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Magister Legum - LLM

2011年美國對中國特定產品課徵反傾銷稅和平衡稅一案上訴機構報告發布，該案上訴機構推翻小組判決，於條文無明文規定的情形下判定：若針對「同一」損害同時課徵反傾銷稅和平衡稅，則非「適當」的平衡稅額，構成雙重救濟而有違WTO規範。雖然WTO無先例原則，然為維持機構的穩定性，小組與上訴機構多會參考先前裁決，因此，美國雙反案上訴機構判決將對往後相關議題產生一定影響，值得探究。 小組認為反傾銷協定與SCM協定各有其規範範疇，且會員於此二協定下之義務互不干涉，故除條文明文規定不得針對出口補貼同時課徵反傾銷稅和平衡稅外，同時課徵皆不違反WTO之規定。本文檢視兩協定的發展歷史後，發現雖然其分立是出於歷史上的偶然，但由談判過程可見該二貿易救濟措施具不同的救濟目的和實施方式，故小組立論有其基礎。 接續本文觀察上訴機構論理，以釐清其於條文無據的情況下判定雙重救濟有違WTO規範的原因，而本文發現上訴機構之裁決乃依條約解釋原則所為，並無造法之處，唯其相較於小組更著重會員在WTO涵括協定下義務的累積，是以得出與小組相悖的結論。 最後，本文透過經濟模型和經濟分析檢視雙重救濟於現實中的可能樣態，得出雙重救濟確實不單產生於針對出口補貼同時課徵反傾銷稅和平衡稅的情形。此外，為提供WTO會員往後面臨此議題的參照，本文觀察美國對雙反案之履行，發現進口國交由受調查廠商舉證其是否將補貼反應於售價之做法，確為調查機關同時課徵此二稅收之可行方式。

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T14:27:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MariannaPP_DISSERT.pdf: 1396601 bytes, checksum: aaf52b34dbdc02a341c65518d94c4687 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-12-11 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / The Multilateral Trading System has evolved and presented new international mandatory rules to States. Along with the World Trade Organization constitutive treaty, Brazil has incorporated the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) in the national legal system. That treaty limits de scope of subsidies concession by governments since this practice can constitute a mechanism of commercial disloyalty, affecting national industrial development in the importing country. At the same time, the multilateral agreement grants defense legitimate instruments to States, among them the possibility of domestically and unilaterally imposing countervailing measures to subsidized products that enter the national territory. Since the issue concerns both international and domestic level in complementary grounds, this research, besides investigating the treaty related obligation, aims at studying the national legal fundaments to ASCM s application by the Brazilian State. Therefore, the essential point resides in the State s conduction of its international trading and also in its available and constitutionally established mechanisms of economic intervention. State s regulating power reveals itself as a fundamental prerogative to succeed in the internalization of international agreement s requirements in the domestic legal system, which represents a basic prerequisite to the implementation of countervailing measures. Once the whole normative outlines are apprehended, this study shall scan the administrative process of trading defense main elements, along with the means of controlling public administration acts. The action taken by the public organs that directly intervene in foreign trade shall be analyzed as well, so as to enable reasoning if the unilateral application of countervailing duties by the Brazilian State is happening on legitimacy grounds / O Sistema Multilateral do Com?rcio evoluiu e adveio com normas internacionais de cumprimento obrigat?rio pelos Estados. Juntamente com o acordo constitutivo da Organiza??o Mundial do Com?rcio, o Brasil incorporou em seu ordenamento jur?dico interno o Acordo sobre Subs?dios e Medidas Compensat?rias (ASMC). Este tratado internacional limita a margem de concess?o de subs?dios pelos governos em raz?o de a pr?tica poder constituir um mecanismo de deslealdade comercial, afetando o desenvolvimento da ind?stria nacional do pa?s importador. Ao mesmo tempo, o acordo multilateral outorga aos Estados instrumentos leg?timos de defesa, dentre os quais se destaca a aplica??o, a n?vel interno e de maneira unilateral, de medidas compensat?rias aos produtos que adentrarem o territ?rio nacional com o incentivo das subven??es. Em se tratando de mat?ria em que as ?rbitas internacional e interna complementam-se, a presente pesquisa, al?m de perscrutar acerca dos deveres oriundos do tratado internacional, prontifica-se a estudar os fundamentos jur?dicos dom?sticos para a aplica??o do ASMC pelo Brasil. A quest?o insere-se, por conseguinte, na condu??o estatal de seu com?rcio internacional e tamb?m nos mecanismos de interven??o na ordem econ?mica, consagrados constitucionalmente. O poder regulamentar do Estado brasileiro revela-se fundamental para a internaliza??o dos requisitos do acordo internacional no ordenamento jur?dico p?trio, o que, inclusive, representa requisito basilar para a aplica??o das medidas compensat?rias. Uma vez compreendido todo o arcabou?o normativo pertinente, este estudo procurar? deslindar os elementos essenciais do processo administrativo de defesa comercial, juntamente com os meios de controle da administra??o p?blica. A conduta dos ?rg?os p?blicos diretamente envolvidos no tratamento do com?rcio exterior brasileiro ser?, finalmente, analisada, como forma de se apreender se a implementa??o unilateral dos direitos compensat?rios pelo Estado brasileiro ocorre, como deve ser, de maneira leg?tima

行銷通路經過幾年來的變革已成為產業成功的一項關鍵。誰能掌握通路，誰就能掌握產業的命脈。因此國內廠商紛紛投入通路的經營，如統一企業創立統一超商，泰山企業設立福客多超商，味全的安賓及康國行銷等，莫不以掌握通路為要務。而萬客隆量販店的設立更是對傳統通路造成極大的衝擊，亦更顯現出通路的重要性。 　　飲料業的產品特性為產品生命週期短、週轉快，先期進入往往成為領導品牌、通路是成功關鍵及流行跟隨日本腳步等。由於飲料業的這些特性，可知通路是飲料成功的命脈。往往誰有良好的通路，誰就能脫穎而出，成為優秀的製造商。故如何維持與通路良好的關係，實是飲料業界應重視的課題。 　　本論文主要研究的主題在探討通路間製造商權力、權力來源及經銷商對製造商之依賴與經銷商抗衡權與通路衝突間之關係。以了解通路間之關係並進而提出相關建議供業界參考。 　　本文重要之研究結果約如下述： 　　1.就製造商權力來源與通路衝突言，大製造商通常採用非強制權力來源，因而與經銷商的衝突會較少。反之，小製造商則採用強制權力來源則會增加通路間之衝突。故建議，若在資源許可的情況下，小製造商應盡量少運用強制權力以減少通路間的衝突，以使與經銷商間的關係衝突減少，關係更為良好。 　　2.就製造商權力與通路衝突之研究，大製造商在此向關係上不顯著，小製造商則達顯著水準。顯示出小製造商運用其權力時，易招致經銷商的負面反應，而導致通路關係之不良。故小製造商在運用其權力時，應多加考慮經銷商可能之反應，以免破壞彼此之關係。 　　3.就製造商權力與經銷商對製造商依賴言，經銷商對大製造商有較高之依賴。而對小製造商則關係不顯著。而相對應於通路衝突來分析，可發現經銷商對製造商依賴大的話，製造商應用影響力較不致引起經銷商的反抗。故對小製造商而言，如何結合有限的資源，以使經銷商能更加的依賴製造商是值得探討的關鍵所在。 　　4.在經銷商抗衡權與通路衝突方面，由研究可發現，無論大小製造商，經銷商的抗衡權都會導致通路衝突的增加。此意味製造商對於經銷商本身所具備的各項資源與條件應做適當的評估，在制定通路決策時，應考慮到經銷商抗衡能力的大小，則決策方可有效的推行。

This PAR project used applied communications to get and use power to influence public policy. Informed by social and policy network theories, the method used Facebook as an organizing tool to create and position a recreation issue network in tension with an environmental policy community, exploring the concepts of layering, conversion, exhaustion, policy image, and venue change in an effort to influence policy. The introduction of a new-media social network as a competing influence in a policy network was an innovation, and demonstrated that the “strength of weak ties” may have implications for policy-making. The study concluded that a Facebook group was an efficient and effective organizing tool, capable of organizing an issue network and disrupting the status quo; however, the tightly coupled nature of a policy community makes it highly resilient to outside influence and an issue network may not gain sufficient influence to change policy. Keywords: Facebook, new-media social network, policy community, issue network, policy image, venue manipulation, layering, conversion, exhaustion

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil

Submitted by Helena Laneuville Teixeira Garcia (laneuvillehelena@gmail.com) on 2017-05-26T19:21:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Final.pdf: 698751 bytes, checksum: a42e995534698e498fe856b2bc63c1d1 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2017-05-30T13:36:26Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Final.pdf: 698751 bytes, checksum: a42e995534698e498fe856b2bc63c1d1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-30T13:36:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Final.pdf: 698751 bytes, checksum: a42e995534698e498fe856b2bc63c1d1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-24 / This thesis develops a simple model to represent a procurement situation with two main features. The first is that the optimal level of production cannot be fully anticipated when suppliers build their plants due to demand shocks. The second is that producers competing for a supply contract typically have different technologies within an efficient frontier, characterized by a trade-off between the marginal cost of production and the fixed cost per unit of capacity. With this framework in mind, we investigate how the shape of the frontier and the distribution of shocks affect efficient technology choices when the planner knows firms' technologies (first-best) and when she doesn't (second-best). In addition, we characterize how and when a well established real-life mechanism such as a quasi-linear score auction may implement second-best social welfare. We find that, if there is a strict preference over technologies in first-best, a quasi-linear score auction may implement second-best allocations. However, there is a non-neglectable case in which countervailing incentives arise, i.e. firms' allocations may be distorted either upwards or downwards with respect to first-best depending on their technologies. In that case, the planner may optimally choose to hire more than one firm, and there is no quasi-linear score auction that provides the social welfare achieved in second-best.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:56:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 4 Silvia_Faga_Almeida_2009.pdf.jpg: 18779 bytes, checksum: 09429a3a8b21ba7df6970f3efeaf4c0d (MD5) Silvia_Faga_Almeida_2009.pdf.txt: 456765 bytes, checksum: d318ffa211f89087addc37ff72a1c2ca (MD5) license.txt: 4810 bytes, checksum: 2b426b5b9b8dca2a2b29bce9bbfdf1e7 (MD5) Silvia_Faga_Almeida_2009.pdf: 924518 bytes, checksum: 0e7f42f351c72b0058e834d33c38eae0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-05-19T00:00:00Z / The countervailing power created by those damaged in an asymmetrical power relationship may be beneficial in terms of welfare. The analysis based on the framework proposed by Dobson et al. (1998) drove to the conclusion that such conditions are restrictive and are directly related to the interdependence recognition and cooperation among stakeholders. It was also observed that, differently from the outcomes of Dobson et al. (1998) analysis, the creation of countervailing power may have a positive welfare effect even though parties do not recognize their interdependency and do not cooperate with each other – what depends on the relationship of price-elasticity of demand and supply. Despite the possibility of positive effects, the antitrust doctrine in Brazil and in other jurisdictions such as USA and European Community apply the countervailing power concept mistakenly or completely ignore its existence. However, the goal of antitrust policy and the creation of compensatory power are aligned: the balance of power asymmetries in relations between agents, preventing the abuse of power in the transaction. Thus, there is an incongruity between court decisions and economic theory. The conflict in applying the countervailing power concept by antitrust doctrine can be clearly observed in the Brazilian health care sector. Physicians often coordinate themselves into cooperatives in order to counteract the exercise of buying power by health insurance firms. However, this agreement among physicians, presumably competitors, has been condemned by antitrust authorities based on the interpretation that such collective bargain is a cartel – an antitrust offence. This study investigates – using panel data econometric method – if collective bargain enables physicians to exercise countervailing power and increases social welfare. The empiric analysis corroborates theoretical propositions: in the healthcare sector, at least in the price dimension, there is a possibility of positive effects related to countervailing power. However, it must be noted that such a result would be related to cooperatives condemned by CADE, which should represent the group of associations that would effectively deter economic power to counterbalance the power asymmetry in negotiations with healthcare service providers. Given that fact, it is important to reassess CADE’s decisions regarding physicians’ cooperatives as a public policy aiming to increase social welfare. / A criação de poder compensatório decorrente da ação concertada daqueles prejudicados em uma relação de poder assimétrica pode gerar aumento de bem-estar social. O desenvolvimento analítico a partir da estrutura proposta por Dobson et al. (1998) permite constatar que as condições para que sejam verificados os efeitos positivos são restritivas e estão diretamente relacionadas ao reconhecimento da interdependência e à cooperação entre os agentes envolvidos. Foi possível observar também que, diferentemente do que previu a análise de Dobson et al. (1998), a criação de poder compensatório pode ter efeitos positivos em termos de bem-estar, ainda que as partes não reconheçam sua interdependência e não cooperem entre si – o que depende da relação das elasticidades-preço da demanda e da oferta. A despeito da possibilidade de efeitos benéficos, as doutrinas de defesa da concorrência brasileira e nas demais jurisdições, como EUA e Comunidade Européia, aplicam de maneira equivocada o conceito de poder compensatório ou ignoram por completo sua existência. Há que se considerar, contudo, que o objetivo da política antitruste e o da criação de poder compensatório estão alinhados: equilíbrio de assimetrias de poder nas relações entre os agentes, coibindo o exercício abusivo do poder de uma das partes na transação. Verifica-se, portanto, uma incongruência entre a jurisprudência e a teoria econômica. O conflito na aplicação do conceito de poder compensatório pela doutrina antitruste pode ser nitidamente observado no mercado de saúde suplementar brasileiro. Um fenômeno verificado nesse setor é a coordenação de médicos em cooperativas para fazer frente ao exercício de poder de compra por parte das operadoras de planos de saúde. Essa ação concertada tem sido condenada pelas autoridades de defesa da concorrência com base na interpretação de que a coordenação entre médicos constitui formação de cartel, passível de condenação pelas autoridades antitruste. A análise empírica corrobora as proposições teóricas: no setor de saúde suplementar, pelo menos na dimensão preço, existe a possibilidade de efeitos positivos associados ao poder compensatório. Destaca-se, contudo, que esse resultado estaria associado às cooperativas condenadas pelo CADE, que devem representar o grupo de associações que efetivamente deteriam poder econômico para equilibrar a assimetria de poder na negociação com as operadoras de planos de saúde. Diante dessa constatação, é importante reavaliar as decisões do CADE acerca das cooperativas médicas enquanto política pública que visa aumentar o bem-estar social.

To penalize contractual breaches allows efficient allocation of risks in a contract, ensuring and maintaining the contractual equilibrium that the parties had in mind and shaped in its contractual regulation. The intelligent use of penalties will safeguard and maintain the economic balance of the contracts, thus maintaining the profitability of business operations pursued through them. / Penalizar los incumplimientos permite una asignación eficiente de los riesgos en un contrato, asegurando y conservando el equilibrio contractual que las partes tuvieron en mente y plasmaron en su regulación contractual. El uso inteligente de las penalidades permitirá salvaguardar y mantener el equilibrio económico de los contratos, manteniendo así la rentabilidad de las operaciones comerciales perseguidas a través de ellos.