Thesis (M.Ed.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 108-115). Also available in print.

Magister Legum - LLM

O presente trabalho tratou do erro na ação rescisória, compreendendo tanto o erro de fato como o erro de direito, apontando eventuais equívocos e acertos da doutrina e jurisprudência sobre o tema. Na primeira parte do estudo estabeleceu-se as premissas necessárias para as demais, iniciando-se por uma breve introdução a respeito da prestação jurisdicional e seus escopos, pois a ação rescisória não só é meio de prestação jurisdicional, como também é meio de revisão dessa mesma tutela prestada pelo Estado, passando-se, posteriormente, a uma sucinta apresentação da garantia da coisa julgada. Em seguida, ingressando já no tema da ação rescisória, na parte segunda traçou-se um panorama geral acerca do instituto, estabelecendo as principais diferenças entre a ação rescisória e os demais meios de impugnação das decisões judiciais, nos quais se insere a ação rescisória, dando ênfase à excepcionalidade do instituto ora em estudo, justamente por ser meio de revisão da coisa julgada, que goza de proteção constitucional. Na terceira parte, analisou-se o objeto da ação rescisória, que são as sentenças de mérito transitadas em julgado, apontando as possíveis decisões que podem abrir oportunidade ao manejo da ação rescisória, inclusive tratando de questão atual, que concerne à nova definição de sentença de mérito, concluindo-se pela impossibilidade de cisão formal da sentença, bem como examinou-se as principais divergências existentes no que tange às demais decisões, terminando, ainda, com uma breve abordagem do tratamento conferido à ação rescisória no anteprojeto do Código de Processo Civil. Finalmente, na quarta parte, foram feitas considerações sobre as principais questões que surgem em relação ao erro na ação rescisória à luz da doutrina nacional e italiana, bem como acerca dos erros e acertos da jurisprudência dos tribunais superiores a respeito do tema. Demonstrou-se que, para a ação rescisória por erro de fato exige-se apenas a existência de um requisito, qual seja, a ausência de controvérsia sobre ponto a respeito de que a sentença teve que se pronunciar ou teria que se pronunciar. Quanto ao erro de direito, concluiu-se que, para fins da ação rescisória, não é necessário nem que a norma seja clara, nem que a violação se dê contra a literalidade da norma, pois, dificilmente um órgão julgador irá contrariar uma norma de forma clara e frontal. / This paper addresses the error in actions for reversal of judgment, including both errors in fact and errors at law, and points out some possibly mistaken and correct understandings of legal scholars and case law on the subject. The first part of this study lays down the premises required for its other parts, beginning with a short introduction regarding jurisdictional relief and its scopes, since an action for reversal of judgment is not only a means of seeking jurisdictional relief, but also a means of revising such relief as provided by the State. Then, a brief presentation is given on the assurance of res judicata. Next, now entering the realm of actions for reversal of judgment, its second part provides an overview of their institution, setting forth the main differences between actions for reversal of judgment and other means of challenging court rulings, wherein actions for reversal of judgment are included, emphasizing the exceptional nature of the institution studied herein, precisely because such actions are a means of revising a res judicata, which enjoys constitutional protection. Its third part analyzes the subject-matter of actions for reversal of judgment, aimed at judgments on merit that have become res judicata, pointing out rulings that possibly can afford an opportunity for pursuing an action for reversal of judgment, including in dealing with a current issue, which concerns a new definition of judgment on merit, and then it concludes for the impossibility of formally splitting a judgment. It also examines the main existing divergences as regards other rulings, and it closes, furthermore, with a brief discussion of the treatment given to actions for reversal of judgment in the preliminary bill of law for the Code of Civil Procedure. Finally, in its fourth part, some comments are made on the main issues that arise in connection with errors in actions for reversal of judgment, in light of Brazilian and Italian legal scholarship, and on some mistaken and correct understandings in the case law of higher courts regarding the subject. It is demonstrated that for an action for reversal of judgment upon an error of fact, only one existing requirement is called for, namely, the absence of any dispute over a point that had to be heard, or would have to be heard, in the judgment. As for errors at law, the conclusion is reached that for the purposes of an action for reversal of judgment, it is neither necessary for the rule to be clear nor for the violation to be against the literalness of the rule, because a judging authority will hardly contradict a rule in a clear and outright manner.

Magister Psychologiae - MPsych / The aim of this research was to examine whether a significant relationship exists between ethical decision-making had an impact on HR employees within a retail organisation. The questionnaire for the South African Board for People Practices, and the Ethical Position Questionnaire was administered to a sample of 150 employees in a large retail organisation within the Western Cape - South Africa. The researcher used a non-probability sampling technique specifically, a convenience sampling approach. The results of this study indicate that there is a statistically significant correlation between moral awareness and decision-making amongst HR employees. However with regards to gender there seems to be no statistical significant relationship amongst HR employees and ethical decision-making. Similarly results also indicated that there was no significant relationship between ethical ideology and ethical decision-making. Notwithstanding the limited generalisability of this study, implications for research and practice are suggested and recommendations are made to facilitate improved functioning. / South Africa

Clinical decision rules improve health care fidelity, benefit patients, physicians and healthcare systems, without reducing patient safety or satisfaction, while promoting cost-effective practice standards. It is critical to appropriately and consistently apply clinical decision rules to realize these benefits. The objective of this thesis was to understand how physicians use the Ottawa Ankle Rules to guide radiography decision-making. The study employed a clinical judgment survey targeting members of the Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians. Statistical analyses were informed by the Brunswik Lens Model and Social Judgment Analysis. Physicians’ overall agreement with the ankle rule was high, but can be improved. Physicians placed greatest value on rule-based cues, while considering non-rule-based cues as moderately important. There is room to improve physician agreement with the ankle rule and use of rule-based cues through knowledge translation interventions. Further development of this Lens Modeling technique could lend itself to a valuable cognitive behavioral intervention.

No description available.

Decision making study has been the multi-disciplinary research involving operations researchers, management scientists, statisticians, mathematical psychologists and economists as well as others. This study aims to investigate the theory and methodology of decision making research and apply them to different contexts in real cases. The study has reviewed the literature of Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM), Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach, Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) movement, Social Judgment Theory (SJT), and Adaptive Toolbox (AT) program. On the basis of these literatures, two methods, Evidence-based Trade-Off (EBTO) and Judgment Analysis with Heuristic Modelling (JA-HM), have been proposed and developed to accomplish decision making problems under different conditions. In the EBTO method, we propose a novel framework to aid people s decision making under uncertainty and imprecise goal. Under the framework, the imprecise goal is objectively modelled through an analytical structure, and is independent of the task requirement; the task requirement is specified by the trade-off strategy among criteria of the analytical structure through an importance weighting process, and is subject to the requirement change of a particular decision making task; the evidence available, that could contribute to the evaluation of general performance of the decision alternatives, are formulated with belief structures which are capable of capturing various format of uncertainties that arise from the absence of data, incomplete information and subjective judgments. The EBTO method was further applied in a case study of Soldier system decision making. The application has demonstrated that EBTO, as a tool, is able to provide a holistic analysis regarding the requirements of Soldier missions, the physical conditions of Soldiers, and the capability of their equipment and weapon systems, which is critical in domain. By drawing the cross-disciplinary literature from NDM and AT, the JA-HM extended the traditional Judgment Analysis (JA) method, through a number of novel methodological procedures, to account for the unique features of decision making tasks under extreme time pressure and dynamic shifting situations. These novel methodological procedures include, the notion of decision point to deconstruct the dynamic shifting situations in a way that decision problem could be identified and formulated; the classification of routine and non-routine problems, and associated data alignment process to enable meaningful decision data analysis across different decision makers (DMs); the notion of composite cue to account for the DMs iterative process of information perception and comprehension in dynamic task environment; the application of computational models of heuristics to account for the time constraints and process dynamics of DMs decision making process; and the application of cross-validation process to enable the methodological principle of competitive testing of decision models. The JA-HM was further applied in a case study of fire emergency decision making. The application has been the first behavioural test of the validity of the computational models of heuristics, in predicting the DMs decision making during fire emergency response. It has also been the first behavioural test of the validity of the non-compensatory heuristics in predicting the DMs decisions on ranking task. The findings identified extend the literature of AT and NDM, and have implications for the fire emergency decision making.

Den här uppsatsen undersöker förhållandet mellan Kants estetiska omdöme, såsom det formuleras i Kritik av omdömeskraften, och Jacques Rancières estetiska projekt, framförallt i förhållande till begreppet dissensus. Dels försöker uppsatsen spåra arvet från Kant hos Rancière och visa hur detta tar sig uttryck, dels ställer den frågan om hur Kants omdöme politiseras med Rancières dissensus. Detta sker i två kapitel, varav det första är en läsning av Kants kritik av den estetiska omdömeskraften, mot bakgrund av idén om dissensus, och det andra en genomgång av Rancières formulering av dissensus, samt relaterade begrepp såsom konstens identifikationsregimer och ”fras-bilden”. Vidare jämför det andra kapitlet Rancières dissensus med Kants idé om det ”intresselösa” i det estetiska omdömet, samt visar vilka politiska eller metapolitiska implikationer Rancière tillskriver det senare. Uppsatsen visar hur Kants estetiska omdöme är oumbärligt för Rancières estetisk-politiska filosofiska projekt och att flera av hans viktigaste begrepp vilar tungt mot Kant. Den visar också, med hjälp av Rancière, på ett möjligt sätt att ge Kants estetiska omdöme politisk betydelse, delvis i motsättning till de politiska läsningar av den tredje Kritiken som främst tar fasta på sensus communis som ett vittne om en konsensuell gemenskap. Rancière visar med sina omformuleringar av Kants intresselösa omdöme att en sådan gemenskap alltid föregås av ett visst dissensus – ett brott med de dominerande formerna för den gemensamma sinnligheten. / This paper explores the relationship between Kant's aesthetic judgment, as formulated in the Critique of Judgment, and Jacques Rancière's aesthetic project, specifically the way in which the concept of dissensus is developed in the work of Rancière. The purpose of the paper is two-fold: first, to trace the legacy of Kant in Rancière and second, to pose the question of how Kant's judgment is politicized in Rancière's reading. This is discussed in two chapters, the first of which is a reading of Kant's critique of aesthetic judgment in light of the notion of dis-sensus; the second chapter examines the concept of dissensus in Rancière, as well as other related concepts, such as the regimes of art, and the 'image-phrase'. The second chapter also offers a comparison between Rancière‟s dissensus and the notion of 'disinterestedness' in Kant's aesthetic judgment, showing how Rancière draws out from the latter a set of political or meta-political implications. Ultimately, the paper serves to underline the essential role that Kant's aesthetic judgment plays in the development of Rancière's aesthetic project, examining how several of Rancière's most important concepts lean heavily on Kant for philosophical support. With the help of Rancière, the paper also provides an alternative way to give political significance to Kant's aesthetic judgment, partly in opposition to those political readings of the third Critique that primarily focus on sensus communis as a testimony of a consensual community. By way of rearticulating Kant's disinterested judgment, Rancière shows that this community is always preceded by a certain dissensus – a break with the dominant forms of a shared sensible community.

¡§Individual¡¨is the basic analytic unit in a pluralistic society. Especially, phenomenon of public affairs is essence of the problem and is based on individual cognition, hidden in group behavior. The individual cognition forms group judgment and interpersonal influence in the group. This interpersonal influence process may simplify as the power relations between group members, the communication network and the interaction form in the group, and the opinion relations within the group (French, 1956). The conflict is the essential situation of interpersonal influence and also is one kind of relational form and phenomenon for group judgment. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the interpersonal influence and conduct interpersonal mutual cooperation in the public affairs area. The group decision-making (or judgment) can be explored based on observable individual preference and group decision-making. That can infer unobservable interpersonal influence. This interpersonal influence process transforms the individual judgment into the group decision-making. There are two stages in interpersonal influence process, including opinion formation for individual members, and compromise among group members. Namely, the individual might revise his or her preference voluntarily. The group integrates the revised members¡¦ judgments into group decision-making. That is, the group process resembles the process which individual integrates multi-cues like information integration theory (IIT) (Friedkin, 2005; Sniezek et al., 1989). The average cognitive algebra pattern in IIT may measure the interpersonal influence effectively. The theories of group decision-making are still insufficient. For example, social power theory and social comparison theory explain the concept of choice shift, but not positivism. Social decision scheme (SDS) employs decision scheme to predict the group decision-making, but it is insufficient for explaining the group decision-making process. Although social dilemma explores both individual level and group level, it cannot provide the weighting method. Cognitive conflict paradigm (CCP) discusses judgment policy shift, but preference shift is still not mentioned. Although CCP focuses on interpersonal learning, it does not propose how to weight interpersonal influence. The functional measurement theory in IIT may supplement insufficiencies in these theories.. The research utilizes the concept and the method of IIT, which prodivides experimental validity for explaining the complex interpersonal influence process by using social weight. This research uses budget allocation as discussion cases. Interpersonal conflicts are divided by the cognitive conflict and the interest conflict. By using social judgment theory (SJT), this research can analyze cognitive difference in the case of cognitive conflict. Besides, using quasi-experimental procedure in IIT, the findings of this research include: 1. In the group process, group members¡¦ judgments are integrated to group decision-making based on unequal-weight rule mostly. Members¡¦ social weights are different and depend on the level of members¡¦ preferences. 2. The members in different groups have the same preferences initially. Although social weights of these members are not significant difference in statistic, these members still appear the differences between individuals. 3. In cognitive conflict case, the group consensus is not consistently accompanied by cognitive consensus. 4. The group influence results from normative social influence, rather than from informational social influence. 5. It shows that there is negative correlation between social weight and normative effect. Besides, social weight and comprise degree also show negative.correlation 6. The cognitive feedback and the outcome feedback don¡¦t affect decision-making result. 7. The relationship between social weight and the degree of satisfaction is not supported. The social weight and the fairness of decision-making process show significant correlation 8. The subjects¡¦ decision-making performances in the study don¡¦t show significant difference

Contemporary theories on frequency processing have been developed in different sub-disciplines of psychology and have shown remarkable discrepancies. Thus, in judgment and decision making, frequency estimates on serially encoded events are mostly traced back to the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Evidence for the use of this heuristic comes from several popular demonstrations of biased frequency estimates. In the area of decision making, these demonstrations led to the conclusion that frequency judgments were generally error-prone. On the other hand, in memory literature detailed computational memory models are used to explain frequency estimates. Although these models to some degree differ evidently in their specific representational assumptions, they all arrive at the basic prediction that frequency estimates should usually be quite accurate but regressed. This prediction was confirmed in numerous studies. However, up to now there have been no systematic efforts in memory literature to identify factors that cause biases in frequency judgments and to explain the demonstrations of erroneous estimates in the area of decision making. The two studies presented in this thesis pursue the questions whether memory models are able to explain errors in frequency judgments and to generate new predictions about biasing factors. In the focus of the first series of experiments is the "famous-names effect": If participants are presented with a list of names of female and male persons, then the frequency of that sex is overestimated that was represented with more famous names on the list. As more famous names are additionally recalled better, this effect was usually explained with the availability heuristic. An alternative account was suggested within the framework of the associationist-model PASS (Sedlmeier, 1999) and the multiple-trace model MINERVA-DM (Dougherty et al., 1999). According to this, the effect is primarily caused by the different pre-experimental frequencies of famous and non-famous names. If this is correct, the famous-names effect should generalize to any stimulus material. This hypothesis was tested in four experiments. The predictions of the memory models were compared with the predictions of a recall-estimate version of the availability heuristic (e.g. Watkins & LeCompte, 1991). Contrary to the predictions of all tested approaches, the participants were mostly able to judge the frequencies of the presented categories approximately correctly. The results indicate furthermore that systematic biases only occurred if the participants based their judgments at least partially on the recall-estimate strategy. However, as the participants only did this in exceptional cases the entire result pattern is explained best within a multiple strategy perspective (Brown, 2002). A re-analysis of the data from all four experiments suggests that the size of the sample of retrieved exemplars is the crucial factor for the (additional) use of the recall-estimate strategy. In the second study new predictions about the influence of associations on frequency estimates are derived from the PASS-model and tested. In two experiments words that were either strongly or weakly associated with each other were presented to the participants. Predictions of the PASS model for the frequency estimates about this stimulus material were gained by means of simulations. In a first step PASS acquired associations between the stimulus words from a large text corpus. Subsequently, the model encoded the experimental study lists. PASS expects higher frequency judgments for associated than for non-associated words. The size of this effect should be independent of the actual presentation frequencies of the words. Finally, the model expects that the frequencies of associated words are discriminated slightly worse than the frequencies of non-associated words. These predictions were largely confirmed in both experiments. The decision times required by the participants to generate their estimates indicate here that they did not base their judgments on the recall-estimate strategy. The results thus strengthen the assumption that the encoding and representation of frequency information are based on associative learning. / Aktuelle Theorien zur Häufigkeitsverarbeitung wurden in unterschiedlichen Teilgebieten der Psychologie entwickelt und weisen erstaunliche Diskrepanzen auf. So werden Häufigkeitsschätzungen über seriell enkodierte Ereignisse in der Urteils- und Entscheidungsforschung zumeist auf die Verfügbarkeitsheuristik (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) zurückgeführt. Evidenz für die Verwendung dieser Heuristik stammt aus einigen populären Demonstrationen fehlerhafter Häufigkeitsschätzungen. Diese Demonstrationen führten in der Entscheidungsforschung zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass Häufigkeitsurteile generell fehleranfällig seien. Demgegenüber wurden in der Gedächtnispsychologie detaillierte, computerimplementierte Gedächtnismodelle benutzt, um Häufigkeitsschätzungen zu erklären. Obwohl sich diese Modelle in ihren spezifischen Repräsentationsannahmen zum Teil deutlich unterscheiden, kommen sie alle zu der grundlegenden Vorhersage, dass Häufigkeitsschätzungen in der Regel recht genau, aber regrediert sein sollten. Diese Vorhersage wurde in zahlreichen Untersuchungen bestätigt. In der gedächtnispsychologischen Forschung hat es jedoch bisher kein systematisches Bemühen gegeben, Faktoren, die zu Verzerrungen in Häufigkeitsschätzungen führen, zu identifizieren und die Demonstrationen fehlerhafter Schätzungen aus der Entscheidungsforschung zu erklären. Die zwei in der vorliegenden Arbeit präsentierten Studien verfolgen die Fragestellung, inwieweit Gedächtnismodelle in der Lage sind, Fehler in Häufigkeitsurteilen zu erklären und neue Vorhersagen über verzerrende Faktoren zu generieren. Im Mittelpunkt der ersten Serie von Experimenten steht dabei der "Famous-Names Effekt": Nach der Präsentation einer Liste mit Namen weiblicher und männlicher Personen wird die Häufigkeit desjenigen Geschlechts überschätzt, das mit berühmteren Namen auf der Liste vertreten war. Da berühmtere Namen zudem besser erinnert werden, wurde dieser Effekt gewöhnlich auf die Verfügbarkeitsheuristik zurückgeführt. Eine Alternativerklärung wurde sowohl im Rahmen des assoziationistischen PASS-Modells (Sedlmeier, 1999) als auch innerhalb des Exemplarmodells MINERVA-DM (Dougherty et al., 1999) vorgeschlagen. Demnach wird der Effekt primär durch die unterschiedliche prä-experimentelle Häufigkeit berühmter und nicht-berühmter Namen verursacht. Ist diese Annahme korrekt, so sollte der Famous-Names Effekt auch auf anderes Stimulusmaterial generalisieren. Diese Hypothese wurde in vier Experimenten überprüft. Dabei wurden die Vorhersagen der Gedächtnismodelle mit den Vorhersagen einer "Recall-Estimate" Version der Verfügbarkeitsheuristik (z. B. Watkins & LeCompte, 1991) verglichen. Entgegen den Vorhersagen aller getesteten Ansätze waren die Teilnehmer in der Regel in der Lage, die Häufigkeit der verwendeten Kategorien recht gut einzuschätzen. Die Ergebnisse sprechen zudem dafür, dass systematische Fehler in den Häufigkeitsurteilen nur dann auftraten, wenn sich die Teilnehmer bei der Generierung ihrer Schätzungen zumindest teilweise auf die Recall-Estimate Strategie stützten. Da die Teilnehmer dies jedoch nur in Ausnahmefällen taten, kann das gesamte Ergebnismuster am besten innerhalb einer "Multiple Strategy Perspective" (Brown, 2002) erklärt werden. Eine Reanalyse der Daten aus allen vier Experimenten legt dabei die Schlussfolgerung nahe, dass die Stichprobengröße erinnerter Exemplare ausschlaggebend für die (zusätzliche) Verwendung der Recall-Estimate Strategie ist. In der zweiten Studie werden neuartige Vorhersagen über den Einfluss von Assoziationen auf Häufigkeitsschätzungen aus dem PASS-Modell abgeleitet und getestet. In zwei Experimenten wurden den Teilnehmern Wörter präsentiert, die untereinander entweder stark oder schwach assoziiert waren. Die Vorhersagen des PASS-Modells über die Häufigkeitsschätzungen zu diesem Stimulusmaterial wurden mit Hilfe von Simulationen gewonnen. In einem ersten Simulationsschritt erwarb PASS aus großen Textkorpora Assoziationen zwischen den Stimuluswörtern. Anschließend enkodierte das Modell die experimentellen Stimuluslisten. PASS erwartet, dass assoziierte Wörter höhere Schätzungen erhalten als nicht-assoziierte Wörter. Die Größe dieses Effekts sollte von der Präsentationshäufigkeit der Wörter unabhängig sein. Schließlich erwartet das Modell, dass die Häufigkeit assoziierter Wörter geringfügig schlechter diskriminiert wird als die Häufigkeit nicht-assoziierter Wörter. Diese Vorhersagen wurden in beiden Experimenten weitgehend bestätigt. Die Verwendung einer Recall-Estimate Strategie konnte dabei mit Hilfe von Reaktionszeitmessungen ausgeschlossen werden. Die Ergebnisse stützen damit die Annahme, dass die Enkodierung und Repräsentation von Häufigkeitsinformation auf assoziativem Lernen basiert.