This dissertation consists of three essays investigating the role of early life events, family environment and personal choices in shaping a child’s chances for human capital accumulation. The first essay examines how physical stature of a child measured in terms of age standardized height influences his/her selection for family labor activities vs. schooling in rural Ethiopia using malnutrition caused by exposure to significant weather shocks in early childhood as sources of identification for the child’s physical stature. We find no evidence that better physical stature of the child leads to his/her positive selection for full-time child labor activities. On the other hand we found reasonably strong and consistent evidence that physically more robust children are more likely to combine child labor and schooling than physically weaker children. The findings indicate that, although better early childhood nutrition leads to higher chances of attending school, it may also put the child at additional pressure to participate in family labor activities which may be reflected in poor performance in schooling. The second essay empirically investigates whether the quantity deficit in the children of the mother’s preferred gender is compensated through their favorable treatment in terms of investment in schooling and nutrition (referred to as compensating hypothesis) and to what extent the mother uses her bargaining power in the family to influence this process. We use data from siblings and twins in two rounds of the demographic and health surveys of Ethiopia with robustness checks using a similar but larger data set from India. We find the mother’s bargaining power working in the opposite direction to that of the compensating hypothesis in the case of child schooling and having no substantive role in the case of child nutritional health. Our findings for child schooling imply that mother’s empowerment could turn out to be unfavorable to a child’s attendance of schooling in the circumstances where the child is needed to help out with family activities. In the third essay we use date from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth (NLSY97) to examine the extent to which high school completion (and to a limited extent college enrollment) are influenced by the choice teenagers make as to when to start dating and/or engage in sex, how many dating and/or sex partners to maintain, and how frequently to engage in sexual and/or dating activities. We use indicators of parental and peer religiosity as instruments for teenager’s involvement in sex and dating activities. While our results for teenage dating are generally weaker than those for teenage sex, the overall pattern of our estimates suggests that teenage sex and dating could have significant effects not only on high school completion but also the subsequent enrollment in a college.

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After surveying the literature on the economics of household decision-making, we employ data from the 2010 European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) to study the relationship between personal characteristics such as gender and decision-making power and responsibility. We find that across Europe, women more often make decisions about everyday spending and purchases for children, while it is mainly men who make the financial decisions in a household. Greater intrahousehold inequality in income and education is correlated with a lower probability of couples making decisions together, as is having a housewife in the home. Interesting patterns of household decision-making across countries emerge; in the Southern European countries, for example, educational differences do not seem to be strongly related to decision-making power and responsibility, and women in Eastern European countries are more likely to make financial decisions when the household reports facing difficult economic conditions. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Kovenanter ett amerikanskt fenomen som successivt har spridit sig över världen. I Sverige börjades olika typ av kovenanter användas under 1960-talet som kreditvillkor vid företagsfinansiering. Men även om kovenanter blivit ett vanligt verktyg inom den svenska kreditverksamheten sedan 1960-talet, finns det fortfarande bristande kunskaper om dess praktiska användande.  Denna studies syfte är att utforska hur bankers användning av kovenanter i låneavtal påverkas av företagsspecifika, relationsspecifika, lånespecifika och andra faktorer. Studien är inriktad till att studera svenska bankernas användning av kovenanter vid företagskreditgivning och kommer därför inte att behandla privat och offentlig sektor.   Studiens ansats är abduktiv, som möjliggör en växling mellan teori och empiri. För att öka förståelsen kring kovenanters användning har semistrukturerade intervjuer genomförts. Urvalet är begränsat till sex stycken av Sveriges största banker. Insamlad empiri har därefter tolkats utifrån agency theory of covenants, som härstammar från agent och principal teori. Därefter avslutas studien med en presentation av slutsatser, samhällsmässigt kunskapsbidrag, etiska bidrag, egna reflektioner och begränsningar samt förslag på vidare forskning.   Studiens resultat påvisar att kovenanter har en viktig funktion som kontroll och riskhanterings mekanism i låneavtal, men det ersätter inte behovet av realsäkerheter. Dessutom tyder resultatet på att användningen av kovenanter främst påverkas av låntagarens storlek, förmåga att lämna säkerheter, lånelöptid och storlek, samt lånets användningsändamål. / Covenants are an Americans phenomenon that has been successfully spread around the world. Different types of covenants are regularly used in Sweden and has been used in corporate loan contracts since 1960. Despite that covenants has been a commonly used tool in the Swedish loan contracts since the 1960s there is still a lack of knowledge about covenants practical use. The purpose of this study is to research the use of covenants in loan agreements from banks point of view, and explain how different factors such as borrower characteristic, loans characteristic, bank-borrower relationships and other factors can affect banks’ practice of using of covenants. The research question in this study is how different factors such as borrower characteristic, loans characteristic, bank-borrower relationships and other factors can affect Swedish banks’ practice in using of covenants. The study is aimed to research the Swedish banks' use of covenants in corporate debt, therefore the private and public sectors financiering are not considered. The survey has an abductive approach that provides ability to move back and forth from theory to empirical data. In order to explore the phenomena of covenants closely the semi-structured interviews are used for collecting data. Participants from the six largest banks in Sweden were selected to participate in the research. Collected data has been interpreted based on agency theory of covenants, which originates from the agent-principal theory. Finally the conclusion of the study is presented as well as socially knowledge contribution and suggestions for the further research. The results collected from the survey shows that the covenants have an important function as control and risk management mechanism in the loan agreement, but it does not replace the need for real security. The survey also shows that the use of covenants is mainly affected by the borrower's size, ability to provide collateral, loan duration and size, and the loan's purpose.

This study analyzed a random sample of thirty-six collective bargaining contracts between teachers and their respective boards of education in Wisconsin, New York, Tennessee, and California. The contracts were studied to assess the effect that collective bargaining has had upon the powers of principals over time. This was done by comparing each contract to a comprehensive list of traditional powers that were available to principals prior to collective bargaining (Pre-Collective Bargaining Power Profile of Principals). This analysis of contracts was a two-phase process. The first step was to identify whether or not the profile statements in the Pre-Collective Bargaining Power Profile were referred to in each contract. The second step was to describe how the presence of references to these statements affected the Power Profile of Principals. The principal's power was reported as being affected in three ways: deleted, constrained, or authorized. The general conclusion of this study was that the effect of teacher collective bargaining upon the powers of principals has been marginal. The data from the analysis of the contracts revealed that the majority (66 percent) of the statements in the Pre-Collective Bargaining Power Profile were not referred to in the collective bargaining contracts. The effects of the references to the statements that were identified were mixed. In the role areas of personnel management, pupil personnel management, and instructional leadership, the negotiation process authorized more power to principals than it deleted. In the role area of business and plant management, the principals' powers were deleted much more than authorized. This was due solely to the inclusion into the contracts of two items (i.e., the power to control building space and the power to control who may and may not enter the building). In the role area of community relations, the frequency of references was so small that the effects upon the power of principals were nonexistent.

Dans de nombreuses industries, les producteurs doivent passer par des intermédiaires afin de distribuer leurs produits sur les marchés. Par exemple, dans le secteur de la grande distribution alimentaire, les producteurs vendent leurs produits à des distributeurs qui ont un accès direct aux consommateurs finaux; dans les secteurs de la santé, les fournisseurs de soins médicaux (e.g., les hôpitaux) traitent avec les assureurs afin d’avoir accès aux patients. Toutes ces industries sont souvent caractérisées par une structure oligopolistique bilatérale avec un petit nombre d'entreprises opérant sur les deux côtés du marché, impliquant des relations commerciales complexes entre les acteurs. En effet, les externalités contractuelles sont omniprésentes dans ce type d’environnement puisque la valeur générée par une transaction et partagée entre un fabricant et un détaillant dépend généralement des décisions contractuelles des autres entreprises opérant sur le marché. Un certain nombre de pratiques, communément appelées « restrictions verticales », peuvent également survenir, telles que des contrats d'exclusivité, des pratiques de ventes liées, ou bien des fixations de prix de revente. En outre, les conditions tarifaires sont principalement déterminées par un processus de négociation entre les entreprises. L’objet de ma recherche consiste à analyser comment les relations verticales entre entreprises dans un contexte aussi complexe que celui des oligopoles bilatéraux peuvent avoir un impact sur le surplus du consommateur et le bon fonctionnement de l’industrie. Dans le premier chapitre de ma thèse, j’élabore un modèle d’économétrie structurelle afin d’analyser empiriquement les relations producteur- distributeur dans des oligopoles bilatéraux avec produits différenciés. L’approche contraste avec la plupart des méthodes empiriques antérieures et permet d’identifier la division du surplus entre les entreprises sans la nécessité d’avoir des données sur les contrats de gros et les coûts marginaux des firmes. Le deuxième chapitre se concentre sur l’étude des effets générés par la formation d’alliances entre distributeurs pour négocier des tarifs communs et acheter des produits auprès de leurs fournisseurs. En utilisant des données d’achats sur les eaux embouteillées réalisés par un panel de consommateurs représentatif de la population Française, j'estime un modèle structurel de demande et d'offre. Je réalise ensuite des simulations pour étudier les effets de trois alliances formées par des distributeurs dans le secteur de la distribution alimentaire en France. Les résultats montrent que le pouvoir de négociation des distributeurs est affaibli, le profit total de l'industrie diminue, et que les consommateurs finaux font face à des prix plus élevés. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse analyse la pratique du «full-line forcing» comme mécanisme d’éviction sur les marchés verticalement liées. Je considère un modèle dans lequel un producteur multi-produit offre une marque leader et une marque secondaire sur laquelle il est en concurrence avec une entreprise plus efficace. Le modèle permet de mettre en évidence que le « full-line forcing » est une stratégie de négociation efficace car elle permet au producteur multi-produit d’influer sur les points de menace dans les négociations et d’imposer son portefeuille de marques sur les étagères du distributeur, excluant ainsi le producteur concurrent. Cette stratégie émerge à l’équilibre sous trois conditions : (i) la marque leader de l’entreprise multi-produit est suffisamment forte, (ii) son inefficacité sur la marque secondaire n’est pas trop sévère, et (iii) le fournisseur concurrent est assez puissant dans sa négociation avec le distributeur. Les résultats suggèrent que les consommateurs finaux et le bien-être total peuvent être réduit alors que, dans certains cas, le distributeur bénéficie d’une telle stratégie d’éviction. / In many economic environments, producers need to deal with intermediaries to supply their products on markets. Examples include grocery markets in which food manufacturers sell their products to retailers who have direct access to final consumers; pharmaceutical industries where manufacturers distribute their drugs on markets through drugstores; multichannel television industries where cable channels sell their programs to multichannel video program distributors who then charge fees to consumers; private healthcare sectors in which medical providers (e.g., hospitals) deal with insurers to have access to sick patients. One particular feature of such industries is that they are often characterized by a bilateral oligopolistic structure with a small number of firms operating on both sides of the market, resulting in complex vertical relationships. Contracting externalities are indeed intrinsic to such environments because the value generated by a transaction and shared between a manufacturer and a retailer generally depends on the contracting decisions of other firms operating on the market. A number of practices, commonly referred to as vertical restraints, may also arise such as exclusive dealing, bundling and tying, resale price maintenance, or quantity discounts. Furthermore, trading terms are mostly determined through a bargaining process between upstream and downstream firms rather than being fixed by one-side of the market. My research consists in analyzing how vertical relationships between firms in such complex settings impact consumer surplus and total welfare. To this end, I rely on both theoretical models and empirical methods to derive predictions of the effects of contractual arrangements within the supply chain. In the first chapter of this dissertation I design a structural framework to analyze manufacturer-retailer relationships in bilateral oligopolies with differentiated products. Our approach contrasts with most prior empirical models of bargaining and allows to identify the division of surplus between firms without data on wholesale contracts and marginal costs. The second chapter investigates the economic effects of alliances formed by retailers to negotiate common prices and purchase products from manufacturers. I use household- level scanner data on bottled water purchases and estimate a structural model of demand and supply. I perform simulations to study the economic effects of three buyer alliances that have been formed by competing retailers in the French food retail sector. Results show that the bargaining power of retailers is weakened, total industry profit decreases, and final consumers face higher prices. The third chapter examines the case of full-line forcing as a foreclosure device in vertically related markets. We consider a setting in which a multi-product manufacturer offers a leading brand and a secondary brand for which it competes with a more efficient single-product firm. We show that full-line forcing is an efficient bargaining strategy as it allows the multi-product manufacturer to affect threat points and impose its brand portfolio on the retailer’s shelves therefore excluding the rival supplier. This strategy arises in equilibrium under three conditions (i) the leading brand of the multi- product firm is strong enough, (ii) the inefficiency on the secondary brand is not too severe, and (iii) the rival supplier is powerful enough in its bargaining with the retailer. Our results suggest that final consumers and total welfare may be harmed whereas, in some cases, the retailer benefits from such a foreclosure strategy.

This thesis aims to analyze the position and influence of developing countries in the WTO. The key points of analysis are the participation of developing countries throughout the history of the GATT/WTO, an assessment of their activity and participation in the WTO bodies and decision-making process, an examination of their bagaining power, suggesting that the position of developing countries may improve through the formation of coalitions. Through a study and analysis of the current round of trade negotiations and its roadblocks, this paper assesses the current position and influence of developing countries in the WTO with an emphasis on the recurring deadlocks of the round. The main phenomena of the current round are an increase in coalition activity and the emergence of a new group of dominant players, namely India, China and Brazil. Owing to these new trends, developing countries in the WTO have been able to vigorously promote their interests. However, these interests clash with those of the developed world, which results in a stalemate of the negotiations.

In this thesis, we investigate how multinational (MNC) parents can use the way they finance their subsidiary firms in order to constrain subsidiary management. In the first essay, we develop a theoretical framework in which we consider a number of alternative decisions related to the financing of MNC subsidiary firms. We show that, from the MNC parent's perspective, the optimal choice is to delegate the monitoring of the subsidiary to host-country banks and finance the subsidiary using short-term and short-term external debt. This arrangement will guarantee that the MNC subsidiary management exerts an optimal amount of effort and abides by the objectives set by the MNC parent. In the second essay, we propose and test four hypotheses addressing how MNC parents can use short-term and short-term external debt to constrain the rent-seeking behaviour of subsidiary management. One set of hypotheses analyses the use of short-term debt. The second set of hypotheses investigates the use of short-term external debt. Moreover, we investigate these two hypotheses in two different settings to measure: (i) the subsidiary effect by comparing between UK domestic and UK subsidiary firms and (ii) the location effect by comparing UK and US subsidiary firms. We find support for our hypotheses, namely that UK subsidiaries have more short-term debt and more short-term external debt as compared to equivalent UK domestic firms, and that US subsidiaries have more short-term debt and less short-term external debt compared to equivalent UK subsidiaries. Our results are both statistically and economically significant and are robust to the use of a matched sample approach to test our hypotheses. The third essay investigates the relationship between the bargaining power of MNC subsidiary firms and the way these firms are financed by analysing the source and the maturity of financing arrangements. We argue that the financing arrangements used to finance the subsidiary are linked to its ability to engage in rent-seeking behaviour and the latter depends on the amount of bargaining power that the subsidiary possesses. We use four different measures of bargaining power, namely age, size, presence of foreign sales and percentage of foreign sales. Using data relating to UK and US MNC subsidiaries between 2001 and 2010, we test two sets of hypotheses linking the bargaining power of the MNC subsidiary firms with the use of short-term debt and the use of external short-term debt. Our results provide strong support for our short-term debt hypotheses while support for our external debt hypotheses is more limited. The results are also economically significant when using the percentage of foreign sales as a bargaining power proxy. We also notice that the use of debt to constrain subsidiary management behaviour appears to differ across UK and US MNC subsidiary firms.

<p>As the Chinese rate of growth has accelerated, China is increasingly considered as an important market for a diverse range of goods and services, including the advancedand complex. This has caught the attention of foreign firms in general and Swedish multinational companies in particular (Demir & Söderman 2007). This thesis focuses on a Chinese perspective of Chinese partners' decision making in SFJV, which is lacking in previous research. Six variables which are related to Chinese partners'decision making in SFJV are founded on a theoretical background. Then these six variables are compiled into a Chinese partners' decision making model. Each of these six variables is further divided into several factors. Data is then collect by a case study in which several SFJVs and their Chinese parents-Chinese partners are interviewed.This data is later used to verify and improve the original model which is founded on theoretical background. Finally an updated Chinese partners' decision making modelis created. The thesis concludes with the important findings and a discussion of the applicability of this model, contribution of the research, and future possible research orientation.</p>

Despite their prevalence, the study of Canadian minority governments has been the object of few published studies. In particular, the issue of how governments that must rely on the support of one or more opposition parties in Parliament manage to remain in power (viability) and pass their legislative proposals (effectiveness) has not been thoroughly investigated. This study examines the parliamentary dynamics at play in these situations by applying a majority building framework grounded in and supported by three theoretical perspectives, namely the rational choice tradition, new institutionalism, and the role of party politics and party systems, to four minority governments that have occurred in the last 50 years or so: 1- Diefenbaker (1957-1958), 2- Pearson (1963-1965); 3- Clark (1979-1980); and, 4- Harper (2006-2008). The data on the specific circumstances that held during these minority governments has been gathered from archival records, from the recorded debates and votes in the House of Commons, from previous Canadian studies on minority government, from political autobiographies, and from third party accounts of the events at the time. The study finds that majority building is a function of primarily two interrelated variables: 1- bargaining power (interparty dynamics and intra-party cohesion) and 2- agenda control (House business, confidence tests, other institutional features). It also stresses the importance of government concessions as an effective means of achieving desired goals and outcomes. Furthermore, this study highlights the capacity and skill of individual parliamentary actors in the exercise of legislative politics generally and in manipulating institutional and party system levers specifically, as a contributing factor to their government’s duration and legislative output. This study adds to the empirical knowledge of the minority experience in Canada and provides a conceptual framework to better understand legislative politics and its impact on the success of minority governments in Canada and elsewhere. / Malgré leur fréquence, les gouvernements minoritaires au Canada n’ont pas souvent fait l’objet d’études. En particulier, peu d’attention a été portée à la question de comment un gouvernement minoritaire réussi à obtenir l’appui d’un ou de plusieurs partis d’opposition dans le but de rester au pouvoir (viabilité) et de faire passer ses propositions législatives (efficacité). Notre étude examine les dynamiques parlementaires qui se déploient dans ses situations. Plus précisément, elle cherche à les comprendre à la lumière d’un modèle de stratégies menant au consensus sur un vote parlementaire. Ce modèle est fondé sur trois perspectives théoriques, soit la tradition du choix rationnel, le nouvel institutionnalisme et le rôle de la politique partisane et du système de partis. Nous étudions quatre gouvernements minoritaires des cinquante dernières années : 1- Diefenbaker (1957-1958), 2- Pearson (1963-1965), 3- Clark (1979-1980) et Harper (2006-2008). Nous avons accumulé nos données sur ces gouvernements minoritaires à partir de documents d’archives, de la transcription des débats et des votes à la Chambre des communes, d’études canadiennes sur les gouvernements minoritaires, d’autobiographies politiques et des souvenirs de tierces parties présentes lors du déroulement des événements que nous étudions. Notre étude identifie deux variables liées à la création de majorités législatives au Parlement, soit : 1- le pouvoir de négociation (la dynamique entre les partis et la cohésion à l’intérieur des partis) et, 2- le contrôle de l’agenda parlementaire (affaires découlant de la Chambre, les motions de confiance et d’autres facteurs institutionnels). De plus, elle identifie l’importance des concessions gouvernementales dans l’atteinte de ses objectifs. Notre étude souligne l’importance de la capacité et du doigté des joueurs parlementaires particuliers dans l’exercice de la politique législative en général et dans la manipulation des composantes institutionnelles et partisanes en particulier pour garantir la longévité et l’efficacité de leur gouvernement. Notre étude contribue à ajouter à notre connaissance de l’expérience minoritaire au Canada et nous offre un modèle nous permettant de mieux comprendre la politique législative et sa contribution au succès des gouvernements minoritaires au Canada et ailleurs.