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Šiame darbe įrodinėju tezę: Berlino dviejų laisvių perskyra pagrįsta, nes tiek praeities, tiek dabarties mąstytojų teorinei minčiai būdingi pozityviosios arba negatyviosios laisvės bruožai. I-oje dalyje pateikiu Berlino pagrindinius dviejų laisvių bruožus. Taip pat nagrinėju Berlino darbus, skirtus lygybės, istorijos filosofijos, pliuralizmo bei Apšvietos ir Romantizmo problematikai. Teigiu, jog Berlinas – negatyviosios laisvės gynėjas, mat jo filosofijoje ginama individo pasirinkimo laisvė, asmuo suprantamas kaip autonomiškas subjektas. Berlinas pasisako už vertybinio pliuralizmo idėjas, teigia, jog visiems žmonėms turi būti garantuotos vienodos galimybės. II-oje dalyje nagrinėju 3-jų žymių praeities mąstytojų laisvės sampratas, įrodinėju, jog jos turi negatyviosios arba pozityviosios laisvės bruožų. Nustatau, kad Loko teorijoje vyrauja negatyviosios laisvės nuostatos, mat autorius teigia, jog visi individai laisvi ir patys gali rinktis gyvenimo tikslus. Spinozos darbus priskiriu pozityviosios laisvės tradicijai, nes autorius teigia, jog laisvi tegali būti individai, besivadovaujantys protu. Teigiu, jog Hegelio sistema priklauso toms pozityviosios laisvės teorijoms, anot kurių asmuo gali būti laisvas tik priklausydamas politinei bendruomenei. III-oje dalyje analizuoju Berlino laisvių perskyros kritiką. Ji pateikiama XX a. Politinių teorijų kontekste: XXa. Vyksta atkaklus ginčas tarp negatyviosios (individualistų) ir pozityviosios (bendruomenininkų) laisvės atstovų. Teigiu... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / In this work I'm proving thesis: the Berlin's distinction between two freedoms is legitimate, because the attributes of positive or negative freedom are characteristic to the past thinkers' theoretical thought. In the first part I'm setting forth the main characteristics of Berlin's two freedoms. I'm also investingating the works of Berlin, which are investigating the problems of equality, philosophy of history, pluralism and Romanticism and Enlightenment. I maintain that Berlin is proponent of negative freedom, because the freedom of individual choice is protected in his philosophy, person is comprehended as autonomous subject. Berlin is proponent of value pluralism, he maintains that equal opportunities must be ensured for all. In the second part I'm analysing the concepts of freedom of three past thinkers, I'm arguing that these concepts of freedom have the features of negative or positive freedom. I'm settling that there are certain attitudes of negative freedom which are dominating in the theory of Locke: it is because author states that all individuals are free and can freely choose the ends of life. I attribute the works of Spinoza to the tradition of positive freedom, because author states that only mind following people can be free. I state, that the system of Hegel belongs to those theories of positive freedom, according to which person can only be free if he belongs to the political community. In the third part I'm analysing the criticism to the Berlin's freedom... [to full text]

Prises à la lettre et strictement appliquées par les intégristes musulmans, certaines dispositions du Coran vont à l'encontre de l'égalité entre hommes et femmes. Pour sa part, Mahmoud Mohamed Taha s'est plutôt attaché à promouvoir cette égalité non pas malgré le Coran mais en raison même d'une compréhension renouvelée du Coran. Après avoir esquissé le contexte global des relations entre islam, modernité, et droits de la personne, ce mémoire évoque les grandes lignes du modernisme musulman dans le secteur du droit pour faire ressortir le caractère original et audacieux de l'approche réformiste proposée par Taha. Cette approche sera d'abord étudiée de façon globale dans ses principes de base et ensuite dans son application au cas spécifique de l'égalité entre hommes et femmes. Puis, un parallèle entre la pensée de John Locke et celle de Taha soulignera leur enracinement commun dans le jus naturale et servira de fil conducteur pour dégager, en conclusion, la portée actuelle de l'oeuvre de Taha. / When taken literally and strictly applied by Muslim fundamentalists, sorne Koranic provisions go against gender equality. As for him, Mahmoud Mohamed Taha has endeavoured to promote that equality not in spite of the Koran but rather precisely because of a renewed understanding of it. After outlining the global context of the relations between Islam, modemity, and human rights, this dissertation evokes the main features of Islamic modemism in the field of law in order to bring out the original and bold nature of Taha's reformist approach. This approach is first studied globally in its basic principles and then in its application to the case of gender equality. After that, a parallel between John Locke's and Taha's thought shall underline their common roots withinjus naturale and lead to a conclusion assessing the actual impact of Taha's work. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (LL.M)"

If we accept the existence evil and evil people in the world, should we punish them? If so, to what extend? Are we obligated to take an evil person's life and if so, how far does our obligation go? Our inquiry begins with a look into the justifications of capital punishment through three philosophical theories: Locke's Deterrence Theory, Kant's Retributivist Theory, and Matthew Kramer's Purgative Rationale Theory. Next we will look at the economic weight of the U.S. capital punishment system. Lastly, should we accept an obligation to the death penalty, we will discuss whether or not the economic burden is worth our commitment. Our discussion will lead to a synergy of the two, one that reduces the economic burden while providing a richer purpose to capital punishment than merely killing criminals.

This thesis aims to find out the job satisfaction level in large and small enterprises by founding on Locke&rsquo / s model and to compare job satisfaction levels. Although, Locke&rsquo / s job satisfaction model includes many dimensions, it is lack of some variables, which are very important for sociology. In order to fill this gap, demographical information and status in the work place have ben added within variables. Consequently, job satisfaction levels of workers who work in large and small size enterprises in different status (white collar, blue collar) and who comes from different demographical structures have been determined / additionally, their expectations from work and their point of views about the work have been tried to understand. In order to reach these findings, a field research, which took approximately 10 months, has been conducted in a large and a small enterprise. Field research has been conducted by applying questionnaire for 64 questions to 85 people. However, some of important information about the work place has been found as consequence of depth interviews done with respondents. While social rights in large enterprises and image of the enterprise effect the job satisfaction positively, in small enterprises social environment and behavior to the workers are important. To get homogeneous answers are easy in large enterprises / because, changes like promotion, increase of salaries are done within a system and formal / which is permanent is not people but the works. However, answers and results are heterogeneous in small enterprises because works are done within informal relations by attaching to people. Whatever the size of the enterprise, as qualifications of the work and educational level increase, as expectations increase and to get satisfaction from the work becomes difficult. On the other hand, most difficult part of conducting this research in Turkey is that workers pay attention to the workplaces where they can get their total salary at right time and where they feel secure, instead of job satisfaction and most of time they think that get satisfaction from work is luxury. Field research was not only of help to this research, but also provide workers who participated to the research to think about their job satisfactions.

This thesis explores the disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy (the study of nature or body) and theology (the study of the divine) in seventeenth-century England. Early modern disciplines had two essential functions. First, they set the rules and boundaries of argument – knowledge was therefore legitimised and made intelligible within disciplinary contexts. And second, disciplines structured pedagogy, parcelling knowledge so it could be studied and taught. This dual role meant disciplines were epistemic and social structures. They were composed of various elements, and consequently, they related to one another in a variety of complex ways. As such, the contestability of early modern knowledge was reflected in contestability of disciplines – their content and boundaries. Francis Bacon, Thomas White, Henry More and John Locke are the focus of the four chapters respectively, with Joseph Glanvill, Thomas Hobbes, other Cambridge divines, and a variety of medieval scholastic authors providing context, comparison and reinforcement. These case studies offer a cross-section of seventeenth-century thought and belief; they embody different professional and institutional interests, and represent an array of philosophical, theological and religious positions. Nevertheless, each of them, in different ways, and to different effect, put the relationship between natural philosophy and theology at the heart of their intellectual endeavours. Together, they demonstrate that, in seventeenth-century England, natural philosophy and theology were in flux, and that their disciplinary relationship was complex, entailing degrees of overlap and alienation. Primarily, natural philosophy and theology investigated the nature and constitution of the world, and, together, determined the relationship between its constituent parts – natural and divine. However, they also reflected the scope of man’s cognitive faculties, establishing which bits of the world were knowable, and outlining the grounds for, and appropriate degrees of, certainty and belief. Thus, both disciplines, and their relationship with one another, contributed to broad discussions about, truth, certainty and opinion. This, in turn, established normative guidelines. To some extent, the rightness or wrongness of belief and behaviour was determined by particular definitions of, and relationship between, natural philosophy and theology. Consequently, man’s place in the world – his relationship with nature, God and his fellow man – was triangulated through these disciplines.

This research empirically investigates Locke's (1997) model of work motivation by means of quantitative research. The OCQ consisting of three tiered questionnaires was constructed based on Locke's model. OCQ-Tierl deals with core components of Locke's model. OCQ-Tier2 determines which factors caused the incidence of dissatisfaction in OCQ-Tierl. OCQ-Tier3 enables the identification of corrective actions. The OCQ was administered to financial services employees. The results were analysed and Locke's model was tested by means of structural equation modelling using the AMOS graphics programme. The results indicated that the model, suggesting causal links between components within OCQ-Tierl, could not be confirmed. A better fit was found at OCQ-Tier2 and OCQ-Tier3. In testing the causal links across the three tiers per component, the models did not fit the data for "personal actualisation" and "goal achievement". Moderate confirmation of the models was found in the case of "goal setting" and "goal behaviour" across the three tiers after some adaptations were made to the models on the basis of "modification indices", suggested by AMOS. A reasonably good fit was found for the models across the three tiers for "quality of work life". The level of correlation between factors was high because of this, and in some cases some of the factors were merged. Modification indices in the statistical output suggested that improvement was possible if covariance between error terms in the model was allowed. This suggested possible systematic sources of covariance between items not accounted for by the factors in the models. As confirmed by the Cronbach Alpha coefficients within tiers and across tiers, the general level of internal consistency was very high. Possibly response set and response style were the cause of this. This made the testing of models difficult in the present study. So too was it difficult to draw a conclusion about the internal consistency reliability of the measurement of each component across the three tiers, because the high Cronbach coefficients may to some extent be due to the indiscriminate high correlations between items / D.Litt. et Phil. (Industrial Psychology)

Nesta tese buscamos identificar uma resposta à questão sobre a formação dos conceitos empíricos à luz da lógica geral. Para responder essa questão, trabalhamos em dois caminhos. Em primeiro lugar, buscamos compreender qual é exatamente a questão que pode ser respondida no domínio da lógica geral. Para alcançar esse objetivo partimos de uma pista encontrada na Crítica da razão pura, onde Kant compara o projeto crítico com aquele desenvolvido por John Locke, e investigamos o modo como Locke explica a formação das representações gerais. Além disso, procedemos por analisar a própria noção de lógica geral em Kant, o que foi realizado, igualmente, em duas etapas: o registro histórico das influências recebidas através do Manual de Meier e a análise das Reflexões concernentes à natureza e limite da lógica geral. Realizado esse trabalho, foi possível circunscrever nossa questão inicial: à lógica geral cabe explicar a forma dos conceitos, isto é, sua universalidade. Assim, em segundo lugar, nos dedicamos à análise da distinção do que consiste propriamente a universalidade dos conceitos para Kant. Sugerimos que a universalidade dos conceitos, em oposição à singularidade das intuições, significa tomar uma representação parcial como fundamento de cognição. A hipótese desenvolvida foi, portanto, enfrentar o texto das Lições e das Reflexões sobre lógica, especificamente, no que diz respeito ao papel dos atos lógicos (comparação, reflexão e abstração), para buscar encontrar uma explicação de como surgem representações capazes de serem utilizadas pelo entendimento como fundamento de cognição. Após discutir e rejeitar uma possibilidade de interpretação encontrada na literatura, sugerimos uma alternativa para compreender o papel dos atos lógicos na geração da forma de um conceito. Defendemos, assim, que a comparação e a reflexão respondem pelas atividades de: i) representar como parte, o que não é explicado pela recepção de um objeto intuído e; ii) tomar uma representação parcial como fundamento de cognição da coisa. Por sua vez, caberia à abstração, atividade de separar representações, um papel negativo: uma vez tomada uma representação como fundamento de cognição da coisa, segue-se uma subordinação da coisa à minha representação na medida em que a penso segundo o que ela tem em comum com outras. / The aim of this thesis is to identify an answer to the question about the formation of the empirical concepts through the general logic in Kant. In order to obtain this aim, we worked on two tracks. First, we try to understand what is exactly the question which can be answered by general logic. For this, we start with a clue found in the Critique of pure reason, where Kant compares his own project with the one developed in John Locke’s work and, then, investigate how Locke explains the formation of general representations. Besides that, we proceed to analyse the Kantian notion of general logic, which is also realized in two steps: an historical approach of the influences received by the Georg F. Meier’s Auszug and the analysis of the Kantian Notes over Meier’s text on the nature and limits of general logic. Therefore, we could circumscribe our initial question: the general logic can explain only the form of concepts, namely, their generality. Secondly, we scrutinize the distinction between intuitions and concepts through the following criteria: immediacy/mediacy and singularity/generality. We suggest understanding the generality of concepts in terms of the capacity of “taking a partial representation as a ground of cognition”. So, the developed hypothesis was to look to the Kantian Notes on logic, especially its sections dedicated to the logical acts (comparison, reflection, abstraction) in order to find an explanation of the generation of general representations capable of being used by the understanding as a ground of cognition. After discussing and rejecting a possibility found in the specialized literature, we suggest an alternative to understanding the logical acts in the generation of the form of concepts. We defend, by the end, that the comparison and reflection are activities of: i) representing as partial, which cannot be explained exclusively by the reception of an object e; ii) taking that partial representation as a ground of cognition. On the other hand, the logical act of abstraction is the activity of separating representations: once we have a representation taken as a ground of cognition, it follows an activity of subordination of the thing represented according to what it has in common with others.

On peut sapercevoir, dans lhistoire de la philosophie, deux sens apparemment égaux mais réellement différents dans lemploi de lexpression sens commun. On propose de nommer sens commun naturel à lun deux et, à lautre, sens commun culturel, pour unifier raisonnablement chaque sens à lintérieur de sa pente, en considérant quil y a quelque chose de concret qui correspond à lun et à lautre, réciproquement, selon des définitions strictes. À partir de ces définitions, on étudie les rapports entre la philosophie et le sens commun, cherchant à établir jusquà quel point il sagit dune relation dantagonisme ou de dépendance, à la quête dune vraie connaissance. / Verifica-se, no correr da história da filosofia, dois sentidos próximos, mas divergentes, no emprego da expressão senso comum. Propõe-se a designação de senso comum natural para um e a de senso comum cultural para o outro, designações estas que unificam razoavelmente, dentro de suas próprias vertentes, os conceitos de senso comum e às quais corresponde algo de concreto, segundo definições estritas. A partir dessas definições, estuda-se o relacionamento entre a filosofia e o senso comum, procurando estabelecer até que ponto se trata de uma relação de antagonismo ou de dependência, na busca de um conhecimento que possa ser tido por verdadeiro.

Nesta tese buscamos identificar uma resposta à questão sobre a formação dos conceitos empíricos à luz da lógica geral. Para responder essa questão, trabalhamos em dois caminhos. Em primeiro lugar, buscamos compreender qual é exatamente a questão que pode ser respondida no domínio da lógica geral. Para alcançar esse objetivo partimos de uma pista encontrada na Crítica da razão pura, onde Kant compara o projeto crítico com aquele desenvolvido por John Locke, e investigamos o modo como Locke explica a formação das representações gerais. Além disso, procedemos por analisar a própria noção de lógica geral em Kant, o que foi realizado, igualmente, em duas etapas: o registro histórico das influências recebidas através do Manual de Meier e a análise das Reflexões concernentes à natureza e limite da lógica geral. Realizado esse trabalho, foi possível circunscrever nossa questão inicial: à lógica geral cabe explicar a forma dos conceitos, isto é, sua universalidade. Assim, em segundo lugar, nos dedicamos à análise da distinção do que consiste propriamente a universalidade dos conceitos para Kant. Sugerimos que a universalidade dos conceitos, em oposição à singularidade das intuições, significa tomar uma representação parcial como fundamento de cognição. A hipótese desenvolvida foi, portanto, enfrentar o texto das Lições e das Reflexões sobre lógica, especificamente, no que diz respeito ao papel dos atos lógicos (comparação, reflexão e abstração), para buscar encontrar uma explicação de como surgem representações capazes de serem utilizadas pelo entendimento como fundamento de cognição. Após discutir e rejeitar uma possibilidade de interpretação encontrada na literatura, sugerimos uma alternativa para compreender o papel dos atos lógicos na geração da forma de um conceito. Defendemos, assim, que a comparação e a reflexão respondem pelas atividades de: i) representar como parte, o que não é explicado pela recepção de um objeto intuído e; ii) tomar uma representação parcial como fundamento de cognição da coisa. Por sua vez, caberia à abstração, atividade de separar representações, um papel negativo: uma vez tomada uma representação como fundamento de cognição da coisa, segue-se uma subordinação da coisa à minha representação na medida em que a penso segundo o que ela tem em comum com outras. / The aim of this thesis is to identify an answer to the question about the formation of the empirical concepts through the general logic in Kant. In order to obtain this aim, we worked on two tracks. First, we try to understand what is exactly the question which can be answered by general logic. For this, we start with a clue found in the Critique of pure reason, where Kant compares his own project with the one developed in John Locke’s work and, then, investigate how Locke explains the formation of general representations. Besides that, we proceed to analyse the Kantian notion of general logic, which is also realized in two steps: an historical approach of the influences received by the Georg F. Meier’s Auszug and the analysis of the Kantian Notes over Meier’s text on the nature and limits of general logic. Therefore, we could circumscribe our initial question: the general logic can explain only the form of concepts, namely, their generality. Secondly, we scrutinize the distinction between intuitions and concepts through the following criteria: immediacy/mediacy and singularity/generality. We suggest understanding the generality of concepts in terms of the capacity of “taking a partial representation as a ground of cognition”. So, the developed hypothesis was to look to the Kantian Notes on logic, especially its sections dedicated to the logical acts (comparison, reflection, abstraction) in order to find an explanation of the generation of general representations capable of being used by the understanding as a ground of cognition. After discussing and rejecting a possibility found in the specialized literature, we suggest an alternative to understanding the logical acts in the generation of the form of concepts. We defend, by the end, that the comparison and reflection are activities of: i) representing as partial, which cannot be explained exclusively by the reception of an object e; ii) taking that partial representation as a ground of cognition. On the other hand, the logical act of abstraction is the activity of separating representations: once we have a representation taken as a ground of cognition, it follows an activity of subordination of the thing represented according to what it has in common with others.