The present Master's thesis seeks to analyze the constitutional system of the Czech Republic in the point of its bicameralism compared to the constitutional system of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic. There is a question of advantageousness of transformation into unicameral constitutional system of Czech Republic ceteris paribus. The work's hypothesis assumes the bicameral parliament states are more successful than unicameral in their economic indicators. This assumption is based on the fact being a state of law where all activities must be in compliance with law which is given by a parliament and economy of the state is determinated by the quality of the rules. This paper does not use the mainstream way of constitutinal law or political science analysis as a main method but prefer the Law and Economics (LAE) and the first mentioned is used as a part of work hypothesis only. GDP per capita is used becouse of its eligibility to be the most depictive economic indicator. Due to the lack of relevant data set World Bank statistics in US dollars of recent price level are used. The mentioned countries were chosen as the low rate of unobserved heterogenity states, decreasing the possibility of inexact analysis but these countries are different in the number of parliament houses and...

The present Master's thesis seeks to analyze the constitutional system of the Czech Republic in the point of its bicameralism compared to the constitutional system of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic. The work's hypothesis assumes the bicameral parliament states are more successful than unicameral in their economic indicators. This assumption is based on the fact being a state of law where all activities must be in compliance with law which is given by a parliament and economy of the state is determinated by the quality of the rules. This paper does not use the mainstream way of constitutinal law or political science analysis as a main method but prefer the Law and Economics (LAE) and the first mentioned is used as corrective element only. GDP per capita is used becouse of its eligibility to be the most depictive economic indicator. Due to the lack of relevant data set World Bank statistics in US dollars of recent price level are used. The mentioned countries were chosen as the low rate of unobserved heterogenity states, decreasing the possibility of inexact analysis but these countries are different in the number of parliament houses and it permits to use Difference-in-differences method (DID). The used DID is very similar to the placebo response and it helps to distinguish...

The focus of both academic and public debate on the expression of work-related conflict has long been focused on strikes. Substantial declines in collective disputes have been associated with more harmonious and less conflict-laden employment relations. This research deals with another, often forgotten form in which conflict is manifested, namely the settlement of individual conflicts through labour courts or employment tribunals. Its aim is to explore and explain differences in application rates to national judicial bodies both across countries and over time. Using a novel database on 23 European Union Member States, it is found that a substantial degree of variance exists; claim rates across Europe differ substantially, and countries have developed along different lines. The explosion of court applications is found to be exceptional, and stability or volatility is identified in the large bulk of EU Member States. In order to explain cross-sectional and time differences, the research draws on wide range of literature, develops a new procedural concept of conflict, and proposes a comparative neo-institutionalist framework accounting for both institutions and actors. The theoretical discussion elaborates three sets of arguments to predict claim incidence. First, it is argued that the existence of comprehensive collective industrial relations institutions, particularly employee workplace representation and collective agreements, tend to reduce the frequency of labour court claims. Second, the amount and complexity of employment regulation is argued to have an impact on the incidence of court applications. Finally, cyclical economic conditions and individual characteristics of the potential grievant are expected to predict the phenomenon. Empirical evidence is presented from a range of different data sources, such as national administrative data and large-scale surveys for three country case studies on France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Findings support that all three sets of explanations contribute to the explanation of the incidence of labour court claims. Moreover, data seem to confirm the need for an interdisciplinary approach drawing on different bodies of literature.

The invasive species Saltcedar is affecting water and land resources throughout the western states of America. Because of great water use capabilities and other ecosystem detriments, Saltcedar has been targeted for treatment. For successful management of Saltcedar, individual landowners need to be aware of the costs and benefits of treating Saltcedar. Eleven of the most commonly reported treatment methods were evaluated for firm level economic feasibility. Evaluated on the basis of treatment cost, treatment effectiveness, Saltcedar water-use, and re-vegetation water-use, a production plan of ten years was created for each treatment method. Some treatment methods required re-treatment and were evaluated with re-treatments most commonly found in the literature. Of the treatment methods evaluated, five treatment methods were determined to be most feasible. Landowner valuation of environmental changes in the ecosystem brought on by Saltcedar is very important in the decision of which treatment method to implement. Personal valuation, over a period of ten years, will often determine which treatment methods are most cost efficient.

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Qualquer sociedade deve decidir como serão repartidas as despesas comuns e isso tem ocorrido há milhares de anos. A partir de elementos próprios do movimento da Law and Economics, esta tese elabora uma proposta científica sobre a questão. Trata-se da democracia fiscal. Parte-se da constatação de que o direito e a economia se influenciam mutuamente numa dinâmica de constantes e infindáveis estímulos e feedbacks recíprocos, o que impede a observação da prevalência de um destes fenômenos sociais sobre o outro. Na democracia fiscal, há três fundamentos que interagem como um sistema de pesos e contrapesos, de modo que um influencie e seja influenciado pelos demais em um desejável equilíbrio. São eles: a liberdade material, a igualdade de sacrifícios e a não inibição, pelo Estado, da atividade econômica. A liberdade material se consubstancia no respeito aos direitos fundamentais da propriedade (em sentido amplo) e da livre iniciativa, cujo exercício permite ao indivíduo decidir como melhor satisfazer suas necessidades e desejos, não se submetendo, por conseguinte, aos desígnios estatais ou à caridade alheia. A igualdade de sacrifícios se revela na necessidade de que a perda de bem-estar causada pelo pagamento dos tributos seja igualmente repartida entre todos os cidadãos, o que se obtém pela aplicação dos princípios da capacidade contributiva, progressividade e pessoalidade, de maneira que a arrecadação se origine, o máximo possível, dos tributos diretos pagos pelas pessoas físicas (sobre a renda, as propriedades e as transmissões de bens em geral). É que os tributos indiretos, além daqueles pagos pelas empresas, de um modo geral, conferem caráter regressivo ao sistema de tributação. A não inibição da atividade econômica permite o incremento da arrecadação, uma vez que as exações, em geral, incidem sobre fatos e atos de cunho econômico. Assim, com mais recursos, o Estado pode melhor se desincumbir de suas missões constitucionais. Logo, a tributação não pode ser desmedida a ponto de gerar distorções mercadologias ou, pior, estimular que os contribuintes abandonem o sistema legal e passem a operar, sempre que possível, na informalidade, sendo certo que em tais hipóteses o Tesouro Público é prejudicado. / Any society must decide how the common expenses will be shared and this has happened for thousands of years. From elements of the own movement of Law and Economics, this thesis formulates a scientific proposition about this theme. Its the fiscal democracy. Starting from the basic assumption that the Law and the Economics influence each other in a dynamic of constant and no-ending stimulus and reciprocal feedbacks, this prevents the observation of the prevalence of one of these social phenomena over the other. On the fiscal democracy, there are three substances that interact like a system of checks and balances so that one influence and be influenced by the others in a likewise balance. They are: material freedom, equality of sacrifices and the non-inhibition, by the State, of the economic activity. The material freedom is about the respect to the basic rights of property (in ample sense) and free initiative, whose exercise allows to the individual decide how to better satisfy their needs and desires, not submitting themselves, wherefore, to the wills of the State and charity. The equality of sacrifices reveals itself in the needing that the loss of welfare due to the tax payment to be equally shared amongst all citizens thats obtained by applying the principles of contributive capacity, progressivity and personality in order that the origin of tax, the maximum possible, is that from the direct taxes paid by the natural persons (over the income, property and goods trades in general). Its that the indirect taxes, besides those paid by companies, usually give an indirect regressive quality to the Tax System. The non-inhibition of the economic activity allows the increase of the tax payment, once the taxes, in general, occur over economics facts and acts. This way, with more resources, State can better attain to the constitutional missions. Therefore, taxing cannot be in a way to create market distortions or, worse, stimulate that the contributors abandon the legal system and start working, always when possible, on the informality, because, in those cases, the Public Treasure is the one aggrieved.

Qualquer sociedade deve decidir como serão repartidas as despesas comuns e isso tem ocorrido há milhares de anos. A partir de elementos próprios do movimento da Law and Economics, esta tese elabora uma proposta científica sobre a questão. Trata-se da democracia fiscal. Parte-se da constatação de que o direito e a economia se influenciam mutuamente numa dinâmica de constantes e infindáveis estímulos e feedbacks recíprocos, o que impede a observação da prevalência de um destes fenômenos sociais sobre o outro. Na democracia fiscal, há três fundamentos que interagem como um sistema de pesos e contrapesos, de modo que um influencie e seja influenciado pelos demais em um desejável equilíbrio. São eles: a liberdade material, a igualdade de sacrifícios e a não inibição, pelo Estado, da atividade econômica. A liberdade material se consubstancia no respeito aos direitos fundamentais da propriedade (em sentido amplo) e da livre iniciativa, cujo exercício permite ao indivíduo decidir como melhor satisfazer suas necessidades e desejos, não se submetendo, por conseguinte, aos desígnios estatais ou à caridade alheia. A igualdade de sacrifícios se revela na necessidade de que a perda de bem-estar causada pelo pagamento dos tributos seja igualmente repartida entre todos os cidadãos, o que se obtém pela aplicação dos princípios da capacidade contributiva, progressividade e pessoalidade, de maneira que a arrecadação se origine, o máximo possível, dos tributos diretos pagos pelas pessoas físicas (sobre a renda, as propriedades e as transmissões de bens em geral). É que os tributos indiretos, além daqueles pagos pelas empresas, de um modo geral, conferem caráter regressivo ao sistema de tributação. A não inibição da atividade econômica permite o incremento da arrecadação, uma vez que as exações, em geral, incidem sobre fatos e atos de cunho econômico. Assim, com mais recursos, o Estado pode melhor se desincumbir de suas missões constitucionais. Logo, a tributação não pode ser desmedida a ponto de gerar distorções mercadologias ou, pior, estimular que os contribuintes abandonem o sistema legal e passem a operar, sempre que possível, na informalidade, sendo certo que em tais hipóteses o Tesouro Público é prejudicado. / Any society must decide how the common expenses will be shared and this has happened for thousands of years. From elements of the own movement of Law and Economics, this thesis formulates a scientific proposition about this theme. Its the fiscal democracy. Starting from the basic assumption that the Law and the Economics influence each other in a dynamic of constant and no-ending stimulus and reciprocal feedbacks, this prevents the observation of the prevalence of one of these social phenomena over the other. On the fiscal democracy, there are three substances that interact like a system of checks and balances so that one influence and be influenced by the others in a likewise balance. They are: material freedom, equality of sacrifices and the non-inhibition, by the State, of the economic activity. The material freedom is about the respect to the basic rights of property (in ample sense) and free initiative, whose exercise allows to the individual decide how to better satisfy their needs and desires, not submitting themselves, wherefore, to the wills of the State and charity. The equality of sacrifices reveals itself in the needing that the loss of welfare due to the tax payment to be equally shared amongst all citizens thats obtained by applying the principles of contributive capacity, progressivity and personality in order that the origin of tax, the maximum possible, is that from the direct taxes paid by the natural persons (over the income, property and goods trades in general). Its that the indirect taxes, besides those paid by companies, usually give an indirect regressive quality to the Tax System. The non-inhibition of the economic activity allows the increase of the tax payment, once the taxes, in general, occur over economics facts and acts. This way, with more resources, State can better attain to the constitutional missions. Therefore, taxing cannot be in a way to create market distortions or, worse, stimulate that the contributors abandon the legal system and start working, always when possible, on the informality, because, in those cases, the Public Treasure is the one aggrieved.

For several years, the literature has discussed whether a country’s particular economic circumstances should be taken into account in competition law and policy design. This thesis discusses whether economic growth should be considered as the guiding principle for Latin American Emerging Economies’ competition law and policy design. It specifically explains why having economic growth as competition policy’s guiding principle makes a difference in choosing superior rules and standards, among the large range of efficient rules. In order to explain how economic growth as a guiding principle has an impact on competition policy design, this thesis studies whether the analysis and application of the prohibitions and standards of abuse of dominance in emerging Latin American economies are appropriate, and why, having regard to economic growth, a different approach might be justified. To engage in the study of such questions this thesis centres on the regulation of dominance and the law governing abuse of dominance, in particular on predatory pricing and excessive pricing. After a careful analysis of such institutions, an optimal rule for the regulation of pricing abuses in these emerging economies is proposed. Similarly, having regard to economic growth as the policy’s guiding principle, the mainstream standards on excessive pricing and price predation are evaluated and a different approach is found to be justified. It is concluded that economic growth should be the principle guiding Latin American emerging economies’ competition law and policy design and it is demonstrated that this will grant these economies policy soundness and identity.

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en Droit (LL.D.) et à la Faculté de Droit et de Sciences Politiques de l'Université de Nantes en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur" / From its inception, intermodal transport of goods has served trade, shippers and carriers, radically increasing transactions of goods worldwide. Multimodal carrier liability rules, however, have not evolved with the same rhythm and remain fragmented cross-modally and cross-country. This is also the case of the U.S. and Canada. The need to seek uniformity of applicable rules in these two countries led us to the comparative analysis of unimodal (landocean) rules in these two countries. Guided by past failed initiatives (1980 United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport), the European intermodal reality, transport deregulation, pragmatism, fairness in the relation between the carrier and the shipper and Law & Economics principles, we used harmonization, codification and contractualism in advancing our suggestions on uniform multimodal carrier liability rules. / Dès sa naissance, Ie transport intermodal a servi le commerce, les chargeurs et les transporteurs, augmentant de façon importante le transport des marchandises au niveau mondial. Pourtant, les règles de responsabilité du transporteur multimodal n'ont pas evolué au meme rythme et restent fragmentées à travers les modes et les pays. C'est aussi Ie cas des États-Unis et du Canada. Le besoin de chercher l'uniformité des règles applicables nous a conduit à l'étude comparée des règles unimodales (terrestres-maritimes) dans ces deux pays. Guidés par l'échec des initiatives passées (Convention de Nations Unies sur Ie Transport Multimodal International des Marchandises, 1980), la réalité intermodale europeenne, la déréglementation du transport, Ie pragmatisme, la justice dans Ie rapport entre le transporteur et le chargeur et l'analyse économique de droit, nous avons utilisé l'harmonisation, la codification et le contractualisme en vue d'avancer nos suggestions sur des règles de responsabilité uniformes du transporteur multimodal.

The present dissertation evaluates the internal dynamics of a specific type of common-pool resource, an information commons. Employing a novel dataset related to more than 800,000 transactions in distinct libraries during a 10-year period (2005-2015), I address distinct questions in the fields of organizational economics, law and economics, and public economics. This dissertation contains three chapters in the format of academic papers, besides the introduction and conclusion. The second chapter evaluates the behavioral responses of library users to monetary sanctions. I exploit variation in the timing of introduction of fines in a library, as well as differences among users, in terms of fine incidence. In the case of this chapter, I report two results: first, the introduction of fines reduces users\' delays, as predicted by standard models of law enforcement. Second, when evaluating the dynamic effects of such an introduction, I uncover a result in which fines lose efficacy over time since its nominal value remains the same after instauration. The third chapter measures externalities in an information commons. I estimate the magnitude of the impacts of actions of library users who were subject to a non-monetary sanction (professors and university employees) over users who were subject to a monetary sanction (students). Additionally, I estimate peer effects among users, considering the number of items they borrow from the library. When investigating external effects, I uncover a \"crowding-out\" effect: for an additional unity in professors and employees\' counts, there is an approximate one-to-one decrease in students\' counts. In the case of peer effects, I find that a rise in the borrowings of a user\'s peer group correlates with her own borrowings, an evidence of positive peer effects. Finally, the fourth chapter explores the interplay between common-pool resources and transaction costs. In particular, I try to answer the following question: what happens when transaction costs go down in a common-pool resource setting? I exploit variation in the timing of introduction of a cost-saving technology (return boxes) and its impacts on library performance measures. Contrarily to standard arguments based on transaction costs, I find a result in which the instauration of return boxes tend, on average, to raise the probability of delays and borrowings\' effective durations. The results reported in this dissertation have important implications for theories based on common-pool resources\' management, and constitute novel empirical evidence for the areas of law and economics, public economics, and organizational economics. / A presente tese avalia a dinâmica interna de um tipo específico de recurso comum, um \"information commons\". Utilizando uma nova base de dados contendo mais de 800.000 transações ocorridas em distintas bibliotecas, ao longo de um período superior a 10 anos (2005-2015), o trabalho busca responder distintas questões relacionadas às áreas de economia das organizações, direito econômico e economia do setor público. A tese contém três capítulos, em formato de artigos, além da introdução e conclusão. O segundo capítulo da tese avalia as respostas comportamentais de usuários de uma biblioteca a sanções monetárias, ao explorar variação no timing de introdução de multas, assim como diferenças entre usuários, em termos de incidência dessas multas. No caso deste capítulo, são reportados dois resultados: em primeiro lugar, a introdução da multa tende a reduzir atrasos dos usuários, conforme previsto por modelos convencionais de cumprimento da lei. Em segundo lugar, uma análise dos efeitos dinâmicos de instauração da multa sugere que ela perde eficácia ao longo do tempo, uma vez que seu valor nominal permanece o mesmo, desde a data de instauração. O terceiro capítulo da tese apresenta estimativas das magnitudes de externalidades em um recurso comum. Neste capítulo, são estimados os impactos das ações de usuários da biblioteca sujeitos a uma sanção não-monetária (professores e funcionários) sobre usuários sujeitos a uma sanção monetária (alunos). Adicionalmente, são estimados efeitos sobre pares (peereffects), considerando o número de itens emprestados por usuários da biblioteca. A análise da magnitude de efeitos externos leva à descoberta de um efeito \"crowding-out\": para cada unidade adicional emprestada por professores e funcionários, há uma redução, na escala de um por um, nos empréstimos de estudantes. No caso de estimações de efeitos sobre pares, um aumento nos empréstimos por parte do grupo ao qual um usuário pertence é correlacionado com seus próprios empréstimos, o que constitui evidência favorável à ocorrência de efeitos positivos sobre pares, no caso. Finalmente, no quarto capítulo, explora-se a interação entre recursos comuns e custos de transação. Especificamente, busca-se responder a seguinte questão: o que ocorre quando custos de transação são reduzidos em um contexto envolvendo recursos comuns? Para tanto, explora-se a variação no timing de introdução de uma tecnologia redutora de custos de transação (caixas de devolução), assim como seus impactos sobre medidas de desempenho na biblioteca. No caso deste capítulo, tem-se um resultado onde a instauração de caixas de devolução tende, em média, a aumentar a probabilidade de atrasos entre usuários da biblioteca, assim como a duração efetiva dos empréstimos, contrariamente a argumentos baseados em custos de transação. Os resultados reportados nesta tese têm importantes implicações para teorias baseadas no gerenciamento de recursos comuns, assim como correspondem a um novo conjunto de evidências empíricas relacionadas às áreas de direito econômico, economia do setor público e economia das organizações.