Der Beitrag geht dem Verhältnis von Zielen und Collective Agency im politischen Handeln nach. Dabei wird die These entwickelt, dass das unmittelbare Erfahren und Gestalten von gemeinsamen Handlungsverhältnissen die Zielorientierung in der Politik nicht ersetzen kann, sondern als eine wichtige Bestandsbedingung des politischen Handelns zu verstehen ist. Ausgangspunkt sind dabei Positionen, wie sie in der politischen Theorie bisher am deutlichsten von Hannah Arendt vertreten wurden und in unserer Gegenwart insbesondere in neuen sozialen Bewegungen verbreitet sind: Diesen zufolge besteht der Kern politischen Handelns in der Erfahrung einer Collective Agency. Der Beitrag rekonstruiert diesen Zugriff anhand der Schriften Hannah Arendts und verortet ihn im Umfeld bestehender Theorieansätze sowie von Erkenntnissen der Aufstands- und Rebellionsforschung. Schließlich werden handlungstheoretische Überlegungen angestellt (u. a. im Hinblick auf die Unterscheidung zwischen Haupt- und Nebenprodukten und die Zweistufigkeit in Handlungsprozessen). Sie laufen darauf hinaus, die Collective Agency in eine komplexere Zielorientierung aufzunehmen. Dadurch ergibt sich eine Korrektur sowohl instrumenteller Politikverständnisse als auch von Theorien, die den Sinn von Politik im Vollzug der Handlungsprozesse selbst ansiedeln. / The article explores the relationship between goals and collective agency in political action. It is argued that the experience and shaping of collective agency cannot replace goal orientation in politics, but must be understood as a resilience condition for the existence of political action. First, the article critically discusses theories of political action that are centered on collective agency. The article then reconstructs this approach from Hannah Arendt’s writings and places it in the context of existing theoretical approaches as well as insights from research on insurgency and rebellion. Finally, reflections are made on how to improve the modeling of political action. Here, among other things, the distinction between main and by-products and the two-stage nature of political action are important. These reflections then allow for incorporating collective agency into a more complex goal orientation. This, in turn, leads to a correction of approaches centered on both instrumental and collective agency.

The aim of this essay is to examine how the Norwegian textile artist Hannah Ryggen depicts the mother and the motherhood in her tapestries. The study also investigates how the view of the depicted mother can be interpreted. The analyses are performed using Erwin Panofskys three-step analysis from a gender theoretical perspective. The material analyzed are three Flemish woven tapestries: Unwed Mother (1937), Liselotte Hermann Decapitated (1938) and Mothers Heart (1947). The results show that Ryggen depicts the mother and the motherhood in a wide range of aspects in the examined tapestries. Some of the most prominent aspects found are how the mother often is criticized, in her motherhood, and also as a woman in a patriarchal society. The examination shows how Ryggen uses her unique combination of traditional techniques of weaving to raise awareness of political as well as social issues during her contemporary time. Thus, she emphasizes the mother’s important role in society.

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This thesis examines the propriety of suffering as a category in political thought. This complex subject matter is approached by examining two responses, and the disagreement arising between these responses, to the perceived failure of politics, modernity and religion in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. The first response to these failures considered is a theological response, representing a politics based on belief, in which we turn to the writings of J.B. Metz as a representative of this position. The second response considered is the philosophical civic humanism of Hannah Arendt as a seminal representative of what we term a politics based on unbelief. Our question regarding suffering as a category in political thought brings our two representative thinkers into disagreement. Metz presents a vision of political life in which belief – and specifically Christian belief – must liberate itself from privatising forces which confine belief and a response to suffering to the private sphere as a matter of individual concern and inward piety. For Metz the issue of suffering is not merely a matter of individual private concern but of political action. Central to his argument are his understanding of theodicy that forms part of his critique of modernity, the central place he gives Christ’s cry of dereliction in theology and his concept of Leiden an Gott. Arendt, representative of politics strictly separated from religion on Modernity’s grounds, robustly argues that concerns which are matters of the private sphere, that is the household, have invaded the public realm and in doing so have destroyed politics. Suffering is such a concern and it introduces to politics the ‘problem of necessity’ and impinges upon her concept of human freedom. She therefore represents the antithesis of Metz’s position. In order to answer our question regarding suffering our argument focuses by engaging with the issues of freedom and forgiveness. This move is important in establishing the basis on which suffering can appear in the political realm. This thesis argues for and concludes that theology provides the means for a reconciliation of the antinomies between the private and public spheres, between suffering and political thought. We therefore conclude that suffering is an appropriate concern of political life and compassion in the form of Christian charity can take an appropriate form in the political sphere.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this mini-thesis I explore Hannah Arendt’s engagement with the problem of foundation in relation to the work of Derrida and complexity theory. In Arendt the problem of foundation takes shape as the attempt to develop a thinking of foundation that does not repress political freedom. The American Revolution is an important point of reference in Arendt’s attempt to develop such a notion of authority. According to Arendt the American republic could, however, not entirely succeed in realizing this conception of authority. I draw on Derrida and complexity theory in order to show that the shortcomings Arendt points to are structural to institutions as such. Following Derrida and complexity theory, I further that the recognition of this structural limitation is an indispensable step in the attempt to think political authority as something stable, but which nevertheless keeps open the possibility of political change. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie skripsie ondersoek ek Hannah Arendt se ommegang met die probleem van begronding deur dit in verband te bring met die werk van Jacques Derrida en kompleksiteitsteorie. Die probleem van begronding neem vir Arendt vorm aan in die poging om politieke gesag op so wyse te bedink dat dit nie politieke vryheid onderdruk nie. Die Amerikaanse rewolusie vorm ’n sentrale verwysingspunt in Arendt so poging om gesag op hierdie manier te bedink. Dit slaag volgens haar egter nie heeltemal daarin om hierdie alternatiewe vorm van gesag te verwesenlik nie. Ek steun op Derrida en kompleksiteitsteorie om te wys dat die tekortkominge waarop Arendt wys in ’n sekere sin struktureel is tot enige instelling. Ek argumenteer voorts in navolging van Derrida en kompleksiteitsteorie dat ’n erkenning van hierdie strukturele beperking ’n belangrike moment is in die poging om politieke gesag te bedink as iets wat stabiel kan wees, maar terselftertyd ruimte laat vir politieke verandering.

This report explores and questions the history of human rights rhetoric through the 18th century anti-slave trade poem of Hannah More, Slavery, a poem. Hannah More used the term ‘human rights’ more than 150 years before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nevertheless, when historians and political scientists track the history of human rights, it is frequently presented as “from Locke through Paine” as part of a narrative of the “coming of age” of democracy in a longer quest for rights stemming from 18th century revolutions and radicalism. This report looks instead at the episodic nature of human rights rhetoric through 18th century ideas of the human. As argued here, More’s use of the term ‘human rights’ indicates an attempt to reconcile the tension between Enlightenment and Christian discourses to promote the anti-slave trade cause. / text

Hannah Hurtzig (MOBILE AKADEMIE) hat eine Vielzahl von Projekten, Installationen und Archiv-Einheiten entworfen, die sich auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen mit der Konstruktion von Wissen, Wissenstransfer und dessen Aufbewahrung, Anhäufung und Sammlung auseinandersetzen. Dazu gehört das Format „Schwarzmarkt für Nützliches Wissen und Nicht-Wissen“. Über die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Begriff des Nicht-Wissens und der räumlichen Inszenierung der Archiv-Installationen der Mobilen Akademie stellt sich auch die Frage nach der sowohl räumlichen als auch gedanklichen Verortung des Archiv-Begriffs.

This thesis analyses the fabled public exchange of letters that occurred between political theorist Hannah Arendt and historian of Jewish religion Gershom Scholem in 1964 following the historic trial of Adolf Eichmann and Arendt's subsequent publication of her report of the event, Eichmann in Jerusalem. The thesis covers the historical issues that form the contextual background to the exchange. It involves the introduction of the two participants as defining Jewish intellectuals of the past century, the course of the trial itself and the political and ideological problems it entailed as well as the turbulent history of the reception of Arendt's book. It is down to these four factors that guaranteed the eminence of the exchange of letters analysed in the thesis. Oft-quoted as the exchange is, there has been no proper analysis of it to this date. To accomplish this task, the thesis adopts the theoretical-methodological framework of discourse analysis in general, and the version of rhetorically oriented discursive psychology, proposed mainly in the publications of Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Billig (1996), in particular. This approach allows the thesis to provide a fine-grained analysis of the various ways of textual construction. Firstly, the ways examined concern the significance, worth and value of the debate itself, as formulated by both of the participants. Secondly, they involve the construction of the attempt to establish definite versions of the content of the book. Thirdly, they cover the textual acts of accounting for that content, or the practice of misinterpretation of that content, respectively. What all these three aspects have in common is the positioning of the problems touched upon in a moral and political context, and ultimately approaching them in terms of the identities of the participants. In this sense, versions of the events and ways of accounting for it will not only aim at producing accurate descriptions of events but in the forms of an implied morality or politics an implied "action-plan" for the future as well. The construction of Arendt and Scholem is, hence, analysed in terms of its argumentative organisation in order to undermine the other's counterversion and to establish its own as the definite one. While, structurally, there are many similarities in the two letters, what distinguishes them is that they conceive of their objects (i.e. the text), subject positions, and political or moral values according to which they should be assessed in quite diametrically opposite ways. This thesis not only registers the various rhetorical ways the participants fashion their versions as definite ones, but also accounts for the differences in their contents.