Denna studie behandlar de statliga intressen som bidrar till att Nato fortsätter att vara en attraktiv institution för stater, då hotet den bildades för att möta har försvunnit. Jag har utgått ifrån min hypotes att det finns varierande intressen hos staterna beroende på deras kapacitet och maktposition i systemet, som gör det lönsamt för staterna att fortsätta verka inom institutionen. I studien används realismen för att finna och identifiera dessa intressen hos USA, Frankrike och Polen som alla är medlemmar av Nato, men även den liberala institutionalismen avvänds som ett komplement till realismen. Mina resultat bekräftade min hypotes om staternas egenintressen i organisationen, och visade att Nato främst är en arena för staterna att utöva och utöka sin makt och sitt inflytande över andra stater. I USA:s fall handlar det om att fördröja och kanske förhindra att ett europeiskt försvarssamarbete tar form och utvecklar kapacitet att utmana deras unipolära ställning. De två andra staterna har valt att två olika hållningar mot USA, där Frankrike använder sig utav balancing för att begränsa USA:s inflytande och Polen använder sig utav en bangwagoning strategi gentemot USA, för att vinna fördelar. / This essay considers the national interests of the states who are members in NATO and their incitement to continue their membership, though the threat that the alliance was formed to counter has dissolved. With a starting point in my theory I have derived a hypothesis that there are self – centred interests of the states that would explain the persistence of Nato, and these interests varies between the states because of their different capacities and power position. For this study I have used the realist theory to find and identify these self – centred interests within USA, France and Poland who all are members of NATO. I have also used the liberal institutional theory to complement the realist theory. As a result of this essay I found that my hypothesis was valid, and showed that NATO was primarily an arena for the states to exercise and pursue power and influence. I found that the US interest in NATO primary concerns the possibility to delay or prevent the Europeans to adapt a European security organisation that might challenge the US unipolar position. France and Poland has adopted different strategies against the US. France has adopted a balancing strategy to oppose the US, while Poland is bandwagoning with the US to gain some advantages.

En établissant une relation entre une stratégie d’alliance et la mise en œuvre d’une politique étrangère dans un espace géographique limité, l’auteur entend interpréter des intentions (géo)politiques et place son étude en discussion avec les travaux théoriques centrés sur les rapports de force. Il reconstruit le contexte de la décision polonaise de faire alliance avec les Etats-Unis et montre l’importance de savoir si les comportements d’alliance et d’alignement sont connectés dans la logique des alliances ou si ce sont deux catégories exclusives l’une de l’autre. Il propose ensuite une relecture de la politique orientale polonaise en prenant notamment en compte l’histoire de la Pologne ainsi que les conceptions de ses élites dirigeantes afin de montrer que la stratégie d’alliance avec les Etats-Unis peut être comprise comme l’instrument privilégié de la politique orientale polonaise. Enfin, il identifie les paramètres qui permettent à la fois de corroborer l’existence d’une alliance polono-américaine opérante dans l’espace post-soviétique et d’estimer sa durabilité. Le cas polonais montre qu’il ne faut pas considérer tous les Etats comme s’ils étaient des puissances satisfaites qui cherchent surtout à maximiser leur sécurité plutôt que leur puissance, et qu’il est indispensable de penser le phénomène des alliances (géo)politiquement, historiquement, mais aussi culturellement pour être en mesure d’éviter le piège des faux paradigmes dont sont porteurs des discours construits a posteriori. / By establishing a connection between an alliance strategy and the implementation of a foreign policy in a limited geographical area, the author means to interpret (geo)political intentions and place his study in the context of theoretical works focussing on balance of power. He recontextualises the Polish decision to establish an alliance with the United States and shows the importance of knowing whether alliance and alignment behaviours are connected in the logic of alliances or whether they are two mutually exclusive categories. He then proposes to reconsider Polish eastern policy, paying particular attention to the history of Poland and the thinking of its ruling elites in order to demonstrate that the strategy of alliance with the United States can be regarded as the main instrument of Polish eastern policy. Finally, he identifies the parameters that make it possible both to confirm the existence of a Polish-American alliance operating within the post-Soviet area and to estimate its durability. The example of Poland shows that not all States can be regarded as self-satisfied powers mainly striving to maximise their security rather than their power and that the phenomenon of alliances must be considered in (geo-)political and historical, but also cultural terms in order to avoid the trap of false paradigms to which post facto discourses are prone.

This diploma thesis is focused on issues of economic diplomacy of ASEAN countries, depending on the conflict in the South China Sea. The first part describes the development of this conflict and explains possible interactions between ASEAN countries and China through the concepts of balancing, bandwagoning and hedging. It arouses the theoretical assumptions of the reactions of the states to the deteriorating security situation in the South China Sea. The practical analytical part is dedicated to the exploration of economic relations between China and ASEAN countries quantitatively through the use of statistical data as well as qualitatively. Finally, the main results are interpreted and the conclusions drawn.

The main aim of diploma thesis "China - real threat for American hegemony?" is to answer the question whether China is trying to threaten American position of world hegemon. After the dissolution of USSR and the fall of Iron Curtain USA became the only world superpower. Balance of power theory assumes that the occurrence of leading actor in the system will invoke attempts of others to balance the power of the leader, or to weaken him. In current world political system there are powers whose power potential is growing. One of them is China, mainly because its fast growing and prospering economy. Author of the thesis works with the concept of hegemony based on hard and soft power and three types of exercising of power - three faces of power - as means of achieving its goals. Author analyses Chinese use of hard and soft power resources, that can be classified under three types of use of power. All policies are then examined from "balance of power" theory view. Author tries to find out which one of behavior "balancing" attempts to balance, weaken USA or "bandwagoning" - support of USA is prevailing in Chinese policies. According to the prevailing tendency of Chinese behavior towards USA the author is capable to state whether China can be considered as a threat for US hegemony.

Conventional wisdom states that, in response to a rising threat, weaker states may choose either to balance against, or to bandwagon with, the threat. However, the states in Southeast Asia, in response to a rising China, exhibit behavior that conforms neither to pure balancing nor bandwagoning. This senior thesis seeks to understand why that is the case, and argues that, in a world of ambiguity, the domestic level of analysis becomes of greater importance in explaining state behavior.

Small states tend to use different security strategies to increase and gain influence over their own level of security. Sweden is a small Nordic state with a long history of proclaimed neutrality when it comes to security policy. But in the last couple of decades the country has increased its contributions to, and participations in, numerous EU and NATO security projects and exercises. In 2009, Sweden adopted a declaration of solidarity towards the member countries of the EU. In 2014, Sweden also signed a memorandum of understanding with NATO. This has ignited bothan internal and an external debate among political scientists and security experts about what the Swedish security strategy is. This paper seeks to describe and clarify the Swedish security strategy by analyzing documents on security policy from the Swedish government. The study also examines the level of continuity in the Swedish security strategy. Based on a theoretical framework of security strategies of small states, the study utilizes three ideal types of the small state security strategies balancing , bandwagoning and hedging to analyze and describe the Swedish security strategy. The study concludes that the Swedish security strategy as it is presented in two official documents on security policy ranging from 2009 to 2015 mostly indicates balancing . The willingness to strengthen the Swedish military capacity and theeagerness for cooperation with the EU, NATO and USA clearly indicates balancing towardsRussia, a state which is described as a security threat in both documents. However, there are also tendencies towards hedging due to the insistence of armed neutrality in both documents. The study also shows that while there is a high degree of continuity in Sweden’s security strategy there has been a small shift in strategy towards more balancing from 2009 to 2015.

BILL, Simon. Bandwagoning with the Belt and Road: Russia's changing attitude towards the Chinese presence in Central Asia post-Crimea. Praha, 2019. 78 pages. Master's thesis (Mgr.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of International Studies. Department of Russian and East European Studies. Supervisor Prof. Jan Šír, Ph.D. Abstract Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has considered the Central Asian states to be a part of its exclusive sphere of influence. In recent years, however, China has also increased its presence in the region, investing heavily in the energy and transportation sectors. This is exemplified by its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), specifically its Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) component, which was launched in September 2013. As China increased its presence in the region, and Russia launched its own initiative, the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), the two powers seemed to be on a collision course. However, relations between the two never deteriorated as predicted. Instead, the opposite has happened. In 2015, Russia found itself internationally isolated due to its controversial actions in Ukraine and embraced China's initiative. This dissertation will seek to explain Russia's increasingly accommodating attitude towards China's growing investment and influence...

Lebanon is seen as a failed state by the international community and this study aims to look at the causes that have made Lebanon dysfunctional. The study uses Andrej Lijpharts consociational power sharing model and the international relations theory realism to analyse the internal and external causes that have made Lebanon a failed state. The study is based on interviews from the three major sects in Lebanon and a text analysis. The study shows that Lebanon is suffering from a corrupt elite that uses the state institutions to benefit their own families. The elite uses clientelism by manipulating consociational power sharing to make the ethnoreligious groups dependant on the elite’s own success. Different regional and international powers use Lebanon in their struggle for power and dominance over the Middle East. The external actors support different ethnic and religious groups by financing and arming them. That in turn deepens the divide between the sectarian groups and hinders the political progress.

本文第一個研究目的，是解釋17、18世紀荷蘭「如何」（how）決定面對英國崛起威脅的策略。這裡指的策略不是短期單一政策，而是「大戰略」（grand strategy）。若將此問題抽離「荷蘭面對英國崛起」的背景，則本文命題便是：「一國崛起的過程裡，其他國家如何決定面對該國威脅的策略？」而本文第二個研究目的，即對此命題提出一套通則理論，該理論適用的「其他國家」包括原有霸權以及其他任何的大國與小國（本文稱這些國家為非崛起國）。然後本文將運用該理論解釋荷蘭面對英國崛起的個案，藉此初步驗證該理論。 　　本文理論認為，非崛起國會採取「抗衡」（balancing）或「順從」（bandwagoning）策略，取決於其對國家利益的界定。首先，非崛起國國內行為者的偏好與實力，將因非崛起國和崛起國在國際體系中相對位置的變化，以及兩國間的互動而改變。接著，非崛起國國內的政經制度與行為者的合縱連橫，會影響各行為者能否有效向「國家」（state）施壓。最後，非崛起國的國內行為者與國家將在正式政策場域中議價，決定對國家利益的界定。之後，非崛起國執行經由國內政治過程選擇的策略，於國際層次與崛起國進行新階段的互動。 　　根據本文研究，本文理論確實能妥善解釋17、18世紀時，荷蘭的對英政策由抗衡到順從的轉變。也因為荷蘭面對英國崛起的個案，能類比當代各國面對中國崛起時的種種政經問題。故以此個案初步驗證的本文理論，應可運用在當代中國與其他國家關係的發展上，包括台海兩岸關係的發展。

This research focuses on the concept of European strategic autonomy and what it really is. Through two different European Union Member States, France and Germany, the research will compare how European strategic autonomy is interpreted and why. The research will use different concepts from the theory of realism to focus on the conventional perspective of strategic autonomy in Europe. The research will show how France pushes for greater European strategic autonomy to secure the future of Europe through strategic hedging strategy when again Germany wants to strengthen European strategic autonomy to be taken more seriously by European external allies and by strengthening European bandwagoning strategy. Based on the previously mentioned, the research will analyze how France and Germany interpret the meaning of European strategic autonomy. The research suggests that France’s approach to European security is through Europeanism when Germany’s approach is through Atlanticism. The research will conclude with findings that the significance of European strategic autonomy is in its meaning of increasing Europe’s and European Union’s credibility, sovereignty, and European integration, to name a few.