Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät I--Zürich--Universität, 1994. / Bibliogr. p. 138-143.

Proefschrift--Utrecht. / Includes bibliographical references.

Μπορεί να συνεισφέρει η θεωρία της διυποκειμενικότητας του Husserl στις σύγχρονες θεωρίες της αντίληψης; Με αφορμή αυτό το ερώτημα εξετάζουμε, αφενός δύο σύγχρονες θεωρίες της αντίληψης - αυτή του Alva Noë και του John McDowell -, αφετέρου τη θεωρία της διυποκειμενικότητας του Edmund Husserl. Προτείνουμε μια γραμμή σκέψης - η οποία περνά μέσα από τις αναλύσεις της χουσσερλιανής φαινομενολογίας για τη διυποκειμενική συγκρότηση του ορίζοντα της αντιληπτικής εμπειρίας και την υπερβατολογική λειτουργία της διυποκειμενικότητας - η οποία θα μπορούσε σε ορισμένα σημεία να ισχυροποιήσει, ή, σε κάποια άλλα, να θέσει εν αμφιβόλω τις θέσεις των Noë και McDowell. Στόχος μας δεν είναι η οριστική απάντηση στα ζητήματα αυτά αλλά η γόνιμη ερωτηματοθεσία μέσα από τη σύζευξη της αναλυτικής και της φαινομενολογικής παράδοσης. / Can Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity contribute to the contemporary theories of perception? Launching from this question we examine, on the one hand two contemporary theories of perception – Alva Noë’s and John McDowell’s – and, on the other, Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity. We propose a line of thought - which passes through Husserl’s analysis of the intersubjective constitution of the horizon of perceptual experience and the transcendental function of intersubjectivity – which could, at some parts strengthen, or object at some others, the contemporary theories of Noë and McDowell. Our aim is not the final answers on these issues, but the productive questioning through the conjugation of the analytical and the phenomenological tradition.

In this dissertation I examine our relationship with the Earth and our natural environment by clarifying what it means to be human. I do this by looking at the interpenetration of spheres of being or philosophical anthropology to articulate how the human being is the dynamic meeting point of life and spirit. In this interpenetration of life and spirit, the task of the human being as loving flashes forth. On the basis of this task, it is possible to realize a loving relationship with the Earth and our natural environment that is not based on domination or use. To understand further how we are situated in relation to the earth and our natural environment, I discuss shortcomings of both the conservation and deep ecology movements. I also discuss problems with traditional philosophical anthropologies to highlight how some of these presuppositions have been incorporated into our relationship with the earth and our natural environment. To illuminate how life and spirit are enmeshed in one another, I describe Nicolai Hartmann's new ontology and Edmund Husserl's regional ontology as well as Scheler's philosophical anthropology since all of these philosophers ground their reflections in experience. However, since Scheler grounds being human in loving, his approach is unique and not only resolves the supposed dualism between life and spirit but gives us a fresh outlook on the responsibility inherent to being human. This opens the possibility for living a loving relationship with the earth and our natural environment.

In this dissertation, I investigate how questioning appears within Edmund Husserl’s work. I do so through five chapters. In the first, I introduce questioning as a moment of a reason’s striving for truth, as it appears both in the individual and through history. In the second, I clarify how he finds the structure of questioning as an intention that appears to fulfill a questionable experience. In the third, I explicate his analysis of its temporal genesis and fulfillment in the individual. In the fourth, I turn to how he treats the development of questioning across generations, especially as it first emerges from the child’s curiosity. Finally, in the fifth, I give an overview of the transformation of questioning through three stages of history, expressed in myth, science, and phenomenology. Through these chapters, I claim Husserl finds a development of ways of questioning through history but also that questioning itself is an essential moment of this historical development.

Zugleich: Diss. Wuppertal, 2001. / Literaturverz.

La présente recherche vise à analyser l’essence de la fantaisie considérée comme un vécu intentionnel à partir de la phénoménologie de Husserl. En quel sens pouvons-nous affirmer que la fantaisie, généralement associée à la liberté et à la création, est en effet productrice ? Il nous faut remarquer que la question de la fantaisie s’inscrit parmi les problématiques qui ont contribué à la consolidation du répertoire thématique de la phénoménologie naissante. Cependant, la définition de la fantaisie à laquelle Husserl aboutit à partir de 1904/1905 ne tient pas compte de son aspect libre et productif, mais la considère comme fantaisie re-productrice. Pour arriver à une définition plus large et précise de l’essence morphologique de la fantaisie, sans abandonner la phénoménologie de Husserl, cette recherche propose les objectifs suivants. En premier lieu, montrer les explications que Husserl met à l'épreuve et pourquoi il les rejette. Parmi celles-ci, en plus des explications propres, il faut souligner celles de Brentano et de Twardowski. Deuxièmement, expliciter comment les analyses de la conscience interne du temps et du souvenir ont conduit à la définition canonique de la fantaisie en tant que modification de neutralité appliquée au souvenir. Ensuite, une critique de cette définition est effectuée. Enfin, il est proposé de surmonter les difficultés soulignées à partir d’éléments de la phénoménologie de Husserl, tels que les fonctions que la fantaisie remplit, entre autres dans l’intuition des essences, l’expérience d’autrui et l’expérience esthétique, où la fantaisie opère par la production d’analogues qui ont un effet « harmonisant » sur l’expérience. / The present research is framed in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, and aims to analyse the essence of phantasy considered as an intentional experience. In what sense can it be sustained that phantasy, generally associated with freedom and creation, is indeed productive? It should be noted that the question of phantasy appears among the issues that contributed to the consolidation of the thematic agenda of nascent phenomenology. However, Husserl’s definition of phantasy, which is attained in1904/05, does not take into account its free and productive aspect, but rather regards it in a re-productive way. To arrive at a broader, yet precise, definition of the morphological essence of phantasy, without leaving Husserl’s phenomenology, the following objectives are pursued. Firs, I present the possible explanations of phantasy that Husserl puts to the test (among which those of Brentano and Twardowski must be highlighted) as well as the reasons why he rejects them. Second, I explain how the analyses of the internal time consciousness and memory led to the canonical definition of phantasy as a neutrality modification applied to memory. A critique of this definition is subsequently established. Finally, I propose that those difficulties may be overcome by considering other elements of Husserl’s phenomenology, such as the functions that phantasy fulfills, for instance in the intuition of essences, in the experience of others and in the aesthetic experience i.a., where phantasy operates by the producing of analogues which have a “harmonizing” effect on experience.

Levinas s’intéresse à la notion du concret de la phénoménologie de Husserl. En 1930, Levinas montre que la notion de l’être a son origine dans l’expérience concrète de l’être qui est l’intuition immanente philosophique. Dans les années 1940, d’une part, Levinas met en relief que la phénoménologie consiste à rechercher dans les vécus concrets l’origine du phénoménologue et de sa vie ; et d’autre part, il détermine l’esprit humain par sa puissance de coïncider avec l’origine de sa vie et de lui-même. À l’époque de Totalité et infini, Levinas clarifie que la description phénoménologique de l’expérience concrète d’une entité est à la fois l’événement même de la révélation de l’être concret de cette entité et l’événement même de l’effectuation de cette entité. D’où Levinas met en évidence, d’une part, la méthode de concrétisation qui lie les expériences concrètes les unes aux autres et, d’autre part, le perspectivisme qui décrit l’expérience concrète telle qu’elle est vécue maintenant. Dans Totalité et infini, Levinas effectue la description phénoménologique comprise par lui. En décrivant les expériences concrètes du moi, il les distribue en deux séries : celle du besoin (vie naïve) et celle du désir (critique de soi). Dans la série du besoin, sur la base de l’habitation se fondent les expériences du moi naïf : le travail, la possession et la représentation. Et dans la série du désir se distribuent les expériences avec autrui : la parole, l’amour avec la femme et la fécondité. Ces deux séries d’expériences constituent la forme originaire de l’expérience du moi personnel. Totalité et infini est en ce sens la description phénoménologique du moi personnel par excellence. / Levinas brings out the notion of the concrete from Husserl’s phenomenology. In his 1930 book, Levinas shows that the notion of the being has its origin in the concrete experience of the being that is philosophical immanent intuition. In two articles published in the 1940s, Levinas reveals that the phenomenology searches in concrete experiences the origin of the phenomenologist himself and his life. On the other hand, he determines the human spirit by its power to coincide with the origin of his life and himself. In four articles published around 1960, Levinas clarifies the phenomenological description of the concrete experience of an entity is the very event of revelation of the concrete being of this entity and the very event of the effectuation of the entity. Hence, Levinas brings out the method of concretization which connects together concrete experiences as well as the perspective which describes concrete experience as it is now experienced. In Totality and infinity, Levinas practices the phenomenological description understood by himself. By describing concrete experiences of the “I”, Levinas categorizes them into two series of experience: that of need (naive life) and that of desire (self-criticism). In the series of need, the experiences of the naive “I” relies on the dwelling : labor, possession and representation. And in the series of desire, experiences with the other are distributed: speech, love with woman and fecundity. These two series of experiences constitute the proto-form of the experience of the personal “I”. Totality and infinity is in this sense the phenomenological description of the personal “I” par excellence.

Cette thèse examine la phénoménologie en tant que philosophie-en-travail, en tant que projet ouvert de recherche. Sa tâche principale consiste à déterminer la façon d’accomplir le travail phénoménologique. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous examinons les analyses de la doctrine phénoménologique de l’attitude (Partie I.), de la doctrine de la méthode (Partie II.) et de l’architectonique « flexible » (Partie III.) de la phénoménologie. Ces élaborations nous permettent de thématiser la dé-limitation de la conscience, l’enrichissement de sens et l’institution du nouveau en tant que traits caractéristiques de la manière phénoménologique d’opérer. Cette recherche exige une oscillation constante entre une systématique ouverte de la philosophie d’Edmund Husserl et des analyses phénoménologues particulières. / This dissertation examines phenomenology as working philosophy (Arbeitsphilosophie), that is, as an open research project. The main aim of the study consists in determining the mode of performance (Vollzugsweise) of the phenomenological work in progress. To achieve this goal we provide an analysis of the doctrine of attitude (Part I.), the doctrine of method (Part II.), and then the “flexible” architectonics (Part III.) of phenomenology. These elaborations enable us to thematize the de-limitation of consciousness (Entschränkung), the enrichment of sense (Sinnbereicherung) and the institution of the new as the characteristic features of the phenomenological method of operating. This research project requires a constant oscillation between an open systematization of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy and particular phenomenological analyses. / Diese Dissertationsforschung hat zwei parallellaufende Aufgaben vor sich. Die erste besteht darin, die allgemeine Form und die spezifische Vollzugsweise der phänomenologisch philoso-phischen Arbeit zu bestimmen; die zweite besteht ihrerseits darin diese Arbeit im Verlauf – auf ihrem Weg zu zeigen. Dafür hat dieser Dissertationstext zwei Einleitungen: die systematische Einleitung, die die offene Systematik (die sog. «flexible Architektonik») der phänomenologi-schen Philosophie darstellt, und die propädeutische Einleitung, die die Grundintuitionen der phä-nomenologischen Philosophie (z. B. das Unverständlichwerden des Selbstverständlichen – das philosophische Erstaunen, die Enttäuschung bei der Trugwahrnehmung etc.) formuliert. Anders gesagt, das Ziel besteht darin, das Spezifische der phänomenologischen Arbeit zu verstehen und zu vollziehen.

Thesis advisor: Richard Cobb-Stevens / In this dissertation, I develop an engaged understanding of objectivity, or good knowledge practices. I argue that for knowledge practices to be good, they must both be truth-conducive and engaged, that is, explicitly implicated in the critical appraisal of background values and assumptions. I pursue this argument in six stages. First, I consider work in epistemology that countenances a place for values in objectivity. I conclude from this that truth-conduciveness is not sufficient for objectivity, and that a social approach to knowledge is called for. Second, I consider standpoint theory, a prominent feminist approach to objectivity. This allows me to show the possible insights available to marginalized perspectives, while indicating that this will be a component of rather than itself offering an account of objectivity. Third, I consider a more comprehensive approach in Helen Longino's critical contextual empiricism, which locates objectivity in the social features of inquiry. Her approach is promising, but requires the insights of early phenomenology in order to develop that potential. I develop the phenomenological framework in Chapter 4, where I consider Husserlian phenomenology. Fifth, I bring the insights of phenomenology to the challenges presented by critical contextual empiricism, and develop my positive view, critical phenomenological objectivity. On this view, inquiry is objective when individuals and communities foster critical perspectives, seek transformative epistemic experiences, build coalitions, foster diversity, and pursue empirical adequacy. In the final chapter, I consider a case study that enables me to defend the merit and warrant of these features of objectivity. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.