Le droit international privé français tient pour usuel la dissociation entre le conflit de lois et le conflit de juridictions. Cette indépendance entre les deux corps de règles est érigée en principe tant par la doctrine majoritaire que par le droit positif. Selon ce principe, toute forme de corrélation est et doit être réfutée, qu’elle opère au moment de la mise en œuvre des règles de conflit ou de leur construction. En d’autres termes, ce sont ainsi trois hypothèses qui sont dénoncées : celle de l’applicabilité directe de la lex fori en tant que telle, mais également celles de la compétence du forum legis et du parallélisme des règles de conflit, celles-ci conduisant à une applicabilité indirecte de la lex fori. Or, selon la présente étude, le droit international privé des obligations montre qu’un tel principe n’existe pas et qu’il n’est pas nécessairement opportun. En effet, et un tel constat s’impose, tant le mécanisme des lois de police que le jeu de l’autonomie de la volonté suscitent une applicabilité directe de la lex fori. Par ailleurs, la réfutation des modes de corrélation indirecte est inopportune. D’une part, la compétence du forum legis permet de garantir l’effectivité des lois de police, dans la mesure où aucun autre remède ne se révèle suffisant. D’autre part, la spécialisation du droit international privé des obligations et l’emprise du droit de l’Union européenne sur cette discipline génère des règles de compétence et de loi applicable qui présentent un certain parallélisme qui n’est pas uniquement accidentel. La thèse invite ainsi à remettre en question certains dogmes classiques du droit international privé des obligations. / French private international law holds as usual the dissociation between choice of law and judicial jurisdiction. This independence between the two sets of rules is set up as a principle by both majority doctrine and law. According to this principle, any form of correlation is and must be refuted, whether it occurs at the time of implementation of the conflict rules or the time of their formulation. In other words, three hypotheses are thus denounced: that of the direct applicability of the lex fori as such, but also those of the jurisdiction of the forum legis and the parallelism of the conflict rules, which lead to an indirect applicability of the lex fori. However, according to this study, contracts and torts private international law shows that such a principle does not exist and that it is not necessarily appropriate. Indeed, both the mechanism of overriding mandatory provisions and freedom of choice of law give rise to a direct applicability of the lex fori. Moreover, the refutation of indirect correlation modes is inappropriate. On the one hand, the jurisdiction of forum legis makes it possible to guarantee the effectiveness of overriding mandatory provisions, insofar as no other remedy is sufficient. On the other hand, the specialisation of contracts and torts private international law and the influence of European Union law on this discipline generate rules of judicial jurisdiction rules and applicable law that present a certain parallelism that is not only accidental. The thesis thus invites us to question certain classic dogmas of private international law of obligations.

An increase in international trade has resulted in an increase in the carriage of goods by sea, which has also promoted the business of marine insurance on a very huge scale. Marine insurance contracts fall within both the admiralty jurisdiction where admiralty laws apply and special contract law where the rules and principles of contract law apply. In certain circumstance this has left the courts with a dilemma in deciding in particular cases which law should apply; whether maritime law, contract law or marine insurance law. There are certain principles under the law of contract that are said to be profound and cannot be ousted easily by substantive law. The principle of party autonomy is one of these principles and it has gained international recognition through a number of cases. However, to date, courts are faced with difficulties in deciding whether to uphold the choice of law on jurisdiction and governing law exercised by parties or resort to substantive law, either by virtue of admiralty law or any other statutes in a country, which provisions may be contrary to the clause on choice of law under the contract. In South Africa practice has shown that courts are always reluctant to apply the clause on choice of law if they believe such application is against the public policy and interest in South Africa. This begs the question as to the precise meaning and effect of “public policy and interest” and how this principle influences the long-standing and well-established principle of party autonomy in admiralty jurisdiction. This dissertation is aimed at providing a legal response to this problem by analysing case law and the different viewpoints of various writers. It is imperative to investigate if their decisions and views answer all the uncertainties with regard to the meaning and the effect of the concept of “public policy and interest” on the principle of party autonomy. / LLM (Import and Export Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

An increase in international trade has resulted in an increase in the carriage of goods by sea, which has also promoted the business of marine insurance on a very huge scale. Marine insurance contracts fall within both the admiralty jurisdiction where admiralty laws apply and special contract law where the rules and principles of contract law apply. In certain circumstance this has left the courts with a dilemma in deciding in particular cases which law should apply; whether maritime law, contract law or marine insurance law. There are certain principles under the law of contract that are said to be profound and cannot be ousted easily by substantive law. The principle of party autonomy is one of these principles and it has gained international recognition through a number of cases. However, to date, courts are faced with difficulties in deciding whether to uphold the choice of law on jurisdiction and governing law exercised by parties or resort to substantive law, either by virtue of admiralty law or any other statutes in a country, which provisions may be contrary to the clause on choice of law under the contract. In South Africa practice has shown that courts are always reluctant to apply the clause on choice of law if they believe such application is against the public policy and interest in South Africa. This begs the question as to the precise meaning and effect of “public policy and interest” and how this principle influences the long-standing and well-established principle of party autonomy in admiralty jurisdiction. This dissertation is aimed at providing a legal response to this problem by analysing case law and the different viewpoints of various writers. It is imperative to investigate if their decisions and views answer all the uncertainties with regard to the meaning and the effect of the concept of “public policy and interest” on the principle of party autonomy. / LLM (Import and Export Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Telemedizin ist der Einsatz von Telekommunikation und Informatik, um medizinische Dienstleistungen zu erbringen oder zu unterstützen, wenn die Teilnehmer räumlich getrennt sind. Die einzelnen telemedizinischen Anwendungen sind im Vordringen begriffen. Telemedizin ist allerdings kein eigenes Fachgebiet, sondern eine Methode, herkömmliche medizinische Maßnahmen zu unterstützen und zu verbessern. Da die Teilnehmer telemedizinischer Anwendungen nicht am selben Ort und zur selben Zeit agieren müssen, ist Telemedizin prädestiniert für die Überwindung der Sektorierung des Gesundheitssystems. Telemedizin kann insbesondere Rationalisierungsreserven mobilisieren und medizinische Dienstleistungen effektiver und effizienter gestalten. Ungeachtet dessen gibt es fünf Problemfelder, die beobachtet und weiter entwickelt werden müssen, um Telemedizin auch für die Zukunft möglich zu machen: Die unterschiedlichen Kommunikationsstandards müssen harmonisiert werden, damit der Datenfluß zwischen den Teilnehmer optimiert werden kann. Krankenkassen und Leistungserbringer müssen gemeinsam eine solide Basis für die Finanzierung derjenigen telemedizinischen Dienstleistungen etablieren, die dem Stand der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis entsprechen. Telemedizin mit Auslandsbeteiligung zieht in der Regel haftungsrechtliche Kollisionen nach sich, die von den Teilnehmern durch eine Rechtswahl- und eine Gerichsstandsvereinbarung vermieden werden können. Die sozialrechtlichen Möglichkeiten, insbesondere solche, Praxisnetze zu bilden, müssen noch in Einklang mit den berufsrechtlichen Vorgaben gebracht werden, da diese einer überörtlichen Leistungserbringergemeinschaft und einer entsprechenden Information des Patienten zum Teil noch im Weg stehen.Die durch die Telemedizin neu entstehenden Möglichkeiten der Kommunikation müssen durch zusätzliche Maßnahmen für Datenschutz und Datensicherheit flankiert werden. Insbesondere bei Datenübertragungen ins Ausland sollten sich die Teilnehmer durch eine gesonderte Einwilligung des Patienten in diesen Datenfluß absichern. / Telemedicine is the use of information and telecommunication technologies to provide and support health care when distance separates the participants. The single uses of telemedicine are growing in quality and quantity. Telemedicine, however, is not a medical field of its own, but a tool that can be used in most fields of medicine to enhance and support communication procedures. Since the participants must not act at the same time and at the same venue, telemedicine is bound to overcome the sectoral boundaries in a health system, which is separated in an outpatient and an inpatient world. Telemedicine can help to mobilise the health systems rationalisation potential and make procedures more effective and more efficient. There still are five tasks that have to be observed and to be solved, to make telemedicine possible in the future: Harmonisation of communicational standards must progress to optimise communication between the participants. Health insurance funds and medical persons must cooperate to insure a solid basis of financing for telemedicinal procedures that are state of the art. Participants of cross-border telemedicine must be aware of colliding laws and are well advised to agree upon the law to be applied and the court in charge. The professional law for doctors in Germany must be reconciled with the managed care concepts of practice networks that are legally permissible in terms of social law. Data protection and data security must be ensured under the new conditions of telemedicine. Especially cross-border data flow should be based on the informed consent of the patient involved

Les règles de conflit de lois n’ont pas toutes la même autorité. Les parties, et même le juge, peuvent être autorisés à passer outre à la désignation opérée par la règle de conflit. Les parties sont parfois libres d’écarter par convention la loi objectivement désignée (règles de conflit supplétives), parfois tenues par la désignation opérée, qui s’impose à elles (règles de conflit impératives). Le juge est tantôt tenu, tantôt libre de relever d’office l’internationalité du litige, et d’en déduire l’application de la règle de conflit. Le choix d’envisager ensemble des questions aussi variées peut étonner, mais c’est celui de la jurisprudence. L’autorité des règles de conflit y est définie de manière conjointe, à l’égard des parties comme du juge, à l’aune de considérations substantielles. Ainsi, parce qu’une demande en recherche de paternité relève, en droit substantiel, d’une matière d’ordre public, et qu’elle intéresse l’état des personnes, réputé indisponible, la règle de conflit qui lui est applicable sera impérative et mise en œuvre, au besoin d’office, par le juge. Inversement, si la prétention relève d’une matière largement supplétive ou vise des droits disponibles, la règle de conflit applicable sera supplétive, et le juge ne sera pas tenu de la relever d’office. Ce sont donc des considérations substantielles qui définissent, en jurisprudence, l’autorité des règles de conflit à l’égard des parties comme du juge.Cependant, ce régime n’est plus celui du droit international privé européen. D’abord, les règlements européens n’ont défini l’autorité des règles de conflit qu’à l’égard des parties, laissant à chaque Etat membre le soin de déterminer leur autorité à l’égard du juge. Ensuite, la définition européenne de l’impérativité des règles de conflit fait abstraction de toute considération substantielle, en retenant une supplétivité de principe pour l’ensemble des règles de conflit unifiées à l’échelle européenne. La jurisprudence a-t-elle raison de définir l’autorité des règles de conflits exclusivement à l’aune de considérations substantielles ? Non, car cela revient à nier que l’effet juridique des règles de conflit est imputé selon des considérations propres à la justice conflictuelle. Pour autant, on ne saurait, à l’instar du législateur européen, exclure toute considération substantielle. Le présupposé des règles de conflit vise des questions de droit substantiel. Les règles de conflit sont donc construites en contemplation de considérations substantielles. Dès lors, si ces dernières ne sauraient dicter à elles seules l’autorité des règles de conflit, on ne saurait, non plus, en faire totalement abstraction. / Choice-of-law rules do not all have the same authority. The parties, and even the judge, may be allowed to override the designation made by the conflict rule. The parties are sometimes free to depart, by convention, from the designated law (suppletory choice-of-law rules), sometimes bound by the designation made (imperative choice-of-law rules). The judge is sometimes obliged, sometimes free to raise ex officio the internationality of the dispute, and to deduce from it the application of the choice-of-law rule. Considering together such varied questions may be surprising, but it is the approach adopted by French case law. The authority of choice-of-law rules is defined jointly, according to substantive considerations. As a matter of example, an affiliation proceeding is, in French substantive law, a matter of public policy regarding someone’s family status, and deemed to concern an unwaivable right. Therefore, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be imperative and applied ex officio by the judge. Conversely, if the claim falls within a largely suppletory subject matter or relates to waivable rights, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be suppletory, and the judge will not be required to apply it ex officio. Therefore, the authority of choice-of-law rules is defined, with respect to both the parties and the judge, according to substantive considerations.However, this regime is no longer that of European private international law. Firstly, the European regulations have only defined the authority of their choice-of-law rules with respect to the parties, leaving it up to each Member State to determine their authority over the judge. Secondly, the European definition of their authority over the parties disregards any substantive consideration, and retains a whole set of suppletory choice-of-law rules, regardless of the subject-matter. Is case law justified in defining the authority of choice-of-law rules solely on the basis of substantive considerations ? No, because choice-of-law rules designate the applicable law according to choice-of-law considerations. However, one cannot, like the European legislator, exclude any substantive consideration. The supposition of choice-of-law rules concerns substantive law issues. Choice-of-law rules are, thus, devised according to substantive considerations. Therefore, if these alone cannot define the authority of choice-of-law rules, they cannot be totally ignored either.

Magister Legum - LLM

An increase in economic globalisation and international trade the past two decades has amounted to an increase in the number of multinational enterprises that conduct business, own assets and have debt in various jurisdictions around the world. This, coupled with the recent worldwide economic recession, has inevitably caused the increased occurrence of multinational financial default, also known as cross–border insolvency (CBI). CBI refers to the situation where insolvency proceedings are initiated in one jurisdiction with regard to a debtor’s estate and the debtor also has property, debt or both in at least one other jurisdiction. When a multinational enterprise is in financial distress, the structure of such an enterprise poses significant challenges to the question of how to address its insolvency. This is due to the fact that, although the multinational enterprise is found globally in different jurisdictions around the world, the laws addressing its liquidation are local. The possibility of restructuring the multinational enterprise or liquidating it in order the satisfy creditor claims optimally depends greatly upon the ease with which the insolvency law regimes of multiple jurisdictions can facilitate a fair and timely resolution to the financial distress of that multinational enterprise. The legal response to this problem has produced two important international instruments which were designed to address key issues associated with CBI. Firstly, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross–Border Insolvency in 1997, which has been adopted by nineteen countries including the United States of America (in the form of Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code) and South Africa (in the form of the Cross–Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000). Secondly, the European Union adopted the European Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (EC Regulation) in 2000. These two instruments address the management of general default by a debtor and are aimed at providing a legal framework which seeks to enhance legal certainty, cooperation, coordination and harmonization between states in CBI matters throughout the world. After discussing the viewpoints of various writers, it seems clear that “modified universalism” is the correct approach towards CBI matters globally. This is mainly due to the fact that the main international instruments currently dealing with CBI matters are all based upon “modified universalism”. By looking at various EU and US case law it is also evident that, although there is currently still no established test for the determination of the “centre of main interest” (COMI) of a debtor–company under Chapter 15, there is a difference in the approach adopted by courts in the EU and those in the US in this regard. This dissertation further discusses the requirements for a debtor–company to possess an “establishment” for the purpose of opening foreign non–main insolvency proceedings in a jurisdiction as well as the choice–of–law considerations in CBI matters. / Thesis (LL.M. (Import and Export Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

An increase in economic globalisation and international trade the past two decades has amounted to an increase in the number of multinational enterprises that conduct business, own assets and have debt in various jurisdictions around the world. This, coupled with the recent worldwide economic recession, has inevitably caused the increased occurrence of multinational financial default, also known as cross–border insolvency (CBI). CBI refers to the situation where insolvency proceedings are initiated in one jurisdiction with regard to a debtor’s estate and the debtor also has property, debt or both in at least one other jurisdiction. When a multinational enterprise is in financial distress, the structure of such an enterprise poses significant challenges to the question of how to address its insolvency. This is due to the fact that, although the multinational enterprise is found globally in different jurisdictions around the world, the laws addressing its liquidation are local. The possibility of restructuring the multinational enterprise or liquidating it in order the satisfy creditor claims optimally depends greatly upon the ease with which the insolvency law regimes of multiple jurisdictions can facilitate a fair and timely resolution to the financial distress of that multinational enterprise. The legal response to this problem has produced two important international instruments which were designed to address key issues associated with CBI. Firstly, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross–Border Insolvency in 1997, which has been adopted by nineteen countries including the United States of America (in the form of Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code) and South Africa (in the form of the Cross–Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000). Secondly, the European Union adopted the European Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (EC Regulation) in 2000. These two instruments address the management of general default by a debtor and are aimed at providing a legal framework which seeks to enhance legal certainty, cooperation, coordination and harmonization between states in CBI matters throughout the world. After discussing the viewpoints of various writers, it seems clear that “modified universalism” is the correct approach towards CBI matters globally. This is mainly due to the fact that the main international instruments currently dealing with CBI matters are all based upon “modified universalism”. By looking at various EU and US case law it is also evident that, although there is currently still no established test for the determination of the “centre of main interest” (COMI) of a debtor–company under Chapter 15, there is a difference in the approach adopted by courts in the EU and those in the US in this regard. This dissertation further discusses the requirements for a debtor–company to possess an “establishment” for the purpose of opening foreign non–main insolvency proceedings in a jurisdiction as well as the choice–of–law considerations in CBI matters. / Thesis (LL.M. (Import and Export Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

En ce début de XXIe siècle, le droit international privé intervient dans un contexte caractérisé à la fois par la multiplication des relations familiales internationales, conséquence de la mobilité croissante des personnes privées, et la montée d’un individualisme qui rechigne toujours davantage à composer avec les contraintes collectives. Ces changements conduisent à une contestation croissante des obstacles à la reconnaissance des situations familiales qui impose de repenser à la fois le cadre théorique et les méthodes de la discipline. Sur le premier plan, il est proposé de consacrer un nouveau principe directeur, l’impératif de reconnaissance des situations familiales, qui reflète à la fois la prédominance effective des intérêts privés et la matérialisation d’une discipline autrefois éprise de justice conflictuelle, et permet d’afficher plus clairement ce qui doit désormais constituer la réaction dominante du for face à une situation familiale constituée à l’étranger. Sur le plan des méthodes, l’enjeu est de traduire le nouvel impératif, ce qui doit consister à libéraliser l’accueil des situations familiales constituées à l’étranger sans aller jusqu’à supprimer tous les chefs de contrôle. Plusieurs voies sont envisageables, qui vont du simple infléchissement des méthodes existantes à la consécration d’une nouvelle méthode de la reconnaissance des situations familiales. Entre ces différentes possibilités, des choix s’imposent qui mêlent technique et politique juridiques, et impliquent de prendre en compte tant les enseignements de la théorie générale du droit international privé que la dimension européenne de la problématique. / Private international law today has to contend with social realities that have evolved markedly over the course of the last few decades. As a result of increased mobility across national borders, international families are ever more numerous and so are instances where recognition of a family status acquired abroad is sought. The effects of this change are compounded by a greater focus on individual agency and self-determination, which leads to stronger challenges to State policies that result in non-recognition. A change in how we understand and ‘do’ private international law seems warranted on two levels. The first change relates to the so-called guiding principles which encapsulate the various aims pursued by the field and can thus provide a useful conceptual framework. I suggest that adding a state duty to recognize a family status created abroad to the existing principles would help strike a better balance between private interests in facilitating recognition and the public interest in the regulation of family forms. This shift necessitates changes on another level, that of the private international law’s methods. Combining easier recognition of foreign family relationships with some degree of state control can be achieved in various ways which range from incremental change to existing methodology to a complete overhaul in the form of a new method of automatic recognition. This raises issues of both technique and policy, which are discussed in the second part of this work from a French and European perspective.

Cette étude se livre à l’analyse de la faculté de "dépeçage" du contrat dont disposent les parties à un contrat international afin de le soumettre à différents systèmes de règles. Permise par le principe d’autonomie de la volonté, cette figure a été consacrée par la Convention de Rome, devenue règlement Rome I, qui constitue le droit international privé français et européen en matière contractuelle. L’intérêt de cette technique a ensuite été renouvelé par la Proposition de règlement Rome 1 dont la nouveauté réside dans l'admission de la combinaison non seulement entre différentes lois étatiques comme c'est le cas actuellement, mais également entre des lois étatiques avec des lois a-étatiques. A cet égard, les contours théorique du terme sont explorés. Le droit des contrats étant avant tout un droit pratique, cette étude se propose d’évaluer l'intérêt réel de la mesure envisagée pour les opérateurs du commerce international. L’intérêt de la démonstration repose notamment sur la méthodologie de recherche employée, la question du dépeçage du contrat étant étudiée tant sur un plan théorique que précisée sur le plan pratique. / This study aims at analyzing contractual “dépeçage” or “contractual splitting”. This ability allow the parties to an international contract to distribute it between different laws. The figure has been enshrined in the Rome Convention, that became the Rome I Regulation, which now constitutes the actual French and European private international law of contract. The advantage of this technique was then renewed by the Proposal for a Regulation Rome 1 whose novelty lies in the admission of the combination, not only between different state laws as it is currently the case, but also, between state laws and non-state laws. In this respect, the theoretical contours of the term are explored. And since contract law is primarily a practical law, this study aims to assess the real value of the measure for international operators. The interest of the demonstration is therefore based on the methodology of the research, the issue split the contract being discussed both on a theoretical level, as on a practical point of view.