Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The end of the Cold War and the September 11th 2001 attacks changed the strategic environment of the world. New socio-political realities increased the use of armed forces. The War on Terror brought the necessity of expeditionary warfare even to countries whose security doctrine had been so far exclusively focused on territorial defense. Poland is one such country. Throughout Polish history, there have been no expeditionary operations. New requirements after 1999 generated the necessity for reforms in Armed Forces of Poland. Since expeditionary warfare has never been practiced by Polish Army before, the reform process needs to be strongly coordinated with such military forerunners as the US Army. The thesis presents a study of contemporary war and its effects on force structure. It also shows how the US Army has reacted to the changing character of warfare. Such reforms as the Stryker Brigades, Army XXI and "Army After Next" program are analyzed in order to assess which of these solutions can be used in Polish Army reforms. The current capabilities of the Polish Army are also assessed in order to judge the background for military reforms in Poland. Finally a recommendation for reforms in Polish Army is made. / Captain, Polish Army

This thesis is about the conflict between participation and bureaucracy. This conflict is illustrated by a case study within the Swedish Armed Forces under the activity that preceded the 1996 Resolution on Defence. More closely it focuses on the decision-making process that led to the Swedish Armed Forces report that were handed over to the Government in March 1996. In this decision-making process the Supreme Commander tried different ways to create participation among all the high- ranking officers, from local up to Headquarters level, to make them participate in the process. The thesis answers the question if it is possible to create participation in a bureau­cratic organisation such as the Swedish Armed Forces, and the conclusion that I draw is that participation is hard to establish. First there is a conflict within the bureaucratic form itself, since a bureaucracy implies a diversification of assignments and responsibilities in different functions and at different levels in a hierarchy. Every level has its own task to fulfil and this states how reality is to be understood. In the Swedish Armed Forces the bureaucratic structure is reinforced by the fact that the officer is promoted to a higher rank after his or her military training. Both the bureaucratic structure and the military training will lead to a differentiation between individuals, and they will be placed in different skills and status levels within the organisation. Besides this, individuals will gather information mostly from their own level, which will further fortify the difference between the levels. Furthermore there are also individual factors connected to the bureaucratic structure that have shown to complicate participation. For example individuals choose not to participate since they experience that they lack necessary competens for the task, that they do not have time, that they have not been consulted or that they consider the task to be solved at a higher level. So even if the military decision-making model encourages and advocates partici­pation, there is a big difficulty to break the bureaucratic design. Leaders often show inability to go from a bureaucratic leadership style to a democratic one. At the same time the subordinate support their leaders when they act as a traditional leader. / digitalisering@umu

Abstract A matter of fact that modern Revolution Military Affairs (RMA) results from the rapid development of ability of computer calculation and new development of information revolution, navigation satellite systems, network for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, sensor, reconnaissance (C4ISR), Precision-guided munition with basis of information technology society. It also means that those developments as mentioned above will be one of the most important key points for controlling the advantage of information technology society to get the victory in the battlefield in next century. Moreover, it is also the key point for ARMY to develop military forces. When accurate guiding weapons develop, amounts of computer-controlling and electronic systems are instead of manpower, it means that Total War, like Consumptive War and Continuative War are abdicated, and C4ISR will become the main fighting concept in the future. This is a kind of fighting style to take ¡§Benumbing War¡¨ as the fighting principle, and take ¡§Home-thrust Strike¡¨ and ¡§Simultaneous Strike¡¨ to execute the so-called ¡§Surgical Strike¡¨ to benumb the enemies rapidly and correctly and make them lose their ability and opportunity to fight back, finally the volition of the enemies will be demoralized to lose the wars soon. RMA not only subverts the fighting principles set from 17th and 18th century, but also makes sure the unshakable position for modern RMA indirectly. Moreover, it will lead the military discourses and profound influences in the next ten to twenty years. The findings from the research are as followed: 1. The definition for traditional battlefield is changed. 2. There is no difference between the usual time and the war time. 3. Information technology fighters control the battlefields. 4. To centralize and strike the fighting center of the enemies. 5. To cut down the command hierarchies for armed forces. Members of ARMY should give up egoism and think about partnership among related organizations with unselfishness again while being in such a rapidly aggressive period. Keywords: Revolution Military Affairs (RMA), ARMY, Total War, Battle doctrine

This research is about using the term ¡§realism¡¨ to study on the relationship across the Taiwan straits. After the Gulf War, Mainland China has started the revolutions in military affairs. Their think of military strategy was from ¡§Conquer Limited Way¡¨ to ¡§Conquer High Technology Limited Way¡¨. The People¡¦s Liberation Army has become more modernized, buying fighter planes, missiles, on board radar, electronic war equipment from foreign countries, and they also have developed J-10 fighters, mid and long range ballistic missile. The People¡¦s Liberation Army will finish the first step of the revolutions in military affairs in 2005, by that time SU-27 and SU-30 will be fully capable for combat. J-10 will began mass production and then Mainland China will have the ability to assault Taiwan. The military power will become unbalance across the Taiwan Straits. When the revolution in military affairs is completed by People¡¦s Liberation Army, People¡¦s Liberation Army will be fully trained for combat, which includes electronic warfare equipment, Air Combat Command, fighter planes, pilots, on-board equipment, missile etc. With the economic take-off Mainland China has increased their defense budget every year. Under this condition the military power can decide the stabilization of the Taiwan Strait. In order to balance the power military of People¡¦s Liberation Army, Taiwan has to purchase long range detect radar, electronic equipment and PAC III missile. According to the view of ¡§security dilemma¡¨ both side of Taiwan Strait have to purchase modern weapons from foreign country to defence itself, this in turn drives to arm race. So Taiwan has to use its advantages, such as the quality of pilot and performed fighter planes. to face the People¡¦s Liberation Army. For national security Taiwan should concern on the mid and long term Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) and long term weapon development program.

Military strategy is in serve to national interests, which is the basic idea underpin this research. The subject of this thesis is ¡§Military Strategy of People's Liberation Army (PLA) toward Taiwan. The context of this thesis divided into six chapters: 1.Motivation, methodology, framework, target of this research and the definition of military strategy. 2. The change of world system and how it impacts the national interests of Mainland China.3.The national strategies of Mainland China.4. Analyzing the military strategies and actions which might be undertaken by PLA to attack Taiwan.5. The strategies of Taiwan's national military strategy against PLA is¡§effective deterrence and strong defense posture¡¨6.Perspective of the Taiwan's future national security .the damage control from Taiwan in the eventual military activities against PLA will be to strike the enemy before it reached the Taiwan's coast.

The Gulf War showed the world how powerful the modern military forces are, and it caused the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) led by U.S. government. Due to the advance of technology, RMA is a chain reaction of changes, on the doctrines, training, organizing and operational methods. Both PLA and its traditional strategic thought of ¡¨People War¡¨ are not able to keep out of impacts brought by RMA, to against High Tech War in the future. Thus, PLA brings this slogan¡¨ RMA with Chinese Characteristics¡¨ in, and devotes itself into military reform, in order to reach the goal of¡¨ Winning High Tech Local War¡¨. PLA hopes to accelerate its step for constructing military information platform, and, at the same time, to reinforce army mechanization. In the end, PLA wants to be as strong as U.S. troops in the year of 2050. In the age of Chinese Reform, Chinese economy is growing incredibly fast, and this economic power turns and pours into its military budget, for constructing modern army forces and transforming military structure. It is obvious to observe, especially taking Chinese Navy¡¦s strategy which changed from¡¨ coastal defense¡¨ to¡¨ offshore defense¡¨ and the pinpoint¡¨ consolidating naval and air supremacy and executing strategic counter attack¡¨ in China¡¦s White Paper on National Defense for two examples, China is seeking to expand its naval capability and to realize its plan for modernization, in order to reach the goal of 2050. PLA Navy (PLAN) understands that there is a huge gap between Chinese Navy and U.S. Navy, however, but they believe that they can make it up through RMA. This essay discusses the influence on modernization for PLAN from 4 aspects, which are: technology and weapon, regime, operational theory, and training, and also analysis relations between PLAN¡¦s modernization and cross-strait security.

The growth and prevalence of the private military industry has led many to conclude that the state has outsourced one of its core functions: public security. As a global non-state actor, PMSCs pose a risk to state sovereignty by undermining the democratic legitimacy of armed forces and challenging the states international monopoly over force. This study, using the tripartite model in English school theory, refutes this commonly held belief by examining the regulatory methods that have brought PMSCs squarely under state control. This study organizes regulatory efforts in a three level concept of national, international and self-regulatory methods, and based on the increased national regulatory methods, mixed with international norms and weak self-regulation, concludes that states maintain their primacy over violence in world politics.

This work examines what constituted 19th century American military science, why it was framed within government policy and taught within the United States Military Academy, and how it became the early American way of war. The work uses as evidence a wide array of documents including biographical records of 2046 West Point graduates. It tracks the evolution of military science from Enlightenment Europe to the United States during the American Revolution and its relative obscurity until after the War of 1812. It then explains why a deliberate decision was made to transplant a French Napoleonic version of military science to serve as the curriculum of the military academy and to support the formulation of a national defense policy that called for militarized coastal frontiers and an “expansible army.” The work then follows how and why military science was modified during the period 1820-1860 in response to changes to the threats to the United States, changes related to state and federal plans for “internal improvements,” Indian wars, westward expansion, war with Mexico, and advances in military technology. Specifically it tracks how the doctrine of military science evolved from the teaching of specific Napoleonic applications to embrace subjects needed for war in North America. Inculcation in this American military science eventually came to provide the army with an officer corps that shared a common all-arms doctrine and common skill in using mathematics for military problem-solving. The majority of long-service graduates went on to spend years of their career fulfilling general staff, engineering, or academy instructor functions. The proliferation of military science through their work, and through published texts available to state volunteers, ensured that on the eve of the Civil War there existed a distinctly American, and scientific, way of war. This work challenges two late 20th century liberal arts revisionist schools, championed by Samuel Huntington and Russell Weigley, that have unfairly reduced military science to near oblivion. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2012-05-28 10:47:55.375

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The most up-to-date definition of Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) is defined by military an-alysts as the role of technology in transforming military affairs. Despite the amount of literature on how RMA impacts great powers the significance of RMA for small states is limited. Is RMA suffi-cient and suitable to define a change in small states security strategies? The purpose of this study is to analyze to what extent RMA can be traced in Swedish strategy implementation after applying Francis Domingo’s theory of small states security strategies. The method used in this essay is a case study that analyses to what extent RMA can be found and proven by using the strategy implementation factors defined in Domingo’s theory. The result of this study shows that only two out of four strategies can prove RMA in Sweden’s implementation of security strategies. The result gives reason for criticism due to Domingo’s the-ory’s inability to trace and prove RMA and its implication in a small state’s security strategies.