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東協區域論壇對亞太安全之影響-國際建制之觀點宋國強, Sung, Kuo-Chiang Unknown Date (has links)
論文摘要
本文主要之研究在於檢驗東協區域論壇是否具有影響亞太區域安全之效能。首先藉由國際關係理論對於「安全」的闡述,筆者運用新現實主義與新自由制度主義的安全觀與對國際建制的看法,來評析東協區域論壇(ASEAN Retional Forum, ARF)對亞太安全的影響力。隨著國際關係理論的檢視過程中得知,新現實主義與新自由制度主義皆認為東協區域論壇在穩定亞太區域和平與穩定的效用不大。
其次,透過Andreas Hasenclever、Peter Mayer與Volker Rittberger在 Theories of International Regimes文章中所提出關於國際建制(International Regimes)評定的指標,其以新自由制度主義的觀點就(1)建制的「效率」(Effectiveness)指標-建制達成目標與貫徹意志的能力、對成員的影響力,以及決議的拘束力等方面;兼以(2)建制的「彈性-堅實」(Resilience / Robustness)指標-東協區域論壇對於現實事件、衝突的解決能力與成效,藉由國際建制的角度來分析東協區域論壇在建制上的完備與否,來評價東協區域論壇是否合乎所謂區域性「安全」機制的標準。 經由國際建制指標的檢視結果得知,不論在「效率」指標或「彈性-堅實」指標,皆驗證出東協區域論壇是個不健全的國際建制,並非所謂的區域性安全機制,對亞太區域安全的影響力也有限。
再者,經由對於亞太地區的主要衝突點-朝鮮半島核武問題、台海危機以及南海主權爭議等事件的討論,檢視東協區域論壇對於事件的處理、事件所做出的決議以及針對事件所發表的聲明,來評析論壇是否具有解決亞太衝突事件之功能。研究發現,東協區域論壇僅能對於衝突事件做出宣示性質的聲明,不具拘束力的決議,無法要求成員國自制,也使得論壇無法做出有效的解決,更失去了處理亞太區域安全事務的能力。
最終,歸結出東協區域論壇的缺失,以及無法有效發揮其安全建制的原因,筆者認為東協區域論壇最主要的缺失在於「制度化程度太低」以及「決議拘束力不足」,因而導致論壇缺乏安全建制的功能、議題無法被普遍討論、對衝突事件缺乏解決能力以及信心建立措施無法順利推展等問題。透過上述之討論,找出提升東協區域論壇解決事件效能之辦法,俾使其發揮安全建制之功能。
關鍵字詞:東協區域論壇、新現實主義、新自由制度主義、國際建制
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冷戰結束以來美國對中共關係定位調整之研究--社會建構主義之詮釋曹清華 Unknown Date (has links)
本論文針對冷戰結束以來的十六年間,美國政府對中共角色與關係之定位,欲探討的問題具體言之是「為什麼美國政府再一九八九年以來,對中共的關係定位會在『戰略夥伴』與『戰略對手』間發生擺盪」。本論文首先指出,理性主義雖是解釋國際關係時較慣用的工具,然而不論新現實主義、新自由制度主義均無法對此研究主題提供一套有系統的解釋;本論文繼而發現,建構主義雖承繼部分理性主義的決策模式概念,卻能對上述關係定位變動做出系統性的詮釋。
本論文共計六章:第一章通盤概述研究的動機、目的、方法,並闡明整個主題架構及限制條件。第二章勾勒出老布希、柯林頓、小布希政府對中共關係定位的變化,完成本論文的「描述分析」,作為整體論述之背景。第三章依循理性主義觀點,發現新現實主義無法解釋何以美國在「確保相對收益」的考量下會與中共採取合作;再者,按照新自由制度主義「開創絕對收益」的邏輯,卻與美國視中共為戰略對手,並陷入人權、貿易、台灣議題等爭議的情況不相符。第四章介紹建構主義的主要論點,並針對何以選定溫特的主流建構主義提出解釋,再逐一檢視建構主義的本體論、認識論、方法論、世界觀。第五章依循國際權力架構、理念等兩大參考點,驗證建構主義之解釋力。發現「亞太扇型戰略」、「多層次統一戰線」、「新保守主義」、「攻勢現實主義」等理念,是美國政府為美、「中」關係定位的重要因素。從世界觀的角度切入,如果是霍布斯的文化架構,中共會被美國視為「戰略對手」;如果是康德的文化架構,中共會被美國視為「戰略夥伴」;如果是洛克的文化架構,美國會在接觸中保持戒慎。第六章為結論,認為儘管建構主義提供一個較寬闊的解析平台,但建構主義與理性主義並非必然相斥,尋求兩個典範之整合,乃成為本研究針對後續研究所提出的建議事項之一。 / This thesis addresses an issue regarding the US Government’s identification of the Chinese role as well as the bilateral relations between the two states during the past sixteen years ever since the end of the Cold War. It deals specifically with the following question: why the US administrations since 1989 have shuttled their identification of China between a strategic partner and strategic competitor? It firstly argues that rationalism, as conventionally an explanatory tool in IR, proves insufficient to provide a set of consistent answer. Unsatisfied, this thesis continues its argument that the question brought forth at the beginning can be effectively resolved, or interpreted, by constructivism, despite the constructivist rationale may not necessarily render rational choice model utterly invalid in this case.
Structurally speaking, Chapter One gives a brief with respect to the whole thematic structure inclusive of purpose of the study mentioned above and research limitations. Chapter Two demonstrates an effort of descriptive study as a set of background information by sketching out different phases of identification about relations with China that have been harbored by successive US administrations from President Bush Sr., Clinton to Bush Jr..
Chapter Three can be seen as an account of this thesis’ trying effort to explore the question per se from the rationalist perspective. The findings in Chapter Three are as follows: Neo-realism fails to explain why the US, premised upon concern of relative gains, would have cooperation with China. Neo-liberal institutionalism, following the logic of maximization of absolute gains, is inconsistent with an answer to the question of why the US would not given in on the issues of human rights and trade deficits. The above findings are suggestive. They open up the need for this thesis to observe the Sino-US diplomatic interactions from a social perspective in IR, i.e., constructivism.
Chapter Four ushers in main points of constructivism. Two arguments are therefore in order. First, it gives a justification for the choice of the mainstream of constructivism in IR advanced by Alexander Wendt. Second, to suit the purpose of this research, it funnels the ontological, epistemological, methodological arguments, world views raised by the constructivist school and thrashes out two reference points—world power structure and ideation—for further observations.
Chapter Five brings up the main body of the argument. It argues that a series of ideas such as A Fan-mode Strategic Concept in Asia Pacific, Multi-layer United Front, Neo-conservatism and Defensive Realism have been influential on the US identification of the relations with China. They in turn strike an image of Sino-US bilateral relations reflective of three kinds of culture distinguished by constructivists. In Hobbes’ terms, China can be seen as a strategic competitor. In Kant’s, China is a strategic partner. In Locke’s, the US is engaged but remains sceptical.
Chapter Six is the concluding part. It goes beyond the phenomena and moves into the theoretical realm by arguing that, although constructivism offers a broader analytic platform, rationalism and constructivism need not be exclusive. That much room for integration of the two paradigms becomes one of the recommendations for further researches.
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Justice pénale internationale : la lutte contre l’impunité en tant qu’impératif moralMakasso, Davy Ludewic 09 1900 (has links)
La lutte contre l’impunité telle qu’elle est menée par la Cour pénale internationale est critiquée et suscite la controverse. Les actions de l’institution pénale internationale sont perçues par ses critiques comme reconduisant des formes de racisme, d’ethnocentrisme, d’impérialisme, de néocolonialisme, d’autoritarisme qui corrompent fondamentalement l’aspiration à la justice. Paradoxalement, le besoin d’une justice pénale internationale s’entend comme un impératif de paix et de justice. Ce mémoire questionne et examine les justifications d’un tel impératif moral. Il part de l’hypothèse que celui-ci est catégorique et relève d’une approche éthique déontologique. Les justifications d’une telle hypothèse découlent d’une analyse des différents contextes historiques ayant vus l’affirmation ou les ré-affirmations d’un rejet catégorique des crimes d’inhumanité (article 5 du Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale : le crime de génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité, les crimes de guerre, les crimes d’agression). Ces condamnations ont posé les bases d’une éthique de portée universelle et ont reconnu en l’humanité une communauté morale universelle. Ainsi, indifféremment des particularismes moraux et éthiques, les fondements philosophiques de la lutte contre l’impunité reposent sur un universalisme moral et l’idée régulatrice d’un contrat éthique liant la communauté des États et des peuples. Il est question d’être et de faire humanité. Dès lors, en dépit; des théories réalistes en relations internationales suggérant à la fois l’amoralité des relations inter-étatiques, des motivations prudentielles et de la rationalité instrumentale (moralité de l’intérêt), en dépit des perspectives culturalistes qui témoignent d’un pluralisme moral et éthique, nous voulons démontrer que la lutte contre l’impunité est avant tout un devoir moral universalisable (fondé sur le principe de dignité) de nature déontologique (même si cette lutte implique aussi des considérations conséquentialistes). Face à la complexité de cette problématique, notre recherche sera transdisciplinaire; et notre approche combine et le déductivisme. / The fight against impunity as conducted by the International Criminal Court is criticized and controversial. The actions of the international criminal institution are perceived by its critics as renewing forms of racism, ethnocentrism, imperialism, neocolonialism, authoritarianism that fundamentally corrupt the aspiration to justice. Paradoxically, the need for international criminal justice is understood as an imperative of peace and justice. This research examines the justifications for such a moral imperative. It starts from the assumption that it is categorical and comes from an ethical approach to ethics. The justifications for such an assumption rest analysis of the different historical contexts that have seen the affirmation or re-affirmation of a categorical rejection of crimes of inhumanity (Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes of aggression). These condemnations laid the foundations for an ethic of universal significance and recognized humanity as a universal moral community. Thus, despite moral and ethical particularisms, the philosophical foundations of the fight against impunity is based on a moral universalism and the regulating idea of an ethical contract linking the community of states and peoples. It is about being and making humanity. Therefore, in spite of; realistic theories of international relations suggesting both the amorality of inter-state relations, prudential motivations and instrumental rationality (morality of interest), despite the culturalist perspectives that testify to moral and ethical pluralism, we want to show that the fight against impunity is above all an universalizable moral duty (based on the principle of dignity) of a deontological nature (even if this struggle also implies consequentialist considerations). Given the complexity of this issue, our research will be transdisciplinary; and our approach combines inductivism and deductivism.
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