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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
221

Anti-paternalism

Grill, Kalle January 2006 (has links)
<p>This is a thesis about anti-paternalism – the liberal doctrine that we may not interfere with a person’s liberty for her own good. Empirical circumstances and moral values may certainly give us reason to avoid benevolent interference. Anti-paternalism as a normative doctrine should, however, be rejected.</p><p><em>Essay I</em> concerns the definitions of paternalism and anti-paternalism. It is argued that only a definition of paternalism in terms of compound reason-actions can accommodate its special moral properties. Definitions in terms of actions, common in the literature, cannot. It is argued, furthermore, that in specifying the reason-actions in further detail, the notion of what is self-regarding, as opposed to other-regarding, is irrelevant, contrary to received opinion.</p><p><em>Essay II </em>starts out with the definition of paternalism defended in essay I and claims that however this very general definition is specified, anti-paternalism is unreasonable and should be rejected. Anti-paternalism is the position that certain reasons – referring one way or the other to the good of a person, give no valid normative support to certain actions – some kind of interferences with the same person. Since the reasons in question are normally quite legitimate and important reasons for action, a convincing argument for anti-paternalism must explain why they are invalid in cases of interference. A closer look at the reasons and actions in question provides no basis for such an explanation.</p><p><em>Essay III</em> considers a concrete case of benevolent interference – the withholding of information concerning uncertain threats to public health in the public’s best interest. Such a policy has been suggested in relation to the European Commission’s proposed new system for the<em> R</em>egistration, <em>E</em>valuation, and <em>A</em>uthorisation of <em>Ch</em>emicals (REACH). Information about uncertain threats to health from chemicals would allegedly spread anxiety and depression and thus do more harm than good. The avoidance of negative health effects is accepted as a legitimate and good reason for withholding of information, thus respecting the conclusion of essay II, that anti-paternalism should be rejected. Other reasons, however, tip the balance in favour of making the information available. These reasons include the net effects on knowledge, psychological effects, effects on private decisions and effects on political decisions.</p>
222

Rational Goal-Setting in Environmental Policy : Foundations and Applications

Edvardsson Björnberg, Karin January 2008 (has links)
The overall aim of this thesis is to present a model for rational goal-setting and to illustrate how it can be applied in evaluations of public policies, in particular policies concerning sustainable development and environmental quality. The contents of the thesis are divided into two sections: a theoretical section (Papers I-IV) and an empirical section (Papers V-VII). Paper I identifies a set of rationality criteria for single goals and discusses them in relation to the typical function of goals. It is argued that goals are typically set to enhance goal achievement. A goal that successfully furthers its achievement is “achievement-inducing”. It holds for each of the identified criteria that, ceteris paribus, improved satisfaction of a criterion makes a goal better in the achievement-inducing sense.Paper II contains an analysis of the notion of goal system coherence. It is argued that the coherence of a goal system is determined by the relations that hold among the goals in the system, in particular the relations of operationalization, means and ends, support, and conflict. Paper III investigates the rationality of utopian goals. The paper analyzes four arguments that support the normative criterion of attainability: that utopian goals are (1) too imprecise and (2) too far-reaching to guide action effectively, (3) counterproductive, and (4) morally objectionable. A tentative defence of utopian goal-setting is built on counter-arguments that can be put forward to weaken each of the four objections. Paper IV investigates the nature of self-defeating goals. The paper identifies three types of situations in which self-defeating mechanisms obstruct goal achievement: (1) situations in which the goal itself carries the seeds of its own non-fulfilment (self-defeating goals), (2) situations in which the activity of goal-setting contributes to goal failure (self-defeating goal-setting), and (3) situations in which disclosure of the goal interferes with progress (self-defeating goal disclosure). Paper V provides a brief description of the Swedish system of environmental objectives and a preliminary inventory of the management difficulties that attach to this goal system.Paper VI contains an investigation into the rationality of five Swedish environmental objectives through an application of the rationality criteria identified in Papers I-II. The paper identifies and discusses some difficulties that are associated with management by objectives and the use of goals in environmental policy. Paper VII analyses the rationality of the Swedish environmental quality objective A good built environment. Among the conclusions drawn in the paper are that some of the sub-goals to the objective are formulated in terms that are unnecessarily vague from an action-guiding standpoint and that others are problematic from the viewpoint of evaluability. / QC 20100715
223

Chosen Children? : An empirical study and a philosophical analysis of moral aspects of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and germ-line gene therapy

Zeiler, Kristin January 2005 (has links)
With pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), genetic testing and selective transfer of embryos is possible. In the future, germ-line gene therapy (GLGT) applied to embryos before implantation, in order to introduce missing genes or replace mutant ones, may be possible. The objective of this dissertation is to analyse moral aspects of these technologies, as described by eighteen British, Italian and Swedish gynaecologists and geneticists. The objective is systematised into three parts: research interviews and qualitative analysis, philosophical analysis, and elaboration of a framework that supports the combination of analytic methods. PGD was described as positive since it enabled some couples at risk for a genetic disease to have a child without the disease. PGD was described as in different senses ‘better’ than methods for prenatal diagnosis and selective termination of pregnancy. It was also described as positive since it provided couples at risk with one more option, even if it did not result in the birth of a healthy child. However, interviewees were concerned about the difficulty of defining and evaluating genetic disease. They were also concerned about patients’ choices, and about exaggerated use or misuse. Whereas PGD gave rise to ambivalence in terms of how to understand, describe and evaluate it, GLGT was often described as unrealistic or undesirable. The results of the qualitative analysis are used in a philosophical analysis of the concepts of choice, autonomous choice, ambivalence, trust and ambivalence in trust relations. A set of distinct characteristics of each concept are elaborated. The results of the philosophical analysis are used in the discussion of the results of the qualitative analysis. The study shows that the technologies imply both ‘new’ ways to perform ‘old’ medical practices and ‘new’ practices. Old moral questions are reformulated. New moral questions are added. Against the background of this, the concept of genetic identity is discussed. Key words: empirical ethics, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, germ-line gene therapy, qualitative research, philosophical analysis, medical progress, genetic disease, choice, autonomous choice, ambivalence, trust, genetic identity.
224

The Mortality or Pre-Emtive War : In search of Justifications and Guidelines for Pre-Emptive Warfare

Srimuang, Sarunsiri January 2007 (has links)
<p>The thesis argues that, as a tradition, the concept of just war is socially and contextually sensitive and revisable. It explores the relevance of theory according to the dynamic changes in the nature of threats in the international arena and concludes that the just war tradition is still relevant to the contemporary modern threats that require an act of pre-emptive warfare. However, it needs some revision to be comprehensively applicable to the dynamic of modern threats and the nature of pre-emptive war. Due to the nature of pre-emptive war a nation launches the attack before the aggression from the other nation-in-conflict erupts. The author, therefore, proposed several theoretical and procedural revisions in both the principle of “Jus Ad Bellum” and “Jus In Bello” using the method of reflective equilibrium to create a comprehensive “just” pre-emptive war doctrine as part of the development and dynamic in just war tradition.</p>
225

Iterabilitet, upprepning och permanens : En kritisk analys av debatten mellan Derrida och Searle / Iterability, repetition and permanence : A critical analysis of the debate between Derrida and Searle

Gardfors, Johan January 2009 (has links)
<p>The essay seeks to clarify some of the decisive but often obscured issues in the famous debate between Jacques Derrida and Jonn F. Searle. The debate commenced in 1977 with the publication in <em>Glyph</em> of Derrida’s lecture <em>Signature Event Context</em> from -71, followed by Searle’s <em>Reiterating the Differences</em>. A Reply to Derrida and subsequently Derrida’s reply <em>Limited Inc a b c …</em> which encouraged Searle to renew his criticism. I situate the debate within a philosophical context where questions of the aim of philosophy and the nature of philosophical writing cannot be excluded from the specific topics that are being discussed. Starting from Derrida’s controversial reading of Austin, where a few key points of criticism are placed under scrutiny, I proceed to problems of writing and communication where special attention is paid to the concept of iterability and Searle’s remark that this has been confounded with permanence in Derrida’s exposition. The concept of ”writing” is examined as a crux in the understanding of the two philosophers. And iterability is then found to be derieved from the theorization of absence in relation to that very concept. Iterability designates an essential possibility of absence and implies the possibility of every mark to be grafted onto new contexts of significance. Thus it draws the consequences of a general repeatability, within which difference is underscored as the inevitable outcome. The last section of the essay relates to the phenomenological project of investigating the genesis of idealization and traces the emergence of iterability in Derrida’s further writings on Husserl, where repetition can be perceived of as constitutive for ideality and thus for identity. Bearing on this observation, the type/token-distinction, proposed by Searle to undo the problem of iterability, is subjected to further inquiry and linked to the process of idealization, within which iterability is revealed to have a temporal relevance that also affects the notion of permanence. The claim is then made that iterability should be understood as a fundamentally ambiguous phenomenon through its dual relation to identity and difference. Its utility is found to be hinged upon the status of the possible. Finally, the question of iterability as concept is posed, which entails its interdependence upon notions of dissemination and différance.</p>
226

The Mortality or Pre-Emtive War : In search of Justifications and Guidelines for Pre-Emptive Warfare

Srimuang, Sarunsiri January 2007 (has links)
The thesis argues that, as a tradition, the concept of just war is socially and contextually sensitive and revisable. It explores the relevance of theory according to the dynamic changes in the nature of threats in the international arena and concludes that the just war tradition is still relevant to the contemporary modern threats that require an act of pre-emptive warfare. However, it needs some revision to be comprehensively applicable to the dynamic of modern threats and the nature of pre-emptive war. Due to the nature of pre-emptive war a nation launches the attack before the aggression from the other nation-in-conflict erupts. The author, therefore, proposed several theoretical and procedural revisions in both the principle of “Jus Ad Bellum” and “Jus In Bello” using the method of reflective equilibrium to create a comprehensive “just” pre-emptive war doctrine as part of the development and dynamic in just war tradition.
227

Iterabilitet, upprepning och permanens : En kritisk analys av debatten mellan Derrida och Searle / Iterability, repetition and permanence : A critical analysis of the debate between Derrida and Searle

Gardfors, Johan January 2009 (has links)
The essay seeks to clarify some of the decisive but often obscured issues in the famous debate between Jacques Derrida and Jonn F. Searle. The debate commenced in 1977 with the publication in Glyph of Derrida’s lecture Signature Event Context from -71, followed by Searle’s Reiterating the Differences. A Reply to Derrida and subsequently Derrida’s reply Limited Inc a b c … which encouraged Searle to renew his criticism. I situate the debate within a philosophical context where questions of the aim of philosophy and the nature of philosophical writing cannot be excluded from the specific topics that are being discussed. Starting from Derrida’s controversial reading of Austin, where a few key points of criticism are placed under scrutiny, I proceed to problems of writing and communication where special attention is paid to the concept of iterability and Searle’s remark that this has been confounded with permanence in Derrida’s exposition. The concept of ”writing” is examined as a crux in the understanding of the two philosophers. And iterability is then found to be derieved from the theorization of absence in relation to that very concept. Iterability designates an essential possibility of absence and implies the possibility of every mark to be grafted onto new contexts of significance. Thus it draws the consequences of a general repeatability, within which difference is underscored as the inevitable outcome. The last section of the essay relates to the phenomenological project of investigating the genesis of idealization and traces the emergence of iterability in Derrida’s further writings on Husserl, where repetition can be perceived of as constitutive for ideality and thus for identity. Bearing on this observation, the type/token-distinction, proposed by Searle to undo the problem of iterability, is subjected to further inquiry and linked to the process of idealization, within which iterability is revealed to have a temporal relevance that also affects the notion of permanence. The claim is then made that iterability should be understood as a fundamentally ambiguous phenomenon through its dual relation to identity and difference. Its utility is found to be hinged upon the status of the possible. Finally, the question of iterability as concept is posed, which entails its interdependence upon notions of dissemination and différance.

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