<p>The object of this thesis is the foundation of ethics. The question is whether there exists a universal core to ethics consisting of a fundamental ethical principle across cultures. This principle could for example be the so-called Golden Rule, which goes as follows: ‘You should do to others what you want them to do to you’. The Golden Rule is to be found in many of the world’s religions and is also reflected in secular society. The rule can for example be found in a political version in legal declarations e.g. the Humans Rights Declaration of 1948. There are philosophersand scientists who interpret the Golden Rule secularly. If one looks at the Golden Rule from a non-religious point of view, it can be understood for instance in the following ways: 1) As a rule which is followed to fulfil self-interest and 2) As a rule concerning role reversal. In this thesis we will go into detail on these two interpretations of the Golden Rule, because as we will see, they can be seen as two very different views of human nature. We will discuss which of the two interpretations of the Golden Rule is most adequate in connection with the description of human beings as moral agents having reason, motives, freedom and responsibility. Furthermore we will focus on the Golden Rule in a Nordic context, in this connection we will look at whether the Golden Rule corresponds to the four bioethical principles presented by the two American philosophers Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress. These principles are the principle of respect for autonomy, the principle of nonmaleficence, the principle of beneficence and the principle of justice. According to the Danish physician Henrik R. Wulff one cannot use Beauchamp and Childress’ bioethical principles as a tool for solving ethical problems in the North, because they do not correspond to the Golden Rule. Wulff argues that the Golden Rule is a moral ideal within the health services in the Nordic countries. The purpose of the thesis is, among others, to analyse and discuss whether the four bioethical principles are implicitly contained within the Golden Rule and whether Beauchamp and Childress’ method can be used to analyse bioethical problems in a Nordic context. Finally, we will set forth an ethical assessment of a treatment within biomedicine. As an example of the application of the four bioethical principles, we will look at whether human somatic gene therapy is an ethical acceptable treatment. Thus my thesis is that the Golden Rule can be viewed as a fundamental ethical principle across cultures and that Beauchamp and Childress’ four bioethical principles correspond to the Golden Rule. That is, I think there is a reason to maintain, that the bioethical principles can be of use for solving bioethical problems across cultures.</p>

Uppsatsen tar upp Arne Naess djupekologi. Den undersöker djupekologins struktur och vilka krav som ställs på en teori för att den skall vara en djupekologi. Uppsatsen tar även upp skillnader mellan djupekologi och grundekologi på en praktisk nivå. Uppsatsen behandlar Warwick Fox kritik rörande djupet i djupekologin och Arne Naess svar på den kritiken. Författaren till uppsatsen finner att Fox kritik inte är helt träffande och att Naess svar på kritiken är för svag. / This paper discusses Arne Naess’ theory of deep ecology. It investigates the structure of deep ecology and what conditions a theory has to fulfil to be a deep ecology. The paper demonstrates differences between deep ecology and shallow ecology on a practical level. The paper presents a criticism put forward by Warwick Fox which focuses on the deepness of deep ecology, and an answer from Arne Naess on this criticism. The author of this paper finds Fox’ criticism not quite convincing, and that Naess’ answer is too weak.

The paper explores theoretical shortcomings in the egalitarian theory by John Rawls and provides a complementary view on the problem of morally arbitrary contingencies. The conception of natural lottery, which Rawls presents to signify the starting range of morally arbitrary inequalities, falls short in philosophical grounding. According to critics, the notion of natural lottery appeals to the philosophical conception of moral luck which undermines ascription of moral responsibility. Since moral responsibility is a basic prerequisite for egalitarian justice, the appeal to morally arbitrary contingencies of the natural lottery may be self-defeating for the theory. Criticizing Rawls’s approach to morally arbitrary contingencies Susan Hurley investigates philosophical groundings for judgment of moral responsibility. Philosophical inquiries into moral luck differentiate four categories of luck and expose the difficulties of ascription of moral responsibility for it. The conception of moral luck implies epistemological shortcomings in the rational judgment of moral responsibility. Hurley claims that ascription of moral responsibility requires another logical strategy. The critical discussion by Norman Daniels refers to another egalitarian theory by Ronald Dworkin which suggests ascription of moral responsibility on a gradual scale. The theory divides the naturally contingent recourses into categories of brute luck and option luck. This strategy stratifies normative standards of responsibility by the criteria of individual choice and circumstances. Considering the strategy of gradual ascription of responsibility, I suggest to apply a moral developmental perspective as an additional outlook on the moral responsibility in egalitarian theory. The theory of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg provides an explanation of a gradual development of moral responsibility through a natural order of developmental stages. It stratifies the moral responsibility into a hierarchical model of measurement and systematizes the order of normative standards.

<p>Since the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) that causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was discovered in the 1980s, the condom has scientifically proven to be the only technological device that can prevent transmission of the virus during sexual intercourse. This technical approach to the HIV has strongly emphasized that prevention is only possible if the condom is properly used. However, as a technological artifact the condom has shown that its use is laden with values. The question of values on condoms has brought in a heated debate on the moral justifications of its use. In Malawi, just as in other African countries, the Faith Community has rejected the Governmentsplea to promote condoms as the preventive measure against the virus.The Faith Community has emphasized on abstinence and mutual faithfulness as the only reliable means to the prevention of HIV/AIDS. The main argument from the Faith Community is that condoms promote promiscuity. Nevertheless, the Government agrees with the Faith Community on abstinence and mutual faithfulness, but still insists on condom use as a preventive measure against the virus. The Government argues that the condom is the only proven technical approach to the HIV prevention and therefore it should be promoted. T</p><p>he main purpose of this study is to attempt an ethical analysis of the arguments for and againstcondom use as the preventive measure against HIV. In this case, the study tries to analyse the Government and Faith Community stands on condoms. In relation to the arguments for and againstcondom use, the study also touches such areas as: the concept of rights and condom use, ethics of condom advertisement, African cultural values versus condom use and the implications of condom use on behaviour change. From the study, it has been argued that condoms should be promoted. The argument comes from that understanding that AIDS has plundered Africa than any war or disease in human history, and therefore, it needs to be stopped. In this case, such theories as, Utility, Love, Autonomy, Rights and umunthu moral conscience have been used to support the argument.</p>

<p>With an estimated 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria, no doubt, has been grappling with the problem of pluralism of ethnic nationalities. It is not news in Nigeria that extreme ethnic consciousness of its citizens has led to the victimization of one ethnic group by another. This victimization has come in the form of exclusions in the distribution of both wealth and power in the country.</p><p>Amidst all the exclusions, the unity of the country has been ironically regarded as sacrosanct, and should not be negotiated. It is often said that fate brought all the ethnic nationalities in order to form one great country. I subscribe to this belief that fate brought us together for the above purpose, especially now that several countries around the world are merging in one way or the other to form a formidable force to reckon with both politically and economically. Hence, “(ethnic integration) is the integration of capabilities. It develops the capabilities of the workforce… it offers opportunities for better synergy of skills”. However, it would be ethically unhealthy for the unity of the country not to be compromised under the present dispensation, which has been compromising in turn the basic moral principle of social justice. There cannot be any moral basis for the continued existence of a country like Nigeria, which as it were, has thrown equality of all citizens to the dogs.</p><p>Should the country remain united, it must do so by imbibing the culture of regarding all citizens, as well as, all ethnic nationalities as equal, and none should have more privileges than the others. Therefore, how can a plural society like Nigeria remain united as one indivisible country?</p><p>Rawls has offered some solutions to the problem of stability engendered by the pluralism of ethnic groups in Nigeria. His idea of ‘overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ in his Political Liberalism is capable of bringing back the country to the state of stability. There will be stability, if all forms of exclusion seize to exist in the Nigerian polity.</p>

<p>Growing up as a child, we had a Dog. To us, it was like a means to an end. That is, hunting other animals for food and for protection, with no special care and treatment given to this animal. Butas days passed by I began to witness a wind of change against such actions. I was made to understand that we were committing two crimes-: using the Dog as a means to an end (for hunting and for eating animals). Today almost every newspaper has something to say about the treatment of animals by humans, especially in their use as experimentation subjects. This has led to the wide spread arguments about “Animal right” and “Animal equality” Advocates of the above arguments hold that just like humans, animals too have rights and are in many ways like humans. There also exist animal right groups. Organisations and countries now have laws regulating animal used in the laboratory. If I may be permitted, I will want to say that the world is in a state of dilemma regarding animal experimentation. While some argue against it, based on the claim that these animals have no right and are not equal to humans, others argue in favour of it on claims that animals have moral rights, feel pain and suffer just like humans and should not be subjected to painful experiments. I then begin to wander how research on animals to improve human health should not be undertaken just because it is claimed that these animals have rights and are in many ways equal to humans. It is the contention of this paper to find out the extent to which animal rights and animal equality justifies the fight against animal experimentation.</p>

<p>Are agency and responsibility solely ascribable to humans? The advent of artificial intelligence (AI), including the development of so-called “affective computing,” appears to be chipping away at the traditional building blocks of moral agency and responsibility. Spurred by the realization that fully autonomous, self-aware, even rational and emotionally-intelligent computer systems may emerge in the future, professionals in engineering and computer science have historically been the most vocal to warn of the ways in which such systems may alter our understanding of computer ethics. Despite the increasing attention of many philosophers and ethicists to the development of AI, there continues to exist a fair amount of conceptual muddiness on the conditions for assigning agency and responsibility to such systems, from both an ethical and a legal perspective. Moral and legal philosophies may overlap to a high degree, but are neither interchangeable nor identical. This paper attempts to clarify the actual and hypothetical ethical and legal situations governing a very particular type of advanced, or “intelligent,” computer system: medical decision support systems (MDSS) that feature AI in their system design. While it is well-recognized that MDSS can be categorized by type and function, further categorization of their mediating effects on users and patients is needed in order to even begin ascribing some level of moral or legal responsibility. I conclude that various doctrines of Anglo legal systems appear to allow for the possibility of assigning specific types of agency – and thus specific types of legal responsibility – to some types of MDSS. Strong arguments for assigning moral agency and responsibility are still lacking, however.</p>

<p>Ämnesdidaktiken kräver kunnande i både ämne och pedagogik och en god förankring i praktisk verklighet. Varför, hur och vad brukar betecknas som de grundläggande didaktiska frågorna. Varför skall man lära sig filosofi? Hur - Vilka alternativa undervisningsstrategier finns? Vilka viktiga vägval ställs filosofiläraren inför? Hur stimulerar man elevernas intresse för ämnet filosofi? Hur väljer man ut ur filosofins stora skattkammare, ett stoff för undervisning i ämnet?</p><p><strong>Syftet </strong>med denna uppsats är</p><ul><li>diskutera de didaktiska frågorna i filosofiämnet utifrån ”Hur-frågan”.</li><li>genomföra arbetsformer inom det problembaserade lärandet under ämnesblocket ”Etiska frågor”.</li><li>analysera hur elevernas intresse för filosofi stimuleras och eventuella negativa attityder till ämnet förändras inom det problembaserade lärandet.</li></ul> / Uppsatsförfattaren har senare bytt efternamn först till "Nilel" och sedan till "Högman".

<p>This thesis deals with the concepts of individual and individuation as defined by Leibniz and Spinoza. I go through the use and definition of the concept of individual in four stages.</p><p>First I discuss the individual as conceived by Spinoza as a relation formed by a composition of parts and the individual as conceived by Leibniz as a complete notion consisting of all the events in the life of a subject.</p><p>Next is the roll of perception in Leibniz discussed, likewise individuation through different perception with varying distinctness, and the affinity of perception with affection.</p><p>The discussions concerning the individual concludes in a section about the essence of the individual as being the desire of the individual. In the last stage, I discuss the multitude as being an own individual.</p> / <p>Den här uppsatsen handlar om individ och individuation som det definieras hos Leibniz och Spinoza. Jag följer användandet och definitionen av individ i fyra etapper.</p><p>Först diskuterar jag Spinozas individ som relationen av en sammansättning av delar och Leibniz individ som en fullständig notion bestående av alla händelser i ett subjekts liv.</p><p>Därefter diskuteras perceptionens roll hos Leibniz, liksom individuation genom olika tydliga perceptioner, samt perceptionens affinitet med affektionen.</p><p>För individens del mynnar diskussionerna ut i en del om individens essens i form av dess begär. Den sista etappen diskuterar mångfalden såsom en egen individ.</p>

<p>The focus of this study is the opposition of Ludwik Fleck to the logical positivism. The main interest focuses on the mutability of knowledge and the inherent problems of incommensura-bility, as well as on Fleck´s notion of reality. Fleck emphasizes a rational and continuous de-velopment of knowledge, in contrast to Thomas Kuhn´s discontinuous and irrational devel-opment, and rejects all forms of reality independent of human beings.</p><p>Fleck´s monograph Entstehung und Entwicklung einer Tatsache is a rich and multifac-eted inquiry into the nature of knowledge, emphasizing the social and historical aspects of the epistemology of science at the expense of certain logical precepts. With his concepts thought style and thought collective, Fleck is generally acknowledged as a precursor to Kuhn´s con-cepts of paradigm and scientific community. Fleck maintains a relativistic view of science and develops a comparative epistemology which challenges the logical positivists in many re-spects. He dismisses every form of reality and has therefore been regarded as an idealist, al-though there are certain aspects to his epistemology which point toward an implicit ontology based upon his idea of the passive components of knowledge.</p><p>The chief epistemological works of Fleck and his contemporary Karl Popper were published within a year of each other, 1934 and 1935, respectively, by which Popper had left the Continent to eventually become one of the leading British philosophers, while Fleck spent several years during the Second World War as a prisoner in Nazi camps. Both were firmly opposed to the logical positivism, one as a critical rationalist, the other as a sceptical relativist. Fleck was also a forerunner to the constructivist ideas and the Strong Programme.</p><p>The word ”incommensurability” has been ascribed Kuhn but the term had already been used by Fleck in 1927. The ”incommensurability thesis” dominates Kuhn´s notion of scientific revolutions and is accordingly the reason why scientific progress is considered an irrational process. The debate on the incommensurability thesis has continued to interest epistemologists and philosophers of science and many solutions have been suggested, some in line with the one proposed by Fleck.</p>