Psychological disorders such as autism, obsessive-compulsive disorder, drug addiction, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder involve atypically persistent behavior and atypical activity of the neurotransmitter dopamine. Behavioral momentum theory states that the persistence of behavior in a context is determined by the reinforcement received previously in that context. Contexts previously associated with higher rates of reinforcement yield greater persistence of behavior than contexts previously associated with lower rates of reinforcement. According to a prominent hypothesis in behavioral neuroscience, dopamine mediates the incentive salience of a stimulus. A synthesis of behavioral momentum theory and the incentive salience hypothesis proposes similar roles for dopamine activity and reinforcement in determining the persistence of behavior in a context. The aim of this dissertation was to determine the extent to which a history of dopamine modulation in a context affects the subsequent persistence of behavior in extinction and relapse. Three groups of rats were trained to press a lever for food in two alternating contexts of a multiple schedule. Following a stable baseline, rats entered a treatment phase in which they received a drug or saline injection before and after sessions in each context. In the drug context, rats received the indirect dopamine agonist amphetamine, dopamine D1 antagonist SCH 23390, or a combination of amphetamine and SCH 23390 prior to the session and a saline injection following the session. The injection schedule was reversed for the saline context such that rats received a saline injection prior to each session in the saline context and a drug injection following the session. During an extinction phase, access to food was withheld. Response-independent food was then provided in each context to trigger reinstatement of responding. A history of dopamine agonism in a context increased the relative persistence of behavior, while a history of dopamine antagonism at D1 receptors and a combination of dopamine agonism and dopamine antagonism had little impact on the relative persistence of behavior. Likewise, reinstatement was relatively greater in a context previously associated with dopamine agonism. This effect was blocked when dopamine agonism was preceded by D1 antagonism. A history of D1 antagonism alone did not affect reinstatement. These results suggest that dopamine plays a role in the persistence of behavior in extinction and relapse, but that different dopamine receptors mediate these effects.

經濟部技術處長久以來為推動產業研究發展工作、強化產業之技術開發能力，每年均委託法人機構執行「科技研究發展專案計畫」（科專計畫），對國家科技水準及人才培育，貢獻斐然，以為我國科技研發能力奠定良好基礎。為能對民間所具有研發能力之廠商加以整合應用，以利政府達成協助國內產業升級轉型，以提升國家整體競爭力的目的。自86年度起，經濟部科專計畫以開放給民營事業申請，一方面希望能夠借重民間企業的研發能力與資源優勢，提升原財團法人較不具執行優勢之科專計畫研究成果品質。另一方面藉由政府與民間企業研發單位之間的合作，亦可藉由產業界本身對科技研究之投入與努力，達到政府藏技於民的美意。其計畫目的以導引企業投入研究發展工作，並期以發揮相乘效果，促進企業進一步參與及進行投資，達到強化研發能量之目的。由於86、87試辦年度廠商反應熱烈，為擴大業界參與科技專案計畫，自88年度起，新作法改為以補助款方式來鼓勵業界投入研發活動（原為委辦方式），推動「業界開發產業技術計畫」（原業界科專）。且放寬申請資格、及智慧財產權下授給廠商…等變革。 由於88以後年度業界科專制度設計的改變，為瞭解兩套制度設計如何影響廠商參加業界科專的動機，本文應用理論模型、實證、深入訪談的方式來探討，得到若干結論如下： 1.由本文理論模型分析可知，86、87委辦年度時，從模型中推論可知，廠商申請業界科專為研發投入規模較大時，個別或會員廠商參加業界科專的意願較高。而88以後年度時，廠商參加業界科專後，由模型推論為不論此專案的研發規模為何，個別或會員廠商皆願意參加業界科專，這也符合經濟部擴大申請範圍的立意，而實證分析結果也大致上符合模型的推論。 2.委辦年度所設計的機制，較能鼓勵研發投入龐大及規模制度良好的廠商參加業界科專。若廠商參加業界科專研發的主要目的是希望政府共同分攤高風險、金額龐大的研發成本，或其研發成果較偏向基礎研發，或原先就具相當好的研發體制，在市場已佔一席之地而希望取得技術領先的地位者，在88以後年度的設計下，反而會降低其來申請業界科專之動機。 由於88以後年度的設計，下放智產權給廠商、提高廠商配合款比例及簡化申請手續。若參加業界科專主要目的在於以研發成果（應用研發）來獲取商業利益，及完全擁有智產權，且參加科專不但能與政府一起分攤研發成本、更能改善廠商體制，故較能吸引較新成立或規模較小的廠商來參與。 3.為瞭解廠商為何很少以共同研發的方式來參加業界科專，本文輔以深入訪談廠商的方式來瞭解。在委辦及補助年度各選取一家廠商來訪問。台中精機因研發成果技術上的需要，需與跨領域的錸德公司合作。由於此共同研發為獨立作業，除了在評鑑時台中精機有等待錸德外，共同研發並無太大問題。其參加主要的目的為研發經費的補助，並認為由於為私人企業，老闆較重視短期的利益，且研發又具高度風險，經濟部能給予廠商一筆經費來從事研發，老闆較不會限制其經費的運用，對業界研發助益很有幫助。但由於廠商自籌款的要求增加，並無再參加業界科專的動機。 另漢翔航空工業則表示，其研發聯盟伙伴皆為其下游廠商，由於此專案為建立一標準化作業系統，也因為如此，對其研發伙伴的包容性較一般研發聯盟還大。因其為領導廠商，相對的付出成本也更多。漢翔也是希望政府的補助款能再增加，否則對於領導廠商而言，參加業界科專成本反而更增加了！

金融事件的頻傳，主管金融機構的政府財政主管難辭其咎，而財政主管的 職責則囊括了兩個方面，一方面是對於金融機構平日的監督管理，包括能 允分掌握其營運資訊，若有小問題時，則要求適當的改正，另一方面則是 指當銀行經營狀況不是好時，對於這些機金融機構的處理方式，例如適時 地限制其貸放額度、範圍，甚至勒令其停止營業、清查資產，都可避免其 繼續惡化下去。為了避免財政主管在監管金融機構上，會有延誤處理金融 問題的不良動機與原因，本篇文章即試著利用適當報酬結構的設計，看看 是否能糾正此弊端；透過模型的設立，可以看出(1)金融機構的資產選與 其自有資本比例的大小有關(2)財政主管的報酬設計與其在監管金融機構 上的巧妙連繫(3)在設計報酬來誘使其出力監督銀行與最適的關門時機之 間的確有一抵換(trade-off)的關係。

Bakgrund och problem: Efter införandet av IFRS 2 ska svenska börsbolag behandla aktierelaterade ersättningar som en kostnad i redovisningen. Då detta inte krävdes tidigare, medförde de nya reglerna diskussioner om vilka konsekvenserna skulle bli. Frågan är om kostnadsföringen av dessa ersättningar lett till att bolag utformat sina aktierelaterade incitamentsprogram annorlunda efter införandet av IFRS 2. Syfte: Att undersöka om införandet av IFRS 2 har påverkat svenska börsbolags utformning av aktierelaterade incitamentsprogram samt förklara orsaken till en eventuell förändring. Metod/Empiri: Information har samlats in via årsredovisningar från 42 svenska noterade bolag under en tidsperiod av tio år. Datamaterialet analyseras genom observationer och regressionsanalyser där isolering sker av påverkan från företagsspecifika faktorer. Slutsatser: Studien visar på att förekomsten av optionsprogram minskar under åren 2003 och 2005 samtidigt som antalet aktieprogram ökar. Förändringen sker samtidigt som införandeprocessen av IFRS 2 och stämmer överens med antagandet om att kostnadsföringen av aktierelaterade ersättningar ligger bakom förändringen. Att kostnadsföring påverkar bolagsbeslut i utformning av incitamentsprogram överensstämmer med studier, som visar att beslutsfattare i bolag anser att bolagets intressenter koncentrerar sig på den redovisade vinsten. / Background and problem: Swedish listed companies treat share-based payments as an expense since the adoption of IFRS 2. The adoption meant a change compared to previous accounting treatment, which triggered discussions regarding the consequences of such expensing. The question is if the expensing of share-based payments resulted in changes in the design of share-based incentive programs. Aim: Investigate whether the adoption of IFRS 2 has affected the design of share-based incentive programs in Swedish listed companies and explain the reason for such change. Method/Empirics: Information has been collected through annual reports from 42 Swedish listed companies over a period of ten years. In order to analyze the impact of IFRS 2, observations are made together with regression analysis where the impact of firm-specific determinants is accounted for. Conclusions: The existence of option plans are reduced between 2003 and 2005, while the number of share plans is increasing. The change takes place at the same time as the implementation process of IFRS 2 and is consistent with the assumption that the mandatory expensing of share-based payments is causing the change. The reason for expensing affecting corporate decisions regarding share-based incentive programs is that decision makers believes that company stakeholders focuses on reported earnings.

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The promotion of science & technology and the creation of an enabling environment for countries innovation systems has been a growing worldwide trend in developed countries, with 21 out of 30 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) currently utilising some form of tax incentive program aimed at encouraging investment in research and development (R&D) by private industry. 1 Encouraging R&D and associated innovation is generally seen as an effective tool in advancing science and technology, which in turn leads to the creation of new products and services, an increase in international competitiveness of local business, direct foreign investment and social spin-offs in the form of increased employment and economic growth? R&D is, however, expensive and involves high levels of technical risk, with the costs and risk involved often outweighing the potential profit. Consequently, many businesses choose not to perform R&D, which has resulted in governments of most developed countries having implemented various incentives to encourage private business to undertake R&D. These incentives can take the form of either direct incentives (grants, soft loans, subsidies etc) or indirect incentives (such as tax incentives). Tax incentives effectively subsidise the costs of R&D, making it a more attractive and profitable alternative for business. Developed countries, including: the United States of America (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, China, Canada and Australia have all adopted a combination of both direct and indirect incentives, with various tax incentive measures receiving much attention in the last 2 decades. In South Africa the legislation providing for R&D tax incentives has been substantially amended in recent years through a number of Taxation Amendment Acts,] culminating in the enactment of s lID of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Act). The aim of this dissertation is to critically examine the current South Afi'ican tax incentive scheme as contained in sliD, focusing on the eligibility requirements of that incentive. In addition, the dissertation will highlight design features and characteristics of the incentive, particularly in respect of its generosity, predictability, simplicity, administration and targeting. 4 The design and characteristics of the South African incentive is then compared to those of three different countries: the UK, Australia and Canada.s Based on the analysis and comparison, certain lessons are identified for South Africa6 and various opinions are advanced on the effectiveness of the current structure and whether particular aspects of it could be improved going forward. / Thesis (LL.M.)-Unversity of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.

<p>This dissertation studies the optimal control of two different dynamic systems with learning: (i) diagnostic service systems, and (ii) green incentive policy design. In both cases, analytical models have been developed to improve our understanding of the system, and managerial insights are gained on its optimal management.</p><p>We first consider a diagnostic service system in a queueing framework, where the service is in the form of sequential hypothesis testing. The agent should dynamically weigh the benefit of performing an additional test on the current task to improve the accuracy of her judgment against the incurred delay cost for the accumulated workload. We analyze the accuracy/congestion tradeoff in this setting and fully characterize the structure of the optimal policy. Further, we allow for admission control (dismissing tasks from the queue without processing) in the system, and derive its implications on the structure of the optimal policy and system's performance.</p><p>We then study Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) policies, which are incentive mechanisms by governments to promote renewable energy technologies. We focus on two key network externalities that govern the evolution of a new technology in the market over time: (i) technological learning, and (ii) social learning. By developing an intertemporal model that captures these dynamics, we investigate how lawmakers should leverage on such effects to make FIT policies more efficient. We contrast our findings against the current practice of FIT-implementing jurisdictions, and also determine how the FIT regimes should depend on specific technology and market characteristics.</p> / Dissertation

Belöningssystem och dess utformning diskuteras både i organisationer samt forskningsvärlden. Att utforma ett fungerande belöningssystem är problematiskt och det är många faktorer att ta hänsyn till. Butiken och dess miljö är en viktig faktor i ett dagligvaruhandelsföretag för att skapa bästa upplevelsen för kunden. Butikschefen ansvarar för att skapa detta samt för att butiken ska fungera systematiskt. Men hur är ett belöningssystem utformat till butikschefer i ett dagligvaruhandelsföretag? När belöningssystem utformas finns risken att det inte leder till önskande beteenden. I dessa fall kan en förändring ske, men vad är det egentligen som motiverar förändringen? Det är detta denna rapport har tagit sikte på samt det faktum att organisationen är kooperativa påverkar ledningens beslut och således belöningssystemet. Studien kommer således att undersöka: ”Hur är ett belöningssystem utformat till butikschefer i ett svenskt kooperativt dagligvaruhandelsföretag och vad motiverar en förändring av det?”. För att undersöka detta problem har principal-agentteorin tillämpats för att belysa problematiken som kan uppstå mellan ledning och butikschefer. Kooperativa teorier öppnar till en diskussion om det faktum att organsationen är kooperativ har påverkat utformningen av belöningssystemet. Teorier kring belöningssystem utgör en del i den teoretiska referensramen för att förstå hur belöningssystem är utformade samt vad som kan motivera en förändring av dem. För att besvara problemet har en kvalitativ metod tillämpats där en fallstudie på Kf Göta har genomförts. Faktumet att organisationen är kooperativ påverkade inte belöningssystemets utformning direkt. Dock påverkades belöningssystemet indirekt på grund av den bristande medlemskontrollen och att de kooperativa värderingarna genomsyrar de dagliga besluten. Den förevarande studiens slutsats är att det inte endast finns ett optimalt belöningssystem som tillfredsställer alla organisationer utan det bör anpassas efter det beteende som ledningen vill främja. Vi har således kommit fram till att det är viktigt att belöna ett beteende som leder till ett bra resultat snarare än att bara belöna ett bra resultat. / Incentive programs and its design is something that is discussed in organisations and academia. It’s problematic to design an effective incentive program and there’re many factors to consider. In a FMCG enterprise, the store and its environment is an important factor for creating the best experience for the customers. It’s the store manager's responsibility to make sure that everything in the store works in a systematic way. But how is a store manager incentive program designed in a FMCG enterprise? When incentive programs are designed, chances are that it does not lead to the behaviours that’s wanted. In these cases, a change may occur, but what actually motivates the change? This study has also reviewd if the fact that the organization is cooperative has affect the management decisions and therefore the incentive program. The study will examen "How is a incentive program designed to store managers in a Swedish cooperative FMCG enterprise and what motivates a change of it?”. To examine this problem, the principal-agent theory has been applied to illustrate the problem which can arise between management and store managers. Co-operative theories opens up to discussion about if the fact that the organisation is co-operatives has influenced the design of the incentive program. Theories about incentive programs is part of the theoretical framework for understanding how incentive programs are designed and what may motivate a change in them. To answer this problem, a qualitative method is applied and a case study on Kf Göta has been implemented. The fact that the organisation is co-operative did not affect the inceintive program design directly. However, it affected the incentive program indirectly because of the lack of member control and the co-operative values ​​permeate their daily decisions. The present study concludes that there is not only one optimal incentive program that suits all organisations, and it should be adapted to the behavior that management wants to promote. We have therefore concluded that it’s important to reward a behavior that leads to a good result rather than simply rewarding good results.

The Blue Drop Incentive-based Regulation (programme) was introduced in 2008 by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) with the aim of maintaining and improving drinking water quality in South Africa. The programme is being implemented in order to protect consumers from water services providers who might not act in the interest of the public. For some years the confidence level of the public regarding the quality of drinking water in South Africa has not been at the desired level. The programme involves annual assessment of water services authorities by the DWA. In order for water services authorities to be awarded the Blue Drop status they are required to comply 95% in terms of the criteria used in the assessments. During the first and second years of Blue Drop assessments a number of municipalities chose not to be assessed but quite a few achieved the Blue Drop status nationally. It is against this background that the researcher undertook a study to determine how water services employees in municipalities perceive the Blue Drop programme. To achieve the study objective the mixed method involving quantitative and qualitative methodologies was employed. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with supervisors and management while water treatment works employees completed a survey questionnaire. The qualitative and quantitative data analysis brought to light the following core findings: * The Blue Drop programme has the support of the overwhelming majority of employees who participated in the research. They perceive the programme as an inspiration for improved performance of the water services function in municipalities. * There is a lack of or poor understanding of the water sector legal framework including the Blue Drop assessment criteria by some participating employees. * There is a perceived lack of management and political leadership involvement and support for the water service function. Although the Blue Drop programme has been reported to be an excellent intervention by nearly all the participants, there are certain aspects that can be improved and are dealt with in the last chapter of the mini-dissertation. / Thesis (M Development and Management)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

This thesis explores whether independent directors in the USA and Canada are effective in holding management accountable by: (1) analyzing how the policy of relying on independent directors developed and operates; (2) introducing the main theoretical critiques of independent directors’ monitoring effect; and (3) examining whether empirical studies in the field of management science and financial economics support the policy in both countries of relying on independent directors as corporate monitors. Empirical evidence shows that boards with a majority of independent directors, in some circumstances, were associated with better firm performance (in the post-SOX period) and fulfilled certain board tasks effectively in the United States. Canadian studies, however, have not shown a positive association with improved firm performance. Audit committees composed entirely of independent directors have been effective in ensuring the quality of financial reporting in the United States, but this effect has not been found in Canada. Compensation committees composed fully of independent directors neither constrained the level of executive compensation nor tied CEO pay to firm performance in either country. US firms with an audit committee member who had accounting expertise, rather than financial analysis or supervisory expertise, were associated with a higher quality of financial reporting, while Canadian firms with an audit committee member who has financial expertise, instead of financial literacy, were associated with a similar effect. Studies also showed that independent directors perform better in certain circumstances. Based on empirical evidence, US regulators should consider: (1) changing the current mandatory requirements for an independent board and a completely independent compensation committee to a comply-or-explain requirement; (2) narrowing the qualification of a financial expert to an individual who has accounting expertise; and (3) recruiting independent directors who have two or fewer outside directorships, hold more of the corporation’s shares, have lower cost of acquiring corporate information, and have no social connections with the CEO. In Canada, weak evidence of the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors supports the existing comply-or-explain approach. Canadian regulators may only need to require or recommend that at least one audit committee member has financial expertise, instead of only financial literacy.