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Wayne Booth and other rhetorical critics have developed methods for examining the rhetorical aspects of fiction. In this dissertation, I examine, specifically, the use of rhetorical violence in American fiction. It is my premise that authors use rhetorical violence and the irrationality of violence created mimetically to construct ironic metaphors that comment on the irrationality of the ideology behind the violence, pushing that ideology's maxims to its logical ends. The goal of rhetorical violence, therefore, is to create the conditions for a transfer of culpability so that the act becomes transitive-transferable-loosed from its moorings. Culpability, if indeed it reflects something intrinsically awry with an ideology, becomes the fault of the ideology-€”it becomes the perpetrator of illogic and the condemnatory force associated with the act of violence gets transferred to it. Hence, if the author has created an effective metaphor, when he or she flips the violent scene'€™s "€œvalue," the audience is willing to follow along. The violence remains a great evil, but the culpability for the act is shifted to a representative of the ideology in question-as-victimizer; nonetheless, that transfer can only occur inasmuch as the audience is willing to force-fit the incongruities of the metaphor.I examine this rhetorical phenomenon in the works of three modern American writers: Flannery O'Connor, Toni Morrison, and Chuck Palahniuk. I seek to examine the ideologies questioned in these works, the contradictory beliefs expressed by the authors, and to explicate primary episodes in the works of fiction wherein rhetorical violence functions in a rhetorical fashion to promulgate the author's ideology by emotionally jarring the reader loose from commonly-held ideological assumptions in three specific appeals: first, to negate one socially-held ideology in order to promote a conflicting one (Wise Blood); second, to elicit compassion for victimized characters representing social ills (Beloved); third, to call into question the validity of social institutions and practices (Fight Club).

Wayne Booth and other rhetorical critics have developed methods for examining the rhetorical aspects of fiction. In this dissertation, I examine, specifically, the use of rhetorical violence in American fiction. It is my premise that authors use rhetorical violence and the irrationality of violence created mimetically to construct ironic metaphors that comment on the irrationality of the ideology behind the violence, pushing that ideology's maxims to its logical ends. The goal of rhetorical violence, therefore, is to create the conditions for a transfer of culpability so that the act becomes transitive-transferable-loosed from its moorings. Culpability, if indeed it reflects something intrinsically awry with an ideology, becomes the fault of the ideology-€”it becomes the perpetrator of illogic and the condemnatory force associated with the act of violence gets transferred to it. Hence, if the author has created an effective metaphor, when he or she flips the violent scene'€™s "€œvalue," the audience is willing to follow along. The violence remains a great evil, but the culpability for the act is shifted to a representative of the ideology in question-as-victimizer; nonetheless, that transfer can only occur inasmuch as the audience is willing to force-fit the incongruities of the metaphor.I examine this rhetorical phenomenon in the works of three modern American writers: Flannery O'Connor, Toni Morrison, and Chuck Palahniuk. I seek to examine the ideologies questioned in these works, the contradictory beliefs expressed by the authors, and to explicate primary episodes in the works of fiction wherein rhetorical violence functions in a rhetorical fashion to promulgate the author's ideology by emotionally jarring the reader loose from commonly-held ideological assumptions in three specific appeals: first, to negate one socially-held ideology in order to promote a conflicting one (Wise Blood); second, to elicit compassion for victimized characters representing social ills (Beloved); third, to call into question the validity of social institutions and practices (Fight Club).

Aryeh Kosman’s The Activity of Being is the fruit of a lifetime of work on some of the most difficult and challenging texts of ancient philosophy.

in English: In the first half of the book Theta of his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a property of a being. In this sense, dunamis is primarily a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other, thereby exercising itself in its energeia. In the second half of the book, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a way of being. In this sense, a being is dunamei another thing and in the course of its becoming that thing it changes into being energeiai. The aim of the present thesis is to offer an interpretation of the concepts of dunamis and energeia as they appear in the chapters 1, 2, 6 and partly 7 of the book Theta. The first question is how the concepts of dunamis and energeia in both parts fit together. The problem is posed as follows: Are dunamis in the sense of a principle of change and dunamis as a way of being mutually dependent? Are energeia as change and being energeiai related? Are they not, in fact, two relatively independent philosophical concepts, relative to whether being is regarded from the point of view of physics, respectively metaphysics? Based on the interpretation of Aristotle's statements, the thesis aims to argue that Aristotle starts his exposition with the analysis of dunamis in the sense of a principle of change precisely in order to show the...

in English: In the first half of the book Theta of his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a property of a being. In this sense, dunamis is primarily a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other, thereby exercising itself in its energeia. In the second half of the book, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a way of being. In this sense, a being is dunamei another thing and in the course of its becoming that thing it changes into being energeiai. The aim of the present thesis is to offer an interpretation of the concepts of dunamis and energeia as they appear in the chapters 1, 2 and partly 6 of the book Theta. The first question is how the concepts of dunamis and energeia in both parts fit together. The problem is posed as follows: Are dunamis in the sense of a principle of change and dunamis as a way of being mutually dependent? Are energeia as change and being energeiai related? Are they not, in fact, two relatively independent philosophical concepts, relative to whether being is regarded from the point of view of physics, respectively metaphysics? Based on the interpretation of Aristotle's statements, the thesis aims to argue that Aristotle starts his exposition with the analysis of dunamis in the sense of a principle of change precisely in order to show the...

In the course of this thesis, decisive problematizations, in the Foucauldian sense, around Viktor Šklovskij’s early Russian Formalism shall be the object of re-problematizations. More precisely, a careful look will be taken at re-problematizations around theoretical aspects regarding Šklovskij’s paradigmatic reductionist model, primarily as it is introduced in his article Art as device (1917), described most notably by Aage Hansen-Löve and Wolf Schmid in Der Russische Formalismus (1978) and Slavische Erzähltheorie (2010), Elemente der Narratologie (2014) as well as Grundthemen der Literaturwissenschaft: Erzählen (2018) respectively. The thesis will distinguish four main problematizations divided into two parts, taking the Marxist-Leninist debate on Formalism stirred by People’s Commissar Trotsky and the Nietzschean Dionysian-Apollonian dichotomy characteristic of Russian Modernism as its starting points, encompassing the problematizations as a whole. The initial part of the thesis will address re-problematizations around Šklovskij’s formalist polemics with and misinterpretation of Alexandr Potebnja’s Humboldtian theories, as they appear chiefly in the monograph Thought and Language (1862), in order to illustrate how Šklovskij’s frames a continuum with Potebnja descending from the teachings of Wilhelm von Humboldt. The re-problematizations shall be underpinned by Victor Erlich in Russian Formalism. History – Doctrine (1980), Jacqueline Fontaine in La « innere Form » : de Potebnja aux formalistes (2006) and Serge Tchougounnikov in The formal method in Germany and Russia: the beginnings of European psycholinguistics (2018). The second part of the thesis will foreground the (French) (post)structuralist discourse which, according to this thesis, shapes the formation of problematizations around Šklovskij’s immanent reductionism against the backdrop of Boris Tomaševskij’s interpretation of Formalism in Teorija literatury. Poetika (1925) and also the ideological exchange of the 1920s, assuming this backdrop as part of a definitive understanding and materialist critique of Šklovskij’s reductionist terminology, the homogeneity of its outcome, and what Wolf Schmid calls its anti-substantialism particularly in regards to the binary concept fabula and sjužet. The re-problematizations evolve around what is taken as a materialist solution to these problematizations, which annulls the Aristotelian significance of sjužet as energeia by replacing it with ergon. The discussion will take its point of departure in Göran Sonesson’s article Semiotics of art, life, and thought: Three scenarios for (post)modernity (2011) and search the basis for Sonesson’s argument in Roland Barthes’ article Ecrivains et écrivants (1960). By highlighting Šklovskij’s early Formalism as a mode of experiencing Art on its own terms, this thesis aims to revive its aesthetic principle and the question whether it can enlighten modern literary science.

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’élucider l’intention, la pertinence et la cohérence de l’appropriation par Heidegger des concepts principaux de la philosophie pratique aristotélicienne dans ses premiers cours. Notre analyse portera principalement sur les notions clefs d’energeia et de phronēsis. La première section de la thèse est préparatoire : elle est consacrée à une analyse étroite des textes pertinents de l’Éthique à Nicomaque, mais aussi de la Métaphysique, en discussion avec d’autres commentateurs modernes. Cette analyse jette les fondations philologiques nécessaires en vue d’aborder les audacieuses interprétations de Heidegger sur une base plus ferme. La deuxième et principale section consiste en une discussion de l’appropriation ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque que Heidegger entreprend de 1922 à 1924, à partir des textes publiés jusqu’à ce jour et en portant une attention spéciale à Métaphysique IX. Le résultat principal de la première section est un aperçu du caractère central de l’energeia pour le projet d’Aristote dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et, plus spécifiquement, pour sa compréhension de la praxis, qui dans son sens original s’avère être un mode d’être des êtres humains. Notre analyse reconnaît trois traits essentiels de l’energeia et de la praxis, deux desquels provenant de l’élucidation aristotélicienne de l’energeia dans Métaphysique IX 6, à savoir son immédiateté et sa continuité : energeia exprime l’être comme un « accomplissement immédiat mais inachevé ». L’irréductibilité, troisième trait de l’energeia et de la praxis, résulte pour sa part de l’application de la structure de l’energeia à la caractérisation de la praxis dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque, et du contraste de la praxis avec la poiēsis et la theōria. Ces trois caractéristiques impliquent que la vérité pratique ― la vérité de la praxis, ce qui est l’ « objet » de la phronēsis ― ne peut être à proprement parler possédée et ainsi transmise : plus qu’un savoir, elle se révèle surtout comme quelque chose que nous sommes. C’est ce caractère unique de la vérité pratique qui a attiré Heidegger vers Aristote au début des années 1920. La deuxième section, consacrée aux textes de Heidegger, commence par la reconstruction de quelques-uns des pas qui l’ont conduit jusqu’à Aristote pour le développement de son propre projet philosophique, pour sa part caractérisé par une profonde, bien qu’énigmatique combinaison d’ontologie et de phénoménologie. La légitimité et la faisabilité de l’appropriation clairement ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque par Heidegger est aussi traitée, sur la base des résultats de la première section. L’analyse de ces textes met en lumière la pénétrante opposition établie par Heidegger entre la phronēsis et l’energeia dans son programmatique Natorp Bericht en 1922, une perspective qui diverge fortement des résultats de notre lecture philologique d’Aristote dans la première section. Cette opposition est maintenue dans nos deux sources principales ― le cours du semestre d’hiver 1924-25 Platon: Sophistes, et le cours du semestre d’été 1924 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Le commentaire que Heidegger fait du texte d’Aristote est suivi de près dans cette section: des concepts tels que energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis ou hexis ― qui trouvent leur caractérisation ontologique dans la Métaphysique ou la Physique ― doivent être examinés afin de suivre l’argument de Heidegger et d’en évaluer la solidité. L’hypothèse de Heidegger depuis 1922 ― à savoir que l’ontologie aristotélicienne n’est pas à la hauteur des aperçus de ses plus pénétrantes descriptions phénoménologiques ― résulte en un conflit opposant phronēsis et sophia qui divise l’être en deux sphères irréconciliables qui auraient pour effet selon Heidegger de plonger les efforts ontologiques aristotéliciens dans une impasse. Or, cette conclusion de Heidegger est construite à partir d’une interprétation particulière de l’energeia qui laisse de côté d’une manière décisive son aspect performatif, pourtant l’un des traits essentiels de l’energeia telle qu’Aristote l’a conçue. Le fait que dans les années 1930 Heidegger ait lui-même retrouvé cet aspect de l’energeia nous fournit des raisons plus fortes de mettre en doute le supposé conflit entre ontologie et phénoménologie chez Aristote, ce qui peut aboutir à une nouvelle formulation du projet heideggérien. / The purpose of this thesis is to sort out the intent, the philosophical relevance and the consistency of Heidegger’s appropriation of the basic tenets of Aristotle’s practical philosophy in his early lecture courses. Our analysis will focus mainly on the key notions of energeia and phronēsis. The first preparatory section of the thesis is devoted to a close analysis of Aristotle’s relevant texts of the Nicomachean Ethics, but also of the Metaphysics, in discussion with other modern commentators. This lays the philological groundwork which will enable us to engage Heidegger’s challenging interpretations on a more secure footing. The second and main section discusses Heidegger’s ontological appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics from 1922 to 1924 on the basis of the texts so far published, and with a special attention to Metaphysics IX. The main result of section I is an insight into the central character of energeia for Aristotle’s project in the Nicomachean Ethics and, more specifically, for his understanding of praxis, which in its genuinely original sense turns out to be a way of being of human beings. Our analysis recognizes three essential traits to energeia and praxis, two of which stemming from the analysis of Aristotle’s own elucidation of energeia in Metaphysics IX 6, namely immediacy and continuity: energeia expresses being as an ‘immediate unfinished fulfillment’. Irreducibility, the third trait of energeia and praxis, results from applying the structure of energeia to the characterization of praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics, and from contrasting it with poiēsis and theōria. These three features entail that practical truth―the truth of praxis, the ‘object’ of phronēsis―cannot be properly possessed and thus transferred: more than something we know, it is something we are. It is this special character of practical truth that primarily attracted Heidegger to Aristotle in the early 1920s. Section II, devoted to Heidegger’s texts, starts by reconstructing some of the intellectual steps that led him to resort to Aristotle for the development of his own philosophical project, characterized by a profound, yet intriguing intermingling of ontology and phenomenology. The legitimacy and feasibility of Heidegger’s pointedly ontological appropriation of the Nicomachean Ethics is also discussed, on the basis of the results of section I. The analysis of these texts is characterized by the sharp opposition set by Heidegger between phronēsis and energeia in his 1922 programmatic Natorp Bericht, a perspective that strongly diverges from the results of our philological reading of Aristotle in section I. The assessment of this opposition is maintained throughout the discussion of the two main sources―the 1924-25 winter course Platon: Sophistes, and the 1924 summer course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Heidegger’s direct commentary of Aristotle’s text is followed closely in this section: concepts such as energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis and hexis―which find their ontological characterization in the Metaphysics or Physics―need to be scrutinized in order to follow Heidegger’s argument and to assess its soundness. Heidegger’s hypothesis from 1922―namely, that Aristotle’s ontology does not fit the insights of his more penetrating phenomenological descriptions―eventually culminates in a clash between phronēsis and sophia which divides being into two irreconcilable spheres and brings Aristotle’s ontological efforts to a dead end. Yet, this conclusion of Heidegger is built upon a specific interpretation of energeia that critically leaves in the shade its performative side, one of its essential traits as Aristotle conceived it. The fact that in the 30s Heidegger himself comes to see this side of energeia provides us with stronger grounds to question the supposed conflict between ontology and phenomenology in Aristotle, which can result in a new formulation of the Heideggerian project.

Le but de cette étude est de fonder la parenté entre l'essence hégélienne, le Wesen, et le ti en einai aristotélicien; parenté qu'on croit être non seulement littérale, mais plus proprement spéculative. En effet, le Wesen comme le ti en einai rappellent un sens de passé, mais de passé hors du temps, qui est même spéculatif et théorétique. En particulier, on essaiera de relire certains moments de la Science de la logique en utilisant comme pierre de touche les Leçons sur l'histoire de la philosophie que Hegel a dédiées à Aristote. Déjà la bipartition de la logique objective en « Logique de l'être» et « Logique de l'essence» est une reprise d'Aristote: la science, en allant en profondeur, recherche au-delà de l'être (to on) et, une fois découverte l'essence (ti en einai), élève cette dernière à son objet. Le chemin logique qui va de l'être à l'essence pense éminemment cette vérité. La démonstration de la parenté entre Wesen et ti en einai aurait un double mérite : tout d'abord, celui de clarifier des passages très importants de la Doctrine de l'essence en dissolvant, en parallèle, les ambiguïtés dont le corpus aristotélicien reste susceptible; d'autre part, celui de lire correctement l'imparfait en de la formule monnayée par Aristote; un imparfait, d'après moi, qui ne peut qu'être métaphysique et concerner, donc, ce qui est nécessaire, immuable, hors du temps précisément en tant qu'il légitime le temps, c'est-à-dire qu'il fonde ontologiquement le temps en lui donnant sa vérité. Le travail se compose de quatre chapitres, qui sont quatre moments d'enquête bien distincts : Le premier chapitre, après quelques remarques méthodologiques, offrira une première interprétation générale de l'essence en tant que dynamis, en axant le parallèle sur les concepts aristotéliciens d'essence, d'acte et de but, qu'on utilisera ici comme un laboratoire conceptuel pour l'intégralité de notre travail.Le deuxième chapitre porte sur le sich erinnert de l'être dans l'essence, c'est-à-dire le passage à un niveau différent d'argumentation logique, à partir de son lien d'un côté avec l'anamnesis platonicienne, de l'autre avec le tien einai aristotélicien.Le troisième chapitre problématise le rôle de la Reflexion en tant que processualité immanente de l'essence, en reconsidérant l'équilibre complexe entre être et essence, respectivement, comme proteron pros hemas et proteron te physei, qui correspondent à leur tour aux expressions aristotéliciennes ti esti et tien einai.Le quatrième chapitre aborde le problème de la Wirklichkeit qui clôt la Doctrine de l'essence, en l'interprétant, selon l'indication hégélienne, comme energeia et entelecheia. / The aim of this research is to prove the relationship between the Hegelian concept of Wesen and Aristotle's ti en einai from a not merely lexical point of view. I will specially attempt the reading of some fundamental moments of the Science of logic using the Lectures on the history of philosophy that Hegel dedicates to the Stagirite. Both signifiers, Wesen and ti en einai, refer to a sense of past, but timelessly past (zeitlos), which is pregnantly speculative. Hegel structures the division of the Objective Logic in two books, "Being" and ''Essence", on the mode( of the Aristotelian episteme. True science, meaning the one that goes deeply, looks beyond Being (to on) and, once found its Essence (ti en einai), puts this fast one as its abject. The logical journey from Being to Essence thinks highly this truth. I am convinced that founding such a relationship between the above-mentioned terms has a twofold contribution: On the one hand, which one of clarifying some key-moments of the Doctrine of Essence, so disambiguating expressions, or "formulas" that the Stagirite frequently uses as synonyms (i.e. essence, act, purpose and form); On the other hand, which one of reading, and correctly understanding, the past tense en in the middle of the Aristotelian formula; a past tense definitely metaphysical, which refers to what is necessary, unchangeable, out of time just because it is what time needs most of all and what legitimates time. The dissertation articulates into four chapters, corresponding to four distinct moments of investigation: Chapter I starts with some methodological remarks, and then provides my first general interpretation of the Hegelian Essence as dynamis. I will found this kind of reading on the Aristotelian concepts of essence, act and purpose. The analysis focuses on Aristotle's Metaphysics and approaches a germinal connection between Wesen, An-sich, ousia, dynamis.Chapter Il concems the recollection (sich erinnert) of Being in Essence, that is, switching to a different Ievel of logical argumentation, its connection on one side with Platonic anamnesis, on the other one with the Aristotelian ti en einai. Both anà and en refer to a past that is not truly such: it has no-time significance but clearly a logical-metaphysical one. Logical development is not made up of continuity but rather of breaks and always-new demotions; it recalls some famous words Socrates says to Meno: "And isn't finding knowledge within oneself recollection?" (Meno, 85e-86a). Chapter III, in a direct link with the previous ones, thematizes the role of Reflexion as that immanent process of Essence, rethinking the complex balance of Being and Essence as, respectively, proteron pros hemas and proteron te physei, in turn corresponding to the Aristotelian formulas ti esti and ti en einai. Chapter IV, which takes crosswise the themes of the previous chapters, deals with the problem of Wirklichkeit at the end of the Doctrine of Essence, interpreting it in its twofold meaning of energeia and entelecheia. Despite Hegel, in his Lectures on the history of philosophy, apparently considers entelecheia as the most proper determination of energeia, he actually reveals two distinct senses, which correspond to different ranges of use. Wirklichkeit is then determined both as effectuality and as the determinacy of purpose. If, on the one band, Hegel accomplishes a great ontological building, on the other band he grounds an effectual reality that is only possible, still to submit to the scrutiny of the Subject, Concept, and Idea. / Scopo del presente lavoro di ricerca è fondare la filiazione tra Wesen hegeliano e ti en einai aristotelico da un punto di vista non meramente lessicale, tentando principalmente la lettura di alcuni momenti chiave della Scienza della logica al filtro delle Lezioni sulla storia della filosofia dedicate ad Aristotele. Entrambi i significanti, tanto il Wesen quanto il ti en einai, mettono infatti in gioco un senso di passato, ma passato fuori dal tempo, che è esso stesso teoretico e speculativo. La distinzione della logica oggettiva in logica dell’essere e logica dell’essenza è un calco aristotelico. La vera scienza, la scienza cioè che va in profondità, cerca oltre l’essere (to on) e, trovatane l’essenza (ti en einai) ne fa il suo oggetto. Il cammino che conduce dall’essere all’essenza, o meglio che dall’essere svela l’essenza nella Scienza della logica pensa al massimo grado questa verità. Crediamo che la dimostrazione di una simile filiazione tra i due termini abbia un duplice merito: anzitutto, quello di chiarificare alcuni momenti estremamente importanti della Dottrina dell’essenza disambiguando, nel farlo, alcune espressioni o termini di cui lo Stagirita ha fatto largo uso cadendo spesso nella sinonimia (tra tutti essenza, atto, fine e forma); dall’altro, quello di leggere in modo corretto l’imperfetto en della formula aristotelica – un imperfetto che non può non essere metafisico e riguardare, cioè, ciò che è necessario, immutabile, fuori dal tempo proprio in quanto ciò che più di tutto occorre al tempo, e che perciò stesso lo legittima. Il lavoro si articola in quattro capitoli, che corrispondono a quattro ben distinti momenti di indagine: Il primo capitolo, dopo alcune considerazioni di carattere metodologico, offre una prima generale interpretazione dell’essenza come dynamis, imperniando il parallelo sui concetti aristotelici di essenza, atto e fine. L’analisi è condotta principalmente sul testo della Metafisica. Si approccia una germinale connessione tra Wesen, An-sich, ousia, dynamis. Il secondo capitolo ripensa il sich erinnert dell’essere nell’essenza, vale a dire il passaggio a un diverso livello di argomentazione logica, a partire dal suo legame da un lato con l’anamnesis platonica, dall’altro col ti en einai aristotelico. Sia l’anà che l’en alludono infatti ad un passato che non è veramente tale, che non ha valenza temporale ma chiaramente logico-metafisica. E il procedimento logico, fatto non di continuità ma piuttosto di rotture e di sempre nuove retrocessioni, sembrerebbe richiamare proprio una certa frase di Socrate a Menone: “[m]a ricavar da sé, in sé, la propria scienza, non è appunto ricordare?” (Menone, 85e-86a). Il terzo capitolo, in diretta connessione con il precedente, problematizza il ruolo della Reflexion come processualità immanente dell’essenza, ripensando il complesso equilibrio di essere ed essenza come, rispettivamente, proteron pros hemas e proteron te physei, a sua volta corrispondenti alle espressioni aristoteliche ti esti e ti en einai.Il quarto capitolo, che riprende in modo incrociato le tematiche dei capitoli precedenti, affronta il problema della Wirklichkeit a chiusura della Dottrina dell’essenza, interpretandola nel suo duplice senso di energeia e entelecheia. Malgrado Hegel, nelle Lezioni sulla storia della filosofia, consideri apparentemente l’entelecheia come “la specificazione più propria” dell’energeia, ne emergono due sensi distinti e non propriamente sovrapponibili. La Wirklichkeit si determina quindi tanto come effettualità, quanto come finale determinazione del fine. Se, da un lato, Hegel porta qui a compimento una grandiosa trattazione di ontologia, dall’altro apre le porte all’interpretazione di un reale solo possibile, da sottoporre ancora al vaglio del Soggetto e dell’Idea.

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’élucider l’intention, la pertinence et la cohérence de l’appropriation par Heidegger des concepts principaux de la philosophie pratique aristotélicienne dans ses premiers cours. Notre analyse portera principalement sur les notions clefs d’energeia et de phronēsis. La première section de la thèse est préparatoire : elle est consacrée à une analyse étroite des textes pertinents de l’Éthique à Nicomaque, mais aussi de la Métaphysique, en discussion avec d’autres commentateurs modernes. Cette analyse jette les fondations philologiques nécessaires en vue d’aborder les audacieuses interprétations de Heidegger sur une base plus ferme. La deuxième et principale section consiste en une discussion de l’appropriation ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque que Heidegger entreprend de 1922 à 1924, à partir des textes publiés jusqu’à ce jour et en portant une attention spéciale à Métaphysique IX. Le résultat principal de la première section est un aperçu du caractère central de l’energeia pour le projet d’Aristote dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et, plus spécifiquement, pour sa compréhension de la praxis, qui dans son sens original s’avère être un mode d’être des êtres humains. Notre analyse reconnaît trois traits essentiels de l’energeia et de la praxis, deux desquels provenant de l’élucidation aristotélicienne de l’energeia dans Métaphysique IX 6, à savoir son immédiateté et sa continuité : energeia exprime l’être comme un « accomplissement immédiat mais inachevé ». L’irréductibilité, troisième trait de l’energeia et de la praxis, résulte pour sa part de l’application de la structure de l’energeia à la caractérisation de la praxis dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque, et du contraste de la praxis avec la poiēsis et la theōria. Ces trois caractéristiques impliquent que la vérité pratique ― la vérité de la praxis, ce qui est l’ « objet » de la phronēsis ― ne peut être à proprement parler possédée et ainsi transmise : plus qu’un savoir, elle se révèle surtout comme quelque chose que nous sommes. C’est ce caractère unique de la vérité pratique qui a attiré Heidegger vers Aristote au début des années 1920. La deuxième section, consacrée aux textes de Heidegger, commence par la reconstruction de quelques-uns des pas qui l’ont conduit jusqu’à Aristote pour le développement de son propre projet philosophique, pour sa part caractérisé par une profonde, bien qu’énigmatique combinaison d’ontologie et de phénoménologie. La légitimité et la faisabilité de l’appropriation clairement ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque par Heidegger est aussi traitée, sur la base des résultats de la première section. L’analyse de ces textes met en lumière la pénétrante opposition établie par Heidegger entre la phronēsis et l’energeia dans son programmatique Natorp Bericht en 1922, une perspective qui diverge fortement des résultats de notre lecture philologique d’Aristote dans la première section. Cette opposition est maintenue dans nos deux sources principales ― le cours du semestre d’hiver 1924-25 Platon: Sophistes, et le cours du semestre d’été 1924 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Le commentaire que Heidegger fait du texte d’Aristote est suivi de près dans cette section: des concepts tels que energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis ou hexis ― qui trouvent leur caractérisation ontologique dans la Métaphysique ou la Physique ― doivent être examinés afin de suivre l’argument de Heidegger et d’en évaluer la solidité. L’hypothèse de Heidegger depuis 1922 ― à savoir que l’ontologie aristotélicienne n’est pas à la hauteur des aperçus de ses plus pénétrantes descriptions phénoménologiques ― résulte en un conflit opposant phronēsis et sophia qui divise l’être en deux sphères irréconciliables qui auraient pour effet selon Heidegger de plonger les efforts ontologiques aristotéliciens dans une impasse. Or, cette conclusion de Heidegger est construite à partir d’une interprétation particulière de l’energeia qui laisse de côté d’une manière décisive son aspect performatif, pourtant l’un des traits essentiels de l’energeia telle qu’Aristote l’a conçue. Le fait que dans les années 1930 Heidegger ait lui-même retrouvé cet aspect de l’energeia nous fournit des raisons plus fortes de mettre en doute le supposé conflit entre ontologie et phénoménologie chez Aristote, ce qui peut aboutir à une nouvelle formulation du projet heideggérien. / The purpose of this thesis is to sort out the intent, the philosophical relevance and the consistency of Heidegger’s appropriation of the basic tenets of Aristotle’s practical philosophy in his early lecture courses. Our analysis will focus mainly on the key notions of energeia and phronēsis. The first preparatory section of the thesis is devoted to a close analysis of Aristotle’s relevant texts of the Nicomachean Ethics, but also of the Metaphysics, in discussion with other modern commentators. This lays the philological groundwork which will enable us to engage Heidegger’s challenging interpretations on a more secure footing. The second and main section discusses Heidegger’s ontological appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics from 1922 to 1924 on the basis of the texts so far published, and with a special attention to Metaphysics IX. The main result of section I is an insight into the central character of energeia for Aristotle’s project in the Nicomachean Ethics and, more specifically, for his understanding of praxis, which in its genuinely original sense turns out to be a way of being of human beings. Our analysis recognizes three essential traits to energeia and praxis, two of which stemming from the analysis of Aristotle’s own elucidation of energeia in Metaphysics IX 6, namely immediacy and continuity: energeia expresses being as an ‘immediate unfinished fulfillment’. Irreducibility, the third trait of energeia and praxis, results from applying the structure of energeia to the characterization of praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics, and from contrasting it with poiēsis and theōria. These three features entail that practical truth―the truth of praxis, the ‘object’ of phronēsis―cannot be properly possessed and thus transferred: more than something we know, it is something we are. It is this special character of practical truth that primarily attracted Heidegger to Aristotle in the early 1920s. Section II, devoted to Heidegger’s texts, starts by reconstructing some of the intellectual steps that led him to resort to Aristotle for the development of his own philosophical project, characterized by a profound, yet intriguing intermingling of ontology and phenomenology. The legitimacy and feasibility of Heidegger’s pointedly ontological appropriation of the Nicomachean Ethics is also discussed, on the basis of the results of section I. The analysis of these texts is characterized by the sharp opposition set by Heidegger between phronēsis and energeia in his 1922 programmatic Natorp Bericht, a perspective that strongly diverges from the results of our philological reading of Aristotle in section I. The assessment of this opposition is maintained throughout the discussion of the two main sources―the 1924-25 winter course Platon: Sophistes, and the 1924 summer course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Heidegger’s direct commentary of Aristotle’s text is followed closely in this section: concepts such as energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis and hexis―which find their ontological characterization in the Metaphysics or Physics―need to be scrutinized in order to follow Heidegger’s argument and to assess its soundness. Heidegger’s hypothesis from 1922―namely, that Aristotle’s ontology does not fit the insights of his more penetrating phenomenological descriptions―eventually culminates in a clash between phronēsis and sophia which divides being into two irreconcilable spheres and brings Aristotle’s ontological efforts to a dead end. Yet, this conclusion of Heidegger is built upon a specific interpretation of energeia that critically leaves in the shade its performative side, one of its essential traits as Aristotle conceived it. The fact that in the 30s Heidegger himself comes to see this side of energeia provides us with stronger grounds to question the supposed conflict between ontology and phenomenology in Aristotle, which can result in a new formulation of the Heideggerian project.