本文利用國內投資人參與民國八十五年一月至八十九年四月間77家IPO競價拍賣的投標資料為樣本，來探討投資人過度自信以及自我歸因偏誤的情形。實證結果發現:過度自信假說於對個人投資人在初級市場的投資行為仍有適用，並且男女皆有過度自信的現象，但沒有足夠證據顯示男性較女性過度自信。最後當投資者上次報酬為正時，投資者會更積極的投標。而上次報酬為負時，對其下次投標標價的影響並不顯著。此點符合自我歸因假說的推論。

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents in complex environments. The first application of the multiagent system is to the study of sealed-bid auctions with two-dimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value percent increases, profit, revenue, and efficiency all decrease monotonically, but they decrease in different ways. Finally, I find that forcing revelation by the auction winner of the true common value may have beneficial revenue effects when the common-value percent is high and there is a high degree of uncertainty about the common value. The second application of the multiagent system is to the study of English auctions with two-dimensional value signals using agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal. The third application of the multiagent system is to the study of the optimal payment rule in Treasury auctions using Canadian rules. The model encompasses the when-issued, auction, and secondary markets, as well as constraints for primary dealers. I find that the Spanish payment rule is revenue inferior to the Discriminatory payment rule across all market price spreads, but the Average rule is revenue superior. For most market-price spreads, Uniform payment results in less revenue than Discriminatory, but there are many cases in which Vickrey payment produces more revenue.

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents in complex environments. The first application of the multiagent system is to the study of sealed-bid auctions with two-dimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value percent increases, profit, revenue, and efficiency all decrease monotonically, but they decrease in different ways. Finally, I find that forcing revelation by the auction winner of the true common value may have beneficial revenue effects when the common-value percent is high and there is a high degree of uncertainty about the common value. The second application of the multiagent system is to the study of English auctions with two-dimensional value signals using agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal. The third application of the multiagent system is to the study of the optimal payment rule in Treasury auctions using Canadian rules. The model encompasses the when-issued, auction, and secondary markets, as well as constraints for primary dealers. I find that the Spanish payment rule is revenue inferior to the Discriminatory payment rule across all market price spreads, but the Average rule is revenue superior. For most market-price spreads, Uniform payment results in less revenue than Discriminatory, but there are many cases in which Vickrey payment produces more revenue.

À cause des stratégies de production et de marketing de plus en plus ambitieuses tellesque le Juste-À-Temps et la production adaptée au client, les approches de collaboration logistique verticale qui sont courantes atteignent une limite d'efficacité notamment en transport. La collaboration logistique horizontale (CLH) et plus particulièrement la mutualisation, dont l'efficacité a été prouvée dans la littérature et dans les cas réels, a attiré l'attention des chercheurs ainsi que des praticiens. Cependatn, un des obstacles principaux à la mise en œuvre des CLHs est l'absence d'un mécanisme de collaboration raisonné, en particulier un mécanisme de partage des gains. Nous identifions deux formes d'organisation des CLHs : centralisée limité en pratique à de petites coalitions et décentralisée pouvant comprendre de nombreux participants. Pour des CLHs centralisées, nous proposons un modèle de collaboration qui est un processus de conduite qui intègre les outils d'aide à la décision. Nous développons également un mécanisme de partage par la théorie des jeux. Ce mécanisme est applicable aux différentes catégories des CLHs centralisées, qui peuvent être modélisées par des jeux coopératifs super-additif et non-super-additifs. Afin de proposer un plan de partage crédible aux collaborateurs, ce mécanisme de partage prend en compte la contribution de chacun des collaborateurs, la stabilité de la coalition et leur pouvoir de négociation. Ce cadre est illustré par des exemples numériques issus de cas logistiques. Pour la mise en œuvre des CLHs décentralisées, nous proposons un cadre de travail de logistique collaborative qui est ouvert aux participants potentiels, et avons conçu des protocoles fondés sur le mécanisme d'enchère combinatoire, qui spécifient l'allocation de demande de livraison et la détermination de paiement pour faciliter les collaborations. Cette dernière partie s'appuie sur la théorie dite de Mechanism design. / As the result of the more and more ambitious production and marketing strategies,such as Just-In-Time and increasing customization of products, the current vertical logistics collaboration approaches based on single supply chain seems insufficient to achieve further improvements in transportation efficiency. The horizontal logistics collaboration (HLC), which has been proved an effective approach to efficiency improvement, has attracted both academics and practitioners. One of the main barriers to the implementation of HLCs is the lack of feasible collaboration mechanism, in particular the gain sharing mechanism. We identify two organizational forms of HLCs: the centralized and decentralized ones. For centralized HLCs, we propose a collaboration model that is a collaboration conducting process integrating decision-aiding tools to guide the implementation of the collaboration. We also develop a generally applicable game-theoretic sharing mechanism for different categories of centralized HLCs modeled as super-additive and non-super-additive cooperative games. This sharing mechanism takes into account the collaborators' contribution, the coalition stability, and the bargaining power to propose a credible sharing scheme for collaborators. The approach is illustrated by numerical example taken from logistics cases. For the implementation of the decentralized HLCs, we propose an open collaborative logistics framework, and design the system protocols as the collaboration mechanism that specifies the combinatorial-auction-based request allocation and payment determination to foster the collaborations.

This paper analyzes, from an auction design perspective, the results of the auction of renewable energy that the Peruvian State has initiated since 2008, allowing to show significant results such as the introduction of new technologies for power generation with low CO2 emissions, competitive prices and high levels of competition. Although they are also shown the outstanding issues as the lack of clear direction and heading for future of renewable energy, as well as the need to strengthen institutions to create areas of renewable energies to integrate synergies around the energy transition. / El presente artículo analiza, desde la perspectiva del diseño de subastas, los resultados obtenidos en las subastas de energías renovables que el Estado Peruano ha iniciado desde el año 2008, permitiendo mostrar importantes resultados como la introducción de nuevas tecnologías de generación de electricidad con bajas emisiones de CO2, precios competitivos y altos niveles de competencia. También se muestran los temas pendientes como la falta de dirección y rumbo claros para el futuro de las energías renovables, así como la necesidad de fortalecer las instituciones para crear áreas de energías renovables que integren las sinergiasexistentes en torno a la transición energética.

Cette thèse a pour principal objectif d’étudier la nouvelle configuration de la valeur de l’art moderne et contemporain du Moyen-Orient, et plus précisément la perception qui s’est fait jour à partir du milieu des années 2000, où Dubaï serait devenu le lieu de fixation de la valeur économique et de diffusion de l’art à différents niveaux : national, régional et international. L’art visuel du Moyen-Orient, jusqu’alors limité aux scènes nationales et négligé sur la scène internationale, connaît une évolution locale ainsi qu’un rayonnement international inédit. La mutation innovante du monde de l’art de cette zone géographique repose, en général, sur l’implantation de maisons de vente et sur la formation d’un marché international pour l’art du Moyen-Orient à Dubaï. Ce nouveau dispositif a influencé non seulement l’écosystème du monde national de l’art, mais aussi le choix d’artistes, des commissaires d’exposition autant que des conservateurs des musées internationaux. L’accroissement de champ du marché est l’objet principal de cette étude, et l’ajustement du champ artistique un objet secondaire. En retraçant l’histoire des pays étudiés par une approche sociologique de l’art, il s’agira, d’abord, de cerner l’évolution quantitative et qualitative des galeries d’art visuel, après les avoir identifiées en tant qu’acteur multifonction du monde de l’art, en ce qui concerne trois pays emblématiques de l’art de la région : l’Iran, le Liban et les Émirats Arabes Unis ; ensuite, il s’agira d’analyser leurs activités internationales ainsi que leur rayonnement à la fois régional et international, avant la formation du marché de l’art de Dubaï en 2006 et jusqu’à 2015. La méthodologie employée pour ce travail sollicitera un certain nombre d’outils propres aux sciences sociales et humaines : l’entretien compréhensif, l’enquête quantitative, l’analyse typologique, l’étude documentaire et l’enquête de terrain : l’immersion et l’observation participante. / The main objective of the present doctoral thesis is to study the configuration of the value of Middle Eastern modern and contemporary art. More precisely, we look at how Dubai has emerged in international perceptions as the center for art appraisal and diffusion nationally, regionally and internationally. Middle Eastern visual arts, mainly limited to their national settings, have been overlooked on an international level. Today, we are witnessing their unprecedented emergence and appreciation on the international scene. The innovative mutation of the art world within this geographical zone is mainly due to the implantation of auction houses and the creation of an international market for Middle Eastern art in Dubai. These new measures have not only influenced the ecosystem of the art milieu on a national level, but have also impacted the choice of artists, exhibition commissioners and curators of international museums. The development of this market is the principal object of the present study and as a secondary object, we look at the adjustments made by the art world to adapt to this new art scene. Through the Sociology of Art approach, we retrace the history of three emblematic countries (Iran, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates) with the aim of understanding the quantitative and qualitative evolution of their visual art galleries identified as multifunctional actors of the art world. We then analyze their international activities as well as their expansion, regionally and internationally, before the creation of the art market of Dubai between 2006 and 2015. Our methodology is based on the research methods of the social sciences: comprehensive interviews, quantitative investigations, typological analyses, documentation review and field work through immersion and participatory observation.

O objetivo deste trabalho foi analisar o mercado de concessões de prestação do serviço de transmissão de energia elétrica do Brasil. Essa concessão dura trinta anos e, se for considerado que houve muitos interessados em ganhar as concessões, para a maioria dos leilões realizados até 2005 o resultado dos leilões podem ser considerados um grande sucesso. Esses leilões são recentes, se iniciaram em 1999. Antes disso o setor passava por dificuldades de investimento. Após reformulação de algumas leis, o setor elétrico deixou de ser dependente de financiamentos governamentais. O setor privado começou a investir de forma controlada nesses projetos de grande porte e a obrigação do governo passou a ser o de fiscalizar e formular as leis do setor. Como houve muitos interessados em prestar o serviço público, os leilões foram a forma escolhida para decidir qual era a empresa mais eficiente. Os leilões são descendentes de primeiro preço em dois estágios em que o primeiro estágio é secreto em envelope fechado. Caso a diferença entre o menor valor e os outros lances seja menor do que 5%, o leilão passa para o segundo estágio que ocorre em viva-voz. Como o objeto leiloado é uma concessão, o valor que os participantes tem de decidir não é o preço a pagar, mas sim o valor da receita máxima que a concessionária aceitará receber para prestar o serviço. Uma das características da transmissão que determinou o tipo de regulação a ser utilizado foi o fato da transmissão de energia elétrica ser um monopólio natural, por isso o valor cobrado dos usuários deve ser controlado. O valor desse único lance contém as expectativas dos agentes sobre o valor dos custos estimados para prestar o serviço, contém também as expectativas de lucro possível, da probabilidade de vitória do leilão dada a concorrência etc. A análise deste trabalho se concentra nos leilões realizados no período de 1999 até 2005 em que ocorreram dez leilões com várias linhas sendo leiloadas em cada leilão. Para determinar o que tornou esse mercado tão interessante para as empresas privadas, foram consideradas as características de cada empresa. A característica mais importante é a interdependência. Essa interdependência permite custos menores quanto mais projetos de transmissão a empresa possui, por isso os resultados do leilão podem ser determinados por essa característica especial. Além dessa variável, foram consideradas a concorrência, a competitividade entre os participantes, o tipo de empresa, ou seja, em que setor a empresa possui especialidade na realização de projetos e o fato dos leilões serem seqüenciais. / This work analised the concession market of electricity transmission lines in Brazil. This market was recently created by a major restructuring in the regulation laws. The reason for this change was the investment crisis that the sector was going through before 1999. Those concessions are decided by an auction and lasts for thirty years. It has been considered a major success, due to the interest of many companies in acquiring this permits. The government no longer invested on it but instead decided de the laws to control the sector. One of the key changes in the diferent aspect of the regulation the participation of the private sector. Investments were no longer dependent on government for financial suport. This alteration made the market more competitive, eficient and lucrative. The auctions are classified as a descending first-price with two stages. The first stage is made with a sealed bid and in case the diference of the lowest bid and the other bids are less than 5%, the auction goes to the second stage with a oral auction. The object auctioned is a permit to provide a public service for a period o time, so this is the reason the auction is descending one. The bids made by the participants is the value of a maximum annual income permited by the regulator. The reason for this maximum is a result of the fact that this public service is a natural monopoly. It prevents the concessionare to take advantage over it´s clients by charging a high fee when they don´t have a choice of another provider of this service. When the participants of the auctions choose the value of the bid, this only bid contains all of their expectations of costs, profits, the probability of winning the auction when considering the competition etc. This work uses the data of all the auctions of transmission lines that happened between 1999 and 2005. in this period ocorred ten auctions, with many lines auctioned in each one. In order to determine what made this market so interesting for private companies some caracteristics of those companies were considered. The results of this study finds that the most important caracteristic is interdependencies. It allows lower costs the many concessions the company owns. This result is so powerful that sometimes it may determine the winner of the auction. Other variables analised were the competitiveness of this sequential auctions, the competitiveness of the participants, the kind of work the company is specialized in, as a real option when deciding what kind of company to participate, for exemple, in a joint venture, and the benefits of this decision.

Submitted by Antonio Ferreira (primo.ferreira@globo.com) on 2013-08-02T02:04:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Marco Regulatório Petróleo_Antonio Ferreira.pdf: 766935 bytes, checksum: 130462476dcbdfbda36ca094c516be06 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-08-15T12:56:46Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Marco Regulatório Petróleo_Antonio Ferreira.pdf: 766935 bytes, checksum: 130462476dcbdfbda36ca094c516be06 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-15T12:56:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marco Regulatório Petróleo_Antonio Ferreira.pdf: 766935 bytes, checksum: 130462476dcbdfbda36ca094c516be06 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-05-27 / Esta dissertação analisa o marco regulatório brasileiro do petróleo e gás sob a ótica da Teoria Econômica e faz uma comparação entre o regime de concessão, instituído pela Lei 9.478/97, e o de partilha de produção, adotado após a descoberta do Présal através da Lei 12.351/10. As características do modelo de concessão brasileiro são revistas assim como os resultados obtidos no setor de Exploração e Produção ao longo dos últimos quinze anos. O estudo faz uma abordagem sucinta sobre a descoberta do Pré-sal que ocasionou a alteração do marco regulatório pelo governo brasileiro. Os problemas relacionados à incerteza, poder de incentivo dos contratos, assim como as falhas de mercado relacionadas à assimetria de informação, externalidade e especificidade dos ativos são analisados para ambos os regimes. Ao longo do estudo também são abordadas questões de ordem prática como a insegurança jurídica, o papel da agência reguladora e a mudança do perfil das empresas interessadas em investir no país. / This paper analyses the Brazilian Oil & Gas regulatory framework in light of the Economic Theory, making a comparison between the concession regime, implemented in 1997 by the Law 9.478, and the production sharing model, introduced in 2010 by the Law 12.531, after the discovery of the Pre-salt province. The characteristics of the Brazilian concession regime are revisited, as well as the effects of its implementation in the Exploration & Production sector during the last fifteen years. This study makes an overview of the Pre-salt discovery, which triggered the change in regulation by the government. The issues related to uncertainty, contract incentives, and market failures related to asymmetric information, externalities and sunk costs are examined for both regimes. Also, the paper covers practical questions like the legal uncertainty, the role of the regulatory agency and the change in the profile of the companies interested in investing in Brazil.

Submitted by Milton Saito (milton.saito@gvmail.br) on 2013-09-11T03:21:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-MiltonSaito.pdf: 8406128 bytes, checksum: 2c7b006b9cca9d097d0ee1116e898ef2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2013-09-11T13:27:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-MiltonSaito.pdf: 8406128 bytes, checksum: 2c7b006b9cca9d097d0ee1116e898ef2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-09-11T13:28:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-MiltonSaito.pdf: 8406128 bytes, checksum: 2c7b006b9cca9d097d0ee1116e898ef2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-14 / Essa dissertação tem como objetivo a modelagem, implementação e a simulação de um mercado de leilão duplo artificial utilizando a abordagem multiagente. Mercado de leilão duplo permite que ofertas de compra e de venda possam ser feitas a qualquer momento e de forma contínua. As bolsas de Nova Iorque (NYSE) e de Chicago (CME) são exemplos deste tipo de leilão. Mercados artificiais são modelos que têm o objetivo de capturar as propriedades dos mercados reais para reproduzir e analisar a dinâmica do mercado através de experimentos computacionais. Assim como no mercado real, o modelo propõe que os agentes interagem entre si assincronamente em sessões de negociações contínuos. Estas últimas características do modelo são viabilizadas através do uso de técnicas e arcabouços tecnológicos que são atualmente utilizados nos mercados reais. Neste trabalho, são investigados os comportamentos do mercado artificial para diferentes grupos de agentes e parâmetros. Ao longo dos experimentos foram constatados que o volume de negociação e a volatilidade dos preços, por exemplo, são diretamente proporcionais ao orçamento dos agentes. Também foram identificados alguns fatos estilizados nas séries de preços geradas a partir do mercado artificial. / The purpose of this work is to model, implement and simulate a double auction artificial market using a multi-agent approach. Double auction markets allow offers to buy and sell to be made at any time and in a continuous fashion. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) are examples of exchanges that adopt this type of auction. Artificial markets are models that aim to capture the properties of real markets to reproduce and analyze the market dynamics through computational experiments. As in real markets, the model proposes that agents interact asynchronously in continuous trading sessions. These features are made possible by using modern techniques and technological frameworks currently used in real markets. In this work, we investigated the behavior of a artificial market using different groups of agents and parameters. Throughout the experiments it was identified that, for example, trading volume and price volatility are directly proportional to the agents' budget. Also, some stylized facts were identified on the price series generated by the artificial market

摘　要 電子商務行動化已變成趨勢，而消費者個人間的C2C交易市場也越來越受到注目，尤其是讓使用者輕鬆上架商品、簡化繁複流程的新型態行動拍賣App，更是熱門議題。本研究欲了解台灣目前C2C行動拍賣App中，最具話題性及代表性的「蝦皮拍賣」之顧客體驗流程，研究方法採半結構式深度訪談法，以使用網路購物經驗超過五年以上且使用蝦皮經驗滿三個月以上、同時具有買家跟賣家雙重身分之使用者為研究對象。 本研究主要發現如下：1.使用蝦皮的正向使用經驗在於有清楚直觀好用的使用者介面、擁有即時性及雙向互動並保有使用者隱私性的即時通訊「聊聊」功能、採用可降低風險的第三方支付、因免運費帶起的方便性物流選擇-超商寄貨取貨、讓賣家寄件步驟簡化的整合寄件物流以及使資訊透明的物流追蹤。2.初次使用動機則是受到免運費吸引及社群口碑推薦影響。3.持續使用因素除了涵蓋正向使用經驗因素外，還包括常有免運費或運費補助的促銷活動、同時身兼買賣家身分、因平臺上商品及賣場多而選擇性高及免費的商品置頂推廣功能。4.蝦皮的待改進項目則在於商品上架過程從簡易變複雜、評價多為制式評價因此參考價值有限、推播通知字數多易遭使用者忽略。本研究並且透過「顧客歷程地圖」來綜觀傳統網路拍賣流程的問題，並以訪談內容對照以往流程上的階段，檢視蝦皮是如何提升顧客體驗。 最後，根據訪談發現，提出蝦皮可思考之改善建議為： 1.加速刊登功能及改良照片上傳便利度。2.提供誘因讓使用者填寫真實評價並改進評價機制。3.推播通知精簡及圖像化。4.從後勤面降低物流成本。5.透過推薦系統提升使用者黏著度。本研究以使用者角度出發，建議企業應站在使用者的角度來思考使用者需求，才有機會提供更好的顧客體驗，持續吸引使用者，本研究之發現希望有助於行動電商平臺往後策略發展時的參考。 / Abstract E-commerce has become a universal sales trend that has spread from consumers shopping on their home computers to shopping on their mobile phones through the use of various shopping apps. Much attention has been placed on consumer C2C transactions, especially with respect to consumers’ access to store goods. Simplifying this access, which can be a complicated process, through a new mobile auction app is a highly relevant issue. This study aims to understand the customer experience flow of the most current representative C2C mobile auction app in Taiwan from Shopee Taiwan Co. Ltd. This study adopts a semi-structured depth interview method for users that have over five years of Internet shopping experience in total, and at least three months of experience with the Shopee Mobile Auction App. Both buyers and sellers are classified as users in this study. The main findings are as follows. 1) Positive experiences with the Shopee Mobile Auction App are due to its clear and intuitive user interface, instant messaging two-way interaction availability, high degree of user privacy, third-party risk reduction payment systems, and convenient logistics through the availability of free shipping. Consumers have the option to pick up their goods at local convenience stores, which simplifies the shipment process for sellers, and leads to a clear and streamlined logistics process. 2) The initial motivation for consumers is the reward of free shipping and public recommendations. 3) The factors behind the continuous use of this mobile auction app service include the positive experience, the free shipping or freight subsidy promotional activities that are often included for both the buyer and seller, the wider product selection than what is offered in physical stores, and the offers for promotional free products with the purchase of related goods. 4) The Shopee Mobile Auction App still leaves something to be desired, including: (a) The processures of putting the items for sale have become time-consuming due to more and more requrements. (b) Standardized evaluations and rating systems may limit reference values. (c) Current promotional messages sent via app notification are easily ignored by users. This study uses the customer journey map to take a broad view of issues related to the traditional online auction process, and uses customer experience-based interviews to examine how the Shopee Mobile Auction App improves on these issues. Finally, based on conducted interviews, several suggestions for improvement of the Shopee Mobile Auction App include the following: 1) increasing the speed of new feature releases, and improve the convenience of the photo upload process; 2) providing promotional incentives for users to complete the evaluation, thereby improving the evaluation mechanism; 3) streamlining push notifications and images; 4) reducing logistical costs; 5) improving user loyalty through implementing a recommendation system. This study simultaneously considers both sides of C2C commerce (i.e., the sellers and buyers). It focuses on the user point of view, as selling platforms need to be aware of the opportunity to provide a better customer experience, which will in turn attract more users. The findings from this study can assist mobile platform creators with their future development strategies.