In his defense of negative freedom, Isaiah Berlin&rsquo / s main target is the political voluntarism of enlightenment rationalism which has paved way to totalitarian and authoritarian political regimes of the 20th century which brought the sacrifice of individual freedom. For Berlin, in contrast to Platonic realism of enlightenment rationalism in which there is a substantial belief in reason&rsquo / s capacity for giving us the knowledge of the supreme good, the nominalist foundations of negative freedom can provide us a secure grounding in the justification of the rights over the goods. By declaring the inviolable rights and relying on the principle of neutrality, negative freedom eliminates the risk of political voluntarism stemming from enlightenment rationalism or scientism. Since the 1980s, in Turkey, political and social oppositions to Rousseauian enlightenment of the Turkish state have deployed the epistemic and political tools of negative freedom. This appeal has aimed to open a legitimate space for the language of freedom as non-intervention under which each individual chooses his personal values without the fear of state intervention. In contrast to the interventionist claims of state, negative freedom, it has been believed that, has provided a secure grounding for the rights of individuals. Besides, the meta-ethical thesis of the incommensurability of human goods has also been employed for delegitimizing the substantial belief in the monism of the republican regime which relied on the assumption presenting the republican way of life as the supreme good. This missionary zeal for the re-construction of the republic on the premises of negative freedom has not, however, gone unchallenged. Against such identification of democracy with free-market and value pluralism, the republican front defends the restoration of the foundational ideals of the republic by returning to the substantial understanding of national sovereignty under the formulation of &lsquo / militant democracy&rsquo / . In this study, even though I agree with the nominalist epistemology of negative freedom which manifests a skeptic and agnostic attitude toward the power of reason and the insistence of negative freedom on the necessity of the priority of right, I have demonstrated the reasons behind the failure of negative freedom in justifying the priority of the right over the goods. Actually, my analysis has already displayed that concerning the radical consequences of the thesis of incommensurability, it is doubtful whether negative freedom can provide political conditions even for the cause of peace without the presence of absolute sovereign as suggested in Hobbes&rsquo / s political theory. At this point, I have argued that we should take into consideration the achievements of the ideal of autonomy in grounding the priority of the right over the good. Contrary to Berlin&rsquo / s distorted representation of autonomy, I believe that the critical rationalism of autonomy and its understanding of law will protect us not only from the metaphysics of enlightenment rationalism and scientism, but also from the metaphysics of historicism envisaged by Berlin&rsquo / s version of negative freedom.

This dissertation investigates the relationship between religion and the state in Enlightenment Europe as articulated by John Locke, Benedict de Spinoza and Jean Jacques Rousseau. I conduct the study focusing mainly on the primary texts of the above-mentioned theorists. Locke and Spinoza conceived of toleration to be the best way in which religion and the secular state could peacefully co-exist, even though they differed considerably in their respective understanding of the concept. Locke conceived of toleration using a moderate theological framework, predominantly paying attention to freedom of worship and the separate spheres of influence for religion and the state. On the other hand, Spinoza was radically secular in his interpretation focusing mainly on the freedom of thought, speech and even the press. Rousseau provided the main alternative to Locke and Spinoza's ideas on toleration. His understanding of the most effective relationship between religion and the state revolved around the implementation of a civil religion. This would be a religion based on civil principles. Rousseau argued that good citizenship, a good lawgiver, patriotism, the doctrine of separation of powers and an elective aristocracy were important for his ideas on civil religion to function effectively. Given the context of Enlightenment Europe, this dissertation concludes that toleration, or more exactly Locke's version of it, now forms the foundation of most Western secular states. This is because it did not digress from the most important aspects of contemporary religious doctrine. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2009.

For centuries referential theories of language and meaning have dominated Western philosophy. The idea that noises and scratches become meaningful words and writing by virtue of a mental grasp one has on the referents they are talking about has become deeply entrenched. Starting with Plato, and reinvented by Locke, contemporary theorists continue to reproduce this mental fix requirement (MFR) in their philosophies of language and intentionality-Physicalists, such as Paul and Patricia Churchland are typical. Plato, Locke and the Churchlands all share the view that bits of language reach out to extra-linguistic entities by some act of mind (for Plato the mind grasped referents via the Forms, for Locke Ideas bridged the relation, and the Churchland's, brain states). In each case a self-referential mental act gets language up and running, i.e. mental connections (or representations) to referents do the trick. My question also concerns what makes squiggles and noises meaningful. The question is a nested one-ancillary to it are questions of what makes language work? How do words mean or relate to the world? How do speakers mean certain things and not others? I will approach the question from a contextualist perspective where roles in rule-governed activities are the bottom line, not representations in the mind/brain.

Enlightenment theorists like John Locke and Montesquieu were incredibly influential for the American Revolution. However, while Jean-Jacques Rousseau is widely regarded as one of the most influential Enlightenment writers in history and while his work was very influential in Europe, especially during the French Revolution, Rousseau's theories were not widely read and he is not considered a strong influence on American political theory. In this thesis, I argue that Rousseau is considered noninfluential in particular because of the conflict between his theories of communtarianism and egalitarianism and Federalist political projects that aimed to convert the United States into a large, mercantalist, international presence. Anti-Federalists were much more receptive to Rousseau's theories but were unable to commit to them fully because of their reliance on chattel slavery and his firm opposition to the institution. Finally, I argue that the tensions between early American politicians and Rousseau's theories of egalitarianism showcase the pseudodemocratic nature of early American politics and rhetoric and explain American government's oligarchic tendencies.

Diss. Universiẗat Trier, 2008.

The general distinction between uses of the term "idea" which we draw is between occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them as opposed to concepts. Locke uses "idea" in the first way, Malebranche uses it in the second. Leibniz allows that the mind is infinite and that dispositions in the body correspond to dispositions in the mind; thus he is able to maintain that idea are both concepts and dispositions in the mind. We explain concepts in terms of conventional rules, for the most part linguistic and especially mathematical. We call a system of conventional rules an objective structure and, as those who took ideas to be concepts held that they are concepts of divine science, we treat God as the unique objective structure. The question in seventeenth century theories of ideas is how that body of knowledge comprising ideas and their relations is applicable to thing. In the first four chapters, we consider concepts and the Cartesian programme to reduce the description of everything but that which applies concepts to mathematical descriptions. Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz held that the lack of simplicity and exactness in human knowledge arises from the correspondence between microscopic activities in the body and mental occurrences. With occurrences in the body explained mechanically, it was held, the world can be described with maximum simplicity and exactness. Extended things are law-obeying configurations to which concepts are applied; thinking things are rule-following things by virtue of applying these concepts. But the parts played by convention and behaviour are left out of their accounts and, omitting these, the world cannot be shown to be anything more than a diagram, perhaps portrayed only in the mind of the investigator. In the antepenultimate chapter, we discuss two related views which led the rationalists to maintain that all rational beings naturally follow a unique objective structure: their position on the correspondence between the activity of the body and occurrences in the mind (illustrated in their theories of vision) and the view that divine science is the standard for all scientific formulations. In the penultimate chapter, we present evidence that rationalist accounts of cognition were in fact modelled on rule-governed activity, Plato's theory of knowledge and Ideas is compared with rationalist accounts and is found to have less relevance to rule-governed activity, Kant, we admit, saw the relevance of rules, but no more than the rationalists. In the ninth chapter, we discuss Malebranche's vision in God (which most clearly presents ideas as concepts), its relation to Descartes' and Leibniz's positions and its dependent on occasionalism. In the fifth chapter, we argue against Chomsky's innatist position and, more generally, claims in the behavioural and social sciences to explain human knowledge in terms of internalized components and covert activities. It is also maintained that Chomsky's innatism bears little resemblance to that of seventeenth century rationalism. We discuss in the sixth through the eighth chapters the Scholastic back-ground to the use of the term "idea" and theories of ideas. In the sixth chapter, the pervasive influence of Suarez is established, as is the prevalence of nominalism in the seventeenth century and its connection with Gaszendism and eventually Locke. Suarez combined aspects of Thomism and nominalism, Thomism was concerned with so-called spiritual objects of knowledge, which roughly act as standards and are the contribution of the knower to what is known; rationalism's account of knowledge maintained these aspects of Thomism, nominalism, on the other hand, presented what we shall call a causal or genetic account of knowledge (according to which our knowledge arises from causal relations and operations of the intellect) and was concerned with so-called material objects got from sensation (while allowing for spiritual operations). The distinction between spiritual and material objects and faculties is introduced in the sixth chapter. In the seventh chapter, we discuss the bridge between these facilities, the intellectus agens, which served as an objective structure in Thomist accounts. In the eight chapter, we discuss uses of “spiritual”, “idea” and “mind”, beginning with Scholastic uses, but concentrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi. Locke's causal account is discussed in the final chapter. We emphasise his divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his reliance on mental dispositions. Locke's position suffers from the omission of concepts.

No description available.

Orientador: Profª. Drª. Maria Isabel Limongi / Dissertaçao (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Paraná, Setor de Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Defesa: Curitiba, 27/03/2013 / Inclui referências : f. 64-65 / Área de concentração: Historia da Filosofia Moderna e Comtemporânea / Resumo: Pretendo, neste trabalho, analisar a formação de conceitos na construção do sistema moral de Hume atrás de um debate entre o autor escocês e três representantes de sistemas morais distintos. Respectivamente John Locke e sua moral demonstrativa, Francis Hutcheson e a moral sentimentalista e por fim Thomas Hobbes e a moral egoísta. Hume elaborou um sistema moral inédito, mas não podemos desconsiderar que suas críticas e elogios a outros filósofos morais são fundamentais na constituição de seu projeto sobre as ações morais. Propomos neste trabalho, elencar três concepções distintas às quais Hume recorre para justificar seu ataque à tradição moral racionalista, às relações de ideias encontradas no Ensaio sobre o entendimento humano de John Locke. Focaremos esse ponto da teoria moral lockeana, pois Hume pretende provar que a moral não é passível de demonstração aos moldes da matemática, conforme pretendia Locke. Em seguida apresentaremos o elogio de Hume conferido aos sentimentalistas morais. Tomamos como representante da presente corrente Francis Hutcheson. Hume adota o moral sense e o rearranja conforme sua concepção própria. Por fim, apresentamos a moralidade em Thomas Hobbes, que é egoísta. Notamos que com essa conversa entre Hume e nossos filósofos escolhidos os papéis da razão e das paixões são recolocados de modo original para a época. Depois de expormos as teorias desses três filósofos, e de posicionarmos Hume, estruturando dessa maneira a sua edificação sobre a moralidade, pretendemos demonstrar como para a Hume a moral é regulada e podemos alcançar, a partir da própria natureza humana, juízos morais estáveis. / Abstract: I intend in this work to analyze important concepts in the construction of Hume's moral system behind a debate between the Scottish author and three representatives of different moral systems. Respectively John Locke and his moral demonstrative, Francis Hutcheson and moral sentimentalist and finally Thomas Hobbes and his selfish moral. Hume developed a novel system of morality, but we can not ignore that his criticisms and compliments the other moral philosophers are fundamental in the constitution of his Project. We propose in this paper, listing three different conceptions of which Hume uses to justify his attack on the moral rationalist tradition, on the relation of ideas found in the Essay concerning human understanding by John Locke. We will focus this point of Lockean moral theory, since Hume intends to prove that morality is not susceptible to molds demonstration of mathematics, as intended Locke. Then, we present the praise given to Hume's moral sentimentalists. We take this as representative of the current Francis Hutcheson. Hume adopts the moral sense and rearrange as your own design. Finally, we present morality in Thomas Hobbes, that is selfish. We note that this conversation between Hume and our philosophers chosen the roles of reason and the passions are replaced so original for its time. After exposing the theories of these three philosophers, and position ourselves Hume, thus structuring your edification about morality, we intend to demonstrate how Hume morality is regulated and can achieve from the very human nature, stable moral judgments.

Orientador: Martha Rosa Pisani Destro / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-11T13:38:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Batista_GustavoAraujo_D.pdf: 1579436 bytes, checksum: cddc80f045bbe9d4440dbf238f7eff50 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo : Este trabalho é uma síntese feita a partir de uma pesquisa bibliográfica de filosofia comparada da educação, desenvolvida sobre dois tipos de pensamento pedagógico, elaborados, respectivamente, por John Locke (1632-1704) e por Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778); nessa pesquisa faz-se uma leitura de suas propostas pedagógicas à luz teórico-metodológica do materialismo histórico-dialético. Procurou-se contextualizar historicamente os dois autores abordados, com o intuito de demonstrar em que medida as rupturas e as permanências geradas pelas contradições nas infraestruturas econômicas das sociedades de suas respectivas épocas interferiram nas superestruturas políticas, filosóficas, intelectuais, religiosas e pedagógicas e, conseqüentemente, em suas trajetórias existenciais e em suas obras. Dividindo-se em três capítulos, no primeiro discorre-se sobre a contextualização histórica dos dois filósofos estudados, passando-se em revista os Séculos XVII e XVIII em seus vários aspectos, assim como nele se faz uma descrição acerca das biografias e das personalidades desses autores; no segundo incumbe-se de abordar os pensamentos lockeano e rousseauniano como um todo, ressaltando-se as principais categorias pelas quais seus autores estruturam e articulam as suas idéias acerca do conhecimento, da política, da religião e da tolerância; no terceiro aborda-se algumas categorias pedagógicas desses pensamentos, as quais, comparadas entre si, têm o intuito de aclarar as convergências entre os seus dois autores, ao mesmo tempo em que se procura ressaltar a influência que este recebe daquele em se tratando de constituir o seu pensamento pedagógico; também nesse capítulo são explicitadas as visões de mundo e de homem nas quais esses autores enquadrar-se-iam, assim como são tratadas outras categorias que permitem vincular os seus pensamentos não apenas entre si, mas sim às classes sociais para as quais suas obras constituem significado / Abstract : This work is a synthesis done from a bibliographical research of compared philosophy of education, developed about two kinds of pedagogical thinking, done, respectively, by John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778); in that research one does a reading of their pedagogical proposals by the theoretical-methodological light of the historical-dialectical materialism. One looked for doing historically a context about the two authors approached, with the aim of showing in what measure the ruptures and the permanencies produced by the contradictions in the economical infrastructure of the societies of their respective eras interfered into the political, philosophical, intellectual, religious and pedagogical superstructures and, consequently, into their existential trajectories and into their works. Being divided into three chapters, in the first one discusses about the historical context of the two philosophers studied, passing on review the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries in their several aspects, as well as in this it is done a description concerning the biographies and personalities of those authors; in the second one undertakes to approach the lockean and rousseaunian thoughts at all, standing out the main categories by which their authors structure and articulate their ideas concerning knowledge, politics, religion and toleration; in the third one approaches some pedagogical categories of those thoughts, that, compared to one another, have the aim of clearing the convergences between their two authors, at the same time on which one looks for standing out the influence that this receives from that in regarding of constructing his pedagogical thinking; also in this chapter are made explicit the visions of world and man into which those two authors would be fitted, as well as are treated others categories that permit to link their thoughts not only each other, but so to the social classes to which their works make meaning / Doutorado / Historia, Filosofia e Educação / Doutor em Educação

This study investigates monstrous representations through gender and body in the two fantasy tv-shows Locke & Keyand The Witcher. The aim of the study is to examine how these representations move beyond the gender and body binary and how this creates meaning for its audience. To highlight these monstrous representations this study focuses on two characters from each series, Dodge and Yennefer. As a methodological approach this study uses a thematic analysis as well as a modified trans reading and four themes have been identified in the material: the ambivalent and ambiguous monstrosity, the variable body and gender, the perfect monstrosity, and human monsters. To analyze these themes the study will operate within the framework of monster theory as well as research surrounding trans and crip. The research concludes that gender and body, through the monstrous, is in constant motion and that monstrous embodiment is made through difference where all bodies and genders are changeable and fluid.