受2008年金融海嘯影響，人壽保險業因資本及信用市場之系統性風險而導致帳列資產價值大幅減損，進一步影響壽險公司清償能力，而主管機關為兼顧審慎監理與市場穩定原則，而採行資本監理寬容措施，卻使得資本不足之保險公司缺口擴大。另外，保險安定基金以保費為基礎徵收單一費率，加劇保險公司間交叉補貼之情形。因此，如何透過以責任準備金為基礎，計算公平合理之風險差別費率，以避免產生影響其他保險公司正常經營之系統性風險，抑或引發保險公司道德風險，為本文研究之主要議題。 本文與過去文獻主要之差異為：(1) 資產模型依資產配置方式，使用蒙地卡羅模擬詳盡現金流路徑，著重於描述壽險業之情境；(2) 股票型風險性資產加入跳躍過程 (Jump) 與隨機波動兩種情境，以表達壽險業資產端承受資本市場變動加劇之風險；(3) 考慮政府監理寬容措施，以描述主管機關對於壽險業監理態度。 依蒙地卡羅模擬法試算保險安定基金公平費率，研究結果發現：(1)監理寬容期限增加時，安定基金公平費率增加；(2)監理標準提高，安定基金公平費率有先降後升之效果；(3)保險公司財務槓桿比例增加時，安定基金公平費率上升。 / Due to the global financial crisis in 2008 that resulted in systematic risks in the equity and credit market, it creates significant deprecation in the life insurers’ balance sheet which affect insurers’ solvency. In order to retain prudent supervision and market stability, the authority has announced capital temporal relief plan that may make insolvency insurer worse. Recent occurrences of financial distress to some insurers have raised questions about whether the current guaranty system that charge a flat levy rate in premium-based is adequate to protect policyholders. A risk-weighted levy rate in reserve-based has been proposed to establish reasonable contribution method which can avoid high risk insurers’ moral hazard and protect the other insurers from further systematic risks. A brief summary of the advantages of this paper is listed below：(1) By Monte Carol simulation method, detailed cash flow of insurer’s asset allocation can be used to describe the risk preference of life insurer. (2) Our stock model incorporates jump diffusion and stochastic volatility in order to reflect that life insurers face increasing volatility in capital market. (3) Consider regulatory forbearance to represent government’s attitude to life insurers. We calculate fair guaranty premium through Monte Carol simulation method. We find that： (1) Fair premium increases as extending the period of regulatory forbearance. (2) As regulatory criterion raises fair premium decreases at first, but increases if regulatory criterion reaches certain level. (3) Increasing leverage ratio of the insurer results in increasing fair premium.

本論文探討台北市連鎖式便利商店的市場進入決策。研究發現在便利商店的產業裡，相較於多重市場接觸(亦即是否已同時出現在其他市場)的考量，與競爭對手門市的距離對廠商的進入決策有較大的影響。此外，上期競爭對手存在與否，也是廠商是否進入該市場的重要衡量依據。大型連鎖店會進入前一期競爭較激烈的市場，這些市場競爭對手的門市已有一家以上；而小型連鎖店通常不會依據對手的門市數目來決定其進入的決策。最後，利用不同的落後期變數設定，本文發現廠商的進入決策具有一致性。這表示在台北市，便利商店已經是相當成熟的產業了。 / In this paper we study entry decisions of the convenience store chains in Taipei. We find that the distance between store pairs is more relevant to firms' entry decisions than the multimarket contact (i.e., firms encounter each other in multiple markets) in this industry. In addition, the presence of a firm's rivals in the previous period plays an important role in the entry decision. The large convenience store chains are more likely to enter more competitive markets, such as markets consisting of more than one rivals' store. On the other hand, the small chains are indifferent to their rivals' presence when making their entry decisions. Lastly, firms' entry decisions are consistent when different measurements of lagged variables are used. We interpret that the convenience store industry may have reached a stable state in Taipei.

本文以美國境內航空市場為例，探討多重市場接觸與價格離散的關聯，並研究大型航空公司併購案前後多重市場接觸對航空公司競爭策略的影響。本研究發現：(一) 相互容忍說於併購案發生前後皆成立。(二) 相較於考量擴大市場的市佔率，航空公司更應該關注與競爭者間的競爭關係。(三) 併購案發生前後，航空公司的訂價行為都深受競爭對手的競爭策略影響。(四) 併購案發生前，因競爭者多，市場上航空公司平均市佔率的大小是航空公司可採取競爭手段重要因素之一。在最大的1000 個市場中，雖然每家航空公司的市場力量不大，航空公司仍可採取價格競爭，然若是對手間聯合懲罰，則航空公司不敢採取激進手段，且多重市場接觸越多，價格離散程度越大。而在次要競爭的市場中，則因航空公司的平均市占率是最大的1000 個市場的兩倍，因此航空公司並未有明顯競爭行為。但若考量競爭對手間的碰面次數，則多重市場接觸與不同分位價格關係為正，且多重市場接觸越多，價格離散程度越低。併購案發生後，因航空公司間彼此箝制力量大，與競爭對手間的碰面次數越多，越傾向隱性勾結，且高價位的價格上升較低價位價格多，使價格離散程度越大。 / In this paper, we discuss whether multimarket contact matters for price dispersion in the U.S. airline industry, and compare the influence of multimarket contact on airlines’ competition strategies before and after airline mergers and acquisitions. We find that: (a) Before and after the mergers, mutual forbearance exists. (b) In contrast to an airline‘s market share, the relationship between airlines and itself plays a more important role in its pricing strategy.(c) Before and after the mergers, airline companies’pricing strategies are significantly affected by their competitors’strategies. (d) Before the mergers, because of the intense competition, it is the size of the competitors‘ market share that the company decide whether to take aggressive strategies. In the top 1000 competitive markets,airline companies will take aggressive actions to get more passengers for the punishment from its competitor is an incredible threat, however, if competitors collude together, airline companies will hardly dare to cut price. And the effect of an increase in multimarket contact on price dispersion is positive and significant. In the second competitive markets, since the average market share is twice bigger than in the top 1000 markets, airlines prefer not to participate in cut-throat competition. However, if competitors collude, then airline companies will cooperate together, and the effect of an increase in multimarket contact on price dispersion is negative and significant. After the mergers, increase in contacts with competitors would facilitate mutual forbearance and increase price dispersion and higher-percentile prices will increase more than lower-percentile prices.