Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.

Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.

Nietzsche is a name not often invoked in relation to the topic of responsibility. This study reveals, however, that his work engages vigorously with the problem of responsibility in modernity on both the conceptual and methodological levels. In the concept of &quote; bad conscience,&quote; Nietzsche presents a " dangerous and multi-coloured " alternative to the more monochrome varieties of self-consciousness which ground theories of individual responsibility in the work of other modern philosophers, such as Locke and Kant. The complexity of Nietzsche's approach to self-consciousness allows him to shed light on the range of interconnected practices of responsibility and irresponsibility that characterize modern life. It also raises pressing questions about the possibility and conditions of philosophy in modernity. In grappling with " bad conscience" within the performative structures of his own thought, Nietzsche makes experimental use of methodological resources drawn from both the ancient and modern traditions of Western philosophy. In particular, this study examines Nietzsche's appropriation and " reinterpretation" of meditational methods which form part of the ancient philosophical " art of living," and which re-emerge in altered form, in the work of Descartes. In Nietzsche's writings, such methods are used to provoke and reflect upon the passions of " bad conscience," a dangerous practice which involves the risk of exacerbating this " illness," but which also promises to give birth to new insight and skill in confronting the problem of responsibility in modernity.

Zugl.: Osnabrück, Univ., Diss., 2006

Thesis (Ed.D.)--Teachers College, Columbia University, 1995. / Typescript; issued also on microfilm. Sponsor: Kathleen Loughlin. Dissertation Committee: Matthais Finger. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 431-463).

Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät I--Zürich--Universität, 1989. / Résumés en anglais, en français et en italien. Bibliogr. p 173-201. Index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI Company.

Thesis (Doctoral)--King's College (University of London), 1998. / BLDSC reference no.: D218276. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / Locke, Berkeley, and Hume--referred to as "the classical British empiricists"--are examined for the extent to which a doctrine, called 'imagism' by Price, played a formative role in their philosophies. Imagism as defined has two main varieties, the polemical version and the constructive version. According to the former, images are the primary symbols in thinking and all other symbols are secondary and derivative. According to the latter, thought is the manipulation of mental images. It is this latter doctrine which is demonstrated as applicable to the classical British empiricists; so far as the former doctrine appears at all, it is an aberrant doctrine.[TRUNCATED]

This thesis mainly concerns the concept of social contract with the selected authors. First, I deal with various authors and their concepts, then focuses on their comparison. This thesis has a politico-ethical character. The selected authors are Thomas Hobbes and his "Leviathan, or substance, form and power of the state ecclesiastical and political," and John Locke "Second Treatise on Government", Baruch Spinoza and his "Political debate" and "Theological-political treatise," and finally, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his work "The social contract."