This study mainly investigates the reason of living in civil society, the motives of people to live under the government and necessity of commonwealth by design to live in peace based on modern social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes has a decisive role for developing a western political thought and Locke goes a step further to put superiority of the community and latitude of thought in his theory. In order to examine these topics, similarities of both philosophers in terms of their effort on setting free political thoughts from medieval world view, and their differentiations regarding considerations on human nature, desires and rights of men, formation of the society and the role of government are focused on.

From colonies to nation, this work identifies and emphasizes the influence of interdependent communal relationships on the ascent of the charter school movement. These ideals were made manifest in colonial social covenants that were then compromised by the conformist republican mandate of the common school. These ideals were recovered incrementally as education was affected by broader historical forces, most notably the implementation of court-sanctioned racial apartheid during the Plessy era, the reaction to the underwhelming impact of Brown, and, beginning in the 1980s, the rise of legislation that prepared the way for charter schools. Moreover, this work challenges the assumption that charter schools have proven popular with American citizens due solely to promises of superior academic results. Alternatively, this work suggests that charter schools have prospered because they have challenged the state monopoly in K-12 education, and have thus returned balance to the dynamic between the individual and the state. Finally, this work troubles the idea that charter schools are balkanizing American education, suggesting that the right of citizens to form charter schools, in an effort to sustain unique communities, justifies and is in fact endorsed by the American metanarrative. Research on American charter schools lacks a coherent historical framework. This work provides the charter school movement with an historical narrative that argues for the movement’s legitimacy based on its consistency with the American Republic’s founding philosophy. / Graduate / 0323 / 0337 / 0520 / smg32@duke.edu

Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.

Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.

Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.

Konstanz, Univ., Magisterarb., 2006.

In recent years, The Swedish Moderate Party have repeatedly used the term social contract. What do they mean by this concept that has its roots in the philosophers during the Enlightenment? These thinkers lived in a different time with political problems of ther time. To answer the reserach question, the Moderates' new proposal for an idea program has acted as a research object and a discriptive idea analysis have been done on the text. To then analyze this material, different Ideal types have been used that have been inspired by Enlightenment philosophers and given diffrent types of contract theories. Central points of the social contract theory have been examined and similair ideas as to the philosophers has been found in the idea proposal, some more than others. New ideas have also been seen that can be linked to the social contract. Finally, it is discussed whether the concept has to some extent lost its meaning or whether it is relevant that the concept does not mean the same thing today as three hundred years ago.

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