O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar os processos licitatórios para a concessão do transporte coletivo municipal por ônibus, ocorridos na cidade de Porto Alegre, durante o ano de 2014, visando identificar o porquê de ambos processos terem restado desertos. Para tanto, buscou-se, ao longo desse estudo de caso, subsídios que justificassem o desinteresse, por parte da iniciativa privada, em prover estes serviços. Através de pesquisa a literatura e da análise de casos de Londres (UK), França e Japão, buscou-se reunir tais subsídios. A conclusão que se obteve é de que as grandes barreiras de entrada; o grande tempo de contrato a ser firmado; o risco de receita ao operador privado, em um contexto em que o poder público determina as especificações dos serviços a serem prestados; a ausência de informações completas sobre os serviços a serem prestados; as indefinições sobre a integração tarifária do sistema metropolitano, e sobre a implantação do metrô e do BRT; podem estar entre as justificativas do desinteresse da iniciativa privada em concorrer nos certames ofertados pelo Poder Público. / This study aims to analyze the bidding process for the granting of the municipal public transport by bus, occurred in the city of Porto Alegre during the year 2014 to identify why both processes have no bidders. Therefore, we sought, throughout this case study, subsidies to justify the lack of interest on the part of the private sector in providing these services. Through research the literature and analysis of cases of London (UK), France and Japan, we sought to gather such subsidies. The conclusion obtained is that large entry barriers; the big time contract to be signed; the risk of revenue to the private operator, in a context in which the government determines the specifications of the services to be provided; the absence of complete information on the services to be provided; the uncertainties on tariff integration of the metropolitan system, and for the implementation of the metro and BRT; may be among the reasons of the private sector unwillingness to compete in contests offered by the Government.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar os processos licitatórios para a concessão do transporte coletivo municipal por ônibus, ocorridos na cidade de Porto Alegre, durante o ano de 2014, visando identificar o porquê de ambos processos terem restado desertos. Para tanto, buscou-se, ao longo desse estudo de caso, subsídios que justificassem o desinteresse, por parte da iniciativa privada, em prover estes serviços. Através de pesquisa a literatura e da análise de casos de Londres (UK), França e Japão, buscou-se reunir tais subsídios. A conclusão que se obteve é de que as grandes barreiras de entrada; o grande tempo de contrato a ser firmado; o risco de receita ao operador privado, em um contexto em que o poder público determina as especificações dos serviços a serem prestados; a ausência de informações completas sobre os serviços a serem prestados; as indefinições sobre a integração tarifária do sistema metropolitano, e sobre a implantação do metrô e do BRT; podem estar entre as justificativas do desinteresse da iniciativa privada em concorrer nos certames ofertados pelo Poder Público. / This study aims to analyze the bidding process for the granting of the municipal public transport by bus, occurred in the city of Porto Alegre during the year 2014 to identify why both processes have no bidders. Therefore, we sought, throughout this case study, subsidies to justify the lack of interest on the part of the private sector in providing these services. Through research the literature and analysis of cases of London (UK), France and Japan, we sought to gather such subsidies. The conclusion obtained is that large entry barriers; the big time contract to be signed; the risk of revenue to the private operator, in a context in which the government determines the specifications of the services to be provided; the absence of complete information on the services to be provided; the uncertainties on tariff integration of the metropolitan system, and for the implementation of the metro and BRT; may be among the reasons of the private sector unwillingness to compete in contests offered by the Government.

The public sector in Australia, as in other western countries, has been accused in recent times of being too costly, too rigid, inefficient and ineffective. What is apparently needed is a public sector that is smaller, less costly, more efficient and more effective. The search for alternative and better ways to organise and undertake work to meet these reform objectives is at the heart of the rapid expansion of Competitive Tendering and Contracting (CTC) within the public sector in the last two decades. But increased reliance on government contracting does not always lead to outsourcing. Some government agencies allow, indeed encourage, their current employees to also bid for the work on offer by including an In-House Option (IHO) within their CTC processes. In a number of cases these IHOs have been selected ahead of their commercial competitors. IHOs are effectively internal tenders that, if selected, must be implemented by work areas within the confines of the policies and practices of their parent organisation. The reasons commonly expressed in support of IHOs are to do with addressing the potentially problematic aspects of organisational review and possible outsourcing, and to assist the parent organisation achieve its reform intentions in the most effective and least disruptive manner possible. This research examined the achievements of six IHOs within the Australian Defence Organisation. It also asked what can be learned from their experiences? The findings show that IHOs can contribute to reform and enhance the effectiveness of CTC processes but that these achievements come at a price�borne primarily by the staff who work within selected IHOs. IHOs add to the competition of CTC exercises. They also act as an insurance policy against being caught with no reasonable bids and offer a benchmark against which to assess unknown bids. But competition can also focus bidders on doing what is necessary to win rather than what is best for an organisation or its staff. Having IHOs increases the uncertainty for staff about their future employment while at the same times raising expectations that if they can be successful they will be able to make changes and improve their work areas. This research has shown that this does not always occur and staff can find the whole experience frustrating and demoralising. Organisations that include IHOs within their CTC methodologies need to assist them if they are to have the best opportunity to propose new and innovative ways of working. And they must be prepared for the possibility that their IHOs could win. Selected IHOs need support to successfully implement changes, and as the IHOs examined here have shown, they can make significant improvements in work practices and more efficient use of resources if given the chance.

Der Anlass der Arbeit ist die anhaltende Debatte um die Einführung des Ausschreibungswettbewerbs im Nahverkehr. Die Arbeit betrachtet schwerpunktmäßig die Gestaltung von Ausschreibungen im öffentlichen Straßenpersonennahverkehr, der in Deutschland durch das Personenbeförderungsgesetz (PBefG) geregelt wird. Gerade die Debatte um den Ausschreibungswettbewerb in diesem Bereich ist durch Kompetenzstreitigkeiten zwischen den Verkehrsunternehmen und den öffentlichen Aufgabenträgern bzw. ihren Vergabeinstitutionen gekennzeichnet. Beide Seiten beanspruchen dabei Verantwortlichkeiten auf der taktischen Ebene der Leistungserstellung, beispielsweise die Liniennetzplanung, die Fahrplangestaltung, das Fahrzeugkonzept und das Marketing. Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit besteht darin, herauszufinden, ob es aus ökonomischer Sicht besser ist, diese o. g. Entscheidungskompetenzen den Verkehrsunternehmen oder den Vergabeinstitutionen der Aufgabenträger zuzuordnen. Nach einer Bestandsaufnahme der bereits bestehenden ordnungspolitischen Vorschläge und der gegenwärtigen Zuständigkeiten, wird, ausgehend von der Vertrags- und Auktionstheorie, die Frage erörtert, ob sich unternehmerische Gestaltungsspielräume auf der taktischen Ebene in eine Leistungsbeschreibung integrieren lassen. In einem zweiten Schritt wird die Gestaltung der Beziehungen zwischen Aufgabenträger, seiner Vergabeorganisation und dem Verkehrsunternehmen während der Vertragslaufzeit betrachtet. Die Theorie der unvollständigen Verträge wird dabei auf das Problem der ÖPNV-Verträge angewandt, um aufzuzeigen, ob ein Mehr an unternehmerischer Freiheit bei der Gestaltung des Verkehrsangebots aus der Sicht der Aufgabenträger eher mit Chancen oder mit Risiken behaftet ist. Chancen können sich insbesondere dadurch ergeben, dass das Unternehmen während der Laufzeit des Vertrages neue Möglichkeiten entdeckt, wie sich die Qualität der Leistung verbessern lässt. Risiken ergeben sich dadurch, dass das Unternehmen nach Abschluss des Verkehrsvertrages seine Gestaltungsspielräume ausnutzt, um die Kosten zu Lasten der bestehenden Dienstleistungsqualität zu senken. Im Rahmen von Fallstudien aus Australien, Schweden und den Niederlanden wird das im Rahmen der Betrachtungen zur Theorie unvollständiger Verträge erörterte Spannungsverhältnis aus Kostensenkung, Qualitätsverbesserung bzw. –verschlechterung untersucht. Die Fallstudien zeigen, dass Unternehmen, wenn sie Freiheiten bei der Angebotsgestaltung erhalten, ihre Anstrengungen vor allem auf kostensenkende Aktivitäten fokussieren, die auch zu Lasten der Qualität gehen können. Es wird deutlich, dass vor allem im Hinblick auf die Gewährleistung eines integrierten Angebots und die Sicherstellung von Investitionen allgemeinverbindliche Standards und ein intensives Monitoring durch die Aufgabenträger unerlässlich sind.

Submitted by Irene Nascimento (irene.kessia@ufpe.br) on 2017-03-16T16:28:54Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) 1_TESE_Fernando Rolim_UFPE_CTG_FINAL ✓.pdf: 11444878 bytes, checksum: 49ba52a66dd0e0151594254313b84808 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-16T16:28:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) 1_TESE_Fernando Rolim_UFPE_CTG_FINAL ✓.pdf: 11444878 bytes, checksum: 49ba52a66dd0e0151594254313b84808 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-10-29 / Esta Tese analisa a competitividade de procedimentos licitatórios para a delegação dos serviços de Transporte Público Urbano por Ônibus (TPUO) através do desenvolvimento e aplicação de um original e inédito método de análise baseado na adjunção da Teoria da Regulação Econômica (aqui vista como fenômeno que trata dos mercados nos momentos ex ante e ex post licitações) com a Teoria dos Leilões (aqui vista como processo que trata dos fenômenos que ocorrem durante os próprios procedimentos licitatórios). O método foca na análise tanto das estruturas de mercado ex ante licitações, como nos termos dos editais das licitações, para especular se as licitações tendem a ser competitivas, no sentido de atrair o maior número de empresas entrantes e incumbentes possível às disputas, de estabelecer um ambiente contestável, e de obter contratações mais econômicas. No método desenvolvido é priorizada a adoção de pressupostos baseados em elementos técnicos e econômicos, pois se entende que esses elementos devem limitar a discricionariedade do gestor público, ainda que a legislação eventualmente lhe faculte várias possibilidades para a tomada de decisão. A hipótese da pesquisa, de que em geral as licitações brasileiras para a delegação de serviços de TPUO não têm privilegiado a competitividade, é confirmada pelo teste de hipótese feito, qual seja, a aplicação do método de análise nos editais das Concorrências 02/2013 e 03/2013 do Grande Recife Consórcio de Transportes (CTM) para a delegação de serviços de TPUO na Região Metropolitana do Recife (RMR). Diante dos achados da pesquisa, resta especular que a explicação para a realidade constatada não está na análise econômica. Nesse sentido, a Tese pode fechar um ciclo de pesquisas conduzidas pela academia nacional nas últimas duas décadas, que tem tentado buscar respostas para explicar o porque de não haver competitividade em licitações para delegação de serviços de TPUO no Brasil. As respostas provavelmente não se encontram no campo da Economia, a despeito de a Tese mostrar que a competitividade, segundo a Teoria da Regulação Econômica e a Teoria dos Leilões, não vir sendo atingida nas licitações brasileiras. Resta agora explorar outros caminhos e searas, que enfoquem e estudem as relações sociais e outras disciplinas que eventualmente possam desvendar o que efetivamente está subjacente à falta de competitividade, para entender e diagnosticar, na prática, as forças que impedem a inserção de adequados níveis de competitividade nos mercados de TPUO brasileiros. / This thesis analyzes the competitiveness of competitive tendering (CT) procedures aimed at the delegation of the Urban Bus Public Transport (TPUO) services through the development and application of a method of analysis based on the addition of the Theory of Economic Regulation (seen here as a phenomenon that deals with the markets ex ante and ex post competitive tendering processes) with the Auction Theory (seen here as a process that deals with the phenomena that occur during the competitive tendering procedures). The method focuses on the analysis of both the ex ante CT market structures and the terms of the notices to tender, in order to speculate whether the bids tend to be competitive from the perspective of attracting as many entrant and incumbent firms as possible, of establishing a contestable environment, and of fostering more economic contracts. In the method developed it is prioritized the adoption of assumptions based on technical and economic aspects, since it is considered that these aspects should limit the discretion of the public authority, even when the legislation allows different choices for the decision maker. The hypothesis of the research, that in general the Brazilian CT procedures for the delegation of the TPUO services have not privileged competitiveness, is confirmed by the test of hypothesis done, that means, the application of the method upon the notices to tender 02/2013 03/2013 of the Greater Recife Transport Consortium (CTM) for the delegation of TPUO services in the Metropolitan Region of Recife (RMR). Before the research findings, it may be speculated that the explanation for the reality observed can not be found in the economic analysis. In this sense, the Thesis may close a research effort conducted by Brazilian scholars throughout the last two decades, who have been trying to find answers to explain the reason for the lack of competitiveness in the CT procedures for de delegation of the TPUO services in Brazil. Probably answers may not be found in the Economy field, even though the Thesis has shown that competitiveness, according to the Theory of Economic Regulation and the Auction Theory, has not been achieved in the Brazilian case. Thus, it would be appropriate to explore other fields that focus and study social relations and other disciplines which might uncover what is actually behind the lack of competitiveness, to understand and diagnose, in practice, the forces that prevent the insertion of appropriate levels of competitiveness in the Brazilian TPUO markets.

Der Anlass der Arbeit ist die anhaltende Debatte um die Einführung des Ausschreibungswettbewerbs im Nahverkehr. Die Arbeit betrachtet schwerpunktmäßig die Gestaltung von Ausschreibungen im öffentlichen Straßenpersonennahverkehr, der in Deutschland durch das Personenbeförderungsgesetz (PBefG) geregelt wird. Gerade die Debatte um den Ausschreibungswettbewerb in diesem Bereich ist durch Kompetenzstreitigkeiten zwischen den Verkehrsunternehmen und den öffentlichen Aufgabenträgern bzw. ihren Vergabeinstitutionen gekennzeichnet. Beide Seiten beanspruchen dabei Verantwortlichkeiten auf der taktischen Ebene der Leistungserstellung, beispielsweise die Liniennetzplanung, die Fahrplangestaltung, das Fahrzeugkonzept und das Marketing. Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit besteht darin, herauszufinden, ob es aus ökonomischer Sicht besser ist, diese o. g. Entscheidungskompetenzen den Verkehrsunternehmen oder den Vergabeinstitutionen der Aufgabenträger zuzuordnen. Nach einer Bestandsaufnahme der bereits bestehenden ordnungspolitischen Vorschläge und der gegenwärtigen Zuständigkeiten, wird, ausgehend von der Vertrags- und Auktionstheorie, die Frage erörtert, ob sich unternehmerische Gestaltungsspielräume auf der taktischen Ebene in eine Leistungsbeschreibung integrieren lassen. In einem zweiten Schritt wird die Gestaltung der Beziehungen zwischen Aufgabenträger, seiner Vergabeorganisation und dem Verkehrsunternehmen während der Vertragslaufzeit betrachtet. Die Theorie der unvollständigen Verträge wird dabei auf das Problem der ÖPNV-Verträge angewandt, um aufzuzeigen, ob ein Mehr an unternehmerischer Freiheit bei der Gestaltung des Verkehrsangebots aus der Sicht der Aufgabenträger eher mit Chancen oder mit Risiken behaftet ist. Chancen können sich insbesondere dadurch ergeben, dass das Unternehmen während der Laufzeit des Vertrages neue Möglichkeiten entdeckt, wie sich die Qualität der Leistung verbessern lässt. Risiken ergeben sich dadurch, dass das Unternehmen nach Abschluss des Verkehrsvertrages seine Gestaltungsspielräume ausnutzt, um die Kosten zu Lasten der bestehenden Dienstleistungsqualität zu senken. Im Rahmen von Fallstudien aus Australien, Schweden und den Niederlanden wird das im Rahmen der Betrachtungen zur Theorie unvollständiger Verträge erörterte Spannungsverhältnis aus Kostensenkung, Qualitätsverbesserung bzw. –verschlechterung untersucht. Die Fallstudien zeigen, dass Unternehmen, wenn sie Freiheiten bei der Angebotsgestaltung erhalten, ihre Anstrengungen vor allem auf kostensenkende Aktivitäten fokussieren, die auch zu Lasten der Qualität gehen können. Es wird deutlich, dass vor allem im Hinblick auf die Gewährleistung eines integrierten Angebots und die Sicherstellung von Investitionen allgemeinverbindliche Standards und ein intensives Monitoring durch die Aufgabenträger unerlässlich sind.

The Swedish bus and railway sectors have been recognised as important early cases of regulatory reforms that led to both vertical and horizontal disintegration as well as market-opening. This thesis investigates the origin and evolution of these reforms from 1979 to 2009, focussing on the markets for passenger services. The aim is to improve our understanding of the background, resulting nature, and consequences of these regulatory reforms. A combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses has been applied; e.g. the thesis makes use of a unique database of longitudinal industry statistics. This thesis shows that the origins of the Swedish reform process were internal and largely unrelated to any objectives of deregulated market-opening. However, a combination of the nature of the initial reforms, the behaviour of market actors, and certain key events accidentally sparked a trend towards deregulation, which has had profound effects on market structure and performance. The step-by-step evolution, in particular the introduction and expansion of competitive tendering, is shown to have had path-dependent characteristics. Swedish competitive tendering of bus and railway services has had important effects on costs and subsidies, but has also generated the problematic behaviour of strategic bidding. Included within are detailed articles which make additional contributions to relevant theories and offer normative advice concerning the design and implementation of regulatory reforms in these as well as other sectors.

Andelen konkurrensutsatt offentlig verksamhet har ökat i jämn takt sedan början av 1990-talet, och utvecklingen har både sina förespråkare och kritiker. När det gäller de stora partierna inom de olika politiska blocken, är konsensus numera att konkurrensutsättning är här för att stanna, skiljelinjen ligger mer på hur stor andel av den offentliga verksamheten som skall konkurrensutsättas. Även bristen på en genomlysning och uppföljning av konkurrensutsatta verksamheter har väckt kritik. Kostnadseffektivitet är det som förespråkas vid konkurrensutsättning och används som syfte till att anlita privata eller korporativa aktörer etc., för att bedriva en tidigare offentlig verksamhet på ett mer företagsekonomiskt effektivt sätt. Syftet med uppsatsen var att undersöka hur Region Gotland använder sig av konkurrensutsättning och upphandling för att nå en företagsekonomisk effektivitet i sin verksamhet, och jämföra det empiriska underlaget mot tillgängliga teoretiska källor. För uppsatsen har följande två frågeställningar valts som uppsatsens problemformulering: (1) På vilket sätt genomförs konkurrensutsättning för att uppnå företagsekonomisk effektivitet i offentlig verksamhet? (2) I vilken omfattning sker uppföljning av verksamheter för att kontrollera att tilldelade resurser används på bästa sätt? Uppsatsen visade inte på något otvetydigt klargörande när det gäller ekonomisk vinst vid konkurrensutsättning, eftersom uppföljning och utvärdering av upphandlade verksamheter inte sker i den utsträckning som vore önskvärd. Detta skapar problem med att dra några konkreta slutsatser om det råder någon ekonomisk skillnad, ifall verksamheten bedrivs i offentlig eller privat regi, det blir mer ett antagande än bevisad kunskap. Det framkom även att den byråkratisering som medföljer vid konkurrensutsättning innebär ökad kostnad för det offentliga, och det är inte alltid som effektiviseringarna motsvarar omkostnaderna. Ingen av respondenterna ansåg att konkurrensutsättning är ett felaktigt förfarande utan det behövs mer tid för att bygga upp kunskapen, och att därmed fullt ut utnyttja upphandlingen som ett ekonomiskt instrument. Skiljepunkten mellan respondenterna är snarare hur användandet av konkurrensutsättning bör användas för att gynna Region Gotland och det lokala näringslivet. Flertalet av de anbudsförfaranden som har utfallit med bra resultat, är inom områden där konkurrensutsättning har använts under längre tid, och ”trial and error” är en av förklaringarna som uppsatsen har kommit fram till. Storleken på förfrågningsunderlagen är betydelsefullt, för att öka antalet anbud och därmed konkurrensen. Vilket i sin tur minskar risken för oligopol - eller monopol - ställning för något enstaka storföretag.  Antalet anbud ger också en prispress vilket för det offentliga kan betyda större ”effektivitetsvinster”. / The proportion of Swedish public sector exposed to competitive tendering has increased steadily since the early 1990s. This development or progress has its proponents as well as critics. As for the major parties in the two political blocs, there is now a consensus that competitive tendering is here to stay. The dividing line is more on what proportion of the public sector to be opened to competition. The purpose of this thesis was to examine how The Region of Gotland uses the competitive tendering and procurement to achieve business efficiency in their activities, and compare the empirical basis in relation to the available theoretical sources. For our thesis the following questions are chosen: In what way are implementations of competitive tendering used in order to achieve business efficiency within the public sector? To what extent is monitoring of public sector to ensure that allocated resources are used as intended in the best way? The empirical data shows that there is no straight line in terms of financial results of competitive tendering, as the monitoring and evaluation of procurement activities does not occur to the extent needed. For the same reason a comparison with financial outcome of public operation would become more an assumption than proved knowledge. Areas where a tender procedure has turned out with good results are mostly, in areas where competition has been used for a long time. Our conclusion is that time is needed to develop knowledge of good practice and examples. The size of the tender specifications is important, to increase the number of tender and thus competition. This in turn reduces the risk of monopoly. The number of tenders also provides a downward pressure in prices which can mean greater “efficiency gains”.

The overall purpose of this thesis is to gain further knowledge of how the Swedish local government level is affected by requirements to use public procurement through competitive tendering and, more specifically, understand the actions taken by included actors when public procurement is required in implementation of public transport goals. Through case study method, an in specific process tracing, various implementation processes have been examined. One studied process complied with the procurement regulations, while the others included elements that circumvented them. In each process, the actions taken by involved actors have been the focus. The findings are presented in four papers. An overall conclusion is that, when public procurement is required in implementation at the local government level, several actors need to interact. These actors may use procurement to expand, maintain, or restrain their discretion towards others actors. In addition, various control mechanisms, such as e.g. monitoring, are used to restrain an actor’s discretion when the actor is circumventing procurement legislation. / Det övergripande syftet med denna avhandling är att öka kunskapen om hur den lokala nivån i Sverige är påverkad av kravet på att använda offentlig upphandling, och mer specifikt att förstå de handlingar som olika aktörer vidtar vid implementering av kollektivtrafik mål, då konkurrensutsatt upphandling är ett krav. Genom fallstudie metod har olika implementeringsprocesser undersökts. I en process har upphandlingsreglerna följts, medan i de andra har upphandlingslagen kringgåtts. Resultaten har analyserats utifrån principal-agent teori och presenteras i form av fyra artiklar. I studien konstateras det att flera aktörer är beroende av varandra i implementeringen. Aktörerna kan använda upphandling för att både behålla och expandera sitt handlingsutrymme gentemot andra aktörer, men upphandling kan även vara begränsande. I studien diskuteras även olika kontrollmekanismer som användas då aktörer kringgår upphandlingslagstiftningen.