The scourge of HIV/AIDS is ravaging our communities; many children have lost their parents to this pandemic. The death of parents because of this pandemic has resulted in the emergence of a new phenomenon of child-headed households. This paper seeks to examine the rights of children in child-headed households as entrenched in section 28(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution. Once the rights of children in child-headed households are ascertained, the state’s duty to give effect to these rights is investigated. In the analysis of the rights, the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court is considered. The paper further argues that the state gives effect to the rights of children in child-headed households through legislation and policy. As such, the paper takes a closer look at the legislation and policies that seek to give effect to the rights of children in child-headed households as enumerated in section 28(1)(b) and (c) and gaps in that legislation and policy are highlighted. In conclusion, proposals are made that will assist the state to give effect to the rights of children in child-headed households as set out in the Constitution. / Private Law / LL.M.

Afrikaans text / Suid-Afrika het ‘n ver pad gekom sedert die 16de eeu in die erkenning en ontwikkeling van kinderregte. Kinderregte word vandag ten volle erken in die Grondwet, wat die hoogste gesag in die land is. Hierdie studie het ten doel om die beskerming van kinderregte in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg te ondersoek, met verwysing na die rol wat internasionale reg, soos die United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“die Konvensie”) en die African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990 (“Afrika Handves”) in die ontwikkeling van kinderregte gespeel het. Spesifieke voorskrifte ingevolge waarvan die regte van kinders beskerm word is ondersoek,insluitend artikel 28 van die Grondwet en sekere bepalings van die Kinderwet. Weens die beperkte omvang van hierdie verhandeling, is sekere afgebakende voorbeelde uit die Kinderwet ondersoek met spesifieke verwysing na kinders se regte en tradisionele waardes soos manlike besnydenis, vroulike besnydenis en maagdelikheidstoetse. Daar is gekyk of die praktiese probleme op regeringsvlak, byvoorbeeld die voorsiening en befondsing van maatskaplike dienste, die implementering van die bepalings van die Kinderwet vertraag. Skrywer kom tot die slotsom dat die bepalings van die Kinderwet alleenlik nie voldoende is om effektiewe beskerming aan sekere groepe kinders te verleen nie en hierdie probleme lei daartoe dat kinderregte nie behoorlik gerealiseer en geïmplementeer word nie, en dat daar nie ‘n behoorlike balans tussen die regte en verantwoordelikhede van die kind, die ouers en die staat bereik word nie. Moontlike oplossings vir die probleem en tekortkominge in die uitvoering van die Kinderwet word voorgestel in die slot hoofstuk. / South Africa has come a long way since the 16th century in the recognition and development of children's rights. Children's rights are now fully recognized in the Constitution, the supreme authority in the country. This study aims to investigate the protection of children's rights in South African law, with reference to the role of international law, such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the rights and Welfare of the child 1990, in the development of children's rights. Specific provisions under which the rights of children protected is examined, including Section 28 of the Constitution and certain provisions of the Children’s Act. Due to the limited scope of this paper, some designated examples from the Children’s Act are examined with particular reference to children's rights and traditional values such as male circumcision, female circumcision and virginity testing. It is looked at if whether the practical problems experienced on government level, the provision and funding of social services delay the implementation of the provisions of the Children's Act .Author comes to the conclusion that the provisions of the Children alone is not sufficient to ensure effective protection of the rights of certain groups of children and that these problems led to children's rights not properly realized and implemented, and that a proper balance between the rights and responsibilities of the child, the parents and the state is not reached. In the concluding chapter possible solutions to the problems and shortcomings in the implementation of the Children’s Act is suggested. / Jurisprudence / LLM

Afrikaans text / Suid-Afrika het ‘n ver pad gekom sedert die 16de eeu in die erkenning en ontwikkeling van kinderregte. Kinderregte word vandag ten volle erken in die Grondwet, wat die hoogste gesag in die land is. Hierdie studie het ten doel om die beskerming van kinderregte in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg te ondersoek, met verwysing na die rol wat internasionale reg, soos die United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“die Konvensie”) en die African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990 (“Afrika Handves”) in die ontwikkeling van kinderregte gespeel het. Spesifieke voorskrifte ingevolge waarvan die regte van kinders beskerm word is ondersoek,insluitend artikel 28 van die Grondwet en sekere bepalings van die Kinderwet. Weens die beperkte omvang van hierdie verhandeling, is sekere afgebakende voorbeelde uit die Kinderwet ondersoek met spesifieke verwysing na kinders se regte en tradisionele waardes soos manlike besnydenis, vroulike besnydenis en maagdelikheidstoetse. Daar is gekyk of die praktiese probleme op regeringsvlak, byvoorbeeld die voorsiening en befondsing van maatskaplike dienste, die implementering van die bepalings van die Kinderwet vertraag. Skrywer kom tot die slotsom dat die bepalings van die Kinderwet alleenlik nie voldoende is om effektiewe beskerming aan sekere groepe kinders te verleen nie en hierdie probleme lei daartoe dat kinderregte nie behoorlik gerealiseer en geïmplementeer word nie, en dat daar nie ‘n behoorlike balans tussen die regte en verantwoordelikhede van die kind, die ouers en die staat bereik word nie. Moontlike oplossings vir die probleem en tekortkominge in die uitvoering van die Kinderwet word voorgestel in die slot hoofstuk. / South Africa has come a long way since the 16th century in the recognition and development of children's rights. Children's rights are now fully recognized in the Constitution, the supreme authority in the country. This study aims to investigate the protection of children's rights in South African law, with reference to the role of international law, such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the rights and Welfare of the child 1990, in the development of children's rights. Specific provisions under which the rights of children protected is examined, including Section 28 of the Constitution and certain provisions of the Children’s Act. Due to the limited scope of this paper, some designated examples from the Children’s Act are examined with particular reference to children's rights and traditional values such as male circumcision, female circumcision and virginity testing. It is looked at if whether the practical problems experienced on government level, the provision and funding of social services delay the implementation of the provisions of the Children's Act .Author comes to the conclusion that the provisions of the Children alone is not sufficient to ensure effective protection of the rights of certain groups of children and that these problems led to children's rights not properly realized and implemented, and that a proper balance between the rights and responsibilities of the child, the parents and the state is not reached. In the concluding chapter possible solutions to the problems and shortcomings in the implementation of the Children’s Act is suggested. / Jurisprudence / LLM

Lobbying should be strictly regulated – that is the major finding of this thesis. The thesis presents many reasons to enact stricter regulations. The principle one being that, as lightly regulated as it is, lobbying is corroding democracy in both Canada and the United States. The thesis opens with a deep investigation of how lobbying works in both countries. There are examples taken from the literature, as well as original qualitative interviews of Canadian lobbyists, former politicians, and officials. Together, these make it clear that there is an intimate relationship between lobbying and campaign financing. The link between the two is sufficiently tight that lobbying and campaign financing should be considered mirrors of each other for the purposes of regulatory design and constitutional jurisprudence. They both have large impacts on government decision-making. Left lightly regulated, lobbying and campaign financing erode the processes of democracy, damage policy-making, and feed an inequality spiral into plutocracy. These have become major challenges of our time. The thesis examines the lobbying regulations currently in place. It finds the regulatory systems of both countries wanting. Since stricter regulation is required to protect democracy and equality, the thesis considers what constitutional constraints, if any, would stand in the way. This, primarily, is a study of how proposed stronger lobbying regulations would interact with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2 (free expression and association rights) and s. 3 (democratic rights). The principal findings are that legislation which restricted lobbying as proposed would probably be upheld by the Canadian court, but struck down by the American court, due to differences in their constitutional jurisprudence. The thesis contends that robust lobbying regulations would align with Canadian Charter values, provide benefits to democracy, improve government decision-making, increase equality, and create more room for citizen voices. The thesis concludes with a set of proposed principles for lobbying reform and an evaluation of two specific reforms: limits on business lobbying and funding for citizen groups. Although the thesis focuses on Canadian and American lobbying regulations, its lessons are broadly applicable to any jurisdiction that is considering regulating lobbying.

Wie sollen Rechtssysteme auf Regeln reagieren, die Provider von Netzgemeinschaften wie Facebook oder World of Warcraft Nutzenden auferlegen? Das positive Recht gibt hierauf keine verlässliche Antwort. Erst ein Verständnis der Legitimität der Regeln ermöglicht ein Austarieren des Verhältnisses zwischen den Regelwerken von Netzgemeinschaften und Rechtssystemen. Nach Literaturstimmen sollen die Regeln durch außerrechtliche Mechanismen (z.B. direktdemokratische Verfahren), eine gerichtliche Kontrolle nach verfassungsrechtlichen Kriterien oder Zivilverfassungen legitimiert werden. Es ist aber zweifelhaft, ob Netzgemeinschaften legitime außerrechtliche Mechanismen schaffen können, ob sie wie Staaten behandelt werden sollten und ob Zivilverfassungen entstehen werden. Die Arbeit schlägt ein alternatives Modell vor: Im deutschen Zivilrecht zeichnet sich ein Legitimitätsmodell für private Regeln ab, das auf Regeln von Netzgemeinschaften anwendbar ist und als transnationale Schablone dienen kann. Danach werden die Regeln durch die Zustimmung und das Wohl der Nutzenden legitimiert. Letzteres gewährleistet ein Ausbeutungsschutz der Nutzenden in Form einer gerichtlichen Kontrolle. Die Anwendung des Modells führt zu folgenden Erkenntnissen: 1. Geschriebene Regeln sind schwach durch Zustimmung legitimiert. Eine gerichtliche Kontrolle nach vertragsrechtlichen Kriterien (bei Regelungen des Austauschverhältnisses zwischen Providern und Nutzenden) oder grundrechtlichen Kriterien (bei Verhaltensregeln) verleiht ihnen zusätzliche Legitimität. Die Kontrollintensität hängt von der Höhe des Ausbeutungsrisikos und der Existenz von legitimen außerrechtlichen Mechanismen ab. 2. Code-Regeln (z.B. Newsfeed- Algorithmen) sind auch nur schwach durch Zustimmung legitimiert. Gerichtliche Kontrollmöglichkeiten, die sie gegenüber Nutzenden legitimieren, müssen noch geschaffen werden. 3. Geschriebene und Code-Regeln sind illegitim gegenüber Nichtnutzenden, weil sie nicht auf deren Zustimmung beruhen. / How should legal systems respond to rules that virtual community providers such as Facebook or World of Warcraft impose on users? To answer this question, we must look beyond black letter law. Only an understanding of the legitimacy of these rules allows us to balance out their relationship with legal systems. Current scholarship theorizes their legitimacy as follows: Non-legal mechanisms (e.g. direct voting systems), judicial review according to constitutional principles, or digital civil constitutions may legitimize the rules. Yet, three points remain doubtful: whether virtual communities can develop legitimate self-governance mechanisms, whether they should be treated like states, and whether digital civil constitutions will effectively emerge. This work proposes an alternative legitimacy model: German private law reflects a legitimacy model for private rule-making applicable to rules of virtual communities which can serve as a transnational template. This model suggests that the rules can derive legitimacy from two sources: user consent and the common good of users, the latter ensured by judicial review protecting users against exploitation. This leads to the following key findings: 1. Written rules of virtual communities are weakly legitimized by user consent but derive additional legitimacy from judicial review. Contract law standard applies to rules that govern the bilateral exchange relationship between providers and users. General rules of conduct for users are checked against fundamental rights. The required intensity of review depends on the risk of user exploitation and the presence of legitimate self-governance mechanisms. 2. Rules embedded in computer code (e.g. newsfeed algorithms) are poorly legitimized by user consent. Judicial review procedures legitimizing them towards users still need to be established. 3. Both written rules and rules embedded in computer code are not legitimate towards non-users since non-users have not consented to them.

This thesis is an examination of whether the “egalitarian model” for political finance that has been established by the Supreme Court of Canada, other Canadian courts and legal scholars and commentators is actually egalitarian and has been applied consistently (in Chapter 2), and whether Canada’s political finance system measures up to the Court’s model (in Chapters 3 and 4), and how it could be changed to comply with a more egalitarian model that would also be ethical in terms of preventing even the appearance of a conflict of interest (in Chapters 6 and 7). Chapter 1 sets out a general theoretical framework for evaluating the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, and I develop and set out a more egalitarian model in Chapter 5. In the Chapter 8 conclusion, I summarize the findings and propose structural and positive Charter rights court cases as a way forward, given that the platforms federal politicians and political parties from the past few elections, and the reports of parliamentary committees, have not called for the most of the changes I propose are needed to make the system more egalitarian. The thesis addresses political finance broadly defined as money, property, use of property, gifts, services, favours and other benefits and advantages provided to nomination contestants, election candidates and political party leadership contestants, electoral district associations, political parties, politicians and their staff during election campaign periods and also during the time period between elections, including support provided by “third-party” interest groups, lobbyists and other individuals, and by media outlets. In Chapter 3, I examine the rules that apply to each of these political actors in the areas of registration, donations and loans, spending, public subsidies and disclosure (including auditing), including a separate section on the role of media and social media. Given that political systems include providers (whether as contractors or donors) of money, property and the use of property (including gifts and other benefits and advantages), and services (including favours) to politicians, and given that providers could be lobbyists, I also examine in Chapter 4 the rules concerning gifts, favours and other benefits and relations between voters, lobbyists and politicians, and concerning the conflicts of interest that can be caused by these activities. Other than disclosure and auditing, I do not cover enforcement measures or systems in any of the areas. However, I do note at various points in the thesis that, as several studies and history have shown clearly, effective enforcement measures, policies and practices are key to ensure compliance with such rules. The main contentions that I make are: that the key principles of the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model have not been consistently upheld by the Court and other Canadian courts, that Canada’ federal political finance system does not fulfill the Court’s egalitarian model, and that several changes are needed to make the model and the system more egalitarian, only a few of which have been addressed by Canadian courts and scholars to date. These contentions counter the claim made in the Court’s rulings, and by many scholars and commentators, that Canada’s political finance system has developed and is based on an egalitarian model. In Chapters 5 through 7, I develop a more egalitarian model and set out specific proposed changes to make Canada’s systems more egalitarian, both in theory and in practice, within the framework of a democratic good government political system (meaning a system with separation of powers, elections, human rights protections, rule of law etc.) and a mixed market economy with both public sector institutions and private sector businesses, unions and other organizations (cooperatives, non-profit, religious organizations etc.). Both the model and many of the specific proposed measures should also be applicable in other jurisdictions with different political systems and economic systems. The framework of 19 standards for a more egalitarian model that I develop in Chapter 5 is based mainly on John Rawls’ theory of justice, but modified and expanded to incorporate critiques of Rawls’ theory, other legal principles and democratic good government theories, international standards, government ethics case law, behavioural psychology studies, and evidence of the public’s expectations. The 201 proposals I make in Chapters 6 and 7 for specific changes to the rules of Canada’s current federal political finance system (again, broadly defined), are based on the model, measures from various jurisdictions in Canada and elsewhere, and international standards. I am not claiming that these changes would definitely result in “better” or more “public interest” policy-making decisions, however that would be determined. I am only contending that the framework I develop is more egalitarian than the Supreme Court’s model, and that the rule changes I suggest would make the political finance, gifts, favours, conflict of interest and lobbying systems align with the more egalitarian model I propose. I primarily use the doctrinal research methodology by examining scholarly research and, given I also examine aspects of the laws of Canadian provinces and municipalities, and other countries, I also deploy some aspects of the comparative methodology (most fully when comparing Canada’s federal rules to Quebec’s rules, and somewhat when comparing Canada’s rules to the U.S. and U.K. rules). The research results from these sources inform the conclusions I set out in my thesis. The thesis advances knowledge in the following areas: 1. It is the first complete evaluation of the federal Canadian political finance, gifts-favours-benefits, conflict of interest and lobbying rules and systems in their current state as of May 2023, based on the findings of extensive new research into key parts of these systems; 2. It sets out the first comprehensive analysis of how the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model has been applied by the Court and other courts inconsistently, in ways that do not comply with the model; 3. It sets out the first analysis of how Canada’s political finance statutory rules, again defined broadly to include rules that apply to donations, loans, gifts, services, favours and other benefits, lobbying and conflicts of interest, do not comply with the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, based in part on new statistical research set out in 28 charts, and; 4. It sets out a new theoretical framework based on 19 standards, and a comprehensive set of 201 innovative proposals for changes to make Canada’s political finance rules (again defined broadly) more egalitarian, and more ethical in terms of preventing conflicts of interest. Five comprehensive studies of key parts of the political finance, ethics and lobbying systems are also proposed to gather key information needed to inform the design of some of the 201 proposed changes. Eight structural and positive Charter rights cases are also proposed to challenge current rules that do not comply with the egalitarian model.