Neste trabalho, deriva-se uma política de escolha ótima baseada na análise de média-variância para o Erro de Rastreamento no cenário Multi-período - ERM -. Referindo-se ao ERM como a diferença entre o capital acumulado pela carteira escolhida e o acumulado pela carteira de um benchmark. Assim, foi aplicada a metodologia abordada por Li-Ng em [24] para a solução analítica, obtendo-se dessa maneira uma generalização do caso uniperíodo introduzido por Roll em [38]. Em seguida, selecionou-se um portfólio do mercado de ações brasileiro baseado no fator de orrelação, e adotou-se como benchmark o índice da bolsa de valores do estado de São Paulo IBOVESPA, além da taxa básica de juros SELIC como ativo de renda fixa. Dois casos foram abordados: carteira composta somente de ativos de risco, caso I, e carteira com um ativo sem risco indexado à SELIC - e ativos do caso I (caso II). / In this work, an optimal policy for portfolio selection based on mean-varian e analysis for the multi-period tracking error - ERM - was derived. ERM is understood as the difference between the capital raised by the selected portfolio and benchmark portfolio. Thus, the methodology discussed by Li-Ng in [24] for analytical solution was applied, generalizing the single period case introduced by Roll in [38]. Then, it was selected a portfolio from the Brazilian stock trading based on the correlation factor, and adopted as benchmark the index of the stock trading of São Paulo State IBOVESPA, and the basic interest rate SELIC as fixed income asset. Two cases were dealt: portfolio composed of risky assets only, case I, and portfolio with a risk-free asset - indexed to SELIC - and assets of the case I (case II).

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Development economists generally argue that poor countries at their early stages of development are often faced with limited domestic resources for development, and can therefore borrow from the developed nations to boost their rate of growth and development. This financing gap problem, which is based on the Harrod-Domar growth theory, has made developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, to accumulate large amount of external debt that they could no longer sustain. Moreover, there is now a growing concern that the large external debt service payment is retarding economic growth and investment in the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), while also displacing current expenditure in priority sectors like health, education, and social infrastructure. This dissertation therefore, examines the impact of external debt on economic growth and investment in ECOWAS Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1980-1999. Unlike the traditional debt and growth studies that use a-spatial methods, this study employs spatial autoregressive growth and investment models to determine the effects of spatial interaction and spatial dependence among ECOWAS countries during the period of the crisis. It is obvious that countries are spatial entities that interact with one another, and as such, the growth trends in one country may actually depend on the growth trajectories of others. Based on the above assumptions, the models use external debt service and total debt stock ratios, which are extracted from the World Bank and African Development Bank databases, as key or control variables plus other explanatory variables. The maximum likelihood estimation of both models yield mixed results across time. The results indicate the presence of both positive and negative spatial dependence in ECOWAS countries across time. While external debt service ratio is found to have an inverse relationship with economic growth in most periods under investigation, the total debt stock to GDP ratio only affect growth in fewer periods than expected. With regards to public investment, the external debt service ratio is found to have no impact on public investment in ECOWAS countries. However, the total debt stock to GDP ratio is found to have a negative relationship with public investment in most periods, which suggest that relying on foreign capital to boost growth and investment could be counter productive in Sub-Saharan Africa. (author's abstract)

Abstract This dissertation explores two interrelated aspects of banking crises and bank regulations in perspective of regulator¡¦s soft budget constraints (SBCs in brief) and bank top management compensation. First, this paper models, in a game of incomplete information, bank behavior during banking crises when asymmetric information exists between regulators and banks. Here, I show that the situation creates the incentives for banks to roll over their defaulting loans to disguise their financial statements. Although a prudential regulator may mitigate this incentive by offering a ¡§slack¡¨ rescue packages, the bank¡¦s reputational concern may cause them to reject rescue offers. In this instance, regulators may be forced to offer amounts of recapitalization that will meet the amount necessary to restore banks to solvency. Otherwise, banks may have to gamble for resurrection, or wait until the banking crises become severe, and then more banks become insolvent, regulators have to offer optimal rescue packages subject to SBCs. New findings include (1) During banking crises, the optimal regulatory policies, on the one hand, may cause regulators have to offer rescue or bailout packages subject to different SBCs, on the other hand, mitigate banker¡¦s moral hazard. The more severe the crises will be, the greater soft budget constrained to regulators. (2) The potential severity of banking crises can be measured by the ratios, getting from net worth over the total amount of recapitalization offered by regulators and recovered from nonperforming loans. (3) As banking crises become severe, the cost of rescue becomes larger than that of bailout, the best regulatory policy is to intervene; On the contrary, if a situation labeled ¡§ too-many-to-fail¡¨ arises, the regulators may offer to rescue distressed banks subject to SBC. (4)As Bayesian equilibrium cost of regulator in crises is increasing, a random creative ambiguity for regulators to offer bailout or rescue plans may be the optimal policy to mitigate the expectation of SBC for banks . Second, this paper also shows that in the circumstances of universal banking or bank holding company, concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios and risk-based deposit insurance may be ineffective in controlling banker¡¦s risk-taking and moral hazard. Here, this paper follows, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the insurance premium scheme incorporate features of top management compensation. In a model of universal banking with two-periods and three-subsidiaries or departments, bank owner pre-commits to regulators to pick an optimal management compensation structure that induces the first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank¡¦s management. Findings include (1) If insurance premium is not fairly priced, the incentives are created for banks to have a ¡§regulatory arbitrage¡¨ by segregating its nonperforming assets from the investment bank, and shift it to the commercial bank, that increases the deposit-insurer an additional risk liability, and aggravates the risk-shifting within the universal bank; and vice versa. (2) Given management contracts{ fixed salary, a bonus paid, a fraction of equity of the bank} and { fixed salary, a penalty , a fraction of equity}for bank and security investment department respectively ; and a capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome , here bonus paid larger than 0, a penalty larger than 0, a fraction of equity between 0 and 1, then the investment policies implemented by managers, is less risky than when manger¡¦s interests are fully aligned with the equity interests. (3) Given a fairly priced insurance premium, and capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome, then the optimal management compensation structure can internalize the cost of moral hazard and induce the Pareto-optimal and department-equilibrium investment policies, thus mitigate moral hazard under universal banking. Finally, the state-owned and half-state-owned banks have experienced the institution-induced ineffectiveness; and the latter suffer from poor business performance level, partially because of the issues of ownership structure. This paper shows the investment policy with moral hazard under these banks incorporated with optimal compensation structures, and given capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome, then the optimal policies induced, that will improve their business performance level. This paper also shows that as the controlling shareholders have power over banks in excess of their cash flow rights, the incentives will be created for them to expropriate the minority shareholders. And, when the incentives for expropriation exists, the investment policy will be distorted with the managerial bias induced by their private benefits, and deteriorate morale of the banks. The regulatory mandatory requirements of one-share-one-vote principle may be proposed, instead.

直覺上，跨國資本的自由流動對投資國與被投資國的經濟均有益處，亦可促使資源在國際間以更有效率的方式分配，增進雙方的福利。然而實際上被投資國卻對外來投資加以限制，並且須透過雙邊協商的方式移除此限制。因此，前述自由投資增進兩國福利的直覺似乎與既存的眾多雙邊投資協定相互矛盾。本文建立一基本的理論模型，考慮直接投資以及兩國的策略性投資政策，藉以說明 Nash Equilibrium 為兩國相互課稅，且無單邊降稅的動機。因此，只有透過雙邊簽署投資協定的方式共同降稅，方能消除課稅所產生的無謂損失。 / Intuitively, the free mobility of transnational capital not only benefits home countries and host countries, but also allocates resources globally in a more efficient way, which makes their welfare increase. However, host countries actually implement many restrictions on cross-border capital and try to remove these through bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the intuition that free investment between two countries will increase their economic welfare seems to be contradictory to many existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This article provides a theoretical model with foreign driect investment (FDI) and strategic investment policies, first, as to explain the Nash Equilibrium is that two countries will tax investors' FDI behavior. Second, it explains both countries do not have any motivation to reduce taxes unilaterally. Therefore, only when these two countries decide to remove all restrictions on foreign capital mutually by signing bilateral investment treaties do they eliminate the deadweight loss which restraints bring about.

Neste trabalho, deriva-se uma política de escolha ótima baseada na análise de média-variância para o Erro de Rastreamento no cenário Multi-período - ERM -. Referindo-se ao ERM como a diferença entre o capital acumulado pela carteira escolhida e o acumulado pela carteira de um benchmark. Assim, foi aplicada a metodologia abordada por Li-Ng em [24] para a solução analítica, obtendo-se dessa maneira uma generalização do caso uniperíodo introduzido por Roll em [38]. Em seguida, selecionou-se um portfólio do mercado de ações brasileiro baseado no fator de orrelação, e adotou-se como benchmark o índice da bolsa de valores do estado de São Paulo IBOVESPA, além da taxa básica de juros SELIC como ativo de renda fixa. Dois casos foram abordados: carteira composta somente de ativos de risco, caso I, e carteira com um ativo sem risco indexado à SELIC - e ativos do caso I (caso II). / In this work, an optimal policy for portfolio selection based on mean-varian e analysis for the multi-period tracking error - ERM - was derived. ERM is understood as the difference between the capital raised by the selected portfolio and benchmark portfolio. Thus, the methodology discussed by Li-Ng in [24] for analytical solution was applied, generalizing the single period case introduced by Roll in [38]. Then, it was selected a portfolio from the Brazilian stock trading based on the correlation factor, and adopted as benchmark the index of the stock trading of São Paulo State IBOVESPA, and the basic interest rate SELIC as fixed income asset. Two cases were dealt: portfolio composed of risky assets only, case I, and portfolio with a risk-free asset - indexed to SELIC - and assets of the case I (case II).

In this diploma paper, I would like to explain and prove reasons of economic boom in selected countries in East Asia between 1965-1997. I focus on Asian Tigers namely on investment policy. I would like to answer the questions, what were the specifics of Asian Tigers, what contributed to economic growth the most, what implements were used within investment policy, how was this investment policy successful in individual countries and what role public sector (government) played. I focus on the role of human and physical capital, the role of foreign direct investment and I sum up their impact on economic growth in countries of Asian Tigers.

The aim of this Master thesis is to analyze investment environment of the Russian Federation by focusing on foreign direct investment in the selected countries of BRICS cluster. First chapter is dedicated to the theoretical definition of the investment climate, observation methods such as PESTEL and SWOT analysis, indexes of the multinational organisation (Global Competitivness Index, Ease of Doing Business a Index of Economic Freedom). This chapter also defines investment incentives and foreign direct investment together with typology of this two terms. Second chapter focuses on the Russian investment policy especially on legislative and administrative investment regulation. Last part of this chapter focuses on development of special economic zones, which parcipate in alocation of the foreign direct investment in Russia the most. At the end of this thesis there are strenghts and weaknesses of the russian investment environment together with opportunities and threats described.

The main goal of this diploma thesis is the analysis of political influences on a municipal budget in municipality Kamenický Šenov. Thanks to solving problems of municipal budgets, it is possible to analyze relationship of political decisions and municipal budget. Most of political science's dissertations focus on elections, voting systems or mayor's election, but the question of influence of political relationship on municipal budget is not in public interest. This topic is very important, but unfortunately neglected. This diploma thesis is divided into four chapters. The first three chapters theoretically embed this work. The first chapter introduces the horizontal typology of the municipal systems, public administration, fiscal federalism, incomes and expenses of municipalities and formation of the municipal budget in France and Sweden. The third chapter is dedicated to the Czech Republic and it proceeds from the structure of the first chapter. The fourth chapter of this work is arranged as the unique case study of municipality Kamenický Šenov. The municipality Kamencký Šenov has been ruled by a coalition of KSČM and ČSSD from 1998 to 2009; in 2002 a new member SNK Naše město joined this coalition. This coalition stood up for investment policy, which is represented by the construction of the...

La adopción de prácticas del gobierno corporativo surgió como consecuencia de los últimos escándalos financieros, lo que generó un impacto negativo en la economía mundial por aproximadamente USD 200 000 000. La falta de transparencia y gestiones cuestionables de los directivos y administradores provocó la pérdida de confianza entre los inversionistas y partes interesadas. En este sentido, las empresas familiares con el objetivo de proteger sus inversiones necesitan adoptar prácticas de gobierno corporativo para aumentar la probabilidad de ser empresas familiares sostenibles a largo plazo. El presente trabajo de investigación da a conocer los principales beneficios de adoptar prácticas de gobierno corporativo en empresas familiares al diseñar sus políticas de inversiones. Basado en el principio de divulgación y transparencia en el diseño de política de inversiones de las empresas familiares, se busca facilitar una toma de decisiones más acertada, alineando los intereses de la familia y la empresa y; así generar un ambiente de confianza entre los inversionistas y el mercado. De esta manera se busca responder a la pregunta de investigación sobre los beneficios que aporta el gobierno corporativo en el diseño de la política de inversiones en las empresas familiares. Además, destacamos la importancia del rol que desarrolla el capital paciente y la visión patrimonial como ventajas competitivas de las empresas familiares al diseñar sus políticas de inversiones y; considerar su aversión al riesgo. Por lo que basado en las investigaciones de los autores proponemos algunas recomendaciones para construir confianza entre los miembros de la familia, los inversionistas, la empresa y los grupos de interes al diseñar la política de inversiones en la empresa familiar. / The adoption of corporate governance practices emerged as a result of the latest financial scandals, which generated a negative impact on the global economy of approximately USD 200 million. Lack of transparency and questionable management by managers and administrators caused a loss of confidence between investors and stakeholders. In this sense, family businesses in order to protect their investments need to adopt corporate governance practices to increase the probability of being sustainable family businesses in the long term. This research work reveals the main benefits of adopting corporate governance practices in family businesses when designing their investment policies. Based on the principle of disclosure and transparency in the design of investment policy for family businesses, it seeks to facilitate more accurate decision-making, aligning the interests of the family and the company and; thus generating an environment of trust between investors and the market. In this way, it seeks to answer the research question on the benefits that corporate governance provides in the design of investment policy in family businesses. In addition, we highlight the importance of the role played by patient capital and the equity vision as competitive advantages of family businesses when designing their investment policies and; Consider your aversion to risk. Therefore, based on the authors' research, we propose some recommendations to build trust among family members, investors, the company, and interest groups when designing investment policy in the family business. / Trabajo de Suficiencia Profesional