Spelling suggestions: "subject:"logical positivist""
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Language, necessity and convention : reconsidering the linguistic approach to modalityNyseth, Fredrik January 2018 (has links)
This thesis is an examination of the linguistic approach to modality (also known as 'linguistic conventionalism') - i.e. the view that necessity is to be explained in terms of the linguistic rules that we have adopted. Drawing on an investigation into the history of this approach, I argue against the currently prevalent attitude that it can be dismissed as misguided. The aim, however, is not to argue that the linguistic approach is correct, but, more modestly, to put it back on the table as an interesting and viable research program. The thesis is divided into three parts. In part A, I articulate a conception of the commitments of the approach based on the ideas that influenced it, how it emerged and developed in the work of the logical positivists, and, in particular, the role it was meant to play in "making a consistent empiricism possible". Next, in part B, I defend the core ideas of the approach against various objections. Notably, I consider the objection that truth cannot be "created" by convention, the objection that necessities cannot be explained in terms of contingencies, and the objection that determining what the linguistic conventions are, unlike determining what the modal facts are, is a straightforwardly empirical matter. In part C, finally, I turn to objections which purport to show that there are limits to what can be explained in terms of linguistic convention. Specifically, I consider whether we need to assume a non-conventional distinction between admissible and inadmissible linguistic rules, a non-conventional consequence relation, or a non-conventional starting-point in order to get the linguistic approach off the ground. An overarching question is whether we are forced to take some logic for granted in a way which would undermine the explanatory ambitions of the approach. I argue that some of the prominent objections rely on misunderstandings, that some can be answered head-on, and that some point to genuine challenges and constraints which put pressure on the linguistic approach, but do not warrant a wholesale rejection of the view. Instead, they point to areas where further work is needed.
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Disclosure of a son's homosexuality : a social constructionist perspectiveFirst, Lorian 05 1900 (has links)
This dissertation explores one family's experience of a son's disclosure of homosexuality,
through the use of a second-order cybernetic epistemology, and social constructionist theory.
Second-order cybernetics enables a description of patterns and themes that recursively connect
the family's ideas and behaviour. Social constructionism enables the family's reaction to disclosure
to be recursively linked to their fit with wider society. By using semantic and political frames
of reference to describe the family's narratives around disclosure, this study indicates that
disclosure is a relational metaphor, dependent on the family's locally co-constructed and
transgenerational meanings. It also shows that although the family change with disclosure,
stability is regained in a way consistent with the family's rules and norms. This study therefore
demystifies viewing disclosure in one way only and creates alternative ways of conceptualising
it. / Psychology / M.A. (Clinical Psychology)
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Physicalism, intentionality, mind : three studies in the philosophy of mind.Prior, Stephen January 1977 (has links)
Thesis. 1977. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND HUMANITIES. / Vita. / Includes bibliographies. / Ph.D.
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Carnap e a natureza da lógica / Carnap and the nature of logicTranjan, Tiago 28 January 2010 (has links)
Em The Logical Syntax of Language (1937) R. Carnap elabora o seu Princípio de Tolerância Lógica. Trata-se de um princípio lógico-filosófico de grande alcance, que condensa as posições mais consistentes do autor acerca do significado filosófico da pesquisa em lógica formal. A despeito do fracasso do projeto geral de uma filosofia sintática, esse princípio permaneceu como base de todo o pensamento posterior de Carnap. Mais do que isso, influenciou boa parte do melhor trabalho realizado em lógica até hoje, tendo deixado marcas duradouras sobre a filosofia analítica. Neste trabalho, buscamos examinar a origem do Princípio de Tolerância no pensamento de Carnap, como melhor caminho para estabelecer seu significado e implicações. / In The Logical Syntax of Language (1937) R. Carnap develops his Principle of Tolerance in Logic. This is a far-reaching principle for the whole philosophy of logic, and which sums up Carnaps most consistent tenets concerning the philosophical meaning of research in formal logic. Despite the failure of the general project of a syntactical philosophy, the Principle of Tolerance remained the basis for the whole of Carnaps subsequent thought. Moreover, it proved influential in a good deal of the most important work done in logic to this day; it also left permanent traces in analytic philosophy. In this work, we aim at examining the origins of the Tolerance Principle in Carnaps thought, as the best way to establish its significance and implications.
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Sellars in Context: An Analysis of Wilfrid Sellars's Early WorksOlen, Peter Jackson 01 January 2012 (has links)
Although Wilfrid Sellars's work holds a prominent place in recent analytic philosophy, little work has been done to situate his early approaches to normativity and the philosophy of language in their proper context. What little work has been done tends to emphasize Sellars's connection to a then dominant logical empiricism at the expense of marginalizing other American philosophical schools. On top of this historical issue, most scholars attempting to explain Sellars's systematic philosophy tend to ignore a developmental picture of Sellars's positions and focus on explicating the systematic character of his thought. My dissertation attempts to correct both of these tendencies by offering a historically situated account of Sellars's early papers that presents his views in relation to logical empiricism, the "Iowa School" of philosophy as embodied in Gustav Bergmann's and Everett Hall's writings, and some aspects of traditional American philosophy. By fleshing out the context of Sellars's early papers, it becomes clear that the "strong" normativist project present in his later essays developed out of his shift from his attempt to fit "traditional" philosophical problems into a formalist approach to language. My thesis acts as a "correction" to the previous interpretive points by presenting a more complex characterization of the contextual influences on Sellars's early papers and creating a foundation for a developmental account of Sellars's later views. I do this by examining evidence from Sellars's unpublished correspondence and works from a myriad of archival sources in conjunction with an analysis of his early publications.
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Der Begriff der Wissenschaft im logischen PositivismusHaeberli, Hans. January 1955 (has links)
Thesis-Zürich. / Without thesis statement. "Literaturverzeichnis": p. 170-172.
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Der Begriff der Wissenschaft im logischen PositivismusHaeberli, Hans. January 1955 (has links)
Thesis-Zürich. / Without thesis statement. "Literaturverzeichnis": p. 170-172.
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Examining the Verificationist Theory of Meaning / Examinando la teoría verificacionista del significadoPizarro, Aranxa 10 April 2018 (has links)
This paper purports to analyze the verificationist theory of meaning proposed by logical positivism. According to this theory, only sentences verifiably by means of empirical observation have meanings. Our purpose is to show the reasons why the verificationist theory collapses. In order to do so, we will examine both the internal and external critiques to it. Among the internal critiques, we will show the logical positivists’ failed attempts to formulate an adequate weak verification criterion. Among the external critiques, we will focus on the ones formulated by J.L. Austin on the basis of his theory of performative utterances. / El presente trabajo busca analizar la teoría verificacionista del significado propuesta por el positivismo lógico. De acuerdo a esta teoría, solo los enunciados verificables por medio de la observación empírica tienen significado. Nuestro propósito es mostrar las razones por las cuales la teoría verificacionista del significado colapsa. Para ello, examinaremos tanto las críticas internas como externas. En las críticas internas mostraremos los intentos fallidos de los positivistas lógicos en formular un criterio de verificación débil adecuado. En las críticas externas nos centraremos en las formuladas por J.L. Austin a partir de su teoría de los enunciados realizativos.
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Carnap e a natureza da lógica / Carnap and the nature of logicTiago Tranjan 28 January 2010 (has links)
Em The Logical Syntax of Language (1937) R. Carnap elabora o seu Princípio de Tolerância Lógica. Trata-se de um princípio lógico-filosófico de grande alcance, que condensa as posições mais consistentes do autor acerca do significado filosófico da pesquisa em lógica formal. A despeito do fracasso do projeto geral de uma filosofia sintática, esse princípio permaneceu como base de todo o pensamento posterior de Carnap. Mais do que isso, influenciou boa parte do melhor trabalho realizado em lógica até hoje, tendo deixado marcas duradouras sobre a filosofia analítica. Neste trabalho, buscamos examinar a origem do Princípio de Tolerância no pensamento de Carnap, como melhor caminho para estabelecer seu significado e implicações. / In The Logical Syntax of Language (1937) R. Carnap develops his Principle of Tolerance in Logic. This is a far-reaching principle for the whole philosophy of logic, and which sums up Carnaps most consistent tenets concerning the philosophical meaning of research in formal logic. Despite the failure of the general project of a syntactical philosophy, the Principle of Tolerance remained the basis for the whole of Carnaps subsequent thought. Moreover, it proved influential in a good deal of the most important work done in logic to this day; it also left permanent traces in analytic philosophy. In this work, we aim at examining the origins of the Tolerance Principle in Carnaps thought, as the best way to establish its significance and implications.
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Terence Hutchison's 1938 contribution to economic methodologyHart, John Slater, 1954- 28 February 2002 (has links)
Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing
positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given
Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It
might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in
Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical
positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical
positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean
philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude
on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of
Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction
between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he
introduced Popper into economics.
This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is
resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In
the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the
positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to
which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis
we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the
inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist,
approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement
Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position
that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather
than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics.
Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical
positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to
evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we
highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay
pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)
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