This dissertation aims to understand how Islamist ideology differs across Islamist political parties in majority-Muslim countries. It asks why, despite drawing from the same religious source, the ideology of Islamist parties differs significantly and ranges from a wide spectrum, reaching from rigid conservative ideologies to flexible and even liberal. In order to address this question, the first step I pursue is to create a classification of different types of Islamism based on a spectrum of Islamist thought and behavior. I call the most literalist approach which aims at top-down Islamization Traditionalist Islamism, while the most flexible variety which argues for a bottom-up approach and relies on secular civil law is is labelled Neo-Islamism. Political parties that do not clearly fall under any of these categories and mix characteristics of both are grouped under the Hybrid Islamism category. I argue that if they could, all Islamist parties would moderate their ideology in order to achieve electoral success. However, both the position of the party vis-a-vis other parties in the system, and a high degree of dependence on an internal clique or an external movement create constraints and limitations which prevent parties from moderating their ideological profile. I find support for my argument by comparing five different Islamist parties in Indonesia. I further strengthen my case by introducing several hadow cases from Turkey, Malaysia and Tajikistan (under the authoritarian regime).

Official state ideology (Kemalism) whose core principles are Turkish nationalism and secularism excluded Kurds and Islamists from the newly formed social and political structure of modern Turkey. By insisting on a Kemalist modernization project in which assimilation of Kurdish ethnic identity within Turkish nationalism, and a top down imposition of secular policies on public and state affairs, Turkey has had to deal with two profound issues—the Kurdish question, and political Islam. As these social and political rivals of official state ideology present an alternative way of modernization projects, the Kemalist state apparatus has until recently considered their existence and development within Turkish society as a menace to their core existence. That is why the nearly century-long Kurdish question and Islamism (reactionism-gericilik) have occupied the agenda. The striking point of this reality of Turkey is that while Kurdish nationalist and Islamist social and political groups, whether they are legal or illegal, have sought to supersede the official state ideology with their understandings, they have never united or operated joint activities against their, roughly speaking, enemy. The research, because of this focuses on the reasons why these two social and political groups in Turkey did not work together to eliminate their common rival. Regarding pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic groups, ideological distinctiveness and rigidity led them to consider each other as a part of or as an extension of official state ideology which tries to eliminate its rivals. Despite the fact that they both ideologically and practically confirmed the existence of repression towards Kurds and religious people, the leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish political stream considered religion as a component of denial and assimilationist policy of official state ideology, so that they did not differentiate between Islamist groups and the established state structure, whereas the pro-Islamic political stream refused to co-operate with any member of the leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish stream because of its secular characteristic. The reaction of these groups towards assimilation of Kurdish ethnic origin, and repression over religion, initially embodied itself in several uprisings and revolts in the Kurdish populated eastern areas of Turkey, and religiously sensitive cities, respectively. Thanks to the multi-party system, these groups have found a way in which they can express themselves through political parties, labour unions, associations and foundations so that they have become social movements forcing the Kemalism dominated state to meet their demands. As long as these demands are not met, the interaction between these two social movements and the official state ideology has been hostile. Within this process, the hostile approach to their common enemy reflected in each other’s activities and understandings as they see each other as a part of official state ideology. In the next phase in which their transformation from social movements to a legal political stream competed, the inherited ideological rigidity between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams preserved itself. Overall, the research will indicate that since the mid-20th century, ideological barriers between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic streams have become the fundamental determinant of how they perceive each other.

The main focus of the thesis is the concept of jihad and martyrdom in Islam. It seeks to present these religious ideas from very diverse perspectives and argues that seemingly discontinuous dimensions are all parts of the nature of the phenomenon. In the world of Islam, religion is an omnipresent aspect of a public life. Hence, the historical experience, culture, socio-economics, and politics, they all manifest in religious narratives. Martyrdom embodies these complexities as well. Historically and culturally, martyrdom has been perceived as an expression of utmost activism in the struggle of a believer for the betterment of the Islamic society. Leading a responsible and truthful life sometimes demands the ultimate sacrifice of one's life for the cause. This worldly responsibility for the well-being of the Islamic umma is one dimension of complex dynamics of the Islamist movements like the Palestinian Hamas. For them, martyrdom is only one moment, the climax, which requires leading the whole life as a responsible believer in the first place. In this sense, martyrdom is a celebration of a meaningful life rather than death. This commitment of Hamas to the community, its radical understanding of the politics of the struggle, along with the particular socio-economic, and political situation in...

Cette thèse porte sur la problématique de la laïcité et religion en Tunisie. L’enjeu est d’étudier ces deux notions dans un terrain nouveau : la Tunisie. Cette étude découle de l’indépendance jusqu’à la révolution. Dans le première partie, la thèse se concentre sur la genèse du concept de la laïcité, son originalité et la spécificité de la politique tunisienne. Cette partie constitue une première croisée entre le pouvoir politique et religieux. Dans la deuxième partie, la thèse se concentre sur la société tunisienne. Elle se focalise sur le déchirement entre l’adhésion du mouvement réformiste forcé par Bourguiba et l’islamisme représenté par le mouvement de la Tendance islamique. Cette partie sera une occasion pour explorer le nouvel espace social. Une nouvelle architecture sociale sera dessinée entre voilement féminin et l’épanouissement de la religiosité. Dans la dernière partie, nous nous accentuons sur l’effervescence de la pensée tunisienne contemporaine face au choix entre appropriation et adaptation à la laïcité. La question initiale dans cette partie est doublement ambiguë. Comment dispose la société islamique les questions qui la dérange ? La liberté religieuse, l’apostasie, le vin et le témoignage : des notions soumises à des débats sans fin. Comment pouvons-nous interpréter le retard de la société musulmane ? Les études de Charfi et Talbi nous donnent quelques pistes de réflexion. Une nouvelle génération féminine sera présente en Tunisie. Il sera temps de découvrir comment la pensée féminine occupe la scène culturelle en Tunisie. / This thesis relates to the problems of secularity and religion to Tunisia. The stake is to study these two concepts in a new ground : Tunisia. This study rises from independence until the revolution.In the first left, the thesis concentrates on the genesis of the concept of secularity, its originality and the specificity of the Tunisian policy. This part constitutes first cross between the political power and religious.In the second part, the thesis concentrates on the Tunisian society. It focuses hard tearing between the adhesion of the movement reformist forced by Bourguiba and the Islamism represented by the movement of the Islamic Tendency. This part will be an opportunity to explore new social space. A new social architecture will be drawn, between female warping and the blooming of the religiosity.In the last part, we are accentuated on the excitement of the contemporary Tunisian thought in front of the choice between appropriation and adaptation to the secularism. The initial question in this part is doubly ambiguous. how does the Islamic company lay out the questions which disturbs it? Religious freedom, apostasy, wine, testimony : concepts subjected to endless debates. How can we interpret the delay of the Muslim company? The studies of Charfi and Talbi give us some tracks of thought. A new feminine generation will be present in Tunisia. It will be time to discover how the female thought occupies it the cultural scene in Tunisia. This thesis tries to answer if secularity is the cause of the crisis of the Tunisian society or the solution.

Por meio de dois artigos, um de revisão bibliográfica e outro de pesquisa empírica, este trabalho busca examinar os impactos para o Egito, e as repercussões para o Oriente Médio, da ascensão da Irmandade Muçulmana ao poder após a deposição de Hosni Mubarak, ditador egípcio durante três décadas. O caso do Egito é o objeto da pesquisa pois exemplifica de forma cristalina como as aberturas democráticas nos países árabe-muçulmanos representam um enorme desafio para essas sociedades. A atuação da Irmandade Muçulmana em um ambiente de liberdade era aguardada por observadores dentro e fora do Oriente Médio pois, como principal movimento adepto do chamado islã político, seu sucesso ou fracasso poderiam indicar a possibilidade de êxito na construção das democracias locais, uma vez que parece inevitável o islamismo, como sinônimo de islã político, ser o primordial beneficiário da ruína dos regimes despóticos que grassam na região. Como base para esta análise, o primeiro artigo busca, por meio de uma revisão bibliográfica da história e da ideologia da Irmandade Muçulmana, desde sua fundação, em 1928, as explicações para o comportamento do grupo após a queda de Mubarak. O segundo artigo, por sua vez, estuda a conduta da política externa do Egito e reconstrói a forma como a ditadura de Mubarak desempenhava suas relações exteriores, comparando esta com a política externa do Egito durante o governo de Mohamed Morsi, irmão muçulmano eleito presidente do país em junho de 2012. Por fim, o segundo artigo busca entender os impactos provocados pelo período de governo da Irmandade Muçulmana na política externa do Egito na fase seguinte, após a deposição de Morsi (julho de 2013), em que o país passou a ser liderado pelo marechal Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, cujas ações na seara internacional são manifestamente tomadas em oposição não apenas à Irmandade Muçulmana, mas a qualquer elemento que possa ser identificado com o islã político. / Through two articles, a literature review and an empirical analysis, this paper seeks to examine the impacts to Egypt, and the implications for the Middle East, of the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian dictator for three decades. The case of Egypt is the object of research because it exemplifies in a crystalline way how the democratic openings in the Arab-Muslim countries represent a huge challenge for these societies. The performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in a freer environment was expected by observers inside and outside the Middle East because, as the main supporter of the movement called political Islam, its success or failure could indicate the possibility of success in the construction of local democracies, since it seems inevitable that Islamism, as synonymous with political Islam, be the primary beneficiary of the ruin of the despotic regimes that are rife in the region. As a basis for this analysis, the first article seeks, through a literature review of the history and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, since its founding in 1928, the explanations for the behavior of the group after the fall of Mubarak. The second article, in turn, studies the conduct of foreign policy of Egypt and reconstructs how the dictatorship of Mubarak played its foreign relations, comparing this with the foreign policy of Egypt during the reign of Mohamed Morsi, muslim brother elected president of the country in June 2012. Finally, the second article seeks to understand the impacts caused by the period of government of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt\'s foreign policy in the next stage, after the deposition of Morsi (July 2013), in which the country was led by Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, whose actions in the international arena are clearly taken in opposition not only to the Muslim Brotherhood, but the elements which can be identified with political Islam.

Este estudo compara as situações políticas de Egito, Turquia e Argélia, três Estados de maioria muçulmana, onde existem movimentos políticos islâmicos influentes. Neste trabalho, é verificado se os movimentos e partidos islâmicos são compatíveis ou acomodáveis com os Estados egípcio, turco e argelino. Utilizando a comparação dos conceitos de soberania popular e democracia liberal com o Islã e o Islamismo (também conhecido como \"Islã político\"), são considerados todos os casos históricos de cada sociedade. / this study compares and contrasts political situations in Egypt, Turkey and Algeria, three muslim majority states, where there are political islam´s influent movements. In this work, it´s verified if the Islamic and islamist movements are compatible or accommodable to Egyptian, Turkish and Algerian secular states. Comparing and contrasting concepts of people´s sovereignty and liberal democracy to Islam and islamism (also known as \"political Islam\"), this study considers all the historical cases in each society.

Le 11 septembre 2001, les États-Unis vivaient un traumatisme majeur qui engendra des questionnements sur l’image des Américains dans le monde et plus particulièrement dans le monde arabo-musulman. Cet intérêt croissant est au cœur de ce travail doctoral qui s’intéresse à l’image des États-Unis en Égypte à travers la presse d’expression anglaise et la culture populaire égyptienne de 1991 à 2008. L’Égypte avait déjà commencé à explorer sa relation avec les États-Unis bien avant notre période d’étude mais il y a eu une recrudescence de cet intérêt avec la guerre du Golfe (1990-1991), le processus de paix sous l’égide de Bill Clinton (1991-2000) et l’invasion de l’Irak en 2003. En effet, l’implication croissante des États-Unis dans la région du Proche Orient occasionne une réception complexe qui mérite un examen minutieux. Cette thèse retrace l’historique de cette image dès les premiers contacts pour arriver à esquisser les différents courants qui influent sur la réception des États-Unis en Égypte et jusqu’à un certain degré, dans le monde arabe, en raison du rayonnement culturel de l’Égypte dans la région. / On 9/11 the United States suffered a major trauma which raised questions as to its image abroad, and particularly, in the Arab and Muslim worlds. This ever-increasing interest lies at the heart of our dissertation which focuses on the image of the United States in Egypt from 1991 to 2008, as seen and spread through the English-language press and more specifically, the newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly, as well as through Egyptian popular culture. Egypt had already begun to explore its relationship with the United States well before the period under study, but the Gulf War (1990-1991), the peace process under the leadership of Bill Clinton (1991-2000) and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 revived this interest. Indeed, the United States’ deepening involvement in Middle Eastern issues had led to complex responses that deserve scrutiny. After tracing the history of the image of the United States in Egypt since the first contacts, this dissertation analyzes the ups and downs of the perception of the United States in Egypt between 1990 and 2008, and to some extent, in the Arab world, on account of the cultural influence of Egypt in the region.

Après l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri le 14 février 2005 et le retrait syrien du Liban (avril 2005), son fils, Sa‘d, essaya de fédérer un public politique mobilisé contre la Syrie, le Hezbollah et l’Iran. Ce travail fait l’hypothèse de l’échec de Sa‘d Hariri de mobiliser dans la durée les différents composantes du champ politique tripolitain. Pourquoi Hariri et le Futur ne réussirent-ils pas à mobiliser le potentiel politique fortement opposé au régime syrien abondant au nord-Liban ? Répondant à cette question, la thèse utilise la notion de John Dewey (1859-1952) d’un public politique, un collectif d’individus réunis dans l’action politique à travers la perception d'avoir des intérêts communs. La thèse commence en 1967 et s’arrête en 2011, avec une postface sur les dynamiques après 2011. Elle se divise en trois parties. La première analyse la vague de mobilisation à Tripoli entre 1967 et 1985. La deuxième partie étudie la déstructuration du sunnisme politique et l’essor du salafisme durant la Pax Syriana entre 1985 et 2005. La troisième partie se penche sur la tentative de Sa‘d Hariri de créer un public politique, ainsi sur que la compétition qu’ont représentée les salafistes à son leadership, après 2005. La thèse vise à montrer que le projet politique de Sa‘d Hariri était susceptible d’échouer, en raison de trois obstacles structurels. Premièrement, les obstacles bureaucratiques syriens ou la gouvernementalité syrienne du sunnisme à Tripoli. Deuxièmement, l’essoufflement du nationalisme arabe après le milieu des années 1980 et le fait que les leaders sunnites manquent souvent d’une cause militante, pour laquelle leurs partisans seraient disposés à risquer leur vie. Troisièmement, la présence du Salafisme comme un contre-public transnational et religieux. / After the assassination of Rafiq Hariri (14 February 2005) and the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon (April 2005), Hariri’s son, Sa‘d, attempted to federate a national Sunni political public mobilised against Syria, Hizbullah, and Iran. The study argues that Hariri failed to mobilize the different components of Tripoli’s political field over time. Why were Hariri and Future not successful in mobilising the anti-Syrian potential in North Lebanon? Attempting to answer this question, the study uses the notion of a political public elaborated by John Dewey (1859-1952). A public is a collective of individuals united in political action through a perception of common interests. The dissertation begins in 1967 and ends in 2011, with a Post-Script on the dynamics after 2011. It is divided in three parts. The first analyses the local dynamics in Tripoli between 1967 and 1985. The second part dissects the decomposition of Tripoli’s political field and the rise of Salafism during the period of pax syriana in Tripoli (1985-2005). The third part investigates Hariri’s attempt to create a political public and the competition from Tripoli’s Salafis, after 2005. The main argument is that three types of obstacles made Hariri’s public very likely to fail. The first was the Syrian bureaucratic obstacles, in other words, Syrian prior governmentality of Sunnism in Tripoli in the 1976-2005 period. The second obstacle was Arab nationalism’s loss of impetus after the mid-1980s and the fact that Sunni leaders often lacked a militant cause, for which followers were willing to risk their lives. The third obstacle was the presence of Salafism as a transnational, religious counter-public.

Dans la Turquie moderne bien marquée par la laïcité, l’AKP qualifié « conservateur démocrate » par ses fondateurs issus de la mouvance islamiste est le grand gagnant des élections de tout ordre depuis son apparition en 2001. Bien que l’Establishment kémaliste ait voulu balayer cette formation n’a pu le faire. Paradoxalement toute tentative de sa part n’a fait qu’accroître sa popularité. La question est donc de savoir « quelles sont les transformations socioculturelles et politiques de la société ainsi que les atouts de l’AKP qui peuvent expliquer sa success story à la fois à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur du pays ? ». La réponse à cette question dépend de ce qu’est le « conservatisme démocrate » ayant pu obtenir le feu vert de l’Establishment pour accéder à la scène politique : où s’inscrit le parti sur l’axe politique ; en quoi se distingue-t-il de ses contreparties ; le plus important est-il véritablement une idéologie politique distincte de l’islamisme comme l’avancent ses idéologues ? C’est ainsi que nous pourrons savoir si l’islamisme turc est en train d’inventer dans le monde musulman une forme comparable à ce qu’a été la « démocratie chrétienne » dans les pays de l’Europe. Et si nous pouvons classer l’AKP parmi les islamistes, nous nous interrogerons sur le point de savoir si l’avenir de l’islamisme comme force politique de gouvernement est en Turquie ou ailleurs ? / In modern Turkey clearly marked by secularism, the AKP called “conservative democrat” by its founders from the Islamist movement is the winner of elections of any kind since its appearance in 2001. Although the Kemalist Establishment had wanted to throw out this party could not do it. Paradoxically any attempt on his part has only increased its popularity. Then, the question is “what are the sociocultural and political transformations of society as well as the strengths of the AKP, which may explain its success story both inside and outside the country? ”. The answer to this question depends on what is “Conservative democracy” which could get the green light from the Establishment to enter the political arena: where the party is situated on the political spectrum, what distinguishes it from its counterparties, the most important is it really a political ideology which is distinct from Islamism as suggested by its ideologues? This is how we can know if Turkish Islamism is in the process of inventing in the Muslim world a form comparable to what was the “Christian democracy” in European countries. And if we can classify the AKP among the Islamists, we will examine whether the future of Islam as a political force of government is in Turkey or elsewhere?

O objetivo dessa pesquisa é analisar os fundamentos históricos do debate intelectual francês sobre a presença muçulmana no país e traçar suas características principais em um mapa crítico do debate. O estudo visa fornecer elementos de compreensão acerca dos desafios atuais e das possíveis conseqüências políticas desses projetos intelectuais para o futuro da integração ou da segregação dos muçulmanos franceses. / This research aimed at analyzing the historical foundations of the French intellectual debate on the muslim presence in the country, as well as forging a critical map of this debate. This study intends to provide tools for understanding both the current challenges involved and the possible political consequences of those intellectual projects to the future of integration or segregation of French muslims.