In the Swedish Armed Forces there is a discussion whether the officer education is teaching the right things. The right things are often considered to be practical skills. However, the Swedish Defense University mostly teaches theoretical analyzing and critical approach. This study focuses on how well this approach is received by the Armed Forces, with their view of the officer needing practical skills. It does so through a survey sent to the officers in the ground forces, asking how the newly graduated second lieutenants are perceived by the organization. The result in this survey shows that this focus on theoretical knowledge has been perceived by the second lieutenant and the officers in the organization have trust in the graduates, both in character and knowledge. However, the lack of practical knowledge is considered dire and the first time after graduation is primarily focused on becoming an instructor which is considered the NCOs specialty. Because of this discrepancy the second lieutenants may have a hard time translating the theoretical knowledge to practical.

In this thesis, I discuss John Searles account of Intentionality which includes his theory of the Background as something which is necessary, in some sense, to there being such a thing as Intentionality. In chapter one I briefly introduce the notions of both background and normativity. In chapter two, I discuss the motives and initial rationale of Searles theory. In chapter three I discuss the philosophers he has had contact with who anticipated the Background. In chapter four I claim that Searle has always been conflicted about his theory and I diagnose the root of his conflict, namely that the original rationale required the Background to be normative in nature, but over time it was additionally conceived neurophysiologically, causally, and thus non-normative in nature. I argue that his conflict is inevitable given the irreducibility of the intentional to the non-intentional, and more generally of the normative to the non-normative.

In this thesis, I discuss John Searles account of Intentionality which includes his theory of the Background as something which is necessary, in some sense, to there being such a thing as Intentionality. In chapter one I briefly introduce the notions of both background and normativity. In chapter two, I discuss the motives and initial rationale of Searles theory. In chapter three I discuss the philosophers he has had contact with who anticipated the Background. In chapter four I claim that Searle has always been conflicted about his theory and I diagnose the root of his conflict, namely that the original rationale required the Background to be normative in nature, but over time it was additionally conceived neurophysiologically, causally, and thus non-normative in nature. I argue that his conflict is inevitable given the irreducibility of the intentional to the non-intentional, and more generally of the normative to the non-normative.

The overall aim of this thesis has been to investigate the meaning of the capability to move in order to identify and describe this capability from the perspective of the one who moves in relation to specific movements. It has been my ambition to develop ways to explicate, and thereby open up for discussion, what might form an educational goal in the context of movements and movement activities in the school subject of physical education and health (PEH). In this study I have used a practical epistemological perspective on capability to move, a perspective that challenges the traditional distinction between mental and physical skills as well as between theoretical and practical knowledge. Movement actions, or ways of moving, are seen as expressions of knowing. In order to explore an understanding of the knowing involved in specific ways of moving, observations of  actors’ ways of moving and their own experiences of moving were brought together. Informants from three different arenas took part: from PEH in upper secondary school, from athletics and from free-skiing. The results of the analyses suggest it is possible to describe practitioners’ developed knowing as a number of specific ways of knowing that are in turn related to specific ways of moving. Examples of such specific ways of moving may be discerning and modifying one’s own rotational velocity and navigating one’s (bodily) awareness. Additionally, exploring learners’ pre-knowing of a movement ‘as something’ may be fruitful when planning the teaching and learning of capability to move. I have suggested that these specific ways of knowing might be regarded as educational goals in PEH. In conducting this study, I have also had the ambition to contribute to the ongoing discussion of what ‘ability’ in the PEH context might mean. In considering specific ways of knowing in moving, the implicit and taken-for-granted meaning of ‘standards of excellence’ and ‘sports ability’can be discussed, and challenged. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: In press. Paper 4: Epub ahead of print.</p>

The overall aim of this thesis has been to investigate the meaning of the capability to move in order to identify and describe this capability from the perspective of the one who moves in relation to specific movements. It has been my ambition to develop ways to explicate, and thereby open up for discussion, what might form an educational goal in the context of movements and movement activities in the school subject of physical education and health (PEH). In this study I have used a practical epistemological perspective on capability to move, a perspective that challenges the traditional distinction between mental and physical skills as well as between theoretical and practical knowledge. Movement actions, or ways of moving, are seen as expressions of knowing. In order to explore an understanding of the knowing involved in specific ways of moving, observations of  actors’ ways of moving and their own experiences of moving were brought together. Informants from three different arenas took part: from PEH in upper secondary school, from athletics and from free-skiing. The results of the analyses suggest it is possible to describe practitioners’ developed knowing as a number of specific ways of knowing that are in turn related to specific ways of moving. Examples of such specific ways of moving may be discerning and modifying one’s own rotational velocity and navigating one’s (bodily) awareness. Additionally, exploring learners’ pre-knowing of a movement ‘as something’ may be fruitful when planning the teaching and learning of capability to move. I have suggested that these specific ways of knowing might be regarded as educational goals in PEH. In conducting this study, I have also had the ambition to contribute to the ongoing discussion of what ‘ability’ in the PEH context might mean. In considering specific ways of knowing in moving, the implicit and taken-for-granted meaning of ‘standards of excellence’ and ‘sports ability’can be discussed, and challenged. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: In press. Paper 4: Epub ahead of print. </p>

No description available.

Lacan introduit le concept de lettre dans son enseignement pour définir la direction de lacure analytique. Dans cette perspective, la définition de la lettre s’avère essentielle pour lapsychanalyse. Néanmoins, la définition de la lettre change au fur et à mesure que Lacanavance dans son enseignement. Ce changement de perspective implique une nouvelleconception de la clinique. De cette manière, ce travail propose d’étudier les différentsusages cliniques de la lettre dans l’enseignement de Jacques Lacan. Dans un premier temps,il s’agit d’un usage représentatif de la lettre. Cela implique la production des effets de sens.À ce moment-là, la lettre et le signifiant ne sont pas distingués. Cet usage de la lettre permetde définir la psychanalyse comme une pratique du bien-dire. Dans un second temps, ils’agit d’un usage de jouissance de la lettre. Cela implique la production d’une jouissancehors sens. Cette fois-ci, Lacan réussit à distinguer la lettre et le signifiant. Cet usage de lalettre permet de définir la psychanalyse comme une pratique du savoir-lire. Bien-dire etsavoir-lire désignent ainsi deux modalités d’usage de la lettre. C’est pourquoi cetterecherche a pour objectif de démontrer que la psychanalyse est une pratique de la lettre. / Lacan introduced the concept of the letter in his teaching in order to define the direction ofthe analytic cure. In this perspective, the definition of the letter is essential forpsychoanalysis. Nonetheless, the definition of the letter changed throughout the course ofhis teaching and this change of perspective implies a new conception of the clinic. As such,in this work we propose to study the different clinical uses of the letter in Jacques Lacan'steaching. Initially, it involved a representative usage of the letter, one which implies theproduction of meaning effects. At this moment, the letter and the signifier areindistinguishable. This use of the letter permits one to define psychoanalysis as a practiceof saying-well. Secondly, it involves the letters use of jouissance, which implies theproduction of senseless jouissance. This time, Lacan successfully distinguishes betweenletter and signifier. This use of the letter permits one to define psychoanalysis as a practiceof knowing-how-to-read. As such, saying-well and knowing-how-to-read designate twomodalities for the usage of the letter. The objective of this investigation is thus that ofdemonstrating that psychoanalysis is a practice of the letter.

Research by design refers to the design of architectural research as an integral part of architectural design processes. In 1980s, it emerged as a third way in design research that was dominated until then by the methods of natural sciences and humanities. With this new formulation of design research, a methodological and epistemological transformation occurs, leading to the integration of practical knowledge into architectural research. The primary epistemological question transforms from knowing what design is and knowing how to design to knowing what through the act of design. The integration of the act of design in research transforms the status of design in design research from being an object of inquiry to being a research approach. In the literature on research by design, this transformation is often related with Donald Sch&ouml / n&rsquo / s conceptualization of &ldquo / reflective practice.&rdquo / The main discussion of reflective practice is primarily methodological rather than epistemological. Although it provides methodological insights, it is not sufficient to constitute an epistemological basis for research by design. Thus, the epistemological basis of research by design has not yet been adequately defined. In this study, the notion of &ldquo / reflective practice&rdquo / is investigated in a broader context relating it to its sources in the concepts of &ldquo / tacit knowledge&rdquo / and &ldquo / action research.&rdquo / A conceptual framework for research by design is constructed by relating these concepts with the discussions on research by design and with practical philosophy, the implications of which has remained rather uninvestigated in this context. Aristotle&rsquo / s elaboration of knowledge generation in action and the concept of phron&amp / #275 / sis (practical knowledge, prudence, or practical wisdom) constitute the underpinning of this conceptual framework. The conceptual framework that is constructed on the basis of the key concepts in practical philosophy is discussed in the context of architectural design education. When architectural design education is formulated as a process of research by design within this framework, knowledge generated in the educational design processes promises not only to improve the particular educational context and architectural education but eventually to contribute to architectural knowledge.

This thesis is about the nature of proofs in mathematics as it is practiced, contrasting the informal proofs found in practice with formal proofs in formal systems. In the first chapter I present a new argument against the Formalist-Reductionist view that informal proofs are justified as rigorous and correct by corresponding to formal counterparts. The second chapter builds on this to reject arguments from Gödel's paradox and incompleteness theorems to the claim that mathematics is inherently inconsistent, basing my objections on the complexities of the process of formalisation. Chapter 3 looks into the relationship between proofs and the development of the mathematical concepts that feature in them. I deploy Waismann's notion of open texture in the case of mathematical concepts, and discuss both Lakatos and Kneebone's dialectical philosophies of mathematics. I then argue that we can apply work from conceptual engineering to the relationship between formal and informal mathematics. The fourth chapter argues for the importance of mathematical knowledge-how and emphasises the primary role of the activity of proving in securing mathematical knowledge. In the final chapter I develop an account of mathematical knowledge based on virtue epistemology, which I argue provides a better view of proofs and mathematical rigour.

No description available.