une action à prendre. L'information éventuellement transmise est sans engagement, sans coût et sans possibilité de vérification.L'état du monde et l'action impactent l'utilité des deux agents.Il y a possibilité de transmission d'information dans la situation d'équilibre où l'association d'un message à un ensemble d'états du monde induit l'action qui la détermine.La nature des équilibres est en général conditionnée par le conflit d'intérêt des agents, qui est la distance entre leur action préférée, étant donné l'état du monde.Dans les trois chapitres de la thèse, nous considérons un état du monde et une action bi-dimensionnels, une révélation d'information utilisant deux messages à l'équilibre, et nous supposons que l'utilité de l'agent non informé décroît avec la distance euclidienne entre l'état du monde, qu'il ne connait pas a priori, et son action.Le conflit d'intérêt des agents est alors la distance entre l'état du monde et l'action préférée de l'agent informé, qu'il ne décide pas.Chaque chapitre étudie l'impact de différents facteurs conflictuels sur les conditions d'existence d'équilibres informatifs.Dans le premier chapitre, nous étudions l'impact de la prise en compte, par l'agent informé, d'une complémentarité des deux dimensions de l'état du monde. Dans le second chapitre, nous étudions l'impact d'un biais constant de l'agent informé relativement à l'action préférée de l'agent non informé. Enfin, dans le troisième chapitre, nous étudions l'impact d'un intérêt croissant pour associer une action plus grande à un état du monde plus grand. / We investigate how information is transmitted and processed between rational agents, from a theoretical perspective.An informed agent holds private information on a state of the world, sends a message which is observed by an uninformed agent, who takes a decision.Information transmitted is without commitment, at no cost and unverifiable.State and action impact both agents' utility.There is information transmission in equilibrium when the relationship between messages and states induces the action that precisely generates the relationship.In the three chapters, we consider a two-dimensional state, a two-dimensional action, an information revelation that uses two messages in equilibrium, and we assume that the uninformed agent's utility function is decreases with the euclidean distance between state and action.Then agents' conflict of interest simplifies to the distance between state and the most highly preferred informed agent's action.In each chapter, we investigate how specific conflicting features of the agents' utility functions impact the equilibrium existence conditions.In chapter 1, we investigate the impact of complementarities between the dimensions in the informed agent's utility. In chapter 2, we investigate the impact of a constant bias of the informed agent with regard to the uninformed agent's preferred action. In chapter 3, we investigate the informed agent's incentives to exaggerate more with an higher state.

Esse trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a sensibilidade do investimento ao fluxo de caixa de 356 firmas brasileiras de capital aberto no período de 1997-2010, considerando a estrutura de propriedade e controle. As firmas são classificadas a priori entre subinvestimento e superinvestimento, e reagrupadas conforme o nível de oportunidades de investimento do setor industrial. Com uma versão do modelo acelerador de investimento, estimado pelo método GMM System, o estudo mostra que essa sensibilidade poderia sinalizar oportunidades de investimento, problemas de agência do fluxo de caixa livre e problemas de assimetria de informação. Particularmente, discute-se que o superinvestimento pode ser oriundo tanto dos problemas de agência do fluxo de caixa livre quanto ser uma sinalização ao mercado do volume de oportunidades de investimento. Além disso, também é investigado se firmas com controle familiar, estruturadas como pirâmides e pirâmides controladas por família têm influência sobre o volume de recursos próprios aplicados para financiar os investimentos. As estimativas mostram que os investimentos das firmas consideradas com subinvestimento e grandes oportunidades de investimento podem não ser sensíveis ao fluxo de caixa quando o excesso de direito de voto sobre o direito de propriedade do maior acionista é baixo. Por outro lado, para as firmas consideradas com superinvestimento e poucas oportunidades de investimento, o controle familiar e a pirâmide controlada por família poderiam intensificar essa sensibilidade, caso o controlador detenha níveis extremos de excesso de controle. Esse estudo proporciona evidências de que a maior aplicação de recursos próprios nos investimentos das firmas com superinvestimento e grandes oportunidades de investimento seria, principalmente, uma característica de firmas familiares com o menor desvio entre o direito de voto e o direito de propriedade. Como uma análise adicional, o presente estudo investiga se a relação entre a sensibilidade do investimento ao fluxo de caixa e o excesso de controle do maior acionista é não linear. Os resultados estimados evidenciam a não linearidade dessa relação, exceto para as firmas piramidais familiares classificadas com superinvestimento e poucas oportunidades de investimento. / This study investigates the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a sample of 356 Brazilian listed firms on the period of 1997-2010, considering the ownership and control structure. Firms are grouped into underinvestment and overinvestment, and re-classified according to industrial investment opportunities. Using a version of the accelerator investment model, estimated by the System GMM, the results show that the investment-cash flow sensitivity may indicate asymmetric information, investment opportunities and agency problems of free cash flow. Specifically, it is discussed that the overinvestment may be signaling high investment opportunities or agency problems of free cash flow. The purpose of this study is also investigate whether family control, pyramidal ownership structure, and pyramidal controlled by families (pyramidal-family firms) can influence the level of internal capital used to finance investments. The results show that the investment of underinvestment firms with high industrial investment opportunities may be not sensitive to cash flow when the excess of control rights over cash flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholder is lower. However, for overinvestment firms with low industrial investment opportunities, the family control and pyramidal-family may intensify the investment-cash flow sensitivity when the excess of control rights is high. For lower levels of excess of control rights, the results support that higher investment-cash flow sensitivity of overinvestment firms with high industrial investment opportunities may signal profitability potential of family firms. As an additional analysis, it is also investigated whether the relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity and the excess of control rights is non-linear. The results confirm the non-linearity of this relationship, except to pyramidal-family firms into the overinvestment group with low industrial investment opportunities.

Este trabalho investiga como os modelos de comunicação e informação podem contribuir para analisar o relacionamento entre empresas pertencentes à rede de cooperação e seus fornecedores. O foco da pesquisa limita-se aos modelos de assimetria de informação, tais como: teoria do agente e principal, seleção adversa e risco moral. Esses conceitos são importantes para mostrar os problemas que podem vir a ocorrer nas transações entre compradores e vendedores. Com o intuito de minimizar esses problemas, este trabalho se propõe a analisar o impacto da tecnologia de informação (TI) na redução das assimetrias de informação. O enfoque será na análise do comércio eletrônico entre empresas (B2B), especificamente, os e-marketplaces verticais. Por fim, é apresentado um estudo de caso no setor da construção civil em que algumas das maiores construtoras brasileiras têm como proposta compartilhar custos e riscos para o desenvolvimento de um e-marketplace. A conclusão da pesquisa é de que a abordagem de redes de cooperação, incorporada ao uso adequado de ferramentas de TI permite diminuir as assimetrias de informação e conseqüentemente fortalecem o poder de compra das empresas que compõem à rede / This work investigates how the information and communication models can contribute to analyze the relationship among enterprises from cooperation network and their suppliers. The focus of research is limited to asymmetric information models, such as: principal-agent theory, adverse selection and moral hazard. These concepts are important to show the problems that can occur in transactions between buyers and sellers. Considering ways to minimize that problems, this work proposes analyze the impact of information technology (IT) to reduce asymmetric information. The study will focus in analyze e-commerce B2B, specially, the vertical e-marketplaces. Latter, a case study is presented in civil construction sector which some huge brazilian building construction have proposed to share costs and risks for the development of an e-marketplace. The conclusion of this research is that interorganizational cooperation network approach, incorporated with proper use of IT tools allows the decrease of asymmetric information and consequently strenghtens the purchase of enterprise that belongs to the network

As negociações na fase pré-contratual permitem às partes determinarem de que forma certa operação econômica será concretizada e cumprida por cada um dos particulares, materializando-se como importante ferramenta para as partes estabelecerem, consensual e racionalmente, as melhores alternativas em termos de eficiência que estão à disposição. Inexistem rigidez e regramento específico no processo negocial, estando seu desenvolvimento submetido aos interesses e às pretensões de cada um dos negociantes, e o seu resultado varia de acordo com o tipo de negociação, as estratégias adotadas e o poder de barganha individual. Não obstante, há outros fatores que também condicionam o desenrolar e o desfecho deste processo, mas em geral impedindo a obtenção de resultados tão benéficos quanto os que poderiam ser alcançados em um paralelo livre de ineficiências. Em um mundo factual as partes precisam lidar com as adversidades existentes nas negociações se desejarem concluir o contrato e dele se beneficiar, seja por meio de medidas particulares ou por intermédio de soluções regulatórias, as quais têm a missão de fornecerem adequados incentivos para sua aplicação tornar-se socialmente desejável. Além disso, em virtude de as negociações serem norteadas pela autonomia de vontade e liberdade contratual, sem deveres de vinculação, os atos de exercício destes direitos devem ser medidos para que não produzam lesões ao patrimônio jurídico dos demais envolvidos nas tratativas. Tal controle é exercido pela incidência da boa-fé objetiva na fase pré-contratual, a qual impõe deveres de conduta aos particulares durante as negociações. Também é a regra da boa-fé o supedâneo da responsabilidade civil para recomposição dos prejuízos advindos de situações que malfiram a confiança gerada ao longo das tratativas, daí que o conteúdo da indenização nestas hipóteses deve considerar as justas expectativas criadas pelas partes e ser balizado para que o lesado não acabe em situação melhor do que estaria se o eventual contrato tivesse sido concluído e integralmente cumprido. / Negotiations in the pre-contractual stage allow the parties to determine how a certain economic operation will be carried out and fulfilled by each of the individuals, and is an important tool for the parties to establish, in a consensual and rational manner, the best alternatives available in terms of efficiency. There is no rigidity or specific regulation in the negotiation process, in such way that its development is submitted to the interests and the pretensions of each one of the traders, and its result varies according to the type of negotiation, strategies adopted and individual bargaining power. There are other factors that also condition the unfolding and outcome of this process, but generally preventing the achievement of results as beneficial as those that could be achieved in an inefficiency-free parallel. In a factual world, the parties need to deal with the adversities in the negotiations if they wish to conclude the contract and benefit from it, either through particular measures or through regulatory solutions, which have the task of providing adequate incentives so that their implementation is socially desirable. Moreover, because the negotiations are guided by the autonomy of will and contractual freedom, without binding obligations, the exercise of these rights must be measured so that they do not produce damages to the legal patrimony of others involved in the negotiations. Such control is exercised by the incidence of objective good faith in the pre-contractual phase, which imposes conduct duties on individuals during the negotiations. It is also the rule of good faith the foundation of civil liability for the recovery of damages arising from situations that mislead the confidence generated during the negotiations, hence the content of compensation in these cases must consider the fair expectations created by the parties and be restricted so that the injured party does not end up in a better situation than it would have been if the contract had been completed and fully complied with.