The berry industry is one of many migration corridors where migrant workers work under precarious forms of employment. The essay’s purpose is to examine different perspectives on the living and working conditions in the Swedish berry picking industry. This will be studied qualitatively, with oral history as the primary research method, by analysing inspection reports and through interviews with six informants. The informants consist of workers from The Swedish Municipal Workers' Union (Kommunal), a berry picker and a berry principal. Previous research on this topic is sparse and few have used historical and sociological perspectives to explain the phenomenon. The Thai berry pickers’ living conditions varies. Some municipalities need to execute inspections far more frequent, for the inspections to become an important mechanism of control which can exert pressure. Kommunal has since 2009 had the right to represent the Thai berry pickers and the working conditions have improved ever since. Through the collective agreement the workers are given the right to minimum-wage in addition to the piece rate. Kommunal plays an important role but are limited as few berry pickers are members of the labour union. The working hours is one area of concern where Kommunal has difficulties to act. The piece rate has given rise to intense work and the berry pickers therefore want to maximize their profits. The berry picking principals, in the competitive industry, varies in terms of seriousness but can change the industry. This responsibility has not always been adopted. / Bärindustrin är en av många migrationskorridorer, där migrantarbetare arbetar under prekära anställningsformer. Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka ett flertal perspektiv på boende- och arbetsförhållandena inom den kommersiella bärplockningen i Sverige. Detta studeras kvalitativt, med muntlig historia som huvudsaklig undersökningsmetod, genom att analysera opublicerade inspektionsrapporter samt förhållningssätt till företeelsen genom intervjuer med sex relevanta informanter. Informanterna består av anställda på Svenska Kommunalarbetareförbundet (Kommunal), en bärplockare och en bärföretagare. Forskningsläget om den kommersiella bärplockningen är begränsat och få har anlagt historiska och sociologiska perspektiv för att förklara fenomenet. De thailändska bärplockarnas boendeförhållanden varierar. Vissa kommuner behöver utföra mer frekventa inspektioner för att inspektionerna ska kunna utgöra en viktig kontrollmekanism i form av ett påtryckningsmedel.  Sedan 2009 har Kommunal haft organisationsrätt att företräda de thailändska bärplockarna och därefter har arbetsförhållandena förbättrats. Genom kollektivavtalet har alla thailändska bärplockare rätt till lagstadgad grundlön, utöver ackordslönen. Kommunal har ett viktigt ansvar men är begränsade då organiseringsgraden är låg. Arbetstiderna är ett problemområde där Kommunal har svårt att agera. Ackordslönen ger upphov till intensivt arbete och bärplockarna vill därför maximera sina inkomster. Bärföretagen i den konkurrerande branschen varierar i seriöshet men har möjligheter att påverka arbetsförhållandena. Detta medför ett ansvar som inte alltid har antagits.

The EU jurisdictional scheme, known as the “Brussels Regime”, confers competence to national courts to adjudicate over international matters. The main rule in Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation sets out that the defendant should generally be sued in the courts of the Member State where he is domiciled. For certain subject matters, the scheme allows the action to be brought elsewhere. The raison d’être is to provide an adequate counterbalance to the one-sided rule of Article 4(1). Articles 7(1) and (2) enable the claimant to launch the suit, “in matters relating to a contract”, at the court of the Member State where the contractual obligation was to be fulfilled, and, in “matters relating to tort”, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred. Whether to invoke Article 7 is entirely the claimant’s choice, but the final decision on its interpretation is vested in the Court. Thereby, the manner in which the Court views the provisions will effectively decide the extent of the claimant’s choice to invoke so-called special jurisdiction. It also means that greater emphasis on special jurisdiction will reduce the importance of the main rule in Article 4. Conversely, if the Court were to interpret Article 7 narrowly, its intended effect within the system would be denied. In both cases, the balance between Articles 4 and 7 has been upset. In the former case, the claimant is favoured because of the increased possibilities to choose the forum for the dispute, while in the latter case, the defendant is favoured because he retains the advantage of litigating in his home turf. The starting point for this essay is this very idea of a purported balance between litigants’ interests in EU cross-border litigation. The thesis analyses whether the Court’s case-law on general vis-à-vis special jurisdiction has transitioned from being generally defendant-friendly to claimant-friendly. It is argued that already from the first judgments rendered on the original Brussels Convention in 1976, increasingly more disputes have been launched at special fora, which has amounted to a claimant-friendly scheme. It is also argued that this development has been at the expense of the defendant. Greater choice for the claimant means in turn that the defendant’s ability to foresee before what courts he may be sued has been largely impaired. The thesis highlights how this imbalance is the result of inherent challenges in the Brussels Regime, particularly in relation to how the relevant connecting factors are designated. It is proposed that the unwanted effects of the Court’s practice as well as the shortcomings of the scheme itself are to be considered in the Commission’s evaluationof the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which is presently in the works.