Bien que Wittgenstein ait toujours douté de l’intérêt philosophique de ce genre de constat historique, il est généralement admis que l’auteur des Recherches philosophiques est l’inventeur d’une critique dévastatrice du «mythe de l’intériorité », qui représente l’une des tentations les plus constantes de la philosophie moderne. À l’encontre des pensées de la réflexion qui assignent pour tâche à la philosophie de clarifier la signification des concepts obscurs de notre langage (vérité, signification, pensée, etc.) en portant une attention réflexive à nos états mentaux (Locke et James sont de bons exemples de ce paradigme), Wittgenstein a montré qu’une telle entreprise philosophique repose sur une profonde incompréhension du fonctionnement du langage ordinaire et de sa grammaire. Wittgenstein n’est pas le premier à se lancer dans une initiative du genre, mais les moyens utilisés pour s’en acquitter expliquent la place qu’il a occupée dans les débats que n’a cessé de susciter la question de l’intériorité tout au long du vingtième siècle : on ne peut croire à la valeur d’un recours à l’introspection en philosophie qu’en se méprenant profondément sur la nature et le fonctionnement du langage nous permettant d’exprimer notre vie mentale. Étant donné que la phénoménologie husserlienne se propose de résoudre les problèmes philosophiques en adoptant pour méthode la réflexion et la description de l’expérience vécue, il est très tentant de voir en Husserl un héritier de cette tradition philosophique qui se trouve ruinée par les arguments de Wittgenstein. En partant du présupposé que la déconstruction du «mythe de l’intériorité» enclenchée par Wittgenstein est juste en son principe, il s’agira de montrer que l’on ne peut trouver chez Wittgenstein une réfutation implicite de la conception phénoménologique de l’intériorité qu’en faisant une lecture superficielle des Recherches logiques et des Idées directrices. En effet, si l’on sait porter attention aux détails des textes pertinents, on peut déceler chez Husserl une réflexion très fine sur la nature du langage qui débouche éventuellement sur une critique de la conception moderne et empiriste de l’intériorité du sujet très similaire à celle mise en chantier par les i Recherches philosophiques, critique qui, de surcroît, a l’avantage de désamorcer certaines difficultés rencontrées par Wittgenstein. Une telle étude comparative et polémique permettra de tirer deux grandes conclusions à l’égard de la méthode devant être employée en philosophie. Premièrement, il sera démontré que la réflexivité exigée par le discours philosophique se reflète dans l’usage que Husserl et Wittgenstein font des guillemets. Cette observation en apparence triviale permettra d’établir que le discours philosophique repose sur l’usage d’un dispositif typographique banal appartenant à la grammaire de notre langage ordinaire. Ensuite, la supériorité de la méthode « généalogique » de la phénoménologie génétique de Husserl sera mise en relief. Cette dernière a le mérite d’éviter les apories du conventionnalisme de Wittgenstein tout en désamorçant les difficultés soulevées par l’essentialisme de la phénoménologie statique des Idées directrices. / Wittgenstein is typically thought to have put forth a devastating critique of one of the most constant temptations of modern philosophy: the so-called "myth of interiority". Against philosophies of reflexion, which attempt to clarify the meaning of obscure philosophical concepts (e.g. truth, significance, thought, etc.) by reflecting upon our mental states (Locke and James come to mind as examples of this paradigm), Wittgenstein showed that such a philosophical project is premised on a profound misunderstanding of how ordinary language and its grammar function. Although Wittgenstein might not have been the first to propose this kind of criticism, his central role in the last century's debates over the problem of interiority is due to the distinctive means through which he carried out this criticism: believing in the value of introspection within philosophical inquiry requires a profound misunderstanding of the nature and operation of the language through which we express our mental life. Since Husserl's phenomenology purports to solve philosophical problems through description and reflection upon lived experience, it is extremely tempting to see him as an inheritor of the philosophical tradition that Wittgenstein's arguments demolished. Taking as its starting point the assumption that the deconstruction of the "myth of interiority" instigated by Wittgenstein is well founded, this project will attempt to show that Wittgenstein's arguments can only appear to refute Husserl's conception of interiority on the basis of a superficial reading of the Logical Investigations and of the Ideas I. Indeed, upon a close examination of the relevant texts, Husserl's reflexions on the nature of language can be shown to lead him to a critique of the modern and empiricist conception of interiority very similar to Wittgenstein's, a critique that turns out to have the resources to avoid some of the major difficulties that the latter faces. This comparative and polemical study will defend two more general theses about the method that philosophical inquiry ought to rely upon. First, it will be argued that the reflexiveness required for philosophical discourse is illustrated in both Husserl and Wittgenstein's use of quotation marks. This seemingly trivial observation will support the claim that philosophical discourse relies on the use of a banal i typographical devise belonging to the grammar of ordinary language. Second, a case will be made for the the superiority of the "genealogical" method of Husserl's genetic phenomenology, for it manages to avoid the pitfalls of Wittgenstein's conventionalism while also steering clear of the problems incurred by the essentialism of the Ideas I static phenomenology. / Cotutelle avec l'Université Panthéon Sorbonne - Paris I

By extending Husserl’s own historico-critical study to include the conceptual mathematics of more contemporary times – specifically category theory and its emphatic development since the second half of the 20th century – this paper claims that the delineation between mathematics and philosophy must be completely revisited. It will be contended that Husserl’s phenomenological work was very much influenced by the discoveries and limitations of the formal mathematics being developed at Göttingen during his tenure there and that, subsequently, the rôle he envisaged for his material a priori science is heavily dependent upon his conception of the definite manifold. Motivating these contentions is the idea of a mathematics which would go beyond the constraints of formal ontology and subsequently achieve coherence with the full sense of transcendental phenomenology. While this final point will be by no means proven within the confines of this paper it is hoped that the very fact of opening up for the possibility of such an idea will act as a supporting argument to the overriding thesis that the relationship between mathematics and phenomenology must be problematised.

La tesis doctoral presentada es un trabajo de investigación sobre el problema de la conciencia del tiempo en la fenomenología de Husserl defendida en la Universidad de Barcelona en abril del 2007. Tras justificar la importancia que el tema tiene para el pensamiento de Husserl son presentados los diferentes acercamientos a esta cuestión en cada una de las épocas de su pensamiento, distinguiendo fundamentalmente tres periodos: las lecciones sobre la conciencia interna del tiempo (1904/05), los manuscritos de Bernau (1917/18) y los manuscritos C (1929/34).El tratamiento de la cuestión de la temporalidad no es algo accidental en el pensamiento de Husserl. Lejos de tratarse de un tema cuyo estudio fuese motivado por una mera curiosidad o por la necesidad de mostrar su potencial explicativo, la aclaración de qué sea el tiempo y la relación entre el tiempo y la conciencia para la que este se da puede ser considerada uno de las claves de todo el entramado fenomenológico. La fenomenología de Husserl no se acerca al problema de la temporalidad en abstracto para formular una teoría acerca de si el tiempo es cíclico o no, o acerca de en qué consista la eternidad, el sentido de la historia, etc. Tampoco se trata de una teoría psicológica en torno a la percepción subjeti¬va del tiempo: es decir, no se trata de un intento por explicar por qué en oca¬siones el tiempo pasa más o menos deprisa, nuestras sensaciones subjetivas de tiempo. Algo que quedaría del lado de la psicología. La fenomenología del tiempo de Husserl tampoco es un intento de explicación de la finitud o infinitud temporal de mi existencia (al estilo de Heidegger).El tema del tiempo permita seguir la evolución del pensamiento de Husserl desde sus inicios hasta los desarrollos más avanzados de los manuscritos de los años 30, la temporalidad goza del interés intrínseco de ser uno de los aspectos esenciales de la constitución de cualquier objeto. Todo objeto es una unidad dotada de una determinada duración que debe ser constituida por la conciencia a través de algún proceso. Toda dación hace referencia a una serie de aspectos temporales que intervienen en su constitución, así como toda dación se sitúa en un determinado tiempo. Más allá de la estricta constitución de la unidad de un objeto temporal el tema del tiempo afectaría a otros ámbitos vitales de la fenomenología de Husserl. Así, en cuanto que la investigación fenomenológica consiste en la descripción de una serie de daciones, la conciencia de tiempo parece ser uno de los elementos clave en esta investigación: sólo gracias a que una dación es conservada, retenida en la conciencia de alguna manera, puede ser objeto de descripción. Por otra parte, la investigación acerca de la temporalidad de los objetos constituidos permitirá el vital descubrimiento de que en la propia subjetividad no deja en todo instante de operar también algún peculiar "tiempo", o incluso, dicho mucho más rotundamente, de ser ella misma ante todo "tiempo". Habitualmente entendida esta como una sucesión lineal de vivencias, cuando se pone en duda esta premisa de la actitud natural, se descubre que más que un tiempo lo que caracteriza a la conciencia es un movimiento, un temporalizar.PALABRAS CLAVE:Fenomenología, tiempo, conciencia, Edmund Husserl. / This PhD concerns the problem of time- consciousness in Husserl's phenomenology. After justifying the relevance of the subject to Husserl, we present the different approaches to the problem of time-consciousness in every period of his thinking, distinguishing mainly three phases: the lessons about inner time consciousness (1904/05), the Bernauer manuscripts (1917/18) and the C- manuscripts (1929/34).KEYWORDS:Phenomenology, time, consciousness, Edmund Husserl

This thesis deals with the notion of conceptual thought as developed by the Czech philosopher, Ladislav Hejdánek, within the referential framework of Husserl's phenomenology. The aim of the thesis is to thoroughly reconstruct the points of departure and basic motifs of Hejdánek's concept, since the reflection of conceptual thought is one of the milestones of Hejdánek's critical thinking, which has not yet been systematically worked out by Hejdánek or anyone else. Hejdánek is interpreted here mainly in the context of Husserl's noematic theory of meaning, enabling us to view Hejdánek through the predicates of a philosophical mainstream as well as to explore some of the problematic points of Husserl's thought processes that are not usually noticed and which have been approached creatively by Hejdánek from an unexpected perspective. The first two chapters present a preliminary overview of Husserl's philosophy (from his Göttingen period in particular), drawing on in-depth research into Husserl's manuscripts carried out by Petr Urban. This overview is followed by four chapters that interpret Hejdánek's concept and finish with a summary, applying the concept of conceptual thought to the world of knowledge and placing the notion of conceptuality within Hejdánek's thought. The individual chapters discuss...

L’opposition entre le fondationnalisme et le cohérentisme constitue l’un des débats importants de l’épistémologie contemporaine. Les deux conceptions s’opposent sur la structure justificative de la connaissance. D’un point de vue phénoménologique, il s’agit d’un dilemme qui est surtout apparent. Le but de ce mémoire est d’en faire la démonstration en se penchant sur la phénoménologie d’Edmund Husserl, dont les travaux permettent de voir qu’une conception alternative de la justification épistémique est tout à fait possible. En se basant, entre autres, sur sa théorie de l’intentionnalité et son analyse des vécus, nous expliquerons en quel sens la perception doit être considérée comme l’expérience d’évidence par excellence. Dans la mesure où l’aspect intuitif de l’expérience perceptive fait office de fondement évident pour la connaissance, la théorie de Husserl retient un aspect important du fondationnalisme. La perception n’est toutefois pas un moment d’évidence simple. Elle est inscrite dans un contexte où la cohésion des vécus (Erlebnisse) joue un rôle crucial, démontrant ainsi que Husserl incorpore également des éléments cohérentistes dans sa théorie. Étant donné que les deux aspects sont « intrinsèques » à cette expérience, il semble que, d’un point de vue phénoménologique, l’opposition classique entre les structures fondationnaliste et cohérentiste de la justification soit trop rigide et puisse être dépassée. / The opposition between foundationalism and coherentism is a classical debate in contemporary epistemology. The two conceptions oppose on the justificatory structure of knowledge. From a phenomenological standpoint, this dilemma is mostly apparent. The aim of this thesis is to prove just this. We will procede by focusing on the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, whose work shows that an alternative conception of epistemic justification is quite possible. Taking our cues in Husserl’s theory of intentionality and his analysis of lived experiences (Erlebnisse), we will explain in what sense perception should be considered as an experience of evidence. To the extent that the intuitive aspect of perceptual experience serves as the foundation for knowledge, Husserl's theory comes close to foundationalism. Perception, however, is not limited to its intuitive moment. It is inscribed in a context where the cohesion of lived experiences plays a crucial role in the epistemic function of experience, which suggests that Husserl's position also incorporates coherentist elements in his theory. Since both foundationalist and coherentist aspects are "intrinsic" to perceptual experience, it seems that, from a phenomenological point of view at least, the classical opposition between the foundational and coherentist structures of justification is too rigid and can be overcome in a shared unified framework.

The limit between the proper and the foreign – how this limit is established, but also crossed and dissolved – has remained a crucial issue in phenomenology. Setting these questions in the context of the phenomenology of religion, this thesis develops an analysis of the relation between transcendence and body understood in terms of a certain limit. The introductory part is rooted in Edmund Husserl’s discussions of the concept of transcendence, which is shown to have an essential connection to the analysis of inner time-consciousness. Here we encounter a decisive limit to objectifying knowledge, which also comes across in his investigations of the body and its spatiality. The second part discusses Max Scheler’s critique of Husserl’s excessively objectifying view of knowledge, with a particular focus on Scheler’s understanding of love as a condition of possibility for any knowledge. Scheler is shown to have developed a new concept of transcendence that avoids the pitfalls of objectivism, although in his philosophy of religion he tends to downplay the importance of the body. The third part undertakes a reading of Edith Stein, who develops ideas similar to Scheler’s, though in a phenomenologically more nuanced fashion. Although her philosophy of religion also bypasses the body, Stein provides a more genuine access to the writings of the mystics, the analysis of which forms the core of the fourth and concluding part. Drawing on the work of the 13th century Beguine Mechthild of Magdeburg, this concluding chapter develops a phenomenological understanding of religion with an emphasis on transcendence and limit, while also retaining the centrality of our experience of the body. This means: a phenomenology of the limit is investigated, rather than a limit of phenomenology. / Hur gränsen mellan det egna och det främmande ska dras är en central fråga inom den fenomenologiska traditionen, en fråga som här undersöks i ett religionsfilosofiskt sammanhang. På vilket sätt kan vi överskrida oss själva mot det främmande och ogripbara, och på vilket sätt är denna möjlighet förbunden med vår egen kroppslighet? Dessa teman utvecklas i en serie diskussioner av filosofer som Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler och Edith Stein. Redan i Husserls analyser av transcendensen, tidsmedvetandet och kroppsligheten framträder en bestämd gräns för den objektiverande kunskapen, även om han i sista hand alltid uppfattade den som ett ideal. I Schelers och Steins religionsfilosofier utvecklas därefter en kritik av denna kunskapssyn, bland annat i form av en analys av kärleken (Scheler) och mystiken (Stein), men hos ingen av dem får kroppsligheten en central ställning. I den avslutande delen, som analyserar den mystika erfarenhetens uttryck hos den medetida beginen Mechthild von Magdeburg, utvecklas en fenomenologi som förbinder transcendens med kroppslighet och sinnlighet. Därmed undersöks en gränsens fenomenologi snarare än fenomenologins gräns. Jonna Bornemark är forskare och lärare på Södertörns högskola. Boken är hennes doktorsavhandling.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jonas Moreira Madureira.pdf: 602505 bytes, checksum: e021610d48ec5847401dd3413ec2441e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-19 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / In this study, it is justified the phenomenology of the representations, found in the V Investigation of the Investigations logics of Edmund Husserl. More specifically, it refers to about the husserlian analysis of the equivocation of the term representation in the thesis all the acts either are representations or are established in representations . To explain the equivocation of the term representation especially in what concerns to the cited thesis and not in what it relates to the general use of the term -, it is necessary to discriminate the equivocation s elements. In the V Investigation, Husserl analyzes only four of them, which are: the mere representation (bloβe Vorstellung); the matter of act (Aktmaterie); the nominal act (nominaler Akt); the objective act (objektivierender Akt). From this quadruple equivocation, Husserl presents three possible interpretations of the thesis: (1) all act either is one mere representation or have one matter of act as a fundamental component in the intentional essence; (2) all act either is one nominal act or it is established in one or several nominal acts; (3) all act either is one objective act or it is established in one objective act. Thus, the main objective of this dissertation is to explain exactly these three interpretations. For this, it becomes necessary to clarify the husserlian structure of act, once the understanding of such structure is conditio sine qua non for the understanding of Husserl s the three interpretations / Nesta dissertação, explica-se a fenomenologia das representações, presente na V Investigação das Investigações lógicas de Edmund Husserl. Mais especificamente, trata-se de uma elucidação da análise husserliana da equivocação do termo representação na tese todos os atos ou são representações ou se fundam em representações . Para explicar a equivocação do termo representação especialmente no que diz respeito à referida tese e não no que se refere estritamente ao uso do termo , faz-se necessário discriminar quais são os elementos equivocados. Na V Investigação, Husserl analisa apenas quatro. São eles: a mera representação (bloβe Vorstellung); a matéria de ato (Aktmaterie); o ato nominal (nominaler Akt); o ato objetivante (objektivierender Akt). A partir dessa quádrupla equivocação, Husserl apresenta três interpretações possíveis da tese. São elas: (1) todo ato ou é uma mera representação ou possui uma matéria de ato como componente fundante na essencial intencional; (2) todo ato ou é um ato nominal ou está fundado em um ou vários atos nominais; (3) todo ato ou é um ato objetivante ou se funda em um ato objetivante. Assim, o objetivo central desta dissertação é explicar justamente essas três interpretações. E, para tanto, faz-se necessário clarificar, primeiramente, a estrutura de ato husserliana, uma vez que a compreensão de tal estrutura é a conditio sine qua non para a compreensão das três interpretações de Husserl

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

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