The purpose of this descriptive study was to investigate the relationships among the awarding of career pay, teacher motivation, and student achievement. This study sought to answer the following questions: (1) Is there a difference in intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of those teachers who receive career pay as opposed to those teachers who do not receive career pay? and (2) Is reading and mathematics achievement higher in teachers' classes where teachers receive career pay than in classes where teachers do not receive career pay? According to the U.S. Department of Education projections, by the year 2009 school systems will face a 2-2.5 million teacher shortage. Some 200,000 new teachers are needed annually to enter the profession. Career pay may prove to be a method to reward, to attract, and to retain excellent teachers. Student achievement was assessed using the California Achievement Test. Pretest and Posttest gain scores were used to assess higher achievement in reading or mathematics for teachers who receive career pay as opposed to those who did not receive career pay. A Teacher Motivation Questionnaire was used to assess intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of teachers. Specifically, the instrument was used to determine if teachers who received career pay were more intrinsically or extrinsically motivated than teachers who did not receive career pay. Data collected were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences using regression analysis, frequencies, reliability, and t-tests. Conclusions of this study are that teachers who receive career pay are not more intrinsically or extrinsically motivated than teachers who do not receive career pay and that student achievement is not increased by the awarding of career pay. / Ed. D.

This experiment investigated how different percentages of incentive pay affected performance on a number-entering task. It was hypothesized that the critical factor in incentive pay systems was the absolute amount of money that could be earned in an incentive pay paradigm. A counterbalanced single-subject reversal design was employed to examine effects of incentives on performance. Twelve subjects were used in the experiment with three subjects assigned to one of four experimental paradigms. Two of the experimental paradigms incorporated 10% and 100% incentive pay conditions, while the other two experimental paradigms incorporated absolute pay conditions equal to the 10% and 100% incentive pay conditions. Results indicated that similar trends in productivity occurred across subjects in all four experimental paradigms.

The aim of this study is to investigate and identify perceptions, problems and challenges that may arise for wage-setting managers as well as individual employees when working with a performance-based payroll system. A letter of formal notice was sent to a recruitment company inviting them to participate in the study, which also included an explanation of the study’s purpose, approach and procedure. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews with nine participants, including the wage-setting manager. The study has given insight into how these participants perform in relation to the performance-based payroll system and the results of the study imply that their experiences vary to a great extent. The wage-setting manager believes that the payroll system is well-functioning. However, he finds challenges in creating a common interpretation of the salary criterias with his employees, as well as communicating the basis of his wage-setting decisions. For employees, results show that the payroll system contributes to experiences of increased motivation and development, as well as stress. Additionally, the study indicates that the results reflect a gender perspective as the women in the study are more prone to stress caused by the performance-based payroll system than men.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The enlisted personnel assignment process is a major part in the United States Navy's Personnel Distribution system. It ensures warfighters and supporting activities receive the right sailor with the right training to the right billet at the right time (R4) and is a critical element in meeting the challenges of Seapower 21 and Global CONOPS. In order to attain these optimal goals the ways-to-do-it need to be customer-centered and should optimize both, the Navy's needs and the sailor's interests. Recent studies and a detailing pilot in 2002 used a web-based marketplace with two-sided matching mechanisms to accomplish this vision. This research examines the introduction of an Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) as part of the U.S. Navy's enlisted personnel assignment process in a simulation environment. It uses a previously developed simulation tool, including the Deferred Acceptance (DA) and the Linear Programming (LP) matching algorithm to simulate the assignment process. The results of the sensitivity analysis suggested that the Navy should mainly emphasize sailor quality rather than saving AIP funds in order to maximize utility and the possible matches. When adopting such an introduction policy also the percentage of unstable matches under the LP as the matching algorithm was reduced. / Commander, German Navy

The goal of the diploma thesis is to make analysis of the remuneration system and to identify motivation tools vhich are used by the company. The output of the diploma thesis is summary of areas which are motivated, reasonable and transparent for employees or not. As a part of the diploma thesis are improvement suggestions which are focus on problematical areas.

Abstract This essay is a study on "the influence that the stock options of the salary incentive pay system have on the management level of Chinese mainland insurance industry". this study is divided into four parts : first , introduce the theory that influence the setting of the salary incentive pay system ; second, analyses the common-used incentive pay system in Chinese mainland at present and its developmental tendency ; third , introduce the basic information of Taiwan's insurance industry brought into mainland . We hope that the study on mainland's insurance industry will contribute to the Taiwan' study in the field of mainland' insurance market. Fourth, analyze how Taiwan's insurance industry establish salary incentive pay system that meet the market demands in their development in mainland . The stereotype of the industrialist, the collected data, the careful analysis and the case that was picked out, can be referred to by those who want to develop on the mainland market. From this study, we find that there are active effects of thestock options system from the salary incentive pay system, whichcannot be found in the mainland's intermediate insurance industry. The cause can be concluded into two species: individual factor, externalfactor. Each conclusion has three items. So there are totally sixitems. The conclusions suggest that, mainland's intermediate insurance companies' planning on the management's salary incentive pay system is faced with many influence factors now. Althongh there are some limitations of the annual salary, such as the management behaviors Short-termism, the frequently-liquid of the managements' talents, the shortage of management talents, still, the effects are more active than other incentive pay system forms such as manager acquisition, insurance plan and retire plan, golden parachutes and EVA, except stock rights and options. The key words : the salary incentive pay system; management; Chinese mainland insurance market; stock options; golden parachutes

This paper will introduce the reader to the issues of moral hazard in a principal-agent setting, with the primary focus on the incentive pay models of moral hazard. Firstly, with an introduction and analysis of various microeconomic models designed to alleviate the problems of moral hazard, and secondly, with an analyses of these models in the context of a specific company, the aim of this thesis is to offer a comprehensive understanding of the specific problems caused by moral hazard in the principal-agent problem, as well as the mechanisms used to lessen such problems in the real business environment and their connection to the theoretical microeconomic models.

This paper investigates the effect of CEO compensation structure on the risk-taking of the firms in Sweden. In addition, the study examines whether the gender of the CEO plays a role in this relationship. In the recent decades, there has been a drastic increase in the use of variable pay in the CEO compensation package, motivated by the alignment of risk preferences between shareholders and CEOs. However, researchers have failed to reach a unanimous conclusion regarding the effect of variable pay on risk-taking. This study examines the companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, comprising 643 observations during the three-year period from 2017- 2019. The results from this study find no positive relationship between compensation and risk-taking as predicted by the agency theory. The study results confirm no or negative relation, depending on the risk measure; indicating that increased CEO variable compensation reduces firm risk through less financial leverage and no significant relationship is found between variable pay and volatility of stock return. Moreover, when examining the gender aspect of risk-taking, no significant difference is found and gender has no impact in the effect of compensation structure on risk-taking.

This thesis extends the standard shirking model of efficiency wages to a continuum of effort levels. The generalisation completely overturns previous intuitions. In particular, the characteristic feature of the earlier theory that monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for motivating workers, no longer exists. This is remarkable, since such a negative correlation has been used as the primary empirical test for the existence of efficiency wages. With a continuum of effort levels, the efficiency wage model can also more conveniently be compared with conventional linear incentive wages. The most frequently recurring objection against the efficiency wage model is that unemployed workers should offer to pay entrance fees. This criticism is responded to in a model with finitely many periods. It is shown that the per period worker rents associated with efficiency wages strongly diminishes with the number of periods. It is further argued that both bonds and entrance fees are inferior means of extracting the remaining worker rents compared to investments in firm specific human capital. Finally, the above refinements of the efficiency wage theory are translated to fit in the arena of environmental economics and government policy. The corresponding results establish a rationale for a government to subsidise polluting firms and explain why a command and control policy is preferable to market-based incentive schemes. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1999

本論文包含二篇與公司財務相關之文章，第一篇文章嘗試在考量總體經濟條件和公司生產力衝擊下，建構一個簡單結構式模型以探討公司之資本結構決策。特別的是，由該模型可得到公司最適負債比率與總體經濟條件衝擊之報酬波動性呈反向關係，惟公司最適負債比率與公司生產力衝擊之報酬波動性呈正向關係。第二篇文章係利用對稱寡占產業均衡模型，以探討產業內經理人薪酬決策之異質性。即使產業內所有公司皆為同質，在模型均衡下存在有些公司會採取激勵性薪酬，而其他公司則不採取激勵性薪酬。該模型預期當市場競爭性增加時，產業內公司經理人薪酬決策會更具異質性。此外，上述二篇文章皆分別以美國製造業資料進行實證，並且實證結果均符合其模型之預期。 / This dissertation proposes two essays about corporate finance. Essay one develops a simple structural model to investigate a firm’s capital structure choices in consideration of macroeconomic conditions and firm-level productivity shocks. The model particularly generates the implication that the optimal debt ratio is negatively correlated to the return volatility of macroeconomic conditions, but positively correlated to that of firm-level productivity. Essay two is contributed to explore the heterogeneity of the compensation decision within the industry by employing a symmetric oligopoly industry equilibrium model. Within the equilibrium some firms will adopt incentive pay while others will not, even though all firms are ex ante identical. The model predicts that there is more heterogeneity in the compensation decision as the intensity of market competition increases. Both of the two essays further provide empirical evidence of the US manufacturing industry to support the model implications.