Thesis advisor: Kenji Hayao / This thesis explores the motives behind, changes made by, and the consequences of the Japan's 1993 electoral reform that completely overhauled the electoral system. It begins with some background information that leads to the earthshattering event in 1993 that ousted the ruling Liberal Democratic Party from power for the first time since 1955. Then it explains and analyzes the old and new electoral systems. Finally, it concludes with the analysis of the 2003 elections, which was the third and latest election to be held under the new system. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2004. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

This study examines how the former president, Robert Mugabe and the ruling party, ZANU-PF, have designed and manipulated the political system in Zimbabwe to remain in power. The study begins with a comprise background and then analyzes which political system the country possesses. Finally, the analysis discusses how Robert Mugabe have used the constituencies, legal threshold, form of the state and exclusion of other parties to remain in power.

Trata-se de um estudo de caso realizado durante as eleições presidenciais de 2014 em quatro conjuntos habitacionais conhecidos como Cecap localizados na cidade de Taubaté-SP. A pesquisa explorou, a partir de entrevistas e etnografia, as estruturas cognitivas que os moradores possuem e como eles as empregam na hora de escolher quem será o próximo presidente do Brasil, com o intuito de avaliar o alcance que a teoria do lulismo desenvolvida por André Singer possui. Além disso, procurou-se compreender os motivos de vários eleitores terem optado pelos candidatos da oposição, mesmo votando, em outras eleições, em prol do governo. Verificou-se que, apesar de existir um ambiente simpático ao lulismo na Cecap, os eleitores também levam em consideração a situação econômica atual na hora de escolher o candidato, ocorrendo, assim, a tensão entre duas formas de voto retrospectivo. Diante desse quadro, formaram-se dois grupos distintos: os que escolheram Dilma e os que preferiram Aécio Neves. Entre os que votaram na presidenta, estão moradores que mantiveram a situação econômica estabilizada e que avaliaram como sendo mais vantajoso manter o governo. Em contrapartida, para os eleitores que votaram na oposição, a crise econômica e moral foram os principais motivadores do voto. / It is a case study made during the presidential elections of 2014 in four Joint Housing known as Cecap located in Taubaté. The research explore, based on interviews and ethnography, the cognitive structures that the residents of these neighborhood have and how they choose who will be the next president of Brazil in order to assess the scope that lulismo theory, developed by André Singer, has. We also aimed to understand the reason for several electors to have opted for opposition candidates, even having voted in other elections in favor of the government. Although there is a favorable atmosphere to lulism in Cecap, the electors also take into account the current economic situation when they decide the candidate. There is a tension between two forms of retrospective vote. Given this situation, it has formed two distinct groups: those who chose Dilma and those who preferred Aécio Neves. Among those who voted for Dilma are residents who maintained their economic situation stabilized and they judged more advantageous to keep the government. In contrast, for the electors who voted in opposition, the economic and moral crisis were the main reasons.

Esta pesquisa pretende estudar como denúncias e evidências de corrupção mobilizam partidos da oposição, eleitores e prefeitos incumbentes levando à punição de prefeitos corruptos durante as campanhas de reeleição. Usando um banco de dados oriundo de relatórios de auditoria aleatórios elaborados pela Controladoria Geral da União que analisam como as transferências federais foram usadas em pequenos municípios brasileiros, nós mostramos que o momento em que os resultados da auditoria são divulgados aos eleitores desempenha um papel importante para saber se prefeitos corruptos serão punidos. Quando os resultados de auditoria produzem provas de corrupção antes da eleição, os prefeitos são menos propensos a concorrer à reeleição. Além disso, os municípios em que as auditorias foram divulgadas antes e durante o período eleitoral tiveram menores taxas de reeleição dos prefeitos. Mostramos isso devido ao aumento da candidatura de candidatos de partidos da oposição como rivais. Nossa análise é restrita a 270 municípios cujos prefeitos estavam em seu primeiro mandato, e cujas administrações foram auditadas entre 2003 e 2004. Nossas conclusões lançam luz sobre os mecanismos que ajudam a explicar os resultados anteriores que mostram que evidências de corrupção punem prefeitos corruptos. Chamamos à atenção para a importância da dinâmica política como ajudar a explicar porque os prefeitos corruptos vão ou não ser punidos. / This research aims to study how corruption allegations and evidence mobilize opposition parties, voter and incumbent mayors leading to the punishment of corrupt mayors during re-election campaigns. Using a database based on random audit reports prepared by the Controladoria Geral da União examining how federal funds were used in small Brazilian municipalities, we show that the timing of when audit findings are disclosed to voters plays an important role in whether corrupt mayors will be punished. When audit records produce evidence of corruption prior to the election, mayors are less likely to run for re-election. Moreover, municipalities where audits were disclosed before and during the election period had lower rates of re-election of the mayors. We show this due to the increase in the candidacy of opposition party candidates as rivals and votes. Our analysis is restricted to 270 municipalities whose mayors were in their first term, and whose administrations were audited by federal accountants between 2003 and 2004. Our findings shed light on the mechanisms which help to explain previous findings showing that random audit corruption evidence punishes corrupt mayors. We draw attention to the importance of political dynamics as helping to explain why corrupt mayors will or will not be punished.

El presente trabajo explora las atribuciones causales de éxito electoral en los integrantes del Frente Amplio (FA) durante las elecciones generales. Para esto se realizaron entrevistas a profundidad con 9 miembros de la coalición. Se identifican cuatro grandes grupos explicativos para el éxito: causas vinculadas a la organización política, a la candidata presidencial, a elementos en la coyuntura política y a la población. Estos bloques de sentido se analizaron y categorizaron de acuerdo al modelo tridimensional, el cual contempla la ubicación, el control y la estabilidad como dimensiones independientes y complementarias. La sistematización de la información recopilada permite afirmar que el enfoque teórico de Bernard Weiner ayuda a comprender los fenómenos políticos a nivel psicológico, puesto que brinda una aproximación cognitiva, emocional y volitiva del problema. / This paper explores the causal attributions of electoral success in FA members during the general elections of 2016. In-depth interviews were conducted with 9 coalition members. Four major groups are identified for success: causes linked to the political organization, the presidential candidacy, elements in the political situation and the population. These blocks of meaning were analyzed and categorized according to the three-dimensional model, which contemplates location, control and stability as independent and complementary dimensions. The systematization of the collected information allows affirming that the theoretical approach of Bernard Weiner helps to understand the political phenomena at the psychological level, since it provides a cognitive, emotional and volitive approach of the problem. / Tesis

This thesis examines the Scottish Conservative party between 1832 and 1868. It focuses on the party's organisation, structure, leadership, and attitudes. It begins by examining the social, occupational, educational, and religious background of its MPs, candidates, and peers. This reveals that the party's composition, while predominantly aristocratic, nevertheless boasted a range of distinctive and often competing interests. The thesis then explores the make-up, organisation and activity of the party on a local constituency level. This illustrates that the party was more inclusive and heterogeneous than might be assumed, and was very active in promoting itself through a wide variety of methods. The party thus had a notable impact on the wider social and cultural life of Scotland throughout the mid-nineteenth century. Following this, the structure and leadership of the Scottish party on a national level is examined. These could be a source of innovation and accomplishment, and their subsequent decline had a marked effect on the party's overall performance. Above this level, the party's role in parliament, governance, and in a British context is explored. It is demonstrated that the Scottish party maintained a modicum of distinctiveness even at Westminster. Moreover, its multifaceted role in Scottish governance gave it significant influence over Scottish society. Finally, the positions of the Scottish party on important political issues are examined, as are the underlying attitudes which determined these positions. The Scottish party contained many competing and overlapping factions, which held a hitherto unsuspected diversity of outlooks. Overall, this thesis illustrates that the Scottish Conservative party had a pronounced effect on many different facets of Scottish politics and wider society, and was itself more complex and more popular than is reflected in the existing historiography. It therefore counters the assumption that Scotland was almost hegemonically Liberal - a finding which has potential implications for scholarship spread across Scottish and British political, social, and cultural history.

Esta pesquisa pretende estudar como denúncias e evidências de corrupção mobilizam partidos da oposição, eleitores e prefeitos incumbentes levando à punição de prefeitos corruptos durante as campanhas de reeleição. Usando um banco de dados oriundo de relatórios de auditoria aleatórios elaborados pela Controladoria Geral da União que analisam como as transferências federais foram usadas em pequenos municípios brasileiros, nós mostramos que o momento em que os resultados da auditoria são divulgados aos eleitores desempenha um papel importante para saber se prefeitos corruptos serão punidos. Quando os resultados de auditoria produzem provas de corrupção antes da eleição, os prefeitos são menos propensos a concorrer à reeleição. Além disso, os municípios em que as auditorias foram divulgadas antes e durante o período eleitoral tiveram menores taxas de reeleição dos prefeitos. Mostramos isso devido ao aumento da candidatura de candidatos de partidos da oposição como rivais. Nossa análise é restrita a 270 municípios cujos prefeitos estavam em seu primeiro mandato, e cujas administrações foram auditadas entre 2003 e 2004. Nossas conclusões lançam luz sobre os mecanismos que ajudam a explicar os resultados anteriores que mostram que evidências de corrupção punem prefeitos corruptos. Chamamos à atenção para a importância da dinâmica política como ajudar a explicar porque os prefeitos corruptos vão ou não ser punidos. / This research aims to study how corruption allegations and evidence mobilize opposition parties, voter and incumbent mayors leading to the punishment of corrupt mayors during re-election campaigns. Using a database based on random audit reports prepared by the Controladoria Geral da União examining how federal funds were used in small Brazilian municipalities, we show that the timing of when audit findings are disclosed to voters plays an important role in whether corrupt mayors will be punished. When audit records produce evidence of corruption prior to the election, mayors are less likely to run for re-election. Moreover, municipalities where audits were disclosed before and during the election period had lower rates of re-election of the mayors. We show this due to the increase in the candidacy of opposition party candidates as rivals and votes. Our analysis is restricted to 270 municipalities whose mayors were in their first term, and whose administrations were audited by federal accountants between 2003 and 2004. Our findings shed light on the mechanisms which help to explain previous findings showing that random audit corruption evidence punishes corrupt mayors. We draw attention to the importance of political dynamics as helping to explain why corrupt mayors will or will not be punished.

This thesis consists of three stand-alone chapters studying theoretical models concerning a range of issues that take place within the context of political delegation: tax enforcement, political selection, electoral campaigning. First chapter studies the problem of a small electorate of workers who cannot influence tax rates but can influence their local politicians to interfere with tax enforcement. It develops a two-candidate Downsian voting model where voters are productivity-heterogenous workers who supply labour to a local firm that can engage in costly tax evasion while facing an exogenously given payroll tax collected at the firm level. Two purely office motivated local politicians compete in a winner-takes-all election by offering fine reductions to take place if the firm gets caught evading. Two results stand out. First, equilibrium tax evasion is (weakly) increasing in the productivity of the median voter as a result of the latter demanding a weaker enforcement regime through more aggressive fine reductions. Second, if politicians were able to propose and commit on tax rates as well, then the enforcement process would be interference-free and the tax level would coincide with the median voter's optimal level. These two results underline the fact that from voters' perspective, influencing enforcement policy is an imperfect substitute for influencing tax policy in achieving an optimal redistribution scheme due to tax evasion being costly. In other words, a lax enforcement pattern in a given polity can be indicative of a political demand arising as an attempt to attain a redistributive second-best when influencing tax policy is not a possibility. Second chapter turns attention to the role and incentives of media in the context of ex ante political selection, i.e. at the electoral participation level. It constructs a signalling model with pure adverse selection where a candidate whose quality is private information decides on whether to challenge an incumbent whose quality is common knowledge given an electorate composed of voters who are solely interested in electing the best politician. Electoral participation is costly and before the election, a benevolent media outlet which is assumed to be acting in the best interest of voters decides on whether to undertake a costly investigation that may or may not reveal challenger's quality and transmit this information to voters. The focus of the chapter is on studying the selection and incentive effects of changes in media's information technology. The setting creates a strategic interaction between challenger entry and media activity, which gives rise to two main results. First, an improvement in media's information technology, whether due to cost reductions or gains in investigative strength always (weakly) improves ex ante selection by increasing minimum challenger quality in equilibrium. Second, while lower information costs always (weakly) make the media more active, an higher media strength may reduce its journalistic activity, especially if it is already strong. The intuition behind this asymmetry is simple. While both types of improvements increase media's expected net benefits from journalism, a boost to its investigative strength also makes the media more threatening for inferior challengers at a given level of journalistic activity. Combining this with the first result implies that the media can afford being more passive without undermining selection if it is sufficiently strong to begin with. In short, a strong media might lead to a relatively passive media, even though the media is "working as intended". Third chapter is about electoral campaigns. More precisely, it is a theoretical investigation into one possible audience-related cause for diverging campaign structures of different candidates competing for the same office: state of political knowledge in an electorate. Electorate is assumed to consist of a continuum of voters heterogenous along two dimensions: policy preferences and political knowledge. The latter is assumed to partition the set of voters into ignorant and informed segments, with the former consisting of voters who are unable to condition their voting decisions on the policy dimension. Political competition takes place within a probabilistic voting setting with two candidates, but instead of costless policy proposals as in a standard probabilistic voting model, it revolves around campaigning. Electoral campaigning is modelled as a limited resource allocation problem between two activities: policy campaigning and valence campaigning. The former permits candidates to relocate from their initial policy positions (reputations or legacies), which are assumed to be at the opposing segments of the policy space (i.e. left and right). The latter allows them to generate universal support via a partisanship effect and can be interpreted as an investment into non-policy campaign content such as impressionistic advertising, recruitment of writers capable of producing emotionally appealing speeches, etc. The chapter has two central results. First, a candidate's resource allocation to valence campaigning increases with the fraction of ignorant voters, ideological (non-policy) heterogeneity of informed voters and proximity of candidate's initial position to the bliss point of the informed pseudo-swing voter. The last one results from decreasing relative marginal returns for politicians from converging to pseudo- swing voter's ideal position. Second, even if candidates are otherwise symmetric, a monotonic association between policy preferences and political knowledge can induce divergence into campaign structures. For instance, if ignorance and policy preferences are positively correlated (e.g. less educated preferring more public good) then the left candidate would conduct a campaign with a heavier valence focus and vice versa. Underlying this result is again the decreasing relative marginal returns argument: a candidate whose initial position is already close to that of the informed pseudo-swing voter would benefit more from a valence oriented campaign. An implication of this is that a party that is known having a relatively more ignorant voter base can end up conducting a much more policy focused campaign compared to a party that is largely associated with politically aware voters.

Memoria para optar al título de Periodista / En 1999, la vida política del Uruguay sufrió un vuelco. Era un año especial, ya que además de terminar un siglo, este país atravesaba un período de recesión económica, la más seria de la década, cuyas cifras eran elocuentes: la tasa de desempleo se alzaba al 11,2 por ciento en el mes de septiembre y la inflación llegaba al 4 por ciento en diciembre. En medio de esta problemática, la nación debía enfrentar el último proceso electoral de la centuria con reglas de juego nuevas, ya que una reforma constitucional de 1996 había impuesto importantes cambios a las leyes electorales, entre ellos la instauración de la segunda vuelta electoral.

Diseñador Gráfico / El presente trabajo pretende servir como un real aporte a la disciplina, sentando las bases para desarrollar un sitio web políticoproselitista, que responda a los parámetros reales dados por el escenario actual en nuestro país. Para esto es necesario analizar el efecto social que ha producido la progresiva utilización del marketing aplicado a la política en Chile y de las nuevas posibilidades que Internet permite en el desarrollo de una campaña electoral, determinar los factores que han incidido en el cambio de la forma en que se enfrentan las campañas políticas actualmente, el rol que ha cumplido Internet como nuevo medio de propaganda electoral y su perfeccionamiento de uso en este ámbito. Si bien las posibilidades que ofrece Internet son casi ilimitadas, será necesario establecer cuales serán los parámetros concretos que se utilizarán para el desarrollo del sitio, determinar los elementos fundamentales, los innecesarios y los indeseados, desde la óptica del usuario, para poder diseñar una interfaz gráfica egonómica, acorde a las necesidades del electorado chileno. El objetivo general del proyecto es desarrollar una propuesta mediática de interactividad virtual, discursiva y persuasiva, para un candidato presidencial, estableciendo una jerarquía entre el discurso y argumento política, y su representación a través de una interfaz efectiva y de alta usabilidad, para los intereses del candidato asumido como referente, que para los efectos de este trabajo será la candidata de la Concertación, Sra. Michelle Bachelet Jeria.