Dans les années 1960, Peter Laslett fut à l'origine d'une révolution dans les études lockiennes, donnant lieu à un renouvellement de l'intérêt porté à « l'intention » de l'auteur. Ce champ ayant été largement exploré, les historiens se penchent à présent sur la question de la « réception » de la politique de Locke. Toutefois, les études traitent essentiellement de sa réception en Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis, si bien que la question de sa réception sur le Continent reste un champ vierge d'étude. On sait pourtant que Locke passa une longue partie de sa vie en exil, où il évolua dans les cercles huguenots du Refuge hollandais. C'est à leur contact que ses idées s'affinèrent et après son retour en Angleterre, ses vieux amis en assurèrent la connaissance dans toute l'Europe. Mon travail de thèse vise donc à montrer l'influence qu'exercèrent les huguenots du Refuge sur la fortune de l'œuvre politique de Locke, en analysant le rôle « d'intermédiaires » qu'ils jouèrent dans la diffusion journalistique, la traduction et l'édition de l'œuvre politique de Locke dans la République des Lettres, conjurant par là le sort vouant Locke à n'être connu qu'en Angleterre. / In the 1960s, Peter Laslett sparked some kind of revolution in Lockian studies, which rekindled an interest in the “intention” of the author. The field has been widely explored and historians now tend to focus their attention on the question of the “reception” of Locke's politics. However such studies mainly deal with the reception of Locke in England and America, leaving the field of the reception of Locke on the Continent virtually untrodden. And yet, it is a well-known fact that Locke spent great part of his life in exile, notably in Holland (1683-1689), where he moved in Huguenot circles. This allowed him to hone his ideas, and after his return to England, his good old friends took it upon themselves to spread his ideas in the whole of Europe.The aim of my doctoral thesis is to show how much the fortune of Locke's politics owes to the Huguenots of the Refuge, by studying the role of “intermediaries” that they played in reviewing Locke's works in the periodical press, in translating and editing Locke's political works in the Republic of Letters, thereby evading the ill fortune dooming Locke to being only known in England.

Le fait même de nous engager dans un projet explicatif, que nous nommons canoniquement philosophique, nous convoque à ce présupposé de l’affinité entre langage et monde. Nous proposons dans l’introduction une approche cohérentiste des systèmes philosophiques, définis comme des visions du monde où ontologie et épistémologie se doivent un support mutuel. Les positions épistémologiques de Locke, définies par son empirisme, sont juxtaposées à une conception corpusculaire de la réalité. Nous montrerons que les tensions qui existent entre ces deux positionnements sont consolidées par une attitude doxastique profondément réaliste, aboutissant à la fameuse thèse de la ressemblances des qualités primaires réelles et perçues. La science de l’époque est ainsi promue par une ligne rationaliste d’une affinité profonde entre ces catégories qui nous rendent intelligible notre environnement et la réalité même. Le naturalisme contemporain s’appuie quant à lui tout entier sur l’intelligibilité que nous avons du réel au travers de l’activité scientifique, fondant dès lors une résurgence de l’ontologie comme cet idéal d’une accessibilité rationnelle du réel, par le biais de procédures largement a priori, que nos sciences affleurent. Si les prétentions des métaphysiciens à pouvoir remplir cet objectif au moyen de préconceptions ontologiques doivent être déçues, il paraît plus juste de valoriser l’a priori mathématique qui, pace le modèle du réseau holiste de Quine, semble empiriquement incorrigible. Son efficacité ‘déraisonnable’ dans l’heuristique de nos sciences fondamentales le place en première ligne dans la constitution des différentes strates d’objectivation de notre environnement. / The very fact of being engaged in an explicative program, canonically called philosophical, calls us to this presupposition of an affinity between world and words. We propose in the introduction a coherentist approach to philosophical systems, defined as worldviews where ontology and epistemology are in charge of mutual support. In Locke’s empiricism, the epistemological line defined by his empiricism is coupled to a corpuscularist conception of reality. We’ll show that the lines of tension existing between those two positions are consolidated by a deeply realistic doxastic attitude, bringing to the famous thesis of the likeness between real and perceived first qualities. The science of that time is thus promoted by a rationalist line of a deep affinity between the categories that make our environment intelligible and the very reality. Today’s naturalism leans entirely on the intelligibility that we have of reality through scientific activities, so founding the reappearance of ontology as this ideal of rational access to reality, by means of largely a priori procedures, that our sciences flush. If the pretentions of the metaphysicians to meet those objectives have to be deceived, it seems more judicious to value the mathematical a priori which, pace Quine’s model of the seamless web of belief, seems empirically incorrigible. It’s unreasonable effectiveness in the heuristics of our fundamental sciences places effectively it in the very first line in the constitution of the different strata of objectivation of our environnement

Cette recherche porte sur le rôle joué par la lecture de Montaigne dans la philosophie de Rousseau.Il convenait d’abord de repérer les traces de cette lecture et les différents témoignages qu’en donnent son œuvre publiée ainsi que ses manuscrits, d’établir les éditions dans lesquelles Rousseau lit les Essais et les perspectives dans lesquelles il le fait. Il fallait établir également les médiations qui ont joué un rôle dans la réception de Montaigne par Rousseau. Les Essais sont édités et lus au XVIIIe siècle selon des perspectives auxquelles il ne cesse de se confronter. Nombre d’auteurs du XVIIe siècle sur lesquels il s’appuie dialoguent avec Montaigne. L’étude de la relation que Rousseau entretient avec lui demande donc l’examen de toute une tradition philosophique qui s’appuie elle-même sur Montaigne.Cette dimension de l’héritage conduit à trianguler les références, implicites ou explicites, que Rousseau fait à Montaigne dans son œuvre philosophique. Il lui sert de point d’appui pour dialoguer avec Diderot traducteur de Shaftesbury et pour prendre parti, dès le premier Discours, en faveur de la religion naturelle. La lecture politique des Essais qu’il produit nourrit son opposition à toute forme de domination et lui permet de critiquer la position de Montesquieu sur le luxe. Cette lecture politique se développe dans le second Discours, pour dénoncer les effets de l’intérêt particulier, qui détruit le lien politique. Rousseau s’appuie encore sur les principes de La Boétie qu’il trouve dans les Essais pour penser la dépravation de l’homme en société. Le lien social ne demande pas de suivre une morale opposée à l’intérêt, mais de poursuivre l’intérêt universel qui nous lie aux autres hommes. Montaigne occupe aussi une place déterminante dans le dialogue que Rousseau entretient avec des auteurs comme Barbeyrac, Mandeville ou Locke.Cette thèse montre ainsi que la référence à Montaigne met en jeu les principes fondamentaux de la philosophie politique et morale de Rousseau. / The aim of this study is to analyze the role of Montaigne’s legacy in Rousseau’s philosophy.First, evidences and views of Rousseau’s reading of Montaigne have been examined in his published works and in his manuscripts. Editions in which Rousseau was reading Montaigne have also been identified.Then, mediations between Rousseau and Montaigne’s reception have been reviewed. Rousseau reads the Essais with the 18th century points of view. He relies on 17th century authors who judge Montaigne. Therefore, thanks to this philosophical tradition who deals with Montaigne, links between Montaigne and Rousseau are analysed.The implicit and explicit references to Montaigne in Rousseau’s work are triangulated. Rousseau quotes Montaigne to deal with Diderot, – translator of Shaftesbury, to defend natural religion as early as in his First Discourse on the Sciences and Arts.Rousseau has a political reading of the Essais. He denounces all kind of domination, and criticizes Montesquieu’s apology of luxury. The political reading of Montaigne increases in the second Discourse : the possessive individualism destroys the social link.Rousseau underlines the La Boétie’s principles in the Essais, which show the political depravation of society. The social link does not demand to follow moral rules against citizen’s interests. Humanity has to pursue a universal interest, which establishes a relationship between each human being and the whole humanity.Montaigne has a central position to understand the dialogues between Rousseau and Barbeyrac, Mandeville, and Locke. Rousseau refers to Montaigne when he defends his moral and politic fundamental principles.

The present work approaches the matter of the Law of Property and its social function according to John Rawls theory of justice, having the intention to understand what the role of the property is to the author, the ways of property which are considered fair by him and, if it answers to the principles of justice and property which fitted with its social purpose. For such, it deals with, firstly, in chapter 1, the conteporary conception of law of property, which is inserted within a more humanitary, cooperative pespective of society and reciprocity, longing to a socialeconomical harmony and the effectiviness of certain human necesseties to improve the pespective of the citizens lives. Carrying on in this chapter, it is studied Locke s concept of private property to demonstrate the points where his theory disagree with John Rawls theory, thus it brings more individual view of property and it adopts a restricted conception of this right. Locke defends the unlimited accumulation of wealth, being the property turned, only, to the individual growth of the owner and to benefit the business, and then not existing a distributive and cooperative justice. Macpherson criticizes Locke s theory since it is extremely individualist. Chapter 2 aims to analyse the main ideas of Rawls theory of justice, seaching for the main and fundamental concepts so that chapter 3 is well-understood. Rawls supports the distributive justice and encourages the social cooperation. For this author, the basic liberties are inegotiable and the object of his theory is the basic structure of the society as an equitative system of social cooperation among free and iqual citizens. In order to reach this, the individuals make an agreement under the veil of ignorance to formulate the principles of justice which will run the institutions of a democratic constitutional fair society. Chapter 3 fights against the matter of the law of property for this author, a big suppoter of the distributive justice and of the social cooperation, which understands the law of property as basic good, because it helps to accomplish the expectations of the citizens lives, and it must also be capatible to the other rights and liberties which belong to a social system to provide a honored life. Rawls thought was a target for criticism by Robert Nozick, whom rescued Locke s theory of appropriation, not agreeing with the notion of distributive justice and of social cooperation, counteracting in several points to the Rawls theory of justice. However, according to the philosophers Álvaro de Vita, Will Kimlicka and Van Parijs, the defense of John Rawls theory was made, because they support the thought of this author, abova all objections shown by Nozick. Thus, the right of property must have a social mean to promote certain basic needs of the individuals, and this is clear in Rawls work so that he believes in social cooperation, in the effectiviness of human dignity, of self-respect, of self-steem and of their own citizenship, through a distributive justice. / O presente trabalho aborda a questão do direito de propriedade e sua função social a partir da teoria da justiça de John Rawls, com a intenção de compreender qual o papel da propriedade para o autor, as formas de propriedade consideradas justas para ele e, se atende aos princípios da justiça a propriedade que cumpre com uma finalidade social. Para tanto, trata-se, primeiramente, no capítulo 1, a concepção contemporânea de direito de propriedade, o qual está inserido numa perspectiva mais humanitária, cooperativa, de sociabilidade e reciprocidade, buscando a harmonia econômico-social e a efetivação de certas necessidades humanas para melhorar as perspectivas de vida dos cidadãos. Dando continuidade a este capítulo, é estudado o conceito de propriedade privada de Locke, com a finalidade de demonstrar os pontos em que sua teoria contrapõe-se à teoria de John Rawls, pois traz uma visão mais individualista de propriedade e adota uma concepção restrita deste direito. Locke defende a acumulação ilimitada de riquezas, estando a propriedade voltada, unicamente, para o crescimento individual do proprietário e para beneficiar o comércio, inexistindo uma justiça distributiva e cooperativa. Macpherson critica a teoria de Locke por ser extremamente individualista. O capítulo 2 intenciona analisar as principais idéias da teoria da justiça de Rawls, buscando-se os conceitos principais e fundamentais para que o capítulo 3 seja mais bem compreendido. Rawls defende a justiça distributiva e incentiva a cooperação social. Para este autor, as liberdades básicas são inegociáveis e o objeto de sua teoria é a estrutura básica da sociedade como um sistema equitativo de cooperação social entre cidadãos livres e iguais. Para que isso seja alcançado, os indivíduos realizam um acordo, sob o véu da ignorância , para formular os princípios da justiça que regerão as instituições de uma sociedade constitucional democrática justa. O capítulo 3 enfrenta a questão do direito de propriedade para o autor, grande defensor da justiça distributiva e da cooperação social, que entende o direito de propriedade como um bem básico, pois auxilia nas realizações das expectativas de vida dos cidadãos, devendo ser compatível com os demais direitos e liberdades pertencentes a um sistema social para proporcionar uma vida digna. O pensamento de Rawls foi alvo de crítica de Robert Nozick, o qual resgatou a teoria da apropriação de Locke, não concordando com a noção de justiça distributiva e de cooperação social, contrapondo-se em inúmeros pontos à teoria da justiça ralwsiana. Mas, com base nos filósofos Álvaro de Vita, Will Kymlicka e Van Parijs foi realizada a defesa da teoria de John Rawls, pois defendem o pensamento deste autor, acima das objeções apresentadas por Nozick. Asim, o direito de propriedade deve ter uma finalidade social para promover certas necessidades básicas dos indivíduos, e isso, percebe-se na obra de Rawls, pois ele acredita na cooperação social, na efetivação da dignidade humana, do auto-respeito, da auto-estima e da própria cidadania, por meio de uma justiça distributiva.

Dissertation in political science, C-level by Niklas Andersson, Spring Semester 2009. Tutor: Arne Larsson “The Treaty of Lisbon – The Defence against Globalization?” In the modern world globalization have undermined the nation-state and left it without the right measurements to adequately deal with the social and economic unrest that follows in its way. The states, built on contract theories, have an obligation to protect its citizens from the state of nature which seems to have failed as globalization has changed the rules. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls to identify the elements of a state and create a modern and ideal contract theory. The treaty shall then be used on the Treaty of Lisbon as it can be seen as a contract between the European states to create an entity in the shape of the European Union with the power to defend Europe from the unrest created by globalization. My question for this was as follows: Is the new treaty for the European Union acceptable as a new social contract according to the social contract theories? During my research the following criteria’s for a social contract was found: 1. A legislative branch 2. An executive branch 3. A judicial branch 4. The Right to taxation 5. A centralized educational system 6. The right to property 7. Equalizing redistribution system 8. The right to leave the contract. The first four is essential in creating a state and are the primary criteria’s for its existence while the other four is determining the character of the state that is created and are therefore not essential in the creation of the state and are consequently secondary criteria’s in a states creation. The answer to the question is no, as the Treaty of Lisbon first of all don’t give the Union the right of taxation on its citizens and secondly, the Union are not given the mandate to act for an educational or an equalizing redistributive system. Without these criteria’s the EU don’t have the possibility to quickly act on its own to deal with urgent problems that rises from the negative aspects of globalization. / Statsvetenskaplig uppsats, C-nivå av Niklas Andersson, Vårterminen 2009. Handledare: Arne Larsson "Lissabonfördraget - Försvaret mot Globaliseringen?" I den moderna världen har globaliseringen underminerat nationalstaten och lämnat dem utan verktyg för att kunna ta hand om den sociala och ekonomiska oron som följer i dess väg på ett adekvat sätt. Staterna, byggda på kontraktsteorierna har en ansvar för att skydda sina medborgare från naturtillståndet, men som nu har misslyckats i och med att globaliseringen ändrat spelreglerna. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka kontraktsteorierna av Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau och John Rawls för att identifiera beståndsdelarna för en stat och utifrån det skapa en modern idealbild av kontraktsteorin. Kontraktet ska sedan jämföras med Lissabonfördraget då de i viss mån kan ses som ett kontrakt mellan Europas stater för att skapa en enhet utifrån den Europeiska Unionen med makten att skydda Europa mot oron skapad av globaliseringen. Min fråga var följande: Är det nya fördraget för den Europeiska Unioen acceptabel som ett nytt socialt ontrat enligt de gamla kontraktseorierna? Under mon undersökning kom jag fram till följande kriterier för ett socialt kontrakt: 1. En lagstiftande instans 2. En verkställande instans 3. En lagstiftande instans 4. Rätten att beskatta 5. Ett centraliserat utbildningssystem 6. Rätten till ägande 7. Utjämnadne omfördelningssystem 8. Rätten att lämna kontraktet. De första fyra är essentiella i skapandet av en stat och de primära kriterierna för dess existens medan de övriga fyra bestämmer karaktäen på staten som skapats och är ärmed inte avgörande och är därmed sekundära kriterier. Svaret till frågan är nej, eftersom Lissabonfördraget först av allt inte ger Unionen möjligheterna till beskattning och för det andra , Unionen har inte fått madatet till att agera för ett utbildningssystem eller omfördelande ujämningssytem. Utan dessa kriterier har inte EU möjligheten att snabbt agera av egen kraft för att ta hand om brådskande problem som uppståt från globaliseringens negativa sidor.

L’histoire de la pensée des signes se caractérise par une oscillation entre définition large et étroite de son objet. Le XVIIe siècle constitue par rapport à cette histoire une période charnière, marquée par la tendance à une conception particularisante du signe, qui exclut en particulier que les idées puissent être considérées sous cette notion. Mais ce retour ne se fait pas de façon homogène. C’est en effet à cette époque qu’apparaît, au sein de la scolastique tardive, un débat majeur autour de la définition du signe, qui se formalise par l’introduction, au sein des traditionnelles taxinomies, de la division entre ‘signum formale’, qui fait écho à la tendance médiévale à inclure les concepts sous le terme de ‘signes’, et ‘signum instrumentale’, qui correspond à une définition qui remonte à Augustin, et selon laquelle le signe est exclusivement sensible, et strictement différent de la chose signifiée. Cette thèse retrace les termes de ce débat scolastique tardif à partir du commentaire au Peri Hermeneias de Sebastião do Couto, afin de montrer que le XVIIe siècle se caractérise globalement par un retour à une conception strictement instrumentale du signe, qui se libère toutefois de la référence augustinienne qui lui avait donné lieu. Se démarquant de la voie qui avait fait de la Logique de Port-Royal le texte paradigmatique de la pensée sémiotique de l’Age classique, on montrera ainsi que celle-ci se définit par une translatio, visible surtout chez Bayle, Gassendi, et Hobbes, d’un modèle linguistico-psychologique à une sémiotique régie par le paradigme du signe naturel, emblématique d’une mutation de la logique désormais ordonnée au modèle de la physique. / All along its history, semiotic has oscillated between a large and a narrow definition of its object. The 17th century is, in this regard, a pivotal period, with a trend towards a narrower construal of the term ‘sign’, which, for most authors of that time,does not apply anymore to concepts and ideas. This move however is not an homogeneous one. The first half of the century witnesses, among late scholasticism, to an important debate about the definition of ‘sign’, stirred by the introduction, among traditional taxonomies, of the division between ‘signum formale’ and ‘signum instrumentale’. The former echoed the medieval inclusion of concepts under the category of ‘signs’. The latter matches the definition of Augustine, according to which the sign is exclusively sensible and strictly different from the thing signified. The reconstruction of the terms of this late scholastic debate, which originates in Sebastião do Couto’s commentary on Peri Hermeneias, shows that the 17th century authors have tended to return to a strictly instrumental conception of signs, but one from which the traditionnal Augustinian reference is absent. In contrast with the rather common interpretation according to which the definition of signs to be found in the Port-Royal’s Logic offered the new paradigm for representation, this works argues that the semiotic thought of this period is better defined as a translatio, especially visible among Bayle, Gassendi and Hobbes, from a linguistico-pschychological model to a natural semiotics, emblematic of a new logic that has been submitted to physical science.

[pt] Esta tese dedica-se à reflexão teórica em torno do problema do indivíduo na modernidade desde a perspectiva da conjunção entre política e filosofia. Em particular, toma-se como ponto de partida o diagnóstico apresentado pela teoria do individualismo possessivo, de C. B. Macpherson, especialmente quando explicita que as sociedades políticas modernas se estruturaram a partir de uma concepção de indivíduo marcada por características possessivas. A tese objetiva demonstrar como historicamente esteve posta uma disputa teórico-política em torno dessa noção. Assim, na primeira parte, propõe-se que a leitura de Étienne Balibar em relação à filosofia de John Locke, a qual se constitui como uma das bases da teoria do individualismo possessivo, apresenta uma renovação crítica de tal teoria, pois explicita que a conjunção entre indivíduo e propriedade não se limita à teoria política e à teoria da propriedade, mas está inscrita na teoria metafísica, estruturando a própria concepção de consciência individual. Já na segunda parte da tese é analisado em que sentido as teorias contemporâneas sobre o transindividual – hipótese primeiramente formulada por Gilbert Simondon – representam uma contraposição atual a essa perspectiva sobre a individualidade, que, ao mesmo tempo, diferencia-se das críticas tradicionais do individualismo. Essa problemática também é analisada através da leitura de Balibar, a qual oferece às teorias do transindividual um necessário complemento político que não estava inteiramente presente nas versões mais estritamente ontológicas. Além disso, ao partir da filosofia de Spinoza, a interpretação balibardiana permite identificar a formulação de uma concepção alternativa sobre a individualidade contemporânea a Locke. Propõe-se que tal concepção não se baseia em características possessivas e institui um horizonte para a imaginação política frente aos desafios políticos contemporâneos. / [en] This dissertation focuses on the theoretical debate around the problem of the individual in modernity from the perspective of the conjunction between politics and philosophy. It departs from the diagnosis presented by C. B. Macpherson s theory of possessive individualism, especially when it states that modern political societies have been structured by a conception of the individual characterized by possessive qualities. The dissertation aims to demonstrate how historically a theoretical-political struggle around this notion has taken place. Thus, in the first part, it is proposed that Étienne Balibar s reading of John Locke s philosophy, which is one of the foundations of the theory of possessive individualism, presents a critical renewal of such theory, since it clarifies that the conjunction between individual and property is not limited to political theory and property theory, but is embedded in metaphysical theory, structuring the very conception of individual consciousness. The second part of the thesis analyzes how contemporary theories of the transindividual - hypothesis first formulated by Gilbert Simondon - represent a contemporary counterpoint to this perspective on individuality, which, at the same time, differs from traditional critiques of individualism. This problematic is also analyzed through Balibar s reading, which offers to the theories of the transindividual a necessary political supplement that was not entirely present in the more strictly ontological versions. Moreover, by starting from Spinoza s philosophy, the Balibardian interpretation allows the identification of the formulation of an alternative conception on individuality contemporary to Locke. It is proposed that such conception is not based on possessive characteristics and establishes a horizon for the political imagination in light of contemporary political challenges.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-15T12:50:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 434483.pdf: 1073765 bytes, checksum: ab2f37824bea5e6655d20b7030ceb05a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-10-06 / Esta disserta??o apresentada para o Mestrado em Teologia ? um registro reflexivo sobre Teologia da Toler?ncia. Com base na cristologia, eclesialidade, Teologia e pastoral, enfoca o tema a partir das premissas da Carta Sobre a Toler?ncia, de John Locke, publicada em 1689, e dos textos sagrados. Aborda a intoler?ncia religiosa causadora do surgimento de argumentos teol?gicos em apoio ? toler?ncia. Princ?pios te?ricos em defesa da toler?ncia religiosa s?o recolhidos nos contextos da separa??o entre pol?tica e religi?o, do direito ? liberdade de consci?ncia, de culto, da privacidade religiosa e das diferen?as. Sem impor uma resposta ?nica ? conduta crist?, demonstra-se, por uma hermen?utica sistem?tica, que a toler?ncia crist? supera limites hist?rico-culturais e circunst?ncias pol?tico-religiosas e que em Jesus Cristo ? poss?vel a melhor resposta para o modus vivendi crist?o em tempo de sociedade plural.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Joao Roberto Gorini Gamba.pdf: 1007112 bytes, checksum: edb9d57c6304caaf523b14a48859de66 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-06 / The present work is dedicated to the study of the property throughout a historical reconstruction of the institute according to the treatment given to it in legal, economic and social aspects, seeking to identify their philosophical foundations as well as the consequences verified by each adopted model. Initially, we looked for to expose conjectures about the origin of property in a primitive human stage and, in the following moment, pointing out the various transformations undergone by the institute since its apprehension by Roman Law until its receipt by the Napoleonic Code which, as the reading done, consolidates the property as the center of the modern legal system / O presente trabalho se dedica ao estudo da propriedade por meio de uma reconstrução histórica do instituto conforme o tratamento dado a ele nos âmbitos jurídico, econômico e social, buscando apontar seus fundamentos filosóficos, bem como as consequências verificadas por cada modelo adotado. Inicialmente, buscamos expor conjecturas sobre a origem da propriedade num estágio humano primitivo e, na sequência, apontar as diversas transformações sofridas pelo instituto desde sua apreensão pelo Direito Romano até sua recepção pelo Código Napoleônico que, conforme a leitura realizada, consolida a propriedade como centro do ordenamento jurídico moderno

This thesis traces versions of the theory of individualism by three major theorists, John Locke, John Stuart Mill and John Dewey, as they criticize existing social, cultural, economic, legal and military conditions of their times. I argue that each theorist modifies the theory of individualism to best suit their understanding of human nature, adapting it where they can and outright removing aspects where they cannot. Based upon each thinker's conception of human nature, their corresponding theory of individualism does justice to that nature. With their view of individualism, each thinker criticizes the activities of their day for its lack of justice to human nature for the bulk of humanity. I examine each thinker's concrete conditions, their theory of human nature, theory of justice and their corresponding theory of individualism. In the first three chapters, I examine first Locke's, then Mill's then Dewey's theory of human nature, justice and individualism. In my final chapter, I critically examine each thinker's theory of individualism and find that John Dewey's is most adequate for our current social conditions. Locke's individualism was a criticism of the absolute rule of aristocratic Land-owners and was an attempt to undermine the conceptual basis for their continued power. John Stuart Mill's individualism was a criticism of John Locke's individualism insofar as majoritarianism had taken root in England and resulted in the "Tyranny of the Majority." Therefore Mill gave high value to the sanctity of the individual even in disagreement with the overwhelming majority. Dewey's theory of individualism largely was a criticism of widespread poverty and abuse of political power in America during the Great Depression. laissez faire economics, combined with cut-throat competitiveness and atomistic individualism had resulted in pervasive injustice and Dewey recommended recognition of our inter-connectedness and continuity rather than our separateness. While I believe Dewey's theory of individualism to be most fit for our current social setting, even his theory suffers from problems yet to be worked out. I lay out these problems in the final chapter and conclude with remarks on what needs yet to be done.