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The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is
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Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
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Showing 1 to 9 of 9 (0.032 seconds)Spelling suggestions: "subject:"hippies"" "subject:"hippie""
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Delusions Of Grandeur: The Interpretation Of Plato's Hippias MajorJanuary 2016 (has links)
My dissertation is an interpretation of Plato’s Hippias Major, in which Socrates investigates τό καλόν (usually translated as “the beautiful” or “the noble”). My reading of the Hippias Major focuses on the importance of appearing beautiful, to others and thereby to oneself, and reveals the way in which the impulse to appear beautiful is connected to the desire for the immortal preservation of oneself and one’s own. The impulse to appear beautiful is essential to political life, insofar as the pleasure of praise effects a kind of harmony between the private good and the common. This impulse, however, is also a fundamental impediment to Socratic philosophy, as it prevents the critical examination of oneself and one’s opinions, while hindering a truly erotic experience of the beautiful. In examining these issues, my dissertation seeks to establish the Hippias Major’s connection to and consonance with other more popular Platonic dialogues, such as the Republic, Symposium, and Phaedo. / Travis John Mulroy
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'Criminal' utterances: an interpretation of Lesser HippiasHussain, Rubina Kareem Unknown Date
No description available.
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'Criminal' utterances: an interpretation of Lesser HippiasHussain, Rubina Kareem 06 1900 (has links)
If wonder is the beginning of philosophy, then Platos Lesser Hippias is not wanting in this regard. In it, we encounter a Socrates that appears to be very different than the one we meet in other Platonic dialogues for this Socrates puts forth strange and terrible views. Indeed, he seems to argue that the liar and truthful man are one and the same and that to do injustice voluntarily is better than to do it involuntarily. Needless to say, the unfolding of these arguments leave many perplexed. Yet since Socrates ends by doubting his own conclusion, explaining that it was the necessary result of the argument, we are invited to re-read the dialogue with an eye to examining the steps of the argument in hopes of making sense of this perplexing piece of work.
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"What's Beautiful is Difficult": Beauty and Eros in Plato's Hippias MajorRamos, Santiago January 2015 (has links)
Thesis advisor: Marina B. McCoy / This dissertation investigates the role that eros in general, and philosophical eros in particular, plays in the search for the eidos of the beautiful in Plato’s Hippias Major. It defends the claim that noesis of the eidos of the beautiful can only be accomplished within the life of philosophical eros, that is, within the life of eros which is directed toward the good. As such this dissertation aims both to provide an interpretive key to the Hippias Major, allowing us to read the dialogue in a rich and novel way, and also to make the claim that the Hippias Major presents us with a picture of the interrelation between eros, philosophy, and beauty, and about how these three elements manifest themselves in human life. As such, some continuities and parallels can be found between it and the other two dialogues which deal most explicitly with beauty and eros, the Phaedrus and Symposium. The first five chapters interpret a particular section of the Hippias Major according to role the eros plays within it, attempting to show that eros, both in general and in its unique manifestation as philosophical eros, is a crucial mediating term for any comprehensive understanding of any section of the dialogue, and therefore of the dialogue as a whole. In each of these five chapters, I will articulate the role that eros plays within the search for obtaining a noetic glance at the eidos of the beautiful. The first chapter demonstrates how Socrates’s philosophical eros gives birth to the question about the beautiful itself within the context of a discussion about sophistry and money. The second chapter shows how Socrates’s philosophical engagement with Hippias’s definitions of the eidos of the beautiful generates a dialectic of ascent, allowing Hippias to expand his understanding of what counts as beautiful in a trajectory that mirrors Diotima’s ascent in the Symposium. The third chapter articulates the erotic significance of Socrates’s claim that the eidos of the beautiful inheres in being and not appearances. The fourth chapter gauges the erotic significance of Socrates’s and Hippias’s claim that the beautiful is good, and the good beautiful. The fifth chapter interprets the comic and tragic aspects of the dialogue in terms of philosophical eros, its rejection and fulfillment. The sixth chapter will take stock of the overall interpretation of the Hippias Major developed in the first five chapters, and will present the overarching view about the relationship between the contemplation of beauty, on the one hand, and desire for possession of beauty and moral concern, on the other, which one can glean from the character and action of Socrates in Hippias Major. It will bring this view into a conversation with the notion of “liking devoid of interest” which is found in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. The conclusion of this dissertation will underscore the principle claim, that the philosophical search for the eidos of the beautiful can neither be separated from the eros which beauty inspires in a human being, nor can it be accomplished without one’s eros benig directed toward the good, and that this philosophical search is marked by suffering and possible tragedy. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.
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Proeve van onderzoek naar Platoon's opvatting van de sophistiekHoendervanger, Willem. January 1938 (has links)
Proefschrift--Utrecht. / Includes bibliography.
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Konstens arete : Techne som dygd hos Platon i Den Mindre Hippias och GorgiasHildeman Togner, Theodor January 2018 (has links)
The most common question that scholars ask regarding the concept of techne in the Plato dialogues is if it is possible to understand arete, morale or the good, as a techne, that is, if arete kan be viewed as a knowledge, an ability or a skill. Is arete something that can be taught? In this essay I will explore this question from a reversed viewpoint, and try the claim that techne always in itself is an excercise of arete, inasmuch as the goal of a techne has to be the good, or ”what is best”, in order for it to be a techne for Plato at all.
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[en] LIE IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF PLATO S LESSER HÍPPIAS, HOMER S ILIAD AND SOPHOCLES PHILOCTETES: AS TRUE AND SIMPLE, AND ODYSSEUS, MULTIFACETED AND FALSE / [pt] A MENTIRA NO HÍPIAS MENOR DE PLATÃO, NA ILÍADA DE HOMERO E NO FILOCTETES DE SÓFOCLESRODRIGO SANTOS PINTO DE OLIVEIRA 19 December 2018 (has links)
[pt] Tendo como princípio a inquietação causada pelo questionamento de Sócrates no Hípias Menor de Platão (363a-364c): Qual personagem, entre Aquiles e Odisseu, seria superior? A presente dissertação leva em consideração o direcionamento do diálogo acerca do que seja a mentira segundo a ótica platônica, e dedica-se especificamente a descobrir quem destes poderia ser compreendido como um mentiroso: entre Aquiles e Odisseu, quem estaria mentindo? Primeiramente a pesquisa deseja averiguar as definições que sejam provenientes do diálogo platônico, para em seguida retornar para a cena da epopeia homérica em que seja possível definir para qual herói caberia a alcunha de mentiroso. Abalizado pelos critérios extraídos do diálogo entre Sócrates e Hípias, a busca pela cena que atenda às definições necessárias para a mentira se direciona às tragédias, onde o Filoctetes de Sófocles se sobressai entre as demais remanescentes, por atender aos critérios e nos permitir examinar a mentira de modo a justapor definições e critérios à cena que melhor exemplifica o caso. Em suma, metodologicamente tenta-se conjecturar para além do que se vê no diálogo Hípias Menor, buscando exemplo mais oportuno do que aquele dado pelo sofista a Sócrates, contudo, sem deixar de atentar para os argumentos e definições expostas, deseja-se chegar mais próximo de uma compreensão menos aporética deste diálogo, lançando mão do exemplo como um recurso didático que pode ajudar concomitantemente na compreensão do que seja a mentira, ao mesmo passo que se observe quem seja um mentiroso. / [en] Taking as a principle the uneasiness caused by Socrates questioning in Plato s Hippias Minor (363a-364c): which character, between Achilles and Odysseus, would be superior? This dissertation takes into account the direction of the dialogue about the lie according to the Platonic perspective, and is dedicated specifically to discover who could be understood as a liar: between Achilles and Odysseus, who would be lying? First, the research wants to ascertain the definitions that come from the Platonic dialogue, and then return to the scene of the Homeric epic where is possible to define which hero would be named as the liar. By the assignments taken as criteria drawn from the dialogue between Socrates and Hippias, the search for the scene that meets the necessary definitions for the lie is targeted to the tragedies, where the Sophocle s Philoctetes excels among the plays remaining fully, to revel the criteria and allowing us to examine the lie in order to juxtapose definitions and criteria to the scene that best exemplifies the case. In sum, this dissertation tries methodologically to conjecture for beyond what is seen in Hippias Minor, seeking a more opportune example than that given by the Sophist to Socrates, yet without neglecting the arguments and definitions set forth, it is desired to get closer to a complete understanding of this dialogue, using example as a didactic resource that can help concomitantly in the understanding of what is the lie, at the same time as observing who could be a liar.
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Platonic Craft and Medical EthicsBader, Daniel 14 February 2011 (has links)
Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se.
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Platonic Craft and Medical EthicsBader, Daniel 14 February 2011 (has links)
Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se.
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