Title: It’s easy to quit - I’ve done it hundreds of times: A literary study of the correlation between free will and substance abuse The purpose of this bachelor's thesis was to examine, through an integrative literary study, how selected previous research on the two theories, The Brain Disease Model of Addiction and The Choice Model of Addiction, describe the significance of free will in the development of and recovery from substance use disorder. The findings indicate that free will is significant in all stages of substance abuse. The study suggests that the discourse surrounding voluntariness and addiction ought to become more nuanced. The study notes that clients are easily influenced by treatment providers and thus conversations concerning disease versus free will should be approached cautiously by the treatment provider. The study suggests that social workers could benefit from critically examining their own stance regarding free will and addiction, including moral responsibility. Future research should continue developing screening methods to measure motivation levels in clients and to find the best treatment for each individual. / Syftet med denna kandidatuppsats var att genom en integrativ litteraturstudie undersöka hur utvald tidigare forskning om de två teorierna The Brain Disease Model of Addiction och The Choice Model of Addiction beskriver betydelsen av fri vilja när det gäller utvecklingen av och tillfrisknandet från ett substansberoende. Huvudresultatet visar att fri vilja är av betydelse i alla stadier av ett substansberoende. Studien tyder på att diskursen kring frivillighet och beroende torde blir mer nyanserad och att beroendeforskningen torde se beroende på ett spektrum. Studien konstaterar också att klienter är lättinfluerade av behandlare och därför bör samtal om sjukdom kontra fri vilja hanteras försiktigt av behandlaren i klientmöten. Socialarbetare som arbetar med beroende bör kritiskt granska sin egen ståndpunkt gällande beroendets frivillighet, inklusive moraliskt ansvar. Förslagsvis bör framtida forskning fortsätta att utveckla screeningmetoder för att bättre kartlägga motivationsnivån hos klienter och för att hitta den bästa behandlingsplanen för varje individ.

The aim of this essay is to identify common problems associated with free will and determinism in two authors, originating from different social contexts. As well as different time perspectives. The authors and books chosen for this purpose is Brainstorms written by Daniel C. Dennett, and  The Free Choice of the Will by Augustine of Hippo. The essay identifies two problems: evil and beliefs, and examines how the authors approach these issues from a hermeneutic framework. With support in the method the essay has furthermore defined the concepts behind the words determinism and libertarianism, and used these to navigate the questions it means to present answers to. In addition to the theories above, an idea analysis has been applied to structure and examine whether the logic behind the arguments are reasonable. The essay presents the both authors' views on the problems whilst trying to maintain an objective viewpoint in the process.  The study has reached the following conclusions; The problem with evil is an issue discussed during a long period of time. Whether you consider yourself an atheist or a religious person the concern about evil is relevant. The difference of view depends on your philosophy of life. Daniel C. Dennett approaches the problem with scientific explanations, while Augustine tends to seek for answers in God. Augustine believes that the problem has its roots in free will, namely that we are free to choose either sin or virtue. Dennett identifies the same root to the problem but with a scientific point of view.  The problem with beliefs is approached by the authors with a different stance concerning both writers. Dennett examines the structure behind our opinions and beliefs, which leads him to the conclusion that often enough our opinions are not our own, but a product of our environment. The essay connects this with his view on the deterministic and free universe. Augustine draws on another aspect of the issue, his main focus is not belief in its broad meaning, but in the will and need to search for truth and virtue.

The author has attempted a dubbleedged purpose, as indicated by the title. The author firstly deals with Pereboom; begining with his so-called ‘wild coincidence’-argument, by which Pereboom claims agent-causation to be unlikely. The author argues that this argument lacks both scope and strenght. The author then deals with the question of compatiblity between physics and agent-causation as related to Pereboom’s basic problematization; whether agent-causation would or would not diverge from what is expected (from any other event) given our best physical theories. This results in a strong criticism against Pereboom’s whole position, and a positive argument for agent-causation. After the first purpose is achieved, the author turns to the purpose indicated by the subtitle. The author presents a general criticism against the field of metaethics concerning the question of free will. The author also makes suggestions for a possible solution. / Författaren har, som titeln indikerar, tagit på sig ett tveeggat problem. Först hanterar författaren Pereboom; och börjar med hans så kallade ‘wild coincidence’-argument, med vilket Pereboom hävdar att agentkausalitet är osannlik. Författaren menar att detta argument saknar både omfång och styrka. Författaren hanterar sedan frågan om kompatibilitet mellan fysik och agentkausalitet, så som den är relaterad till Perebooms grundläggande problematisering; huruvida agentkausalitet skulle eller inte skulle avvika från vad som vi förväntar oss (givet någon annan händelse) från våra bästa fysiska teorier. Detta resulterar i en stark kritik mot Perebooms hela position, och ett positivt argument för agentkausalitet. Efter att det första syftet är avklarat, så vänder sig författaren till undertitelns syfte. Författaren presenterar en generell kritik mot fältet metaetik avseende frågan om fri vilja. Författaren föreslår även en möjlig lösning på problemet.

Hur tillskriver vi moraliskt ansvar, och varför? Inom filosofin debatteras häftigt huruvida vi har fri vilja eller ej, och således ifrågasätts om vi kan tillskrivas moraliskt ansvar över huvud taget. Ett av argumenten som sägs hota den fria viljan är den omfattande situationistiska litteraturen, som verkar visa på att människors beteende påverkas mer av situationella faktorer än av personlighetsdrag. EH (Explanation Hypothesis) är en psykologisk hypotes som, förutom att redogöra för vardagliga moraliska bedömningar, kan reda ut filosofiska frågor såsom varför våra intuitioner kring moraliskt ansvar ter sig inkonsekventa. Denna studie testade EH experimentellt med en enkätstudie som dessutom undersökte folks intuitioner i moraliskt signifikanta situationer med kopplingar till den situationistiska litteraturen. Resultaten stärkte EH i enlighet med tidigare resultat, samt visade på att folks moraliska bedömningar inte påverkades av vetskapen om starka psykosociala fenomen som kan ha haft inverkan på agenternas beteenden. Implikationerna för den filosofiska debatten kring fri vilja och moraliskt ansvar, liksom begreppet determinism, diskuteras och förslag på fortsatt forskning läggs fram. / How do we attribute moral responsibility, and why? The notion of free will is heavily debated within philosophy, thus questioning whether we can truly be morally responsible for our actions. One of the arguments said to threaten the notion of free will is the vast collection of situationist literature that seem to show that human behavior is often more influenced by situational factors rather than personality traits. The Explanation Hypothesis (EH) is a psychological hypothesis that make general claims about everyday moral judgements, as well as accounting for philosophical issues such as the inconsistency of folk-intuitions on these issues. This study used surveys to test EH experimentally, also investigating folk-intuitions on moral responsibility in scenarios related to the situationist literature. The results support the hypothesis according to an earlier, similar study, as well as showing that the participants moral judgements were not influenced by being made aware of strong, psychosocial phenomena that seem to have had an impact on agents behaviors. The implications for the philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility as well as the notion of determinism is discussed and further research is proposed.