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Bergson et la psychologie du dix-neuvième siècle : la métaphysique de mouvements contre Kant / Bergson beside the psychology of 19th century : the kantism replaced and the metaphysics of movementsKiyama, Yasuto 11 September 2018 (has links)
Matière et mémoire de Bergson est largement inspirée des idées psychologiques du 19e siècle. Nous restituons le contexte psychologique afin de montrer que la psychologie contemporaine pousse Bergson à s’engage dans la lutte contre Kant et à développer sa propre pensée ; discerner et prolonger extrêmement les mouvements. Le premier chapitre porte sur la notion de « plans de conscience ». Nous montrerons dans quelle mesure Bergson reprend les discours des psychologues associationnistes et des psychologues pathologiques (notamment Pierre Janet) sur le déroulement des idées. Ce détour nous permettra de cerner les enjeux proprement bergsoniens de la notion de plans de conscience : il s’agira de discerner les mouvements sui generis de la mémoire.Les deux chapitres suivants essaient de pénétrer dans le domaine de la psychologie physiologique ; le développement de la notion d’action réflexe cérébrale modifie le problème du rapport entre le mouvement et le moi qui en est la cause, de sorte qu’il met en question la notion de la causalité (Carpenter Laycock et Ribot) ; Fouillée transforme le problème psychologique en celui de la condition de donnée. Tout cela met en lumière la polémique essentielle entre Bergson et Kant ; Bergson a tiré des conceptions psychologiques une implication philosophique qui destitue le fondement de la Déduction kantienne : il remplace la limitation kantienne de la réalité phénoménale par le prolongement démesuré d’un mouvement dans un fait, et ce jusqu’à une perception universelle en droit. Ce dernier point sera le cardinal de notre interprétation. Le dernier chapitre porte sur le sens de l’être dans la critique bergsonienne de l’idée de non-être de l’Évolution créatrice, qui éclaircira le rapport entre la détermination et l’existence et qui profile une conception bergsonienne de la réalité comme mouvements. / Matter and memory of Bergson is considerably inspired by psychological ideas of 19th century. We reproduce the psychological context to clarify how the psychology of the same period urges Bergson to entered into a struggle against Kant and to develop his own thought: discerning and prolong movements.The first chapter is concerned with a notion of “plans of consciousness”. We point out to what extent Bergson takes up views of assimilationists and the pathological psychology (especially that of Pierre Janet) about development of ideas. This detour allows us to define distinctively Bergsonian point of the notion of “plans of consciousness” : it consists in discerning different movements of memory.The next two chapters set about inquiring into a domain of physiological psychology. The development of a notion of reflex action modified the problem of relation between a movement and the I which is its cause and how the notion of causality constitutes the central difficulty (Carpenter, Laycock and Ribot). Fouillée transforms the problem of psychology into that of the condition of given. This detour clarifies a polemic between Kant and Bergson ; indeed, Bergson draws from psychological conceptions a philosophical implication which dismisses a necessity of the Kantian Deduction : he replaces Kantian limitation of phenomenal reality by prolongment of un movement in fact, and that to universal perception of right (en droit). This last point is the canonical of our interpretation.Finally, the last chapter inquires the question of the meaning of being in the critic of the idea of not-being in Creative evolution, that clarifies a relation between the determination and the existence, so that it outlines a Bergsonian conception of reality as movements.
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Pour une éducation libératrice : alliances conceptuelles entre Deleuze et Bergson / In favor of a liberatin education : conceptual alliances between Deleuze and Bergson / Por uma educação liberadora : alianças conceituais entre Deleuze e BergsonSanfelice Zeppini, Paola 16 October 2017 (has links)
La critique deleuzienne de l’image dogmatique de la pensée vise à la création d’autres manières de concevoir ce que signifie penser. Une telle critique nous permet d’opérer certains déplacements afin de vérifier les résonances productives entre philosophie et d’autres formes de production de la connaissance. En ce qui concerne les problèmes s’imposant au domaine de l’éducation, le but du présent travail consiste à penser les possibilités d’une éducation marquée par des mouvements qui dégagent d’autres manières de penser capables de frayer la voie à des processus de création visant à d’autres formes de vie plus puissantes et joyeuses. Pour ce faire, on partira de l’alliance conceptuelle établie entre Gilles Deleuze et Henri Bergson afin de vérifier de quelle manière la méthode de l’intuition permet de mettre en évidence le rôle central des problèmes et la façon dont on les pose, cela dans le but d’affirmer la nécessité pour chaque participant d’une processualité éducationnelle de soulever les questionnements vitaux qui le traversent. Les différences existantes entre le savoir en tant que résultat et l’apprendre en tant que processus, nous conduiront à remettre en question la notion de sujet et à affirmer la vie comme un mouvement de création et de différenciation constante, ce que nous permettra de penser la libération éducationnelle en termes d’augmentation de la capacité réceptive et de déclenchement de liaisons inattendues. Il s’agit en effet d’affirmer notre capacité de renforcer la différenciation de soi-même qui nous constitue et l’apprendre comme opérateur intensif qui relie les mouvements d’organisation et d’explosion créative. / Within the context of Gilles Deleuze critique to the dogmatic image of thought in support of the creation of other ways of grasping the meaning of what it is to think, displacements may be produced so as to ascertain productive resonances between philosophy and other forms of knowledge production. Amidst questions which impose themselves to the field of education, this thesis aims to think about the possibilities of an education marked by movements that liberate other ways of thinking and are capable of triggering processes which lead to the creation of more potent and happier ways of living. In order to achieve this, our analysis starts out with the conceptual alliance established between Gilles Deleuze and Henri Bergson, so that we may ascertain in which ways the method of intuition enables one to affirm the importance of not only the questions themselves, but also the way in which they are posed; and thus also affirm how necessary it is for a participant of an educational process to be able to raise vital questions that they may be going through. The existing differences between knowledge as a result and learning as a process lead to challenging of the notion of subject and to the affirmation of life as an ongoing creation and differentiation movement, that enable one to conceive the liberation that interests us in terms of the receptive capacity increase and of the triggering of unusual connexions. That is, to affirm our capacity to bolster the act of differing from oneself, which constitutes us, and the act of learning as an intensive operator that connects movements of organization and of creative explosion. / No âmbito da crítica feita por Gilles Deleuze à imagem dogmática do pensamento em proveito da criação de outras maneiras de se dar o que significa pensar, deslocamentos podem ser operados no sentido de verificar ressonâncias produtivas entre a filosofia e outras formas de produção de conhecimento. Em meio a problemas que se impõem ao campo da educação, este trabalho busca pensar as possibilidades de uma educação marcada por movimentos liberadores de outras maneiras de pensar e que sejam capazes de abrir processos de criação de maneiras mais potentes e alegres de viver. Para tanto, parte-se da aliança conceitual estabelecida entre Gilles Deleuze e Henri Bergson para verificar de quais modos o método da intuição permite afirmar a importância dos problemas e da forma como são colocados, para afirmar também a necessidade de que cada partícipe de uma processualidade educacional possa por em pauta os questionamentos vitais que o atravessam. As diferenças existentes entre o saber como resultado e o aprender como processo levam à problematização da noção de sujeito e a afirmação da vida como movimento de criação e de diferenciação constante, o que permite pensar a liberação que nos interessa em termos de aumento de capacidade receptiva e disparação de conexões inusitadas. Trata-se de afirmar nossa capacidade de potencializar o diferir de si mesmo que nos constitui e o aprender como operador intensivo que conecta movimentos de organização e de explosão criativa.
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Re-examination of the work of T.E. HulmeHadjiyiannis, Christos January 2011 (has links)
This project challenges a series of common interpretations of Hulme's work: that his arguments are contradictory; that his career can be separated into distinct “phases”; that he endorsed other thinkers' ideas uncritically; and that he promulgated authoritarian politics. Chapter 1 examines the entries in Hulme's notebooks that relate his views on the nature of reality and language. Read through ideas in the works of Bergson, Nietzsche and Ribot, these rudimentary notes present a coherent “anti-intellectualist” philosophical position, consistent with claims made in his later writings. Chapter 2 focuses on “A Lecture on Modern Poetry.” Hulme's rejection of nineteenth-century verse was part of a broader campaign by poets in London to find new ways of expression, yet his ideas stand independently of claims made by Flint, Storer and Pound. Hulme's greatest contribution to Imagism is the emphasis he put on the use of images in poetry, a method that follows from the distinction he drew in the notebooks between “direct” and “indirect” language. Chapter 3, which examines Hulme's essays and lectures on Bergson, demonstrates that, although he embraced Bergson's philosophical method, Hulme remained critical of many of Bergson's theories. This discredits the claim that he was simply reiterating Bergson's ideas. Ultimately, Bergson's “intuition” enabled Hulme to develop his earlier description of “modern” poetry and to recast it as “classic” poetry. Chapter 4 investigates Hulme's political essays. Together with Storer, Hulme participated in a debate in the Commentator concerning the parliamentary crisis of 1910. It was as part of an attempt to create an efficient propaganda strategy for the Conservative party that Hulme postulated his famous antithesis between Romanticism and Classicism. Hulme's analysis of the process of political conversion shows that in 1910-12 he had not abandoned elements in his thought from Bergson's philosophy. Moreover, far from sharing the authoritarian political views of the Action Française, he can be more accurately described as a “moderate Conservative.” Chapter 5 demonstrates that claims Hulme made in his art criticism are consonant with the general reaction in 1913-14 against representational art. While drawing heavily on Worringer's anti-materialist conception of art history, he was using it to defend his contemporaries' experimentation with geometric forms, in a way similar to Fry and Bell. Although, like Worringer and Ludovici, Hulme campaigned for antihumanism and mixed aesthetics with politics, the model of art he proposed did not carry the authoritarian implications of those of Worringer and Ludovici. Finally, Chapter 6 explores Hulme's war writings. Hulme was not a militarist; rather, he supported Britain's involvement in the war on the grounds that war against Germany would protect the British political institutions. He stayed true to his Conservative principles, using ideas from Sorel and Proudhon to dissociate the “democratic” from the “pacifist” ideology. There is also evidence that, despite his explicit rejection of vitalism in “A Notebook,” Hulme continued to value Bergson's method of “intuition” right up to his death in 1917. This project, therefore, argues for a re-interpretation of Hulme's work and shows the value of scrutinising the intellectual and political context in which he was writing in understanding the precise nature of his thought.
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The Difference Space Makes: Bergsonian Methodology and Madrid's Cultural Imaginary through Literature, Film and Urban SpaceFraser, Benjamin Russell January 2006 (has links)
In the present effort, the philosopher Henri Bergson’s (1859-1941) seminal philosophical work functions as a revitalizing force and even an implicit point of departure for the more urban-oriented critique of Henri Lefebvre’s (1901-1991) watershed text L’Producción de l’espace/The Production of Space (1974). Both Lefebvre and Bergson in fact share a common perception of space—it is neither a static ground, nor an apriori condition of experience as Kant argued, but is instead a process inseparable from time and implicated in thought itself. Grounded in this resulting novel understanding of space, time and difference, I use an interdisciplinary approach to analyze Madrid’s cultural imaginary through novels by Belén Gopegui (1992), Pío Baroja (1911) and Luis Martín-Santos (1961); films by Carlos Saura (1996), Alejandro Amenábar (1997), and American Jim Jarmusch (1992); and the urban space of Madrid’s Retiro Park. The purpose of this work is twofold. On the one hand it is an attempt to reconcile the spatial issues of concern to cultural or human geography with an approach to social life grounded in the humanities. On the other it is a call for a deeper understanding of methodology taken in its widest sense. The former seeks not only to introduce spatial questions to the analysis of literature and film but also to articulate the intimate relation of cultural products to the urban processes in which they are formed, interpreted and sold. The latter requires an investigation of the philosophical preconceptions that structure our spatial practice and interpretation, as well as an awareness of the consequences these preconceptions hold—not only for understanding our common world, but also for producing it and finally for the possibility of changing it through action. These twin purposes—bringing geographical concerns into the humanities and assessing the philosophical bases of our spatial production and interpretation—are not so far removed. Through a careful reading of the above key literary, filmic and urban texts from twentieth century Madrid, this work explores the important consequences of conceiving of space as simultaneously mental and physical. In the Bergsonian fashion, these explorations seek to dispense with the stagnant and irreconcilable philosophical tropes of both pure materialism and pure idealism in order to yield a more precise understanding of cultural forms as living processes.
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Emotion in the digital age : Bergson's creative emotion and metaphysical methods for digital video productionMinchin, Heather Marie January 2012 (has links)
This PhD explores Bergsonian notions of duration and the unrepresentable characteristics of creative emotion. Contemplating emotion through Bergson’s duration assists an understanding of the measure of emotion’s quantitative multiplicity, the complexity of its qualitative multiplicity and its creative potential. The application of these ideas to the Deleuzian cinematic concepts of the movement-image and time-image, allows the exploration of digital and analogue cinematic techniques alongside the characteristics of representable and unrepresentable emotion. The analysis of emotion traverses various historical and contemporary subjects that include areas such as philosophy, science, art and digital sound and moving-image technology. Three video pieces created for this thesis illustrate and elucidate the theoretical argument. The first work deals with movement, duration and change, the second with coexistent time, memory and perception and the third with intuition the élan vital and creative emotion. Each film is intended to allow the viewer/listener to enter their own creative emotion. Thus the research revaluates and elevates the further potentials of emotion, beyond its mere representation in order to discover how its very nature, suggests new approaches to the creation of art work that is itself, able to reveal the nature and process of creative emotion.
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Concrétisation communicationnelle et futurition processuelleDeschênes, Jean-Philippe January 2004 (has links)
Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
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Event, Duration, Soul: A Study of the Measure of Intensive MagnitudesAugust, John W 01 December 2018 (has links)
The treatment of intensive magnitude in Kant’s first Critique initiates a new standard for reasoning. In the dissertation, I trace the development of the concept of intensive magnitudes from Kant, through the interpretations of the physicist Gustav Fechner, and into a kind of fruition in the thought of Bergson. I illustrate how and why the concept of intensive magnitude was transformed from a spatial notion, relying primarily on sense data, in the works of Kant and Fechner into a temporalized understanding of intensity founded upon Bergson's idea of duration, where the latter is based primarily on feeling. The result of this transformation is found in the promise of creating a technical language for philosophy that is capable of appreciating the concrete unfolding of non-sensuous intensive magnitudes. Such a language renders us capable of meaningful research, conversation, and further development in understanding (at least) human becoming and its relation to time. I argue that the capacity for self-knowledge depends upon an understanding of temporality that accords with the experience of temporality itself. The development of the concept of intensity, through further philosophical reflection and inquiry, is a path philosophers should pursue.
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La durée bergsonienne comme nombre et comme moraleMiravete, Sébastien 29 June 2011 (has links) (PDF)
Ce travail propose de revisiter le concept principal de la philosophie de Bergson : la durée. Premièrement, la durée est un nombre spécial. Jankélévitch et Deleuze pensent que la durée de la conscience a seulement des propriétés qualitatives, mais, en fait, le temps réel pour Bergson n'est pas une forme dépourvue de dimension numérique. Secondement, la signification de la durée est morale. Deleuze et Henri Gouhier pensent que la finalité de la vie, pour Bergson, est l'innovation, la création (amour de la création), mais, en fait, la finalité de la vie est la construction d'une société fraternelle (création de l'amour).
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Illuminating the Queer Subtext: the Unmentioned Affairs in Willa Cather's O Pioneers!Neill, Nora 18 July 2008 (has links)
Willa Cather contests the contemporary notion that identification links to a natural or original order. For example, that man equals masculine and femininity comes from an essential connection to woman. Cather deconstructs normativity through her use of character relationships in order to redefine successful interpersonal alliances. Thus, Alexandra, the protagonist of O Pioneers! builds a home and friendships that exemplify alternatives to stasis. My readings of O Pioneers! display the places in the novel where Cather subtly contests the ideology of naturalization. I make lesbian erotic and queer social interactions visible through a discourse on Cather’s symbolism. I favor queer theory as a mode of inquiry that magnifies the power and presence of heteronormativity and I examine Cather’s work as a critique of cultural principles that inflict violence against individuals who participate in dissent from conformity.
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La liberté dans l'action humaine au sein de la pensée de Bergson : conditions de possibilité et limitations, ou, L'insoutenable liberté de l'êtreRoy, Claude-Émilie 06 1900 (has links) (PDF)
Le présent mémoire traite du problème de l'action libre chez l'être humain au sein de la pensée de Bergson. Dans cette perspective, l'enjeu de ce mémoire a été tout au long de sa préparation de comprendre la position de Bergson quant à l'idée de liberté, et plus spécifiquement de la liberté humaine lorsqu'elle est considérée du point de vue de la dimension active de la vie individuelle. Cela nous a mené à identifier les difficultés que présentait l'appréhension de son effectivité au sein d'un monde matériel et social qui impose ses exigences pratiques pour l'adaptation de l'individu à son environnement physique et à la vie en société. Bien qu'il ait réfléchi à la question de l'évolution de la vie en général et à la question de la vie spirituelle partagée, de son origine et de son développement au sein des sociétés, considérations qui seront ici abordées chacune en son temps, Bergson a surtout concentré ses efforts de réflexion sur l'individu. Il a ainsi élaboré son œuvre avec le but avoué de décrire l'expérience vécue par ce dernier, notamment en décrivant son rapport au monde à travers l'élaboration d'une théorie originale de la durée qui fait de celle de l'individu une durée intérieurement vécue correspondant au déploiement de sa conscience, de sa mémoire, mais aussi finalement au développement de sa personnalité. Aussi a-t-il fini par accorder une grande importance à ces concepts au sein de sa pensée et de les mettre en lien direct avec celui de liberté en postulant très tôt leur adéquation. Cela l'a mené à aborder le sujet de l'action, car l'action de l'individu est ce qui le définit en grande partie au sein d'un monde matériel et symbolique communément partagé. L'objectif visé dans ce travail est donc de rendre compte de la manière dont Bergson aborde la question de l'expérience vécue de l'être humain par rapport à son environnement matériel et par rapport à son environnement social et symbolique et ce, afin de dégager le rôle de l'intelligence dans l'appréhension du réel, mais aussi de déterminer le cadre dans lequel est rendue possible une certaine forme de liberté chez l'individu. L'accomplissement d'une action libre étant conditionnel au degré d'éveil de la conscience de l'individu, mais le niveau d'éveil d'un être s'accompagnant toutefois du perfectionnement de certaines de ses facultés, et plus particulièrement de l'intelligence en ce qui concerne l'être humain, cette dernière doit être identifiée comme ce qui à la fois profite et nuit à l'épanouissement et à l'expression de la liberté de l'individu. C'est cette intelligence, en ce qu'elle sert l'individu à des fins pratiques, en tant qu'elle lui assure une emprise sur son monde, qui fait que la liberté lui est en quelque sorte rendue inaccessible. Il s'agit donc de montrer en quoi l'intelligence limite et détermine une expérience qui autrement pourrait être vécue sous le signe de la liberté, autrement dit en quoi le discours qui accompagne l'intelligence se superpose à la liberté dans l'action et en cache finalement l'effectivité au sein de cette action.
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MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Liberté, intuition, nécessité, intelligence, action, être humain, société.
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